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Abstract
Between 1981 and 1991 manufacturing employment in London declined by just under 
50%, a loss of over 325,000 jobs. Relative to Great Britain, the employment
performance of London’s industry has been poor in the extreme. Much previous
research has addressed the issue of urban manufacturing decline, and a variety of
competing explanations have been put forward to explain the general observation that
cities have been losing manufacturing at an extremely fast rate relative to small towns
and rural areas. Despite the wealth of literature that exists, much remains unknown
about what is actually happening to London’s manufacturing and also why London’s
industrial jobs are being lost in such a severe and consistent manner. This thesis
explores the dimensions of manufacturing employment change in London over the
1980s, highlighting some important processes which have characterised and
underpinned industrial change. It does so in relation to a set of local authority land use
planning policies which have attempted to protect manufacturing jobs. Using survey
based methods, the thesis shows that while many borough planning authorities have
explicitly pursued these policies over the 1980s, the majority believe that they have not
been successful in protecting manufacturing jobs. Through an examination of a variety
of different indicators of change, the thesis uncovers the empirical context within which
planning policies have operated over the 1980s. It shows that the experience of
manufacturing change in the capital is not only one of decline and that contradictory and
inconsistent trends appear to have taken place. The thesis demonstrates that many of
these inconsistent trends may be reconciled with respect to changing labour
productivity, which provides a useful perspective on the nature of manufacturing change
in the capital. Through the use of econometric techniques and data analysis, the thesis
shows that labour productivity in London is characterised by a highly waged, and highly
skilled manufacturing sector, with an overall low ratio of labour to capital. The thesis
argues that labour productivity growth encapsulates a variety of processes which offer
sound reasons for the lack of success of employment protection policies.
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Chapter 1 : Introduction.
1.0 introduction.
The increasing dominance of service sector employment in the London economy, which 
has accelerated so acutely over the 1980s, has been profoundly influenced by the severe 
absolute and relative loss of manufacturing jobs within the capital. Approximately 50% 
of London’s manufacturing employment was shed between 1981 and 1991, some
325.000 jobs. Research already exists which has explored the dimensions of 
manufacturing employment change in London, yet much remains unknown about what 
is actually happening to London’s industrial base, particularly regarding the processes 
which underpin such extreme and consistent job loss, and also why London’s 
performance stands out from national change in this respect. This thesis investigates 
London’s manufacturing employment change in relation to a set of local authority land 
use planning policies which have attempted to protect manufacturing jobs. Through 
examination of a variety of different sources of evidence on manufacturing change in 
the capital, it is shown that contradictory and inconsistent trends appear to have taken 
place over the 1980s. The thesis demonstrates that many of these inconsistent trends can 
be reconciled with respect to changing labour productivity, and that this in turn offers an 
important insight into the nature of industrial manufacturing employment change in 
London, and is of critical importance in understanding the role of manufacturing in the 
London economy today. The thesis also argues that the analysis of labour productivity 
offers sound reasons for the lack of success of London land use planning policies aimed 
at protecting manufacturing jobs. If extended to other contexts, analyses of changing 
labour productivity could have far reaching implications for the understanding of spatial 
differences in the employment performance of industry.
1.1 The subject of the thesis.
The thesis explores two broad themes related to change in the London manufacturing 
sector over the 1980s. It is concerned with employment change in manufacturing 
industries in the capital and with the processes which have underpinned this change, 
particularly with regard to labour productivity growth. Additionally, the different facets
11
of manufacturing change are examined within the context of local authority land use 
planning controls which have attempted to protect manufacturing jobs. This dual approach in 
the thesis is a feature of the development of the research and it is worth briefly tracing the 
steps that shaped the scope of the final research.
Initially, it was intended that the thesis should study the effects of two particular deregulation 
measures made to the planning system in the 1980s on London’s manufacturing employment 
change.1 During the course of the research however, and particularly through analyses of the 
London manufacturing employment change data, it became apparent that the planning 
deregulation of interest was unlikely to have had a significant influence on London’s 
manufacturing employment change. Most importantly, the loss of manufacturing jobs in 
London over the 1980s was so remarkably severe that the task of isolating specific land use 
deregulation effects would have been extremely difficult, as well as potentially unrewarding. 
This is because much of the data required to analyse the effects of the changes did not exist, 
and bodies such as the London Planning Advisory Committee(LPAC) who had attempted 
similar research in the past had warned that it would be a particularly difficult task given that 
the borough planning authorities would only be able to provide limited help.
The thesis then moved to consider the role of land use planning in a slightly wider context. It 
became apparent that London’s local planning authorities (LPAs) were well aware of the 
scale of manufacturing job loss that had taken place over the eighties and that many 
authorities had developed policies to ‘protect’ manufacturing jobs through the use of land 
use regulation. These policies have been pursued through the development control system, 
where planning authorities have adopted a restrictive stance towards changes of use from 
manufacturing land and buildings, in the hope of retaining the employment opportunities 
offered by industrial use. The examination of these types of planning policies held 
considerable attraction for two main reasons. First, because they represented a direct reaction 
to the observed trend of manufacturing job loss. Second,
1 In the initial research proposal, the thesis sought to explore influences on manufacturing employment change 
that may have arisen from the introduction of the business use class (B l) under the Town and Country 
Planning (Use Classes) Order 1987 and the extension of permitted development related to this class under The 
Town and Country Planning General Development Order 1988. Although the specific focus on these changes 
was abandoned, for reasons cited in chapters three and five, they still form an important component o f the 
thesis research.
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because it seemed that despite the severity of employment decline land use planning 
controls could be of critical importance in manufacturing change, particularly given that 
many of the existing theoretical perspectives had emphasised the importance of space 
constraints and ‘crowding out’ in urban manufacturing change; processes it seemed that 
planning may be able to exert some influence over. In essence, the major change in the 
nature of the research as it progressed was that it moved from seeking to determine what 
the influences of planning regulations on employment change were, to a consideration 
of how planning policy had responded to manufacturing job loss, and why it had been 
so unsuccessful.
A survey was prepared which addressed these issues and was sent to the 33 LPAs within 
the Greater London conurbation. The results, presented in chapter five, were extremely 
interesting, however, perhaps the most consistent and important LPA response was that 
serious constraints existed on the extent to which any difference could be made to 
manufacturing employment loss. The LPAs felt that job change was created by the 
‘market’ and not by planning policy, and the processes underpinning manufacturing 
employment loss were largely outside the scope of LPA control. On the basis of the 
survey results, a decision was taken to shift the focus of the remaining chapters of the 
thesis away from policy, and to ask what was actually happening to manufacturing in 
London. The boroughs believed that they could not exert a significant influence on 
manufacturing employment decline, and thus, to focus on planning policy alone and to 
play down the importance of processes underpinning manufacturing change would be 
unlikely to uncover the unique nature of job loss in the capital’s industry, nor the 
reasons for the lack of success in employment protection. It therefore seemed logical to 
explore the empirical context within which policy operates, and to draw out implications 
on this basis. From this point on, the research sought to determine the dominant 
characteristics of manufacturing change in London over the 1980s, with a view to 
understanding the remarkable scale of job loss, as well as to developing sound reasons 
for the lack of success of planning policy.
It should be stressed here that the planning content of this thesis is not regarded as 
subservient to other themes and forms a central component of the final research. The 
concern with land use planning, and with employment protection policies, has much
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substantive and theoretical relevance as is shown in chapter three. However, it can also 
be considered as an approach to the issue of what is actually happening to London’s 
manufacturing. For example, the thesis will show how research questions arose through 
consideration of land use and planning aspects of employment change, and that 
subsequent empirical analyses could be placed within this context, providing a useful 
basis to reflect upon the potential implications of empirical results. In addition, the 
results of the LPA survey are extremely interesting in themselves and answer a number 
of research questions as well as posing additional question for further consideration.
Two main related objectives of the thesis may therefore be defined. First, to examine the 
dominant characteristics of manufacturing industry and its change in London over the 
1980s which have been instrumental in creating the severe and consistent loss of 
employment. Second, to explore the planning authority response to manufacturing 
employment decline in the capital, and to obtain evidence on the success or otherwise of 
LPA policy.
Through this second objective, the research discovered that high labour productivity 
characterises London’s manufacturing in the 1980s, and much space in the thesis is 
subsequently devoted to this observation. As mentioned in section 1.0, one of the main 
reasons for the focus on labour productivity is that it offers a means by which many of 
the contradictory and inconsistent trends in London’s manufacturing may be reconciled. 
Perhaps more importantly, the thesis shows that this process has had a critical influence 
on the nature of London’s manufacturing employment decline over the 1980s. Previous 
studies of London’s manufacturing change, and indeed most mainstream economic 
geography research, has paid slight attention to the issue of spatial differentials in 
productivity. Yet differences between areas in their rates of growth of labour 
productivity offer a crucial dimension in explaining variations in employment change, 
and this may be particularly true of the urban case. It is the contention of this thesis, that 
in ignoring this issue, previous London research has omitted a component which is of 
central importance in explaining manufacturing employment decline.
It is worth stressing one final issue concerning the broad scope of the thesis. The aim 
here is to describe and analyse change in the London manufacturing sector and the
14
implications for land use planning policy. Many of the research findings must be 
relevant to the employment opportunities and changing social fortunes of London 
employees, however, this thesis does not attempt to address the social implications of 
manufacturing employment decline or of labour productivity growth.
1.2 Methodological approach of the thesis.
Specific research methodologies, such as survey based methods and econometric 
modelling, are used in this thesis to answer research questions or to test hypotheses. 
These types of methods are described in the appropriate places in the text, or in 
appendices referred to in the text, and do not require detailed description here. It is 
however worth making clear at this stage the main thrusts of the methodological 
approach.
The thesis is empirical and largely of a quantitative nature, although qualitative issues 
are addressed particularly in relation to planning policy. The thesis uses aggregate data 
sets and survey based techniques to investigate land use regulation and manufacturing 
change in London over the 1980s. In a philosophical sense, empirical research of this 
type is often associated with the doctrine of logical positivism, which seeks to firmly 
establish knowledge on a verifiable basis through the testing of hypotheses based on 
factual statements, and may also seek to make “empirical generalisations, statements of 
a law like nature which relate to phenomenon that are empirically recognisable.” 
(Johnston, 1986,11) Johnston points out that in geographical research, and in social 
science research generally, many empirical analysts regard the systematic description of 
quantitative research as ‘positivist’ as an inaccurate classification since in many cases 
such research will not seek to produce Taws’ in the same way that it might in natural 
science. Furthermore, quantitative methods are also used by researchers within other 
philosophical positions.
Of the four broad schools of empiricism, positivism, humanism, and structuralism that
Johnston (1986) describes, much of the research in this thesis would be most closely
associated with positivism since it focuses largely on observable and testable 
j phenomena. However, the methodological development of the research did not strictly
15
adhere to the philosophical bounds prescribed in logical positivism. The thesis 
employed a methodological strategy which it was anticipated would allow for the 
research questions to be addressed in a meaningful way given time and resource 
constraints. It is worth outlining the methodological development of the research and the 
decisions that had to be made in this respect.
The thesis is partly concerned with the use of land use planning regulations to protect 
manufacturing jobs in London over the 1980s. The first methodological issue to be 
resolved concerned the appropriate spatial focus of the research. The thesis addresses 
urban rather than regional change. As will be made clear in chapter two, the city is 
thought to be the principal focus of manufacturing decline and the thesis draws upon 
this specific context of intra-regional change to explore the operations of land use 
planning. Much previous literature has emphasised the issue of urban deindustrialisation 
and has provided sound theoretical reasons for assuming that land use planning controls 
could make important differences in the urban setting. A regional perspective was not 
adopted in this thesis, principally because the emphasis was placed on exploring the 
relationship between land use planning controls and urban manufacturing decline in 
detail, rather than to highlight the importance of broader geographical differences. That 
is not to imply that a regional perspective would have been deficient in any way, but 
simply, that it would have involved asking very different questions and would have 
required a very different research focus.
For the analysis of the Greater London area, two main geographical strategies were 
considered. First, to attempt a full coverage of all boroughs within the Greater London 
area, and second, to focus on specific areas within the capital. The first option was 
chosen for three main reasons. First, because it would allow for comprehensiveness and 
diversity and difference of urban circumstance to enter into the results obtained. The 
scale and complexity of London was an issue the research sought to highlight rather 
than simplify. Second, it was thought that if the 33 boroughs planning authority areas 
would form the basic units of analysis, this was not such a significant number of 
observations that a sufficient degree of detail could not be sought. Third, the option of 
selecting case studies would necessarily have involved the imposition of pre-defined
16
spatial analytical framework on the research and in this respect may have placed 
important and unnecessary constraints on the scope of analysis.
Having defined the spatial coverage of the research, it was first decided that manufacturing
employment change should be quantified to specify the empirical context within which employment 
1 . . .protection policies function. To do this, data from the Census of Employment was analysed sectorally 
and spatially for London over the 1980s, providing evidence of the scale and scope of change within 
London, and highlighting differences with the nation as a whole.
The thesis next sought to address the issue of land use planning regulations and the 
protection of manufacturing jobs. Two main methodological approaches were 
considered at this stage : to attempt to quantify the effects of employment protection 
policies through empirical analysis, or to ask the borough planning authorities 
themselves about the operation of these policies in a more qualitative fashion. The scale 
of employment decline that was apparent from the empirical analysis conducted 
suggested that LPAs in London had either not attempted to protect manufacturing jobs, 
or had been extremely unsuccessful in doing so. The lack of systematic variation in rates 
of change between the boroughs indicated that land use regulation was unlikely to be of 
critical importance, and in this respect, a quantitative analysis was thought 
inappropriate, largely because it would be extremely difficult to disentangle the effects 
of planning policy from other, perhaps more fundamental, influences on employment 
change. In addition, it is not possible to evaluate accurately the ‘output’ of the planning 
system through quantitative methods and even planning statistics such as development 
control data give no indication of the policy stance adopted in reaching any final 
decision. Thus it seemed that the most appropriate means of exploring the effects of 
planning regulations was to ask the authorities involved and, for reasons discussed in 
appendix four, the survey of LPAs became more qualitative than quantitatively based.
On the basis of survey results some tentative conclusions could be reached about the use 
of employment protection policies, most importantly, that LPAs felt that they could only 
achieve limited success and that manufacturing employment change was largely outwith 
the scope of planning control. The research then moved in the remaining three empirical
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chapters to explore the ways in which London’s manufacturing was changing, such that 
land use planning regulations could not influence employment decline to any great 
extent. To do this, aggregate empirical analyses of different data sets were conducted 
using various quantitative techniques including econometric methods. The objectives 
were to highlight, quantify, and attempt to explain, some of the dominant characteristics 
of London’s manufacturing sector, and of its change over the 1980s, and to relate these 
back, in the conclusions of the thesis, to the results generated from the LPA survey. The 
nature of these quantitative investigations required that the spatial analytical framework 
be widened to consider London as a whole, and also to examine change in the capital in 
relation to other areas of the country.
Clearly, this last stage of examining change in London’s manufacturing sector could 
have been approached in a number of different ways (Massey, Meegan, 1985), for 
example, through a more detailed industry ‘case study’ approach. The use of the 
aggregate data approach was used in this thesis in preference to a case study based 
approach on the following grounds. First, because the thesis seeks to understand the 
broad processes operating to shift the economic base of the capital and not how 
individual firms operate. Second and related, the nature of the case study approach 
requires that only some industries in particular areas may be studied, and while this is 
useful for particular research questions, it is less relevant to the present research which 
seeks to understand the manufacturing sector of an urban economy in a comprehensive 
fashion, and how land use planning can influence employment change from this sector. 
Third, because the detailed empirical analyses could contribute to, and further the 
findings of, existing literature, much of which had drawn upon similar research 
techniques. Finally, it was found that through the bringing together of a variety of 
different data sets for analysis some inconsistencies and complexities of manufacturing 
change in London became apparent and were of themselves interesting and readily 
available for analysis.
This last point is of considerable importance, as it highlights one of the main 
contributions of this research. The thesis employs the use of many different data sets to 
analyse manufacturing change, some of which have not been commonly used in similar 
British studies. Previous analyses of the London economy have frequently utilised
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employment data, largely due to its superior industrial and geographical disaggregation 
and its high degree of accuracy. To quote Randall “employment change is used as an 
index of regional economic change through necessity rather than choice” (Randall,
1973, 3). This thesis highlights the misconceptions and difficulties that can arise in 
understanding employment change through a narrow focus on employment data alone. It 
argues that in certain respects this type of analysis can lead to some degree of confusion 
over whether London is deindustrialising and in what ways. Thus, the empirical focus is 
not only job change but on other processes related for example to land use and 
floorspace change, firm entry, output change and labour productivity growth.
The research strategy of the thesis is only one course of analysis that could have been 
adopted. This point is raised by Fothergill and Gudgin (1985) who argue that any 
specific chosen method should not necessarily be seen as conflicting with other 
approaches, but as the one most relevant to the question posed. The choice of 
methodological approaches used here was adopted on this pragmatic principal, and it is 
hoped that this will be apparent as the thesis progresses.
1.3 The structure of the thesis.
The thesis structure, closely following the chronological order in which the research was 
undertaken, unfolds a logical sequence of the issues to be addressed within. The 
remainder of this chapter reviews previous research on London’s industry providing an 
historical basis for the empirical analysis of the 1980s undertaken in this thesis. It 
considers the industrial development of London, and the subsequent decline of 
manufacturing that has taken place in the capital since the 1960s.
Chapter two reviews theoretical perspectives on economic change which have featured 
in the geographical literature. The chapter emphasises explanations for urban 
manufacturing decline reporting the relevance of different theories to the case of 
London. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a substantive and theoretical context 
as a basis upon which to consider the relevance of planning controls, and will later allow 
the empirical findings of the thesis to be considered in relation to relevant existing 
theories.
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Chapter three presents arguments which justify why land use planning regulations may 
be of considerable importance in influencing urban manufacturing change. It outlines 
the ways in which planning authorities may use land use intervention to influence 
employment opportunities, and cites cases of the use of ‘employment protection 
policies’ for manufacturing industry. In addition, this chapter presents research 
questions and hypotheses for investigation concerning the relationship between land use 
planning and manufacturing employment change.
Chapter four develops an empirical analysis of employment change in the London 
manufacturing sector which is concerned with both spatial and sectoral detail. The 
purpose of this chapter is to highlight the scale and scope of manufacturing employment 
change in the capital, and to provide an up-to-date and detailed empirical context for the 
research.
Chapter five presents results generated from a postal questionnaire survey of London 
LPAs, which was designed to explore the ways in which local authority land use 
planning controls have been used to protect manufacturing jobs. The results address 
issues such as the LPA perspectives on manufacturing employment decline, the types of 
policies that have been developed to influence this decline, whether LPAs believe these 
policies to have been successful or not, why policies have been successful or not, and 
what London authorities believe to be the main factors underpinning manufacturing 
employment decline in the capital.
On the basis of survey results, chapter six goes on to explore different dimensions of 
change in the London manufacturing sector. It shows that through consideration of a 
variety of different facets of manufacturing change inconsistent and often contradictory 
trends appear to arise. The chapter demonstrates the importance of labour productivity 
in London and argues that the process of labour productivity growth has the potential to 
explain, or at least reconcile, the trends and counter-trends that have taken place in 
London’s manufacturing change over the 1980s.
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Chapters seven and eight go on to analyse labour productivity in the London 
manufacturing sector in more detail. A body of literature is reviewed in chapter seven 
which has attempted to explain observed higher rates of labour productivity in the 
manufacturing sector of cities in other empirical contexts. A methodology designed to 
examine spatial differences in labour productivity is applied to the British case to 
explore the relative importance of a defined set of variables in explaining London’s 
higher labour productivity in manufacturing. Chapter eight then goes on to look at 
changing labour productivity in London focusing on aspects related to structure and 
specialisation in industrial composition.
Finally, chapter nine draws conclusions, emphasising the main contributions of the 
thesis and reflecting upon the processes which have underpinned London’s 
manufacturing change in relation to land use planning controls.
The thesis also include appendices which provide detail on particular issues discussed in 
the text. Appendix one describes the data sources used in the thesis and their associated 
classifications. Changes in the statutory and administrative bases of the London 
planning system are described in appendix two. In chapters three and five the thesis 
introduces the importance of specific deregulation measures made to the planning 
system under the 1987 UCO and the 1988 GDO, and these are outlined in detail in 
appendix three. Appendix four is concerned with aspect of survey design and 
methodology, and includes a copy of the postal questionnaire survey sent to the London 
LPAs.
1.4 Industrial growth and decline in Greater London.
The following section considers some of the main characteristics of the industrial 
development of London and of the subsequent decline in manufacturing activity that has 
taken place since the early 1960s. In doing so, various spatial definitions are introduced 
which are used throughout this thesis and these are shown graphically in Figure 1.1.
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1DistrictsStandard Region 
Outer Metropolitan Region 
Outer London
Inner London
1 City of London 12 Hackney 23 Wandsworth
2 Enfield 13 Newham 24 Lambeth
3 Barnet 14 Barking & Dagenham 25 Southwark
4 Harrow 15 Havering 26 Lewisham
5 Haringey 16 Ealing 27 Greenwich
6 Waltham Foresl 17 City of W estm inster 28 Bexley
7 Redbridge 18 Tower Hamlets 29 Kingston Upon Thame:
8 Hillingdon 19 Hammersmith & Fulham 30 Merlon
9 Brent 20 Kensington & Chelsea 31 Sutton
10 Camden 21 Hounslow 32 Croydon
11 Islington 22 Richmond Uoon Thames 33 Bromley
Figure 1.1 : A graphical representation o f  the spatial definitions referred to in this thesis.
The industrial development of London.
London did not feature prominently as a location for the manufacturing activities 
jassociated with the industrial revolution (Green D R,1991; Johnson, 1990;
Lee, 1986; Schwarz, 1992). While provincial cities of pre-1800s Britain experienced an 
expansion of industry within sectors such as iron, textiles, and engineering, London’s 
manufacturing remained small scale and labour intensive in nature, being conducted 
largely within workshops as opposed to factories, and utilising artisan skills. This was 
partly due to the fact that London did not have nearby supplies of coal or other raw 
materials required by ‘heavy’ industry, but also because of the shortage of space and the 
high costs of land, labour and fuel associated with the capital (Hall, 1962; Green D R, 
1991; Schwarz, 1992). Despite the particular cost disadvantages of London for many 
manufacturing industries however, the huge concentrated market for goods, the 
abundant supply of skilled labour, and the overseas trade associated with port of 
London, created the basis for the development of a variety of high quality 
manufacturing trades.
Eighteenth century London maintained a diverse manufacturing sector with no single 
dominant industry or even group of associated industries (Hall, 1962; 1964). Little 
change in the nature of London’s manufacturing activity occurred during the nineteenth 
century, however, industry continued to grow such that by the mid nineteenth century 
“the capital was clearly the most important single seat of manufacturing activity in the 
country” (Hall, 1962, 23). Until as recently as world war one, London’s manufacturing 
largely involved the craft production of consumer goods in inner London, with 
processing of imports around the port of London, and very little in the way of large 
factory production. Industries which represented final links in the productive process 
remained concentrated in London, while those representing earlier links were less 
important (Hall, 1962; 1964; Green D R, 1991; Johnson, 1990; Schwarz, 1992). “Thus, 
London was deficient in textiles not clothing; in woodworking not furniture; in paper 
production not in stationery or printing” (Hall, 1962, 26).
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These types of craft trades were significantly concentrated in the great Victorian 
industrial belt of London (Hall, 1962). This area, which was fully built up before 1900, 
formed a horseshoe shape which incorporated the cities of London and Westminster, 
parts of Southwark, and stretched out towards the North East boundaries of the county. 
The workshops within the crescent enjoyed advantages through small scale production 
and concentration as opposed to large scale factory production. Hall (1964) describes 
three important characteristics of these industries. First, they were not capital intensive 
and did not require specialised industrial premises. Instead they produced in small 
quantities to specific orders, and thus retained flexibility to changing demand. Second, 
they were characterised by a high degree of disintegration in the productive process, 
which allowed for vertical linkages between firms, and agglomeration economies were 
induced through concentration. As Hall (1964) points out, “no one firm could exist 
without the external economies offered by the existence of the metropolitan economic 
machine, and more particularly of the specialised industrial ‘quarter’, immediately 
outside the workshop” (Hall, 1964, 228). Third, the workshop industries relied on local 
demand, and particularly on the importance of the ‘West End’ retail market and the City 
and ‘East End’ wholesale market.
It should be stressed however, that the capital was also a major centre for employment 
in the service sector at this time. Indeed Hall (1962) notes that service industries, 
including building and construction, public utilities, transport, distribution, finance, 
administration, professional services and miscellaneous services, consistently made up 
over three fifths of the total labour force of London over the period 1861 to 1951, and 
accounted for about one quarter of all service workers in England and Wales. Thus even 
as early as the mid nineteenth century, it was not only that the capital was the largest 
manufacturing centre in the country that made it unique, but also the fact that a much 
smaller proportion of the London labour force were employed in manufacturing than in 
the other urban areas of Britain. Over the nineteenth century a disproportionate share of 
the national growth in office employment was concentrated in the capital (Stevens, 
1964). London was well placed for this service sector expansion with the presence of 
Governmental functions, the location at hub of the road and rail networks, and the 
already well developed financial and commercial functions in the City, providing a basis 
for service growth (Martin, 1966). Furthermore, London’s role as a major centre of
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consumption, ensured an economic dependence on activities associated with trade, 
finance, and administration (Buck, Fainstein, 1992). Hall (1962) points out that since 
the mid-nineteenth century the service and manufacturing sectors have been 
concentrated in areas complementary to one another, with services powerfully attracted 
to Central London allowing accessibility to a wide labour market.
After the turn of the century the nature of manufacturing activity in London began to 
change. From the first world war until approximately 1960, London experienced a 
tremendous growth of industrial activity associated with an expansion of factory 
production in activities such as general engineering, chemical production, electrical 
engineering, vehicle manufacture, building supplies, modem household utilities, and 
aircraft manufacture. Consequently, the industrial geography of London altered 
substantially. The growth of new factories was almost entirely concentrated in the outer 
rings of London beyond the LCC area in a North West quadrant as well as in the Lea 
valley to the North East (Abercrombie, 1945; Green DR, 1991). The decentralisation of 
existing manufacturing, a phenomenon which had been evident since 1900 but had 
become more pronounced since world war one, also contributed to suburban 
employment growth (Forshaw, Abercrombie, 1943). The impetus for industrial location 
in the outer ring was induced by such factors as the provision of industrial estates with 
convenient ready to let premises, improvements in transport facilities, the need for more 
spacious sites, market proximity, and the adaptability and increasing mobility, and 
suburbanisation of the London labour force (Abercrombie, 1945; Green DR, 1991).
The spread of electricity provided another important catalyst to manufacturing 
expansion in London over this period (Green D R,1991; Johnson, 1990; Barlow Report, 
1940; Abercrombie, 1945). As Abercrombie pointed out, “London possessed neither 
coal or mineral wealth. Now the almost universal availability of electric power has freed 
industry from its dependence upon the coalfields, while the very limited amount of 
bulky raw materials used in the manufacture of many modem consumer goods no longer 
necessitates locations near the source of raw materials” (Abercrombie, 1945, 40). Not 
only did electricity attract new industries, it also spumed an increase in demand for 
electric household goods which the new industries could provide (Green DR, 1991).
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However, the expansion of manufacturing activity in London over this period was also 
partly consequent upon industrial decline in the provincial regions of Britain (Barlow 
Report, 1940; Forshaw, Abercrombie, 1943; Green D R, 1991; Johnson, 1990). As 
mentioned previously, the ‘heavy’ industries associated with the industrial revolution 
did not feature prominently in London and their demise, therefore, had a negligible 
effect upon industrial activity in the capital. In fact, the decline of heavy industry after 
world war one was in fact beneficial to London, resulting in the migration of labour 
from provincial regions to the South East, which supplied the labour requirements of the 
new expanding industries.
London’s manufacturing sector continued to grow until at least the early 1960s and several 
factors sustained this growth. These include, the position London held as the country’s largest 
and most wealthy consumer market; the expanding population of London which provided a 
huge pool of skilled and unskilled labour; the expansion of the central London service sector 
which induced continuing demands for manufacturing activities such as printing and publishing 
and office equipment; London’s excellent transport links to other areas of the country, and the 
port of London, which allowed the efficient movement of industrial inputs and outputs (Buck et 
al., 1986). The service sector also expanded with new offices associated with manufacturing, 
sales, advertising, consultancy and operations research, trade unions, higher education,
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research, consultancy, and broadcasting (Hall, 1989a). By 1962, of the 24 employment 
divisions which comprised a standard categorisation of economic activity used in the UK, the 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC), London was deficient in only four (Hall, 1964). Two 
of these were primary industries and the other two were manufacturing sectors associated with 
early stages in the productive process, none of which ever featured prominently in London.
By the 1960s then, London had what appeared to be a diverse and expanding 
manufacturing sector comprising older craft industries in the inner London boroughs 
and ‘new’ expanding sectors in outer London. However, the 1960s also marked a 
turning point in London’s industrial structure, when manufacturing employment started 
to decline, while the service sector continued to expand.
Structural change of this nature was largely unanticipated. However, what had been 
apparent for a number of years was the continuing expansion of manufacturing activity
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in the outer boroughs of the metropolitan area, and the closure and displacement of 
manufacturing activity in the congested core (Forshaw, Abercrombie, 1943; 
Abercrombie, 1945). This was a trend which continued, and coupled with slow growth 
or decline in the outer boroughs, signalled the beginning of London’s manufacturing 
contraction.
The decline of London’s manufacturing.
It is with the process of industrial decline in London over the 1980s that this thesis is 
concerned. The following section reviews previous literature on London manufacturing, 
describing the scale and nature of change that has affected London industry. In addition, 
a brief account is provided of the dominant trends in London’s service sector.
Two points should be stressed concerning the scope of this section. First, the objective 
here is to provide a description of major trends not to discuss the underlying causes of 
industrial decline. Explanations for change form the subject matter of chapter two which 
reviews theories of manufacturing change and specifically relates these to London 
research. Second, this section is by and large not concerned with quantitative detail. 
Figures provided in different publications are often inconsistent, covering different time 
periods or using different sources, and as such are usually incompatible. In fact, in the 
literature reviewed, no detailed up-to-date comprehensive analysis of industrial change 
in London over the 1980s which incorporates a good degree of sectoral detail was 
discovered. Consequently, one objective of this thesis was to provide such an empirical 
description and this is achieved in chapter four. Here, previous research is used to 
describe trends rather than to provide a patchy and general background to quantitative 
measurements which are imperative to this thesis, and which require detailed and 
separate treatment in themselves.
Since at least the early 1960s Greater London has experienced a severe loss of 
manufacturing jobs. This trend is frequently cited, and universally accepted, as a major 
component of London’s economic change over the last three decades. In 1960, 
approximately 1.34 million people were employed in London’s manufacturing 
industries. By 1991 only 360,000 jobs remained, a decline in total manufacturing
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employment of just under 75%. Authors have shown that this loss has been relatively 
consistent over the years, with no pause since it was first observed, and that rates of 
manufacturing employment decline in London have generally been worse than that 
experienced in the nation as a whole (Buck et al., 1986; 1992; Hall, 1989a; GLC, 1983; 
1985; Hamilton, 1991; Kennedy, 1991; Fothergill et al., 1985). For example, Fothergill 
et al. (1985) have shown that between 1960 and 1981, London’s rate of manufacturing 
employment loss of 51.4% was almost double that of Great Britain as a whole (26.3%), 
and also significantly higher than the average for the other British conurbations (43.2%). 
It is worth examining the spatial and sectoral aspects of this decline in more detail.
Two important spatial trends in London’s manufacturing change have been determined. 
The first relates to sub-metropolitan manufacturing employment change. Dennis (1978) 
pointed out that a common assumption concerning London’s manufacturing decline was 
that the inner-city was the primary location for employment loss. As mentioned 
previously, prior to the 1960s an inner outer distinction in London’s manufacturing 
change had been observed, with the relocation and closure of inner London firms, and 
the expansion of manufacturing activity in outer London. Using DTI data on the 
opening and closure of manufacturing establishments within the capital which employed 
twenty or more people, Dennis described industrial change over the 1966 to 1974 
period. He found that the dominant characteristic across London was the high rate of 
firm closure, but that the decentralisation of industry still accounted for a substantial 
27% of total industrial decline. Dennis compared the performance of inner and outer 
London and demonstrated that the loss of employment from factory closures or 
relocation was only marginally greater in inner than outer boroughs. These conclusions 
were broadly corroborated by the GLC (1983) which used the same data sources to 
update the Dennis research to 1980. However, the GLC research also discovered that in 
contrast to the 1966 to 1974 period job loss, as measured in terms of absolute numbers 
and average yearly rates, was most marked amongst the outer London boroughs.
The method used in this research is open to criticism. The firms that were recorded in 
the DTI data were only those employing twenty or more people and as early as 1942 
Forshaw and Abercrombie (1943) had pointed out that “for the county as a whole, the 
average number of workers per factory was only twenty, showing the small scale nature
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London’s industry. If the few relatively large factories were to be excluded, the average would 
be appreciably lower” (Forshaw, Abercrombie, 1943, 68). However, more recent research by 
LPAC (1988a) which considers employment change in sub-areas of London confirms the 
conclusions reached in the Dennis and GLC analyses. The general picture that emerges is one of 
overall manufacturing employment decline in the Greater London area. Regardless of slight 
variations over time, manufacturing decline is a feature of the whole London conurbation.
The second spatial trend in manufacturing relates to disparities in rates of change at the sub­
regional level. Analyses of industrial change in the South East region have observed a general 
urban-rural contrast, with the rapid industrial decline of the Greater London conurbation on the 
one hand, and the much slower decline, and occasional small growth of manufacturing activity 
in the OMA and particularly outer South East on the other (Fothergill, Gudgin, 1982, 1983; 
Fothergill et al., 1985; Hall, 1989a; LPAC, 1988a; GLC, 1985; Hamilton, 1991). The discovery 
of this urban-rural shift, indicates that manufacturing employment decline often has a specific 
sub-regional spatial expression. As Fothergill et al. (1986) point out, the city is now the 
principal location of industrial manufacturing decline.
Hamilton (1991) examines employment change data for London, the OMA, and the outer South 
East for the periods 1975 to 1982 and 1985 to 1988. His figures show that while manufacturing 
employment declined by 27% in the OMA and by 25% in the outer South East between 1975 
and 1982, the London manufacturing sector shed a much higher proportion of jobs, just under 
40%. In fact for the 1985 to 1988 period, Hamilton shows that while manufacturing 
employment fell by 10% in London and by 4% in the OMA, employment actually grew in the 
outer South East by just over 4%.
Thus, despite the rapid decline of London manufacturing since the 1960s, the growth of 
manufacturing activity, or at least lack of decline in the Outer Metropolitan Area (OMA) and 
outer South East, has maintained the importance of manufacturing in the surrounding region 
(Buck et al., 1992). Hamilton (1991), notes that as recently as 1988, the South East region had 
up to one quarter of the total manufacturing employment of the country. There is therefore, an 
indication that a ‘London’ or ‘city specific’ factor may be at work in patterns of
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industrial decline. However, it should be stressed that rates of manufacturing job loss in 
the South East region have varied over time as well as by area, and it would be wrong to 
suggest that all small towns and rural areas in the OMA or the outer South East have 
been free from industrial decline.
In terms of the sectoral composition of change in London’s industries, the general 
pattern that appears to have emerged is one of overall sectoral decline (Buck et al.,
1986; GLC, 1985). Buck et al. (1986) compared the industrial structure of London in 
1961 to that of 1981 and found that employment decline was characteristic of all 
manufacturing sectors in the capital with little sectoral variation. They concluded that 
over the period 1961-81 “the tendency for London’s share of national employment to 
decline was very general, with little evidence of systematic variations in trends at least 
amongst manufacturing industries” (Buck et al., 1986, 72).
Other authors have examined detailed differences between sectors in terms of rates of 
decline over time (GLC, 1983; LPAC, 1988a; Leigh et al, 1982). The GLC(1983) 
analysed employment data at the class level of the SIC (see appendix one) between 1961 
and 1981, defining three broad periods of change. The first is between 1961 and 1971, 
over which a number of sectors could be identified as experiencing particularly severe 
rates of employment loss. These included instrument engineering; shipbuilding and 
marine engineering; vehicle manufacture; clothing and footwear; brick, pottery, glass 
and cement; and timber and furnishing trades. In fact employment in the first two 
sectors fell by almost three fifths over this ten year period. In the second period, 1971 to 
1978, the rapidly declining industries of the 1961-1971 period were joined by coal and 
petroleum products; mechanical engineering; textiles; and leather goods. Over this 
duration these industries lost approximately half of their 1971 employment numbers. 
The final period defined was between 1978 and 1981, within which the GLC (1983) 
argued that with the sole exception of the paper and printing trade, the near collapse of 
every manufacturing sector was ensured by the rapid and increased rate of employment 
loss. In essence, the data showed that job loss had become much less sector specific 
from the 1970s onwards, eventually affecting all manufacturing industries in a most 
severe way.
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However, the analyses of employment data outlined above have been conducted at 
j relatively coarse levels of industrial disaggregation and may therefore mask some 
detailed sectoral growth. In particular, many authors have argued that the South East 
region in general has experienced the expansion of a very narrow set of ‘newer’ 
manufacturing industries associated with the high technology sector (Keeble, 1991; 
Jones, Wild, 1991; Hall et al., 1987; Henry, 1992; LPAC, 1988a; Buck et al, 1992). 
High technology industry is actually very difficult to define, and there has been no 
consistent definition found in the literature (Aydalot, Keeble, 1988; Keeble, 1988;
Green A, 1991). Keeble (1988) argues that there are two main problems with any 
attempt at a categoric definition. First, the growth of high technology industry has 
obscured the distinction between manufacturing and services, and second, if high 
technology is defined as industries employing new technology then the criteria are 
constantly changing as new technology is consistently coming out on the market.
Hall et al. (1987) identified high technology sectors through the extent of industrial 
capacity employing scientific and technologically advanced products, and through the 
share of value added in R&D. On this basis they were able to define seven high 
technology sectors at the activity heading level of the SIC. These are : pharmaceuticals, 
chemicals and preparations; telephone and telegraph apparatus; radio and electronic 
components; broadcasting, receiving and sound equipment; electronic computers; radio, 
radar, and electronic capital goods; and aerospace equipment, manufacturing and repair. 
These sectors provide a useful working definition of the industries associated with high 
technology, generally those employing new technology in production or those 
producing technologically advanced products.
The expansion of the British high technology sector has been heavily concentrated in 
the South East region (Keeble, 1988; Hall et al, 1987, Henry, 1992). In fact Keeble 
(1988) shows that the South East “contained no less than 44% of total British high 
technology employment in 1984” (Keeble, 1988, 74). Greater London contains the 
largest concentration of high technology industry in Britain, however, growth has 
occurred in other areas of the outer South East and concentrations of high technology 
industry are to be found around the M4 corridor and Cambridge (Keeble, 1988; Hall et 
a l, 1987). Much attention has focused upon the area surrounding the M4, described as a
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“major suburban technopole" (Scott, 1988, 179), and thought to be the largest 
concentration of high technology industry outside Greater London. Essentially, this 
area, referred to as part of the ‘Western crescent’, represents the type of new industrial 
growth which has occurred in the South East, consisting of small inter-related high 
technology industrial establishments. Keeble (1991) argues that these types of industries 
are clearly growth industries in output terms and while other manufacturing sectors have 
declined, expansion of these sectors has steered labour requirements away from 
unskilled and semi skilled workers towards professional scientific and engineering 
groups.
Despite growth in the South East region as a whole however, even high-technology 
industries have been prone to job loss in the capital (Hall, et al., 1987). The Greater 
London conurbation suffered severe losses of high technology jobs despite the fact that 
it is still the biggest concentration of such jobs in the country. It should be stressed that 
the potential for job creation arising from the growth of high technology sectors is open 
to debate. Hall et al. argue that in employment terms “manufacturing is in deep decline, 
contrary to popular opinion, high tech is part of that decline” (Hall et al., 1987, 30). 
Nonetheless, spatial patterns of employment change in the South East’s high technology 
industry again emphasise London’s poor, and quite unique, manufacturing employment 
performance.
Consideration of these sectoral and spatial trends in London’s manufacturing 
employment change highlights the extreme nature of industrial employment decline in 
the capital. The internal invariance in London’s sectoral and spatial patterns of decline, 
and the comparison with the surrounding region suggests that the London experience is 
not a straightforward manifestation of national ‘general’ trends, but that there may be a 
‘London specific’ factor at work, forcing the rapid and extreme decline of 
manufacturing industries. To quote Cowan and Gordon (1993) “what needs to be 
explained in London is not why some significant parts of the manufacturing sector have 
lost jobs, but rather why right across the board manufacturing employment has 
contracted both absolutely and (in almost all periods) relative to other parts of the 
country” (Cowan, Gordon, 1993, 26).
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The final trend in the London economy to be discussed here is the growth in the 
importance of service sector activity. As mentioned in section 1.1, the service sector has 
been of considerable importance to the economy of the capital for many years.
However, since the mid 1970s, over 70% of London's jobs have been in service 
industries and an expansion of employment occurred throughout the 1980s. Of course 
the service sector is not homogenous, and in fact many service industries have not 
experienced growth in London. For example, employment in warehousing, transport, 
and various activities connected with manufacturing and the London docks has declined 
in recent years. In the literature, attention has focused on the massive employment 
expansion throughout the 1980s in producer services, being those services whose 
products form intermediate inputs into other industries, (Gershuny, Miles, 1983), and 
particularly on financial and business services (Hall, 1989a; Keeble, 1991; Buck et al., 
1992; Gordon, Harloe, 1991; Frost, 1991; Frost, Spence, 1991b; 1991c; 1993; Sassen, 
1991; 1994; Buck et al., 1986; Kennedy, 1991).
Sassen (1991) analysed employment change data for London over the period 1978 to 
1985. She showed that in two of the four service sectors defined at the division level of 
the SIC - the transport & communications sector, and education, health & other service 
industries - employment had declined between 1978 and 1985 by 18% and 10% 
respectively. Over the same period employment in public administration grew by 13%, 
however, the most impressive increase in the number of jobs was in banking, insurance 
and finance, with a 32% growth in employment over this seven year period. Frost and 
Spence (1993) provide greater sectoral detail for employment change in service 
industries in central London over the 1980s. They show that the largest rates of growth 
in employment were in banking and finance; auxiliary services to banking and finance; 
accountants and tax experts; legal services; computer services; professional services; 
house and estate agents; and ‘other’ business services. The implications from these, and 
other similar studies, is that the really significant expansions of service employment in 
London over the 1980s, and particularly in Central London, have actually been within a 
fairly narrow range of service activities (Frost, Spence, 1991b; 1993; Kennedy, 1991). 
Nonetheless, as Gordon (1995) and Buck et al. (1992) point out, this has still led to 
growth in a wide range of distinct functions including; commercial and investment 
banking, securities and commodities brokerages; insurance; real estate; R&D; cultural
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industries; advertising; publishing; accounting; business consulting; communications 
including media; legal services; computer software services; and other services to 
business.
The literature documents a clear trend in the rapid expansion of tertiary activity in 
London and particularly that associated with producer services. However, services have 
always been an important element of the capital’s economy. Why is it that the growth of 
certain service industries is now thought to have decisively shifted the economic base of 
London? Gordon and Harloe (1991) compared employment trends in banking, 
insurance, financial and business services to London’s manufacturing sector. They 
found that by 1985, “net employment gain overtook net employment losses, and 
financial and business service employment overtook that in the manufacturing sector” 
(Gordon, Harloe, 1991, 379). Indeed the activities associated with producer services and 
finance and business services are now the only source of significant expansion in the 
London economy. Furthermore, the growth of these industries has been particularly 
prominent in London relative to other cities and regions throughout the UK, and some 
authors have indicated that London is a particularly important international location for 
the growth of advanced service functions (Sassen, 1991; 1994; Buck et al., 1992;
Gordon Harloe; 1991; Jones, Wild, 1991).
This thesis is concerned with manufacturing activities in London rather than services. 
However, as will be discussed in chapter two, there are theoretical perspectives which 
draw important causal links between the growth of service industries and the decline of 
manufacturing. Thus, while the thesis will not focus on service sector growth, attention 
is still paid to these trends throughout.
This section has shown that since the 1960s, the dominant trends in London 
manufacturing discussed in the literature have been those of decline. Ignoring slight 
temporal variations, the indication is that industrial employment has fallen in all areas of 
the capital and in all statistically defined industrial sectors. Using terminology 
introduced in the next chapter, London has been, and is, undergoing deindustrialisation.
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Chapter 2 : Urban manufacturing and structural economic change : theoretical 
perspectives and their application to the London case.
2.0 Introduction.
Chapter two reviews selected theoretical perspectives on economic change that have 
featured in the geographical literature. There are two main purposes. First, to provide a 
basis upon which the potential relevance of land use planning controls may be 
demonstrated in the next chapter. Second, and more generally, to present a substantive 
context at the outset which will later allow the empirical findings of this thesis to be 
considered in relation to relevant existing theories.
There is a considerable geographical literature that addresses issues of economic 
transformation, however recently, two broad preoccupation have been with structural 
economic change and deindustrialisation. It is on these two themes that the present 
chapter focuses, deliberately orientating the review in a selective fashion towards 
theories that have emphasised processes of manufacturing change and urban 
deindustrialisation. Where possible, previous research is drawn upon to highlight the 
relevance of the theoretical accounts to the specific case of London. The chapter has 
four main sections. The first considers definitions of deindustrialisation and structural 
economic change. Theoretical perspectives that have attempted to explain why 
particular economic changes affect advanced nations are then reviewed. Section three 
discusses detailed spatial aspects of economic change at the levels of the region and 
city. Finally, some conclusions are drawn.
2.1 Structural economic change and deindustrialisation.
There are no standard or universally accepted definitions of the terms structural 
economic change and deindustrialisation. Indeed disagreement in the literature even 
extends to the basic criteria that are used to detect these processes. It is not the purpose 
here to impose any specific meanings to these expressions, but simply, to illustrate the 
ways in which they are most generally used.
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Structural economic changes have been described as economic changes which are not 
minor in character, but represent a fundamental shift in the whole direction and 
organisation of the economy (Allen, Massey; 1988; Harris, 1988). There is in fact no 
strict way to distinguish between a structural economic change or a minor economic 
change, however, it would seem that that substantial occupational, employment or 
sectoral output shifts in an economy are generally regarded as being structural. For 
example, studies concerned with structural economic change have typically examined 
implications arising from the decline of productive manufacturing and the growth of 
service sector activity within advanced regions and nations (Bell, 1974; Buck et al., 
1992; Sassen, 1991; Savitch, 1988).
Given this broad description, it should be that manufacturing decline, or 
deindustrialisation, represents one facet of structural economic change. However, 
definitional problems exist even with the term deindustrialisation. Martin and Rowthom 
(1986) for example, view it as an ambiguous expression which has been used in a 
variety of ways for both descriptive and analytical purposes in the absence of any 
consensus over its specific meaning. Caimcross (1979) offers clarity in this respect, 
putting forward some comprehensive, and subsequently widely cited, criteria for the 
detection of deindustrialisation. He suggests that the presence of four basic trends may 
be used to identify the existence of this process. The first is a straight-forward decline in 
manufacturing employment or output; second is a shift in employment or output from 
manufacturing industries to services; third is a declining share of trade in manufactured 
goods, such that the surplus of exports over imports is insufficient to maintain an 
economy in external balance of trade; and fourth is the progression of this last trend to a 
point where a country or region is unable to purchase the necessary imports to maintain 
manufacturing production, leading to further cumulative economic decline.
The four trends suggested by Caimcross are useful in describing and identifying 
deindustrialisation. However, they also highlight the different approaches that may be 
taken to observe the process, for example in terms of the measurement criteria used and 
the choice of spatial scale; or whether deindustrialisation is considered in isolation, or 
alternatively viewed in relation to the growth of other sectors of the economy such as 
services in a more causal interpretation.
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There are then degrees of ambiguity surrounding the common use of the terms 
structural economic change and deindustrialisation and this is understood in the 
following review. The prime focus in this chapter is on theories regarding changes in 
manufacturing activity, and to this end, literature is reviewed which has framed these 
changes in terms of structural economic change or deindustrialisation, which has 
considered the processes at different spatial levels, and which has used different 
measurement criteria.
2.2 Why does deindustrialisation or structural economic change happen ?
This section reviews theories that address the processes underlying industrial 
manufacturing change at national and international levels, focusing in particular on the 
case of the UK. In this respect, the theories presented here could be considered as 
‘macro’ perspectives relative to the urban and regional ‘micro’ accounts reviewed in 
section 2.3. The macro outlook may appear less directly relevant to this thesis which is 
concerned with manufacturing change in London. However, before going on to consider 
the reasons underlying the specific spatial manifestations of manufacturing change, it is 
first worth considering why deindustrialisation or structural economic change have 
happened to nations in the first place. It should be stressed here that space does not 
permit the wealth of empirical evidence of the actual trends experienced in particular 
countries to be reviewed. Rather, the quantitative detail of economic change outlined in 
the literature is taken as given, and the focus in this section is on the theoretical 
perspectives that attempt to explain why nations have experienced particular trends.
One of the first prominent comments on deindustrialisation was by Bacon and Eltis 
(1976) who explained Britain’s industrial decline in terms of increasing internal 
deficiencies in economic structure. They argued that the observed shift from 
manufacturing to service employment, and particularly to public services, represented a 
serious ‘structural’ mal-adjustment in the British economy. Simply put, they suggested 
that the growth of non-manufacturing activities, and the related taxation required to 
fund some of these sectors, had starved the manufacturing sector of resources and 
employment leading to “growing numbers of redundancies instead of the increase in
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employment and growth in the availability of resources that should have resulted” 
(Bacon, Eltis, 1976,11).
Singh (1977) argued that Bacon and Eltis were too concerned with domestic economic 
issues alone, and that in an open economy such as the UK, deindustrialisation could 
only be considered in the context of interaction with the rest of the world economy. The 
author stressed that from the point of view of an individual country, the development of 
the world economy may be characterised by a changing balance between 
‘complementarity’ and ‘competitiveness’ in manufacturing growth. Thus, “economic 
growth elsewhere is complementary to the extent that it raises demand for exports, but it 
may become ‘competitive’ insofar as it leads to the development of alternative sources 
of supply” (Singh, 1977,117). Singh argued that Britain had lost competitive power 
because it had not held its share of world manufacturing markets, and had also suffered 
import penetration of the domestic market. Furthermore, he suggested that the British 
manufacturing sector was becoming increasingly inefficient, because it had failed to 
provide enough net exports to meet the country’s overall import requirements at 
socially acceptable levels of output, employment, and exchange rates.
The issue of international ‘competition’ is prominent in more recent explanations of 
national deindustrialisation. It is thought that multi-lateralism has aided nation state 
economies in becoming less self-contained throughout the twentieth century, with 
increasingly intense economic competition occurring in a world rather than national 
market (Dicken, 1992; Sassen, 1991; Harris, 1988). Consequently, nation states are now 
more susceptible to multi-lateral trade in manufacturing products. These developments, 
however, have only opened the economies of nation states, they have not in themselves 
led to deindustrialisation. Harris argues that in the case of Britain, inherent weaknesses 
in the nation’s manufacturing capacity were central to the industrial decline which 
occurred after the challenge was set by the growth of international competition in the 
post-war boom. These weaknesses included falling levels of investment in 
manufacturing, higher labour costs, relatively poor productivity gains in industry, and a 
lack of new product development.
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Another important international influence on the fortunes of industrial activity in 
advanced nations has arisen from the growth of multi-national corporations and the 
movement of manufacturing capital across national boundaries (Massey, 1984; 1988; 
Dicken, 1992). With regard to industrial decline, the importance of this is that multi­
national companies have the ability to reorganise the location of their productive 
capacity. It is thought that the high land and labour costs in advanced industrial nations, 
as well as trade unionism and labour protection, have resulted in the reorganisation of 
manufacturing away from these nations to newly industrialised and less developed 
countries, where cheaper labour can be utilised (Rodwin, Sazanami, 1989).
Other explanations have set out different, yet inter-related, processes which contribute 
to overall structural economic change (Keeble, 1991; Jones, Wild, 1991). Three such 
processes are often identified - deindustrialisation, reindustrialisation and tertiarisation. 
Reindustrialisation refers to the recent expansion of new forms of manufacturing 
activity, often termed high technology industries, being those characterised by their 
propensity to use products with important scientific and technological components and 
to make products incorporating substantial amounts of high value added research and 
development (Hall et al., 1987). Tertiarisation refers to the expansion of service sector 
orientated office activity, particularly within the specialist producer services (Gordon, 
Harloe, 1991; Hall, 1989a, Bucketal., 1992). Together deindustrialisation, 
reindustrialisation and tertiarisation are thought to be the dominant contemporary forces 
affecting advanced economies, creating the absolute or relative growth and decline of 
different economic sectors.
One of the main factors influencing this inter-related change is the shift in capital 
investment from less to more profitable activities, giving rise to the expansion of high 
technology and service sectors, and at the same time forcing the contraction of low 
technology manufacturing. Bluestone and Harrison (1982) raised the issue of the 
diversion of capital investment in the case of the USA, viewing deindustrialisation as a 
problem of dis-investment in productive capacity, particularly in relation to the ‘flight’ 
of capital from productive investment in American domestic manufacturing. Two other 
practical factors that are often used to explain these structural economic changes are the 
obsolescence and redundancy of older industrial plants, and an exhaustion in the
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sources of traditional dynamic returns to scale (Harris, 1988; Rowthom, Wells, 1987; 
Baron, 1992; Liston, 1992).
There are also more abstract theoretical accounts which attempt to explain why different 
components of economic change occur. Keeble (1991) points to three prominent 
perspectives - long wave theory, flexible production theory, and information economy 
theory.
Long wave theory developed in the work of economists Nikolai Kondratieff and Joseph 
Schumpeter proposes that economies undergo cyclical trends of industrial restructuring, 
separated by periods of economic slump and stagnation. The triggering mechanism for 
the economic ‘booms’ is thought to be technological development (Hall, 1985; Hall, 
Preston, 1988). However, the ‘booms’ described in long wave theory will not 
necessarily affect every country in the same way. Hall (1985) makes clear that 
“economic success lies with the country and the region and the city that innovate, that 
keep one step ahead of the action” (Hall, 1985, 5). Thus, Keeble (1991) argues that the 
economic decline of Europe’s older industrial regions is a consequence of the long 
wave recession and industrial restructuring in Europe since the 1970s; while Hall 
(1985) associates the growth of high technology industry in America and Japan with a 
series of technological innovations in each country. In this way, national experiences of 
deindustrialisation and reindustrialisation can be understood by the ways in which the 
long wave cyclical trends affect particular countries.
The second theoretical perspective places industrial change within the context of a shift 
from a Fordist to post-Fordist mode of production (Algietta, 1979; Martin, 1988; Scott, 
1988; Jones, Wild, 1991; Esser, Hirsch, 1989). Industries of the Fordist era are thought 
to be those associated with mass production, technical divisions of labour, and the 
exploitation of internal economies of scale, which were particularly important in 
Britain’s dominant role as a specialised workshop in the 1950s. Post-Fordism has 
emerged, characterised by “a relative decline in the importance of Fordist mass 
production and an enormous expansion of manufacturing activity based on a less rigid 
and more highly adaptable methodological and institutional structure” (Scott, 1988,
171). The fall of the mass production sectors is often linked to international competition
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from Japan and newly industrialised countries, problems of labour militancy, worker 
morale, and the rising costs of production, which slowed down productivity growth and 
eroded competitiveness (Martin, 1988). That is not to say that Fordism no longer exists, 
but simply that Fordist modes of economic organisation have fallen from their former 
leading role as the main component of economic growth (Scott, 1988; Martin, 1988). 
While Fordism was described as a mode of capital accumulation, post-Fordism is 
described as a mode of flexible accumulation. This is because, although varied, the new 
types of production that have emerged in the post-Fordist era are “generally 
characterised by an ability to change process and product configurations with great 
rapidity - an ability that is frequently much enhanced by the use of computerised 
technologies” (Scott, 1988,174). Examples include the high technology industries, 
which have made use of technical innovation based primarily on micro electronics and 
information processing. Thus, this perspective essentially argues that deindustrialisation 
and re-industrialisation can both be explained by important transformations in the 
organisation of production.
The third theoretical perspective, information economy theory, is concerned with the 
relative growth of service sector activities in advanced industrial societies and 
particularly with producer services, which are broadly services whose products form 
intermediate inputs into other industries (Gershuny, Miles, 1983). The rise of service 
industries is often linked to changes in the overall composition of demand which are 
though to have arisen in the post-war period (Allen, 1988; Bell, 1974; Brown, Sheriff, 
1979; Brown, 1988; Wood, 1986b). Two main sources of demand shift are usually 
cited. First, as average national incomes have risen and basic material needs are 
progressively met, so the demands of the general public have shifted away from 
consumer to durable goods, and then have extended to luxury items such as information 
services, education, health care, and the arts. The second demand source is from 
industry itself, which has increased its requirements for managerial, professional, and 
technical services in order to boost efficiency (Daniels, 1986; Corriat, Petit, 1991; 
Sassen, 1991; Lawrence, 1992).
The contribution of information economy theory to understanding manufacturing 
change relates particularly to this second source of demand shift. It is though that the
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distinction that exists between manufacturing and producer services is becoming 
increasingly blurred. This is due in part to “’intermediate subcontracting’ changes, in 
which activities that were (or might have been) part of the production process within 
one industry are subcontracted to an ‘intermediate producer service industry’” 
(Gershuny, Miles, 1983, 249). Thus, as Hall (1987) notes “properly, these functions 
should be treated as part of goods-production employment. But because many of them 
are contracted to specialist organisations (advertising agencies, legal and accountancy 
offices, truck companies, airlines, etc.) they appear under services according to 
statistical conventions” (Hall, 1987, 5). In this respect tertiarisation and 
deindustrialisation are causally related through transformations in the organisation of 
production which are not detected in the statistical industrial classifications.
The final account of manufacturing change to be discussed in this section is by 
Rowthom and Wells (1987). These authors put forward three hypotheses to explain why 
deindustrialisation has happened in the UK. Empirical evidence is provided which 
appears to support each hypothesis, however, the authors go on to present a balanced 
account of the underlying causes of actual manufacturing change in the UK. This text is 
an extremely important contribution to the deindustrialisation debate, describing many 
different aspects underlying national industrial change.
i
The first hypothesis presented in Rowthom and Wells account is the maturity thesis.
This asserts that the share of a nation’s total employment in manufacturing will start 
to fall through the natural progress of economic development. Structural changes in 
the national economy are thought to be caused by relative sequential transformations 
in the structure of employment, as the expansion of one broad economic sector is 
associated with the relative contraction of another. For example, the declining share of | 
agricultural employment was associated with an expansion in manufacturing and J
service labour; and when manufacturing growth stabilised, services continued to 
expand at the expense of agricultural labour, until such a small percentage of the 
workforce were left in agriculture that growth could only be achieved at the expense 
of manufacturing industry, whose share subsequently fell. The maturity thesis is 
framed in relative terms, and thus change in the absolute number of employees in any 
economic sector is dependent upon the performance of total employment.
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The second thesis presented by Rowthom and Wells is the specialisation thesis, which 
is concerned with transformations in the structure of foreign trade. Focusing on the 
economic history of the UK since the 1950s, the authors argue that the role as a 
manufacturing ‘workshop’ economy was not necessarily one the nation chose so much 
as it being an economic necessity. At that time the UK had a large deficit in non­
manufactures trade, particularly due to food and raw materials import, and so required a 
substantial surplus in manufacturing trade. However, this no longer applies to the UK 
economy because huge improvements in non-manufactures trade have been found 
through cheaper imports of food and raw materials, increased domestic food production, 
reduced demands for raw materials, the discovery of North sea oil, and the rise in 
service sector exports. The authors point out that declines in the surplus of 
manufacturing trade over the post-war period need not due to the failure of 
manufacturing to compete successfully, but may be simply because the UK no longer 
has a huge deficit in non-manufactured trade, and as a result no longer requires a 
surplus in manufactured goods. Since the country no longer specialises in 
manufacturing, less employees and resources are devoted to these sectors.
The final hypothesis discussed by Rowthom and Wells, similar to that put forward by 
Singh (1977), is the failure thesis. Under this account the decline of manufacturing 
employment is viewed as a symptom of economic failure, particularly the failure of UK 
manufacturing industry to compete internationally, or to produce levels of output 
adequate for a prosperous and fully employed economy. The failure thesis can be 
summarised in a number of propositions. First, that the UK’s record in income and 
employment has been poor, and this is largely due to the weak performance of 
manufacturing industries. Second, that if the UK’s manufacturing performance had been 
better then industrial output growth would have been higher, stimulating the non­
manufacturing side of the economy and thus creating jobs and output in services and 
other non-manufacturing sectors. Finally, if the UK manufacturing output had been 
higher, then the severity of absolute and relative employment decline in UK industry 
would have been reduced.
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Rowthom and Wells present three viable hypothesis to explain deindustrialisation that 
can be applied to the UK experience. However, they conclude that “virtually all of the 
decline in manufacturing employment, both absolute and relative, is accounted for by 
two components : the maturity effect and the specialisation effect“ (Rowthom, Wells, 
1987, 246). That is not to say that UK manufacturing has performed well, on the 
contrary, the authors do point out that internationally UK manufacturing has performed 
badly. However, the contention is that if Britain’s industrial performance had been 
successful, almost as many manufacturing jobs would have been lost anyway due to 
maturity and specialisation. In this respect, the reduction in UK manufacturing 
employment is viewed as almost unavoidable.
The authors also draw a distinction between two types of deindustrialisation. First, is 
‘positive’ deindustrialisation, which is the result of sustained economic growth where 
productivity in the manufacturing sector rises so rapidly, that regardless of increasing 
output, the labour demands of this sector are reduced. Unemployment, however, does 
not result because the rate of new service sector job creation is sufficient to absorb 
displaced manufacturing employment. ‘Negative’ deindustrialisation on the other hand, 
occurs when labour displaced from the manufacturing sector, due to output decline or 
productivity growth, will not be reabsorbed into the service sector resulting in increased 
and growing unemployment. On this basis they argue that the deindustrialisation of a 
nation does not systematically represent economic failure. However, in the case of 
Britain, the failure of manufacturing has resulted in ‘negative’ deindustrialisation.
This brief review of perspectives on why structural economic change or 
deindustrialisation occur has demonstrated the diversity of opinion that exists. Factors 
cited as being of importance include internal domestic economic conditions, 
government policies, international competition, changes in the composition of demand, 
changes in the allocation of resources between broad sectors of the economy and so on. 
Perhaps more importantly, it has been pointed out that deindustrialisation cannot simply 
be viewed as a kind of economic deficiency, and that in fact economic ‘success’ could 
lead to much the same outcome.
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A final question exists over the extent to which deindustrialisation actually matters 
(Cohen, Zysman, 1987; Massey, 1988). Much has been written in the literature about 
this issue and the debate is largely polarised between two central issues on which 
opinions are based. First, the extent to which manufacturing is viewed as a necessary 
engine of growth, and second, the degree to which manufacturing is seen as a necessary 
basis of exports. For example, some authors have argued that the shift from 
manufacturing to services is the natural progression of advanced economies, and that 
service industry output is increasingly being traded internationally and is thus 
exportable (Baron, 1992; Lawrence, 1992; Liston, 1992; Eltis, Martin, 1992). Others 
have argued that a substantial core of service employment is tied to manufacturing, and 
that while some services may be exportable, the future export potential is simply too 
small to offset the large deficits in manufacturing (Cohen, Zysman, 1987; Bozen, 
Thirwall, 1992; Hughes, 1981). The issue is far from resolved and either side of the 
debate has produced empirical evidence on service exports which support each claim. 
This issue is of critical importance at a national level. However, as will be apparent 
from the discussion in the next section, the extent to which deindustrialisation matters 
for any local area is much more complex.
2.3 Spatial perspectives on manufacturing change : the deindustrialisation of the 
city.
It was mentioned previously that the specific orientation of this section is towards 
processes of urban manufacturing decline. As pointed out in chapter one, 
deindustrialisation has been shown to have had a specific sub-regional effect 
characterised by an urban rural shift. In general terms, a consistent pattern has been 
observed, where large cities within regions have lost manufacturing jobs at an 
extremely fast rate, while small towns or rural areas have often declined at a much 
slower rate, remained static, or actually experienced an expansion of manufacturing 
employment. The urban-rural shift has formed a major preoccupation in the literature 
reviewed and therefore represents an important focus in the discussion that follows.
For ease of explanation, the literature reviewed in this section is considered under six 
broad categories which pull together similar strands of argument. Some interpretations
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may be consistent with more than one category, and it may be that several sub­
categories could be created. Furthermore, many of the explanations reviewed here were 
not directly intended to explain deindustrialisation, but are included because they make 
a contribution to understanding the processes involved. The categories then, are not 
definitive, but hopefully provide some coherence to this review. Where possible, 
London based research has been used to highlight the relevance of the different 
interpretations of deindustrialisation.
Structural explanations.
The structural explanations have featured widely in the literature reviewed and are 
particularly associated with the work of Fothergill and Gudgin (Fothergill, Gudgin, 
1982; 1983; Fothergill et al., 1985; 1986). The impetus behind Fothergill and Gudgin’s 
study was the belief that spatial patterns of deindustrialisation could not be explained by 
traditional means; for example in terms of agglomeration economies, classical industrial 
location theory, or the concept of cumulative causation. They developed a ‘structural 
explanation’ of regional growth and decline in manufacturing activity based on three 
characteristics - industrial structure, urban structure, and the size structure of firms. 
Unequal Growth (Fothergill, Gudgin, 1982) observed a pattern of spatial economic 
restructuring in Britain that was more complex than a simple North-South divide and in 
which important inter- and intra-regional differences could be identified. The three 
structural characteristics defined by Fothergill and Gudgin have been discussed by other 
authors and are examined in turn below.
The central idea underpinning the industrial structure explanation of geographical 
differences in industrial performance is simply that the nature of industrial change in 
any area will depend upon its particular industrial mix and the proportion of this mix 
which is expanding or contracting in the national economy (Wood, 1991; Buck et al., 
1992; Keeble, 1987). As Fothergill and Gudgin point out, “the growth of the market, 
international competition and technical progress do not affect all industries in the same 
way” (Fothergill, Gudgin, 1982, 48). Thus, variations in the performance of individual 
industries nationally are thought to yield an important influence over the geography of 
manufacturing change.
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However, industrial structure has been largely dismissed as a single viable explanation 
for manufacturing change (Fothergill, Gudgin, 1982,1983; Goddard, 1983; Buck et al., 
1986; Keeble et al., 1983). Using shift-share analysis, Fothergill and Gudgin (1982) 
have shown that for most UK regions the link between actual manufacturing 
employment change and the favourability of a region’s industrial structure appeared
tenuous. Several observations confirmed this conclusion. First, it was shown that the 
influence of industrial structure had diminished through time, largely due to the fact that 
employment was declining nationally in almost all manufacturing sectors, and hence 
rates of employment change had become much more alike. Second, it was discovered 
that even those areas with a favourable industrial mix had often experienced severe 
manufacturing employment decline, and this has in particular been a feature of results 
reported for London (Dennis, 1978; Elias, Keogh, 1982; Gripaios, 1977a; Buck et al., 
1986; LPAC, 1988a). However, perhaps the most important finding was that industrial 
structure could not explain the differences between urban and rural areas in their 
manufacturing performance. At the sub-regional level, similar industrial structures were 
producing very different outcomes of change.
This led Fothergill and Gudgin to consider spatial patterns of manufacturing change at 
the sub-regional level. Along with several other authors, they observed that while urban 
areas have experienced severe manufacturing employment decline, rural areas and small 
towns have often expanded manufacturing employment. Furthermore, this urban-rural 
shift, as it came to be known, appeared to be spatially consistent. To quote Fothergill et 
al. (1985), “across the whole urban hierarchy manufacturing employment change has 
been related to settlement size, as a general rule, the bigger the settlement the greater 
the decline” (Fothergill et al., 1985). The fact that this urban rural contrast was not 
unique to the United Kingdom, and could be identified in almost all advanced industrial 
countries despite differences in macro-economic climate, implied that the relative 
economic decline of Britain could not explain spatial processes of manufacturing 
change. (Keeble, 1980; Keeble et al., 1983) It seemed that “urban decline may be both a 
cause and effect of deindustrialisation” (Goddard, 1983, 2).
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Fothergill and Gudgin identified four main characteristics of this urban rural contrast. 
First, that industrial decentralisation played a minor role in urban and rural differences. 
Second, the location of expansion and growth, rather than the location of contraction, 
differentiated cities from small towns and rural areas. Third, it was found that the urban- 
rural manufacturing shift was more pronounced if larger rather than smaller firms were 
examined, and was also more easily identifiable amongst firms with higher capital 
intensity. Finally, a further important observation was that urban areas often 
experienced industrial trends in an inversely proportionate cycle to the rest of the 
country. For example, Buck et al. (1986) observed that when “manufacturing is 
contracting nationally, London’s differential job losses appear to diminish and in times 
of general employment growth London tends to lag behind the rest of the country” 
(Buck et al., 1986, 67).
These observations provided a basis upon which industrial decline could be linked to 
the nature of the industrial environment. Fothergill and Gudgin (1982) developed a 
theoretical explanation, entitled the space constraint thesis, which cited the spatial 
structure of urban areas as a primary causal influence in the urban-rural manufacturing 
shift. They argued that employment densities, defined as the number of workers per unit 
of floorspace, had been falling over the post-war period as competition amongst firms 
has induced pressure to replace labour with capital. Specifically, they argued that the 
“pressures encouraging the introduction of new methods affect urban and rural localities 
alike, so that firms in all types of area experience a reduction in employment density” 
(Fothergill et al., 1985,15). Over the same period the national demand for 
manufacturing land and floorspace had grown to accommodate the increase in capital 
use. However, because cities are densely built up environments where alternative uses 
compete for a fixed supply of land, Fothergill and Gudgin argued that they could not 
match the room for expansion in small towns and rural areas. Urban structure then was 
thought to play a restrictive role, since firms wishing to expand either have to forgo the 
possibility of growth or undertake production in an alternative location. In rural areas 
and small towns possibilities for expansion are much greater, and as employment losses 
are occurring through capital intensification, as indicated by falling employment 
densities, these losses can be more than offset by industrial expansion.
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Applying this hypothesis to the Greater London conurbation it was argued that the 
proportion of factories with no room for expansion could be assumed close to 100% due 
to “the density of development, the high cost of land and the stringent restrictions on 
building on the edge of the greenbelt” (Fothergill, Gudgin, 1983, 29). Hence, they 
concluded that these physical constraints, against a backdrop of falling employment 
densities, could provide “a total explanation for the decline of London’s manufacturing 
employment” (Fothergill, Gudgin, 1983, 39). Many authors have lent support to the 
urban constraint theory (Buck et al., 1986; LPAC, 1988a; Wood, 1986a; Gordon, 
Harloe, 1991; Cowan, Gordon, 1993; Keeble, 1983). In fact, Keeble (1983) found that 
the scale and degree of urban development was directly related to industrial 
employment decline throughout the European Community.
Two main criticisms may be levelled at Fothergill and Gudgin’s space constraint thesis. 
First, it was empirically tested largely on the basis of employment data, and a decline in 
labour demand does not necessarily represent industrial decline. Fothergill and Gudgin 
did not address this issue and the urban rural shift was largely an employment based 
distinction. Second, a systematic description of the types of urban constraints in the 
built environment is missing from Fothergill and Gudgin’s analysis. Fothergill et al. 
(1985) assumed that the possible impact of urban constraints upon the expansion of 
London firms was 100%, they did not, and possibly could not, provide empirical 
evidence to support this. Vacant land does exist in cities, and the majority of urban 
areas have industrial land for release controlled by city planning authorities. Also in 
rural areas and small towns, planning restrictions relating to greenbelt and countryside 
around towns may place important restrictions on the supply of land for industry. The 
possibility remains that land supply for industry may not be quite as physically 
constrained in every urban area, and quite as plentiful in small towns and rural areas, as 
Fothergill and Gudgin have argued.
The final ‘structural’ component proposed by Fothergill and Gudgin (1982; 1983) 
related to the size structure of firms. They argued that small firm formation has a good 
rate of job creation in the long and medium term because these types of firms tended to 
achieve substantial growth even after their very early years, and could be established in 
large numbers. Fothergill and Gudgin (1982) also found that rates of new firm
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formation were higher in rural rather than urban areas. Spatial differentials in growth 
rates however were not entirely urban-rural, and the authors also found higher rates of 
formation declined rapidly as the proportion of employees working in large plants 
increased.
The ‘structural’ explanation, therefore, proposes that these three broad influences have 
been instrumental in causing the unequal growth of regions. A fourth factor, regional 
policy, is often also considered, however it has not been reviewed here as it is discussed 
under another category heading in this section. Two final points about this interpretation 
should be stressed. First, the three structural characteristics often combine to produce 
effects in a conflicting manner. London provides a good example. As mentioned earlier, 
industrial growth in London could have been assumed given its very favourable 
industrial mix. The space constraint thesis, on the other hand, would suggest that the 
capital should experience relative industrial decline. The second point is that the 
influence of each structural component on industrial decline is likely to vary over time. 
For example, the effects of industrial mix lessened over time as manufacturing 
employment decline rates converged for most sectors. Likewise, the influence of urban 
structure varies over time, being most effectual during periods of relative national 
economic growth. The implication of this is that the urban rural manufacturing contrast 
will be more prominent at some times than others (Fothergill et al., 1985).
Cost based explanations of manufacturing change
The cost based explanations seek to explain intra-regional manufacturing location, and 
the urban-rural shift, through differences in the costs of production. The argument is 
simple. To quote Keeble et al. (1983), metropolitan industrial decline can be linked to 
the “substantially higher operating costs for manufacturing in urban centres, with 
consequences for firm profitability, competitiveness and employment change” (Keeble 
et a l., 1983, 46). These higher operating costs are thought to exist in wages and 
salaries, factor rents and rates (Keeble et al., 1983), industrial land costs (LPAC, 1988a) 
(Scott, 1988), and transport costs (Fingleton, Tyler, 1990).
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Much of the research into cost based explanations has focused on London. Fingleton 
and Tyler (1990) modelled industrial movement from London under the assumption 
that the individual firm will choose from a number of alternative locations to achieve 
maximum utility. Controlling for the ‘known influences’ on the movement of 
companies, which included geographic variations in industrial costs and the strength of 
urban and regional policy, the authors showed that companies leaving London and the 
South East over the period 1972-81 were attracted by the lower costs of alternative 
location, but only where these locations were in counties adjacent to London or the 
South East. Costs were therefore thought to vary between locations with important 
implications for urban industrial decline.
The conclusion reached by Fingleton and Tyler (1990) supports the findings of other 
London research. Keeble (1987) estimated that production cost differences between 
London and surrounding rural areas were equivalent to over 30 percent of gross profits 
for the industries studied. Cowan and Gordon (1993) found “substantial evidence that 
for a range of manufacturing industries labour, land, energy, and transport costs 
together are higher in London than in many other locations” (Cowan, Gordon, 1993,
26). LPAC (1988a) actually identified cost gradients for industrial land rents and rates 
and wages and salaries, finding gradients to be steepest in central London and falling 
gradually with distance outwards. The potential consequences of higher costs in 
London were argued to be the decentralisation of London manufacturing, and 
cumulative decline as the higher costs of London are absorbed within the firm, either 
through higher costs for goods which reduces competitiveness, or through a reduction in 
profit which results in less investment in the firm.
A number of criticisms of cost based explanations of urban manufacturing decline have 
been set out in the literature (Fothergill, Gudgin, 1982; Fothergill et al., 1985; Buck et al.,
, 1986; Scott, 1982). It has been argued that within Britain costs do not vary substantially 
from place to place. In addition, cost variations themselves, with the exception of industrial 
j land costs and property rentals, are not found to be systematically urban-rural. For 
i example, labour cost in London may be high, but perhaps no greater than in the Rest-of- 
the-South-East (ROSE), and wages and salaries paid for manufacturing occupations often 
vary considerably within the same locality dependant on the firm. In
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fact Scott (1982) even argues that demands for wage increases are likely to be higher in 
rural areas than in cities because these areas are not as accessible and so have a thinner 
local labour market and hence restricted supply of labour. It is also thought that 
transport costs now make up such a small proportion of total production costs, that 
access to motorway junctions in rural areas is unlikely to be a cost factor relevant to 
industrial location.
The importance of cost based explanations of deindustrialisation should not be 
disregarded. As Fothergill et al. (1985) point out, cost explanations, “cannot be ruled 
out. In certain areas and at certain times, it is likely that each plays a part in generating 
urban rural differences in employment trends” (Fothergill et al., 1985,11). One of the 
main difficulties with cost based explanations is that difference of opinion exists over 
how costs actually vary spatially. If however, the studies which show systematic urban 
rural differences are correct, then cost based explanations may provide an important 
influence in urban deindustrialisation, particularly in terms of the location of expansion 
and growth which the structural explanation cited as the most important determinant of 
the urban rural contrast.
The changing influence of spatial external economies and labour supply factors.
Shifts in the intra-regional location of manufacturing can be linked to changes in the 
nature of spatial external economies, which in this context refer to economic benefits or 
dis-benefits which accrue to industry through concentration and spatial proximity. The 
most commonly discussed spatial external economies are agglomeration economies 
which describe the productive advantages of spatial concentration in urban areas 
resulting from scale economies (Mills, 1972; Richardson, 1978a, Vickerman; 1984). In 
much of the geographical literature it has been argued that urban agglomeration 
economies for manufacturing industries have largely disappeared (Wood, 1986a; Buck 
et al., 1986). In fact, other types of spatial economic externalities, agglomeration 
diseconomies, and what have been ’de-glomeration’ economies, are thought to have 
emerged (Scott, 1982; GLC, 1983; LPAC, 1988a). The consequences are that cities no 
longer possess the operating advantages for manufacturing that they used to, and indeed 
non-urban areas may now offer a considerably better environment for industry.
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The demise of agglomeration economies has been linked to such general trends as : the 
jmovement of skilled labour to the suburbs; the increased usage of roads rendering 
rural areas more accessible; increased congestion in established centres; and the 
disappearance of specialised suppliers and markets. These trends reduce the influence of 
forces which render manufacturing activity prone to agglomeration. Many London- 
based explanations for manufacturing decline have cited instances of how the influence 
of agglomeration economies may have changed to reduce the comparative advantage of 
the capital. Factors such as the size of London’s population, the large pool of technical 
and skilled manual labour, the important market in London for craft production of 
consumer goods, the location of head offices and control functions, and the port of 
London are though to have provided an impetus for production activity to be located in 
close proximity (Buck et al., 1986; Gripaios, 1977a; 1977b; Kennedy, 1991; Leigh et al, 
1982; Cowan, Gordon, 1993). However, as a result of technological advances in 
transport and industry “the role of these factors changed substantially, some largely 
disappeared, some provided a much less tenuous basis for location in London” (Buck et 
al., 1986, 60-61). As a result of this change in the ‘pull’ of agglomeration effects, 
manufacturing employment was displaced from London and the capital became less 
attractive for new investment.
The GLC (1983) went further, providing a list of specific metropolitan diseconomies, 
and what they termed de-glomeration economies. Amongst the metropolitan 
diseconomies they included factors such as : inadequate premises and sites; 
deteriorating city infrastructure; traffic congestion and problems of access; old and 
obsolete plant and equipment; high land costs, rents and rates; a shortage of appropriate 
labour; a high incidence of labour poaching; an unpleasant residential environment; and 
city planning restrictions. The de-glomeration economies offered in rural areas were 
thought to include : the availability of space; the availability of cheap land, rents and 
rates; access to skilled labour; government grants; and a pleasant residential 
environment.
However, the question remains as to why the nature of spatial external economies 
changed in the first place. In the literature, transformations in industrial production and
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structure in the post-war era are often cited as important explanations (Buck et al., 1986; 
Hall, 1989a; Scott, 1982). It is argued that cross-industry interactions were central to 
agglomeration economies, so that the individual firm located not only near resources, 
but also close to other firms that could supply inputs to their productive processes. 
Through metropolitan growth, vertical and horizontal industrial linkages emerged, 
where the former represent the linkages of firms engaged in successive stages of the 
productive processes, and the latter linkage of firms producing inputs for other 
assembly industries.
Post war industrial change, it is thought, has transformed the nature of the productive 
process such that these linkages, and thus agglomeration, are increasingly unimportant 
for certain types of manufacturing. For example, Scott (1982) proposes a theory of 
intra-urban locational processes comprising two basic phenomena. First he describes a 
tendency for small labour intensive firms to cluster together at the centre of the 
metropolitan labour market for reasons of transport costs, industrial linkages, labour 
market accessibility, and the presence of a large market. Second, he describes a trend in 
large capital intensive firms to seek out cheap land inputs at relatively inaccessible 
peripheral locations. In this respect, Scott makes an important distinction between those 
firms which have ‘escaped’ the need for agglomeration economies offered in cities, and 
those firms which have not. The identification of these contemporary manufacturing 
locational processes reflect the observation made in Fothergill and Gudgin’s work that 
small firms were relatively unaffected by the urban rural shift and that it was the most 
capital intensive firms that were prone to this contrast.
Other authors have pursued similar themes with respect to changing locational 
requirements that have arisen through reindustrialisation and the growth of high- 
technology sectors. As mentioned previously, reindustrialisation has been used to 
describe a broad structural economic shift, however it is also argued the growth of new 
manufacturing sectors may “generate their own spatial patterns, underlying the process 
of shifting industrialisation” (Jones, Wild, 1991, 5). For example, Hall (1985) argues 
that the locational requirements of high technology industries are very different from 
those of the traditional industries which located in older industrial areas. “New 
industries may positively seek to avoid older industrial areas” (Hall, 1985, 14) and one
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reason for this is that older industrial cities have a number of disadvantages, including 
ageing infrastructure, a depressing physical environment, poor transport linkages, and a 
lack of innovative entrepreneurship.
Fingleton (1994) believes that London has undergone a process o f ‘delocalisation’ in 
high-technology industry over the 1980s. He suggested in an earlier paper (1992) that 
the factors accounting for the distribution of high-technology industry are to a 
considerable extent the same as factors which account for the distribution of industry 
generally. To explain London’s decline in high-technology jobs, Fingleton (1994) 
argued that London’s particular high-technology industries were at a very mature stage 
of the product cycle and had much more in common with manufacturing in general, for 
which London was increasingly an unsuitable location.
However, it is not only the negative aspects of cities which determine spatial patterns of 
re-industrialisation. One of the most frequently cited factors affecting the location of 
‘new’ growth industries are changing labour force requirements. The spatial distribution 
of reindustrialisation can be partly explained by the change in location of labour 
demand and supply, where firms, or disintegrated parts of firms, move from urban to 
rural areas to exploit the plentiful, highly skilled, mobile, and often less unionised and 
militant labour (Hall, 1989a; Keeble et al., 1983; Keeble, 1987). Industrial restructuring 
through productivity growth may have led to the depletion of many unskilled and semi 
skilled jobs. If so then the labour demands of industry are increasingly orientated 
towards skilled workers, and the location of this type of labour is thought to have 
shifted through trends of counter-urbanisation in the population.
Fothergill and Gudgin (1982) rejected the location of labour supply as a prime 
determinant in the urban-rural shift. They argued that two main difficulties arise in 
attempting to explain deindustrialisation in terms of labour supply and demand. First, 
that labour has always been available in the conurbations that have experienced 
industrial decline. Second, that levels of militancy and unionisation cannot be 
generalised across all manufacturing sectors since some industries are more strike prone 
than others. Furthermore, strike activity varies spatially, and while London’s strike
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activity was well below the national average the capital still experienced the most 
severe industrial decline.
The points raised by Fothergill and Gudgin still do not allow a dismissal of the 
importance of labour-related factors in relation to the industrial decline of cities. 
Although Fothergill and Gudgin argue that labour has always been available in the large 
conurbations, they do not consider supply in relation to the skills demanded by modem 
industry. The GLC (1983) survey cited shortage of appropriate labour as an important 
concern amongst industries in inner London, and cheaper labour was also shown to be 
an important factor in choosing a location outside the capital. Labour factors therefore 
may provide important components in the industrial location decision and hence may 
influence the distribution of industrial activity.
In addition to labour-related factors Hall (1985) cites access to the intellectual external 
economies of universities and R&D, and a high amenity physical environment, as 
important requirements for newer industries. The essential point is that changing 
locational requirements brought about through broad changes in the structure of 
industry may be central to the urban rural shift with re-industrialisation occurring 
outside the largest urban areas and around major infrastructure routes, while 
deindustrialisation continues at a severe pace in the cities (Hall et al., 1987; Keeble, 
1991).
The changing nature of external economies provides an explanation for why 
manufacturing may not be tied to urban centres, and also why an urban rural contrast 
has been observed. However, the literature discussed here has often not been able to 
prove cause and effect and in fact the conclusions reached are not consistent with many 
other studies. For example, in the case of London, Crampton and Evans (1992) have 
argued that changing external economies cannot explain all of London’s manufacturing 
decline because London has declined at such a faster rate than other cities. Furthermore, 
all manufacturing sectors in London have declined, yet there is little evidence to show 
that agglomeration benefits have been reduced in all industrial sectors. However, 
external economies do raise a number of issues that may be of importance in observed 
patterns of industrial decline.
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The reorganisation of production and spatial changes in manufacturing activity.
The common characteristic of the following approaches to deindustrialisation is that 
emphasis is placed not on attempting to identify and then explain spatial processes of 
change but on understanding the social and economic restructuring processes 
underlying industrial change, and how these have been manifest in spatial patterns.
The first analyses of this type were associated with the ‘political economy’ or Marxist 
approach to economic geography. Massey and Meegan (1978) explored national trends 
in the reorganisation of capital in relation to the employment decline of cities. They 
regarded urban deindustrialisation as being part of the “wider phenomenon of 
contraction and change in the UK economy” (Massey, Meegan, 1978, 273). They 
distinguished between two major types of employment change at the national level - an 
absolute change, in which new jobs were created or disappeared altogether, and a 
locational change, in which the geographical location of production was shifted so that 
loss or gain was specific to a particular area of the country. They found that for the 
inner cities of Britain, the majority of jobs lost were due to either closure of firms or 
capacity cuts at the national level, with little locational change involved. The authors 
developed this research further examining different economic processes of 
intensification, rationalisation, and investment and technical change, which led to job 
loss (Massey, Meegan, 1982). This research was not city orientated, however, they 
argued that to understand the geography of employment decline generally, analysis 
would have to go beyond spatial patterns of employment change to the processes of 
production change which actually gave rise to job losses.
Perhaps the most prominent publication of the political economy approach is by Massey
(1984). Again, this research was not city orientated and its methodological approach 
echoed the earlier works of Massey and Meegan. Massey argued that spatial and social 
processes were inseparable and that in “order to understand a spatial pattern we must go 
behind it and interpret it in terms of the structures and processes upon which it is based” 
(Massey, 1984, 67). Massey examined changes in the organisation of production and 
argued that one manifestation of these changes could be identified in new geographical
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structures of production. Spatial aspects of deindustrialisation were documented, from 
patterns resulting from the old spatial divisions of labour which were based upon 
sectoral composition and contrasts between industries, to patterns based on the new 
spatial divisions of labour where the spatial structure of production of individual firms 
had become the dominant force in creating geographical patterns of industrial change.
With the exception of Massey and Meegan (1978) this research has had less to say 
about urban deindustrialisation. However, the importance of it is that spatial patterns of 
manufacturing change generally may be understood, not simply by specific locational 
factors, but by the reorganisation of production at levels above the urban-region. This is 
in contrast to other explanations outlined in this chapter which emphasise city-specific 
factors in decline. In particular, Massey and Meegan (1978; 1982) have stressed the 
deficiencies of research that dismisses the importance of national factors in terms of 
industrial structure. The use of employment data in regional shift share analysis they 
argue, excludes the importance of productive reorganisation at the national level as a 
structural influence and thus over-states the importance of ‘locational’ factors. For 
example, some areas such as London which appear to possess a favourable industrial 
structure, might still suffer from an excessive share of the declining or vulnerable parts 
of those industries.
The work of Markusen (1985) is also relevant to this broad category of explanation. 
Markusen was not specifically concerned with urban deindustrialisation but was instead 
seeking to explain historical trends in the economic and employment fortunes of 
regions. Adopting a long-term perspective, Markusen argued that the evolution of 
different industrial sectors through sequential stages of profit cycle was central to the 
spatial patterns of economic development arising from structural economic change, and 
also to contemporary regional disparities. For any industrial sector, Markusen identified 
five stages in the profit cycle. First, the zero-profit stage, which corresponds to the birth 
and design of an industry and is characterised by extremely low levels of output and 
employment, and by an extremely small number of firms. Second, is the super-profit 
stage, in which the new industries benefit from the absence of immediate competition 
and the possession of innovative edge, leading to the rapid growth of employment and 
output in a small number of firms. Jobs generated in this second stage will tend to be
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within professional and technical occupations. Third, is the normal-profits stage, in 
which the entry of a sufficient number of firms into the market induces normal 
competition and the firms move towards cost reduction and seek optimal scale 
production. Output and employment will continue to grow over this stage, although at a 
slower rate than before, and increasing mechanisation favours a relative increase in 
managerial and production worker occupations as opposed to professional and technical 
jobs. The fourth stage is the normal-plus or normal-minus profit stage, in which either 
excessive oligopalisation sets in through firm closure and take-overs leading to a boost 
of profits for a small number of firms, or, excessive competition induces a reduction in 
profits. The former process may result in some job growth if output continues to 
expand, the latter will inevitably lead to some degree of employment decline through 
rationalisation and closure. Finally, is the negative profit stage, in which the industry 
experiences obsolescence, leading to the outright closure of plants and firms and 
excessive output and employment decline. Plant closure may be selective to some 
extent, particularly affecting older plants and those operating below capacity.
Markusen specifies typical sequential spatial patterns that arise at different stage in the 
profit cycle. Initially the industry will tend to be highly concentrated in one or a few 
localities, which, with the advent of super-profits, will emerge as agglomerations as the 
growing firms seek proximity in order to share skilled labour markets, locate near to 
innovative activity, be able to access new information, and be able to enjoy functional 
specialisation. Next, during the normal profits stage, firms will grow in size and 
diminish in numbers and there will be a strong tendency towards dispersion of parts the 
industry to market locations and also to areas with cheaper land and labour as cost 
cutting becomes necessary. This type of dispersion will generally lead to industrial 
expansion in regions remote from the original industrial core. In the fourth stage of the 
profit cycle, the dispersion trend may actually be retarded if oligopalisation sets in at an 
early stage in which firms are highly concentrated in a few regions. This is because the 
slowdown in the rate of growth of output may favour centripetal rather than centrifugal 
development patterns, due to a tendency to over-develop existing locations while 
slowing growth elsewhere. However, in later stages, it is likely that successful 
unionisation in established industrial regions will accelerate the dispersion of 
production. Markusen notes that when this latter trend occurs “hand in hand with cuts in
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output or with significant new plant scale and technology, the aggregate spatial outcome 
will be relocation” (Markusen, 1985,47). In the final stage of the profit cycle, 
corporations close down production or move to cheaper sites, in what Markusen refers 
to as abandonment.
Markusen argued that for any region, the stage of its industries in the profit cycle is of 
critical importance because factor availability and factor demand are not distributed 
evenly across regions, and thus particular localities are more or less attractive to 
industries dependent on their stage in the product cycle. As regards spatial patterns of 
deindustrialisation, the importance of this is that “the current growth experience in each 
region is a function of the point at which it became an original host for an industry. 
Regions whose major industries are now in the fourth or fifth stages of the profit cycle 
should be experiencing slow or negative growth and unemployment, while regions that 
have hosted first- or second-stage industries should be experiencing the opposite” 
(Markusen, 1985,48). Markusen points out that any region should ultimately expect 
major industries to become job losers as they reach latter stages in the profit cycle. 
However, it is not only aggregate employment effects that may arise in this way. Profit 
cycles would also influence the occupational structure of regions, depending on the 
specific composition of labour demand at any point in the cycle for particular industries.
In this way, Markusen was able to explain the spatial pattern of manufacturing change 
and was able to approach the issue of deindustrialisation in the US regions, while 
rejecting previous explanations which had focused largely on the importance of spatial 
attributes alone. The author pointed out that the profit cycle framework is most relevant 
to those regions that are dependent upon a single or small number of industries, but the 
central message is that “the rise and fall of employment over time is a quite normal 
experience.” (Markusen, 1985, 275) The importance of the explanation is the way in 
which it regards the spatial outcomes of economic change not as a primary function of 
geographical location, but as an expression of the interplay of forces determined 
through socio-economic non-spatial processes.
The third approach to be discussed in this section are the post-Fordist theoretical 
perspectives which were introduced in section 2.2 above. Again, these do not directly
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attempt to explain spatial patterns of manufacturing change. Rather, they seek to 
describe contemporary processes of industrial restructuring in advanced industrial 
societies. However, two important components of this restructuring are relevant to 
geographical expressions of deindustrialisation. First, the decline of Fordism is thought 
to have a specifically spatial consequence evident in the deindustrialisation of cities 
(Martin, 1988; Esser, Hirsch, 1989; Scott, 1988). The emergence of Fordism caused 
industrial regions to grow across Europe within which urban agglomerations grew to 
house workers (Scott, 1988). The ‘crisis’ of Fordism is therefore seen as a ‘crisis’ of the 
Fordist settlement because cities were the centres of this type of economic organisation 
(Esser, Hirsch, 1989). The transition from Fordism to post-Fordism is ongoing, and as 
such the process of metropolitan industrial decline is also thought likely to continue.
The second spatial component of these theories relates to the location of new forms of 
production. It is argued that the types of flexible accumulation which have emerged in 
the post-Fordist era are not driven by internal economies of scale, but are characterised 
by vertical and horizontal disintegration of the productive process (Martin, 1988; Scott, 
1988). As a result of this disintegration, external economies are thought to emerge 
through input output association, leading to the formation of ‘new’ agglomeration 
economies which have in turn induced the emergence of ‘new industrial spaces’ 
(Martin, 1988; Scott, 1988). These include both enclaves within older industrial 
regions, including many inner city areas with revitalised craft, clothing and furniture, 
but more importantly in divergent sun belts in former peripheral or semi peripheral 
zones bordering the old core regions of Fordist industrialisation. These two types of 
location are essentially the same as the pattern as that proposed by Scott (1982), and are 
consistent with observations made by Fothergill and Gudgin. In essence, some small 
industries are growing in the city within the overall context of decline, while at the 
same time the ‘sunbelt’ high technology capital intensive industries are expanding in 
more dispersed areas leading to an emphasis of the urban rural contrast.
The brief review of post-Fordism presented here has therefore raises two main points 
that are relevant to deindustrialisation. First, that the decline of manufacturing in the 
conurbations can be seen in light of changes in the organisation of economic activity.
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Second, that new modes of economic organisation may play an important role in the 
urban rural manufacturing contrast.
However, a number of criticisms of the post-Fordist theoretical framework have been 
outlined in the literature (Lovering, 1990; 1991; Sayer, 1989; Harloe, Fainstein, 1992). 
Difficulties have been encountered in even attempting a comprehensive description of 
what Fordism or post-Fordism actually represent. The post-Fordism perspective 
assumes that the importance of Fordism is declining, but that in the present transition it 
still represents an important economic sector. However, Sayer (1989) points out that if 
Fordism consists of a labour process involved with moving assembly line mass 
production, then recent studies have shown it to be of minor significance, employing as 
little as 700,000 of the total UK workforce of 20.4 million (3.4%) (Sayer, 1989, 867). 
Other criticisms have been aimed at the assumption that Fordist industries are declining, 
and that post-Fordist industries represent a growth sector. Harloe and Fainstein (1992) 
argue that some industries based on the principles of Fordist organisation are actually 
growing. Furthermore, industries associated with post-Fordism such as the high 
technology sectors do not necessarily generate employment growth, and indeed often 
contribute to the process of deindustrialisation (Hall et al., 1987).
A further assumption implicit in the post-Fordist theoretical model is that the adoption 
of new technologies consistent with a flexible mode of production are widespread, and 
that new industrial spaces have emerged. In fact the adoption of new technologies is 
unlikely to be as common as is often claimed (Harloe, Fainstein, 1992). Lovering 
(1990) notes that “the GLC study of London industries found little evidence of any 
widespread move to flexible specialisation” (Lovering, 1990,163). Likewise, the 
emergence of new industrial spaces and post-Fordist agglomeration economies are 
thought to have been very modest having little impact on the industrial geography of 
Britain’s regions (Lovering, 1990).
When applied to the concept of deindustrialisation, limitations of post-Fordist theory 
become apparent. In particular, the idea of a move to a flexible mode of production 
cannot explain properly observed patterns of deindustrialisation. In the first place, this
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shift may not have been evident to the extent that is often implied, and second, even 
those industries that have undergone the shift are part of the general trend of decline.
The global city hypothesis of manufacturing change.
The global city hypothesis has examined the changing position of some of the world’s 
major cities within the overall urban hierarchy. Although the origins of the concept of 
global cities can be traced back to early work by Cohen (1981) and Friedman and 
Woolf (1982), Sassen (1991) provides the most detailed contemporary discussion of 
global cities. The starting point for her account of the new role for major cities in the
world economy is the transformations in international economic activity since the 
1960s, which have altered the structure of the world economy, creating the global 
dispersal of economic activity and the reorganisation of finance. Sassen argues that 
increased dispersal, along with continued economic command and control, have 
assumed forms specific to particular places. She says “Increased capital mobility does 
not only bring about changes in the geographic organisation of production and the 
network of financial markets. It also generates a demand for the types of production 
needed to ensure the management, control and servicing of this new organisation of 
production and finance” (Sassen, 1991, 23).
This demand is largely met in the world’s major cities which contain the 
telecommunications and advanced services which are the key inputs required for global 
control. This concentration in certain cities is actually fed by the globalization and 
dispersal of economic activity, processes which have induced the centralisation of high- 
order activities in suitable locations. The argument therefore stresses that dual spatial 
processes of dispersal and concentration have been occurring within global economic 
restructuring, with the geographic dispersal of production and the internationalisation of 
finance on the one hand, and the concentration in major cities of functions required to 
regulate these financial networks and spatially dispersed production sites on the other.
Sassen looks at three global cities - London, New York and Tokyo - where massive and 
parallel changes in function and economic base can be identified. These cities are set 
apart from their provincial counterparts largely due to their share of international
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financial flows, their high concentration of producer services, and their much greater 
global orientation. The same author (1994) argues that global cities now have more in 
common with one another than with their respective provincial centres.
In the present context, the specific aspect of the global city analysis that is relevant is 
the discussion of manufacturing change. While most global city analyses are not 
explicitly concerned with manufacturing, the reduction in its importance in the 
economy of major cities has received some attention. This is because pronounced 
declines in manufacturing employment have been observed in cities such as New York 
and particularly London; much greater declines than generally experienced in the 
provincial cities of the United States and Britain. The decline and counter-urbanisation 
of manufacturing industry are thought to be global tendencies, and global cities 
experience these tendencies in the most intense way.
Sassen (1991) argues that acute deindustrialisation in global cities can be explained by 
both general and specific factors. Generally, it can be linked to the decentralisation of 
manufacturing production from developed to less developed nations, the growth of 
international competition, declining productivity due to under-investment, and at certain 
times, foreign exchange rates that did not favour manufacturing exports. The specific 
reasons relate to aspects of intra-urban competition between activities, including 
inadequate space, higher land values, higher operating costs, constraints on expansion 
and so on. Sassen develops these specific reasons, explicitly linking the decline of urban 
manufacturing to the growth of the financial services, “one consequence of the 
extremely high level of profitability in the financial industry, for example, was the 
devalorisation of manufacturing as a sector’ (Sassen, 1994,18). Thus, it is argued that 
while the new international financial and producer services may not account for a large 
share of an urban economy, the possibilities for super profits in these sectors have the 
effect of ‘crowding out’ manufacturing through the re-valuing or re-pricing of certain 
economic activities and outcomes. “High prices and profits in the internationalised 
sector and its ancillary activities, such as the top-of-the-line restaurants and hotels, have 
made it increasingly difficult for other sectors to compete for space and investment” 
(Sassen, 1994, 50). The result is the downgrading and displacement of manufacturing, 
and a shift in investment from manufacturing to financial real estate.
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However, crowding out may not affect all manufacturing sectors. Sassen (1991) argues 
that high wage and high value added sectors, such as printing and publishing, high 
technology sectors, and telecommunications industries, may be slightly less prone to 
decline in global cities. Furthermore, while unionised shops have declined acutely, it is 
thought that sweatshops and industrial home-working are still common.
Several recent analyses of London economic change have broadly adopted a global city 
framework (Frost, Spence, 1991b; 1991c; 1993, Buck et al., 1991; Harloe, Fainstein, 
1991) in which the growth and decline of urban economic sectors are viewed as 
interdependent processes, often determined at a global level. Urban economic change, 
and the spatial manifestations of this change, are thought to be associated with the 
interaction of global processes giving rise to multiple economies within a single urban 
and regional space economy, and subsequently leading to competition for space and 
investment between different sectors of the economy.
The most important aspect of the interpretation of manufacturing decline expressed in 
the global city literature is therefore that it is a consequence of the growth of other 
sectors. Such a view is not exclusive to this particular literature. Previous explanations 
of urban deindustrialisation have often been founded on the concept of intra-urban 
competition, where manufacturing and service sectors are generally thought to compete 
in factor markets. As Hamilton (1991) remarks, “the deindustrialisation of London is a 
function of the inability of the materials-based sub system to compete for land, labour, 
services and infrastructure with the administrative information and finance service sub 
system” (Hamilton, 1991, 65). However, it is argued that while competition for space 
and investment between metropolitan activities has existed for many years, the global 
forces which induce the growth and decline of certain activities are thought to have 
intensified this process. (Harloe, Fainstein, 1991)
In sum, two related and specifically urban hypotheses of manufacturing decline can be 
defined within Sassen’s global city framework. First, that the expansion of London’s 
service industries is crowding out manufacturing in the capital because of competition
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for space and other factor inputs to production. Second, that certain manufacturing 
sectors may retain a comparative advantage by maintaining their operations in London.
Policy-related factors in deindustrialisation.
Finally, it is worth considering the effects of policies pursued by successive central and 
local governments. These are often thought to have influenced the scale and location of 
industrial activity at the inter- and intra-regional levels. Some policies, for example 
regional policy, have been formulated with the specific intention of influencing the 
distribution of industrial activity. Others, such as Comprehensive Development Area 
(CDA) procedure and New Towns policy, may not have been specifically intended to 
do so but have often had implications or outcomes in terms of industrial location and 
decline. It should be stressed here that policy-related factors cannot explain the 
underlying structural changes associated with deindustrialisation and are treated here as 
complementary factors rather than as fundamental causes.
Under British regional policy, ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ controls over industry were 
established to steer industry away from London and the Midlands towards the depressed 
areas of Britain, classified as assisted or development areas. The substance of these 
policies is described in Armstrong and Taylor (1985), Diamond and Spence (1983) and 
Hall( 1989b). Regional policy has been modified considerably over the years, and to 
some extent still exists today though in a very much diluted form, and the link between 
regional policy and industrial decline is relevant only in relation to certain areas of the 
country, and here the focus is on the London effect.
Two main effects of regional policy are often cited in relation to the industrial decline 
of London. First, is that firms may have moved away from London as a result of policy, 
and second, that the number of firms that would have located in London would have 
been larger, had regional policy not been exercised.
Research undertaken by Dennis (1978) and updated by the GLC (1983) considered the 
impact of regional policy on London. Dennis concluded that over the period 1966-74, 
only “9% of total employment decline (could) be attributed to movement to assisted
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areas by London firms” (Dennis, 1978, 67). The GLC (1983) found that over the period 
1976-80 the majority of London’s job loss was associated with moves to non 
development areas. In fact, it would appear that in terms of industrial movement 
regional policy has been a marginal influence. The assisted areas did not induce 
movement of London firms to any great extent, and South East destinations are thought 
to be associated with nearly 33% of London’s total job losses over the period 1976-80 
(GLC, 1983).
This still leaves the second policy effect defined above, the issue of how many jobs 
would have located in London in the absence of regional policy. Clearly, this is a very 
difficult effect to identify, and no specific research on this policy impact has been 
reviewed. However Buck et al. (1986) argue that this effect had a very minor impact, 
since “arguments advanced for decentralisation tend to suggest that companies would 
have ended up in the OMA anyway” (Buck et al., 1986, 75). This raises an important 
point about the effects of regional policy - they are not capable of explaining the urban 
rural manufacturing contrast. Until the 1980s, regional policy did not make a systematic 
distinction between urban and rural areas. Keeble (1980) notes that assisted area 
counties were dominated by rural areas, whereas non assisted areas were made up of 
chiefly urbanised areas. However, he found that it was rurality, not assisted area status, 
that was the prime factor influencing the pattern of industrial movement. The 
suggestion is that spatial trends in industrial decline were taking place despite the 
operations of regional policy, and this is supported by the fact that an urban rural shift 
can be observed in both assisted and non assisted areas (Fothergill et al., 1985; 1986; 
Fothergill Gudgin, 1982; Goddard, 1983).
Most authors argue that regional policy has had only a marginal impact on the industrial 
decline of London (Elias, Keogh, 1982; Gripaios, 1977a; 1977b; Goddard, 1983; Buck 
et al., 1986). Fothergill and Gudgin (1982) demonstrated this argument by showing that 
the total level of movement from London was no higher in the 1960s and early 1970s, 
when regional policy was active, than it was in the 1950s when it was not. 
Deindustrialisation and the urban rural shift occurred independently of regional policy, 
and this is consistent with the finding that other European countries experienced much
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the same trends in circumstances in which regional controls were not as sophisticated as 
those in Britain.
There are many ways in which urban planning policies could influence spatial industrial 
change. Mention has already been made earlier about the potential effects of greenbelt 
policy in terms of urban space constraints. Within the literature, attention has been 
focused upon policies relating to CDA procedure and planned decentralisation.
Planning policies of the 1960s and early 1970s were aimed not only at the 
decentralisation of population, but also industrial manufacturing. As Dennis (1978) 
pointed out, “it was argued and is still is argued by some that this (industrial) decline 
would facilitate an improvement in environmental conditions, particularly housing 
conditions” (Dennis, 1978, 63). The Greater London conurbation was the subject of the 
most intense urban policy (Dennis, 1978, Fingleton, Tyler, 1990) of which two main 
effects upon industrial decline may be defined. First, a ‘push’ element, where 
redevelopment programmes of local authorities pushed industry out of the inner city. 
Hebbert (1991) argues that the housing policy pursued by the GLC, which focused on 
redeveloping the inner city contributed to economic decline through “the extinction of
manufacturing activity within the nineteenth century street” (Hebbert, 1991, 107). In 
addition to comprehensive redevelopment, development control policies pursued by 
local authorities often inhibited extensions to existing premises and sites (Dennis,
1978). Second is a ‘puli’ element, which the attraction of new towns and overspill 
towns often having new factory floorspace, provided.
Research undertaken by Dennis (1978) into industrial decline in London, found that the 
second potential effect of urban policy, the pull element of new towns, could only 
account for 7% of the decline in manufacturing employment over the period 1966-74. 
However, Dennis argued that the CDA procedure and development control policies 
pursued by local planning authorities had been instrumental in the industrial decline of 
London. Dennis shows that in some areas up to as much as 23% of factory demolition 
can be attributed to redevelopment. The negligible importance which Dennis accorded 
the pull element induced by new and expanded towns has been disputed by more recent 
studies (LPAC, 1988a; Fingleton, Tyler, 1990). However, this particular effect is 
extremely difficult to quantify or examine.
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Deindustrialisation and the urban rural contrast cannot be explained solely by the effects 
of planning policies. Despite policy changes in the 1970s, aimed at regenerating urban 
areas through employment and population growth, the industrial decline of cities 
continued even though decentralisation was not encouraged and new town development 
was phased out. Furthermore, planning policies pursued since the 1970s have often 
been in conflict with patterns of deindustrialisation since the growth of industry in small 
towns and rural areas is frequently discouraged.
2.4 Conclusions.
This chapter has reviewed contemporary theories on why deindustrialisation and 
structural economic change happens to advanced nations, and it has shown that 
processes underlying observed spatial patterns in manufacturing change have been 
theorised in many different ways. One consistent aspect in the theories reviewed is the 
focus on severe absolute and relative urban deindustrialisation. In the perspectives 
outlined above, manufacturing in cities is largely viewed as being in terminal decline, 
and the explanations have not emphasised the importance of manufacturing in cities 
today. Cities it would seem are no longer viable locations for manufacturing industry.
The review of this literature provides a context based in existing wisdom within which 
results generated in this thesis can be understood. It also provides a background against 
which the importance of planning controls for urban manufacturing change can be 
demonstrated, and it is to this task that the next chapter turns.
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Chapter 3 : The planning system and manufacturing change : land use regulation 
and deindustrialisation.
3.0 Introduction.
The following chapter demonstrates the potential importance of land use planning 
controls for manufacturing employment change in London and illustrates the relevance 
of such controls with respect to the theoretical perspectives reviewed in chapter two.
The chapter begins by defining the scope of land use planning that is of concern in the 
thesis. Section 3.2 then provides a discussion of the general significance of planning for 
land use change. The chapter proceeds in section 3.3 to consider the pursuit of 
‘employment protection policies’ by LPAs, and to emphasise the importance of these 
policies for manufacturing employment by reflecting on some recent deregulation 
measures made to the planning system. The substantive and theoretical relevance of 
employment protection policies are then outlined before conclusions are drawn in 
section 3.5.
3.1 The scope of land use planning considered in the thesis.
It is important at the outset to define the scope of ‘land use planning’ considered in this 
thesis. A wide spectrum of activities may conceivably be defined within the general 
concept of planning, many of which are not provided for in the principal Town and 
Country Planning Acts. These could range from the economic development or housing 
initiatives undertaken by local authorities, to the activities of Urban Development 
Corporations, New Town Development Corporations and National Park authorities 
(Bruton and Nicholson, 1987). In this thesis, the concern is with the activities of 
borough planning authorities in London over the 1980s within the statutory land use 
planning system which has been established since 1947, and in principal comprises the 
two related components of development plans and development control. As this chapter 
will show, the main substantive focus is on if, and how, London Borough LPAs have 
used development control powers to protect manufacturing jobs. The borough LPAs are 
not the only agents that have been involved in the planning of London over the 1980s, 
however, they are those most directly involved in the control of development within
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London, and thus are the authorities best placed to actually manipulate development 
control powers towards defined objectives. It is therefore not by choice that the focus is 
on statutory land use regulation at the borough level, but because it is through this 
means that the policies to be examined in this thesis are executed.
The arrangements for land use planning in London over the 1980s, although unique in 
terms of the institutions involved, essentially comprise the same basic components as 
the British planning system generally. Several authors have provided excellent, and 
subsequently standard, accounts of British planning at various stages in its evolution. 
These range from discussions of the statutory and administrative frameworks and 
general practices of town planning (Cullingworth, Nadin, 1994; Ratcliffe, 1988; Rydin, 
1993; Hall, 1989b; Nuffield, 1986), to studies of more specific planning functions 
(Bruton, Nicholson, 1987; Healey, 1983; Healey et al., 1988; Glasson, 1978), to the 
technical accounts of the actual changing legal framework which permits the practice of 
Town and Country Planning (Grant, 1982; Grant, Heap, 1991; Heap, 1991; Purdue, 
Young, Rowan-Robinson, 1989; Telling, Duxbury, 1993). This literature is relevant to 
the London case, however, recent discussions of the arrangements specific to London 
may be found in Simmie (1994), Burnham et al. (1992), Gowling and Leith (1988) and 
Hall (1989a). Space does not permit a general discussion of the London planning system 
in this chapter, however a summary is provided in appendix two. It is considered far 
more useful here to focus on explaining why planning is important, rather than how it is 
conducted and administered in London, and the general discussion of the importance of 
land use planning and the description of employment protection policies that follows, 
adequately illustrate the issues that the thesis seeks to examine.
3.2 Planning and land use change : some general considerations.
The powers of development control enacted under the planning legislation allow LPAs 
to directly intervene in the ways in which land is used. This section seeks to 
demonstrate that these are considerable powers, which have major consequences for the 
composition of land uses in any area as well as for the actual value of land itself. The 
first main issue to be addressed concerns the fundamental effects that planning 
intervention may have. A useful starting point here is to outline the general rationale for
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intervention in the land and property market. The very existence of intervention implies 
that it has some importance, and discussion on a basic theoretical level provides a frame 
of reference within which one can understand the specific policies considered in this 
thesis.
The rationale for intervention in the land and property market has received a great deal 
of attention in the literature (Webber, 1969; Litchfield, 1979; Litchfield, Darin-Drabkin, 
1980; Harrison, 1977; Evans, 1985; Willis, 1980; Whitehead, 1983; Klosterman, 1985; 
Lee, 1981; Vickerman, 1984; Jensen-Butler, 1995). Essentially, the basic argument is 
that in the absence of a perfectly competitive market and an equitable distribution of 
resources a free market in land and property would be unlikely to allocate land to its 
most ‘efficient’ or desirable use. In fact it is thought that a number of ‘market failures’ 
would be likely to emerge in the free market which some form of intervention may be 
able to correct.
These market imperfections may take several forms. Those most commonly cited 
include negative externalities, the failure of supply of ‘public goods’ and ‘merit goods’, 
and the inequitable distribution of resources. It is worth briefly illustrating the relevance 
of these types of ‘failure’ with respect to the land and property development market. 
Negative externalities refer to external costs which arise from acts of production or 
consumption but are bome by those not directly involved in the decision to produce or 
consume. The most frequently cited example of a negative externality is that of 
pollution, and examples of locational negative externalities which could arise in a free 
land market situation would include the potential impacts of new development, 
particularly in relation to a loss of visual amenity, privacy, or the general quality of the 
built or natural environments; traffic congestion; noise; and incompatibility in 
proximate land uses.
The failure in supply of ‘public goods’ would arise from their two distinguishing 
characteristics. First, that consumers cannot be excluded from using these goods, and 
second, that the amount of the good consumed by one individual in no way diminishes 
the amount consumed by another. Under these conditions a competitive market fails to 
provide any incentive for the individual private supply of these goods as the efficient
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price is zero. Examples of public goods include urban parks, public-infrastructure, street 
lighting, un-congested roads, and local administration. In fact Evans (1985) points out 
that the town plan itself may be considered a public good.
A third imperfection that may emerge under free market conditions is in the under­
provision of ‘merit goods’, which may be defined as goods in which consumption by all 
individuals will increase the utility of society as a whole. In the context of the land 
market the specification of minimum standards of amenity, open space, building design, 
and the layout of built form may be regarded as merit goods.
The final example of imperfection in a free market situation is the inequitable 
distribution of resources which may often arise. Examples of corrections to 
distributional problems through intervention in the land market could include the 
allocation of housing and employment land uses to more deprived areas, the 
improvement of quality of life in inner-cities, the aim of achieving an even spatial 
distribution of certain basic land use resources, or a general presumption in favour of 
land use activities which will maximise welfare utility within any given area.
The four examples outlined above are sufficient to demonstrate the problems that may 
arise under free market conditions in land and property development. Other instances of 
market failure outlined in the literature include the creation of natural monopolies 
yielding excessive market power and the lack of long term information deriving from 
individual decision making. The important point is that the principle upon which land 
use intervention is often justified is that these failures may be corrected, or at least 
reduced, by allowing the state to influence the spatial location of resources. 
Theoretically intervention could take several forms including taxation, subsidies, 
regulation, direct ownership and participation in urban investments, and by intervention 
in related markets such as labour markets, construction material markets, and the like 
(Lee, 1981; Whitehead, 1983). One of the most common types of government 
intervention adopted in advanced industrialised countries has been through regulation in 
the form of established governmental land use planning systems. Reasons for the 
predominance of this form of intervention are thought to include its superiority in 
dealing with locationally specific problems relative to non-locationally specific taxes
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and subsidies; the ease of enforcement of regulations; the costs of establishing tax based 
systems; and the general effectiveness of controls (Evans, 1985; Whitehead, 1983).
The regulation of land use in Britain is principally conducted through the control of new 
development. The development control system, as established under the Town and 
Country Planning Act 1947, is in effect the foundation of the British planning system, 
establishing the requirement that with certain exceptions, planning permission be 
obtained from the appropriate authority before development may be undertaken. It has 
provided the critical basis upon which development plans may be implemented and land 
use change regulated by planning authorities to realise planning objectives. The scope of 
development control is set out under the relevant planning legislation. Under section 12 
of the 1947 Act development was defined as the carrying out of building, engineering, 
mining or other operations in, on, over or under land, or the making of any material 
change in the use of any building or other land.
Thus, the town and country planning system contains powers to control the use of land, 
and unlike forms of intervention which utilise taxation or subsidy, planning regulations 
are not conducted through direct monetary transactions. However, the importance of 
planning controls can be clearly demonstrated by their effects on land values. According 
to urban economic theory the main mechanism underlying patterns of land use in the 
absence of intervention in the urban land market would be the pricing system of land, 
such that land would generally be used by activities that could pay the highest rent 
(Evans, 1985; Vickerman, 1984; Harrison, 1977). Ultimately the demand for land would 
be dictated by the utility or economic return which could accrue from its use. Grant 
(1982) puts it thus, “land has a value for development to an intending purchaser in 
accordance with its likely profitability, which is in turn determined by the likely demand 
for the completed development, or, in the case of industrial premises, for the goods to be 
manufactured therein” (Grant, 1982, 16). Land use change would occur “as soon as 
there is some possibility of a prospective use attracting a potential value that is higher 
than the current use value” (Lichfield, 1979, 114). Evans (1985) points out that even in 
the free market situation there would be complications which may hinder this smooth 
process, particularly in relation to land hoarding, the comparative profitability of re­
developing sites, and problems of land transfer. However, in broad terms land use
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change in the free market situation would be likely to driven by pricing mechanisms, 
and be characterised by the sequential occupation of land by increasingly higher value 
uses such as indicated by bid-rent theory (Vickerman, 1984).
In this respect, it can be argued that land has two distinct values - the existing use value 
and the development value. In fact, this distinction has traditionally influenced the 
approach to land values in town planning legislation (Purdue, Young, Rowan-Robinson, 
1989, Heap, 1991, Grant, 1982). In the planned city however, the development value of 
land is regulated and thus the operations of market are hindered. In relation to planning 
controls, the most frequently cited land value effect is that which arises through 
restriction of supply of land for some uses, for example, housing. As Parry-Lewis 
(1979) remarks, “as a general point we may observe that if the supply of anything is 
reduced while the demand for it is constant or rising, then its price is likely to rise” 
(Parry-Lewis, 1979). Thus, in the case of restriction in the land supply for housing land 
permitted for this use would hold a higher value than it otherwise would. As Evans
(1985) points out, planning permission for use change is valuable and in fact could be 
equal to the difference in the value of the land in one use rather than another. In the case 
where land is restricted to a particular type of use the development value of this land 
will be diminished as higher value uses could not be conducted on the site. This would 
have the effect of providing no incentive for the redevelopment of the site to agents in 
the property market process.
The general effects of planned intervention would be a very uneven land value surface 
with sharp differences between different uses, and the pattern of land use change very 
different from the relatively smooth distribution expected under the free market 
situation (Harrison, 1977). To quote Parry-Lewis (1979), “in towns where there is 
public intervention in the use of land, both the pattern of land use and the market price 
of land are different from what would otherwise have been; and every public decision 
permitting, forbidding or ensuring some change of use is likely to affect the value of 
that land and other land” (Parry-Lewis, 1979, 177). Examples of the potential effects of 
planned intervention upon land values and the implications for patterns of land use 
change are discussed widely in the literature (Lichfield, Darin-Drabkin, 1980; Harrison, 
1977; Parry-Lewis, 1979; Darin-Drabkin, 1977).
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Land use planning can therefore be conceptualised as a means of intervening to correct 
the market failures thought to be characteristic of a free market in land and property, and 
through regulation, it has extremely important implications for patterns of land use and 
for the value of land itself. The land use planning system is frequently regarded as being 
a most stringent form of market intervention. Reflecting upon the implications of the 
introduction of the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act, Grant and Heap (1991) 
remarked that “from the point of view of the local planning authority, the landowner or 
building developer, the 1947 Act contained some of the most drastic and far-reaching 
provisions ever enacted affecting the ownership of land (which for this purpose includes 
buildings) and the liberty of an owner to develop and use his land as he thinks fit.
Indeed, after 1948, ownership of land, generally speaking, carries with it nothing more 
than the bare right to go on using it for its existing p u rp o s e s ” (G ra n t, Heap, 1991,
10002).
So far this section has considered land use planning from a very general theoretical 
standpoint to demonstrate the fundamental effects that this form of regulation may have 
for land use change. Many authors have explored the impacts and implications of town 
and country planning controls in a more practical way demonstrating that by intervening 
in the land use and development market, particularly by means of development control, 
local planning authorities have an important influence on the composition of activities 
within their areas (Evans, 1985; 1988 1991; Cheshire, Leven, 1982; Harrison, 1977; 
Adams, Russell, Taylor-Russell, 1994). These types of studies have focused on specific 
aspects of planned intervention such as greenbelt and housing policies. However, the 
practical effects of planning controls, particularly in relation to economic activity, has 
been discussed widely and in a more general sense over the 1980s as the Conservative 
administration have sought to curtail the scope of planned intervention through 
deregulation. The arguments put forward by the government, and by the commentators 
who supported the deregulation of the planning system are worthy of consideration here, 
as they demonstrate how important land use regulation is perceived to be.
The deregulation of the planning system initiated by the Conservative Government in 
the 1980s has been widely documented in the literature (Thomley, 1988; 1989; 1991;
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Lloyd, 1986; Brindley et al., 1989; Hall, 1988; Healey, 1989; Nuffield, 1986; Bamekov 
et al., 1989). Drawing upon experience from the USA, the government concluded that 
’’the clear indication is that deregulation stimulates economic activity” (GB Minister 
without Portfolio, 1985, 9). In particular, the Town and Country Planning system was 
viewed as a burden on enterprise and on job creation. The government acted by making 
several modifications to the planning system including; the introduction of enterprise 
zones, simplified planning zones and urban development corporations; the restriction in 
the scope of development plans; the extension of permitted development under the 
GDO; and the modification to the UCO. The specific measures taken to deregulate the 
system are not of paramount interest here. What is relevant is that planning was seen to 
be an important form of intervention, particularly as regards economic issues in the 
criticisms and challenges that underpinned the rationale for deregulation.
The conservative government initiated many of the deregulation measures made to the 
planning system, however, town and country planning had been widely criticised before 
1979. In the 1970s and 1980s, a number of bodies in both Britain and America began to 
challenge the post war consensus upon which planning, like other facets of the welfare 
state system, had been based (Ambrose, 1986; Brindley et al., 1989; Thomley, 1991; 
Hall, 1988). Much of this criticism was aimed at the failure of planning to stem the 
economic decline of cities and at the production of poor living environments in the post 
war new towns and estates. However, the principle of land use regulation itself, as 
established in the 1947 Act, was also widely criticised for apparently playing an 
important role in stifling economic growth, dampening private sector initiative, and 
inhibiting wealth creation. Given the context which emerged following the economic 
crisis of the early 1970s, planning regulation was seen by many as an inappropriate 
mechanism to guide economic change. To quote Hall (1988) “Planning - so the radical 
right alleged - had distorted and inhibited the operation of market forces, forcing 
industrialists to take sub optimal location decisions and even throttling 
entrepreneurship” (Hall, 1988, 346).
From the early 1980s, Central Government introduced a number of modifications to 
planning controls and to the institutional arrangements that were established to 
undertake such controls. The rationale behind the governments program of deregulation
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in the planning system was fully documented in the 1985 white paper ‘Lifting the 
Burden’ (GB Minister without Portfolio, 1985). Following the modifications made to 
the planning system in the early 1980s the 1985 white paper reinforced the 
government’s commitment to reducing unnecessary constraints on the creation of jobs 
and wealth. The white paper argued that deregulation would stimulate economic 
activity, and it stressed two important aspects to deregulation. “Deregulation means two 
things. First, freeing markets and increasing the opportunities for competition. Second, 
lifting administrative and legislative burdens which take time, energy and resources 
from fundamental business activity” (GB Minister without Portfolio, 1985, 1). 
Regulations were therefore seen as a constraint on enterprise, and while some were 
recognised as being relatively minor, it was their cumulative effect that was considered 
damaging.
In particular, the Town and Country Planning system was seen to be imposing “cost on 
the economy and constraints on enterprise that are not always justified by any real 
public benefit in the individual case” (GB Minister without Portfolio, 1985, 10). The 
government felt that the planning system was creating delay and uncertainty and also 
had not changed much since 1947, and that “the very wide discretionary power that the 
system affords is used to apply excessively detailed and onerous controls of a kind that 
would not be tolerated in the general legislation” (GB Minister without Portfolio, 1985, 
10). The white paper proposed the abolition of ‘unnecessary controls’ and the objective 
of achieving simplicity and efficiency in the way that necessary control is carried out. 
Circular 14/85 which accompanied the white paper expressed similar sentiments and 
also stressed that in development control decisions the presumption should be in favour 
of development and that the planning system should respond positively and promptly to 
proposals for development (DoE, 1985, 20). The government clearly felt that town 
planning controls were of a very onerous nature and could have an important impact on 
economic change.
The arguments presented in ‘lifting the burden’ were extended into mechanisms for
achieving deregulation in a second white paper, ‘Building Businesses Not Barriers’
(DoE, 1986a). Again the government argued that the apparent success of the USA in job 
creation and in stimulating economic activity could be explained not only by extreme
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entrepreneurial spirit, but also by the existence of a less restricted business environment. 
The 1986 white paper outlined four mechanisms for removing unnecessary controls. 
First, by reducing the scope of control where the type and scale of development does not 
warrant the need to make a planning application. Second, by simplifying the system 
where it is more complicated than it needs to be to meet its objectives. Third, by 
increasing the efficiency of the system by improving performance on planning 
applications and appeals. Finally, by requiring the system to adopt a more positive 
approach so as to facilitate development and renewal wherever that is possible and 
consistent with other objectives. The rationale behind the deregulation of the planning 
system was to stimulate economic activity and generate wealth creation. First, through 
allowing development to proceed unless it would cause demonstrable harm to interests 
of acknowledged importance. Second, by reducing the administrative and time 
consuming burden of planning controls on business. More fundamentally, the 
modifications to the planning system would render planning more sensitive to the 
market and with certain particular qualifications, give market criteria a greater say in the 
development and use of land.
Thus, land use planning, principally through the mechanisms of development control, is 
widely considered to be an important form of government intervention. It has been 
argued in this section that the powers of development control offer a significant means 
of control over the composition of land use in any area, and that this in turn may have 
implications for economic change. Why is this relevant to manufacturing employment 
change in London ? The next two sections develop this theme, moving from general to 
specific considerations, in outlining the aspect of planning control of relevance to this 
thesis - the use of development control powers to protect manufacturing jobs.
3.3 Urban planning and manufacturing industry : employment protection through 
land use intervention and the example of the B1 business use class and related 
permitted development.
Previous research shows that LPAs throughout the country are concerned about 
industrial decline. The results of a national survey of planning authorities quoted in 
Oatley (1991) found that 99% of LPAs regarded a shortage of industrial land and
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premises as being of the highest importance. In the circumstances of industrial 
employment decline which characterise Britain’s cities, LPAs may use development 
control powers to assist in the provision of manufacturing jobs. In this thesis concern is 
with the loss of manufacturing jobs, and with how land use planning powers have been 
used to respond to this loss.
Little research exists concerning the use of planning policies to respond to employment decline. 
However, following the modifications to the Use Classes Order (UCO) and the General 
Development Order (GDO) which are described below, some mention has been made in the 
literature of planning policies which sought to protect manufacturing jobs. Referred to as 
‘employment protection policies’, they represent a direct planning response to the labour market 
consequences of structural economic change. These measures are implemented through the 
development control system in land use allocations and floorspace controls, where a restrictive 
approach is adopted towards changes of use in the hope of encouraging some types of economic 
activity at the expense of others. In many cases such policies have attempted to ensure a sufficient 
supply of land for industry by resisting pressures for the development of office space. It is these 
policies which the thesis seeks to examine for reasons explained in section 3.5 below. This section 
draws on existing literature to illustrate the use and potential importance of these policies, citing 
cases relevant to the London area.
Two points about employment protection policies, which are relevant to the discussion 
of the previous section, should be made at the outset. First, in terms of the rationale for 
planning intervention these policies could be classified under redistribution. This is 
because the intention is to modify the outcome of market forces such that the resulting 
distribution of resource will provide more comprehensive employment opportunities, 
and thus distribute jobs to sections of the population who may be under-provided in a 
free market situation. Second, in using development control in this way planning 
authorities are effectively depressing the development value of manufacturing land by 
enforcing only existing use rights. In other words, the threshold of the development 
value may be considerably lower than it would otherwise have been. This should have 
the intended effect of retaining land in manufacturing use by preventing the realisation 
of the rational development value of sites.
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Examples of the practice of employment protection policies have been provided by 
LPAC (1990). LPAC undertook a study of the supply of industrial land and building in 
London. Three case study boroughs were examined, the London boroughs of Islington, 
Hillingdon and Kingston. LPAC found that although there were differences in areas of 
detail between the local policies operated by each borough “there is a common theme 
which runs through all of them, namely the presumption that to a greater or lesser extent 
industry and offices compete for the same land and buildings, and that the tendency will 
be for offices to outbid industry. It is also generally contended that industrial activity is 
either a better source of local employment than offices or at least that a fair balance has 
to be struck between the two in order to maintain a broad employment base. Thus, each 
borough’s policies seek to protect industry either in specified locations, or generally, or 
even both, whilst channeling office development to a more limited range of locations 
and or circumstances” (LPAC, 1990, 12).
Daniels and Bobe (1990) found that the decline of manufacturing employment in 
London over the last 30 years, and the spatial expansion of office based activities was 
considered problematic by many boroughs. They showed that boroughs on the periphery 
of the City of London had pursued policies which to some extent were aimed at the 
retention of manufacturing industry. Home (1989) provides another example of 
employment protection policies in the case of the City of Westminster which has 
consistently tried to protect industrial floorspace within the borough. The Westminster 
district plan of 1978 stated that industrial activities which have important linkages with 
central London activities, particularly in the Central Activities Zone, should be 
maintained. The rationale for this policy was that, “the greater proportion of this 
floorspace was occupied by firms that had been long established in the area, such as 
clothing, fur and leather, and paper, printing and publishing. Many of these industries 
need a central location in order to maintain the linkages with their markets and perform 
the services required, but this central location also makes them vulnerable to pressure 
from other more financially profitable uses. The City council feels that the loss of these 
supporting activities may threaten the vitality of other important central London 
activities” (City of Westminster, 1978, 109). The reasoned justification for the policy 
recognised that internal changes in the operation of the firm which resulted in relocation
81
or closure could not be effectively influenced by policy, however, external pressures 
which could affect established linkages, often arose from competition for space from 
alternative land uses, and the policy was designed to minimise these pressures.
LPAs may therefore have been using development control powers to protect existing 
manufacturing land in the hope of retaining a range of local manufacturing employment 
opportunities. The rationale for this intervention could be thought of as an attempt to 
address the inequitable distribution of resources which may result in the absence of 
intervention. While the development of industrial land for offices uses may not be an 
inherently ‘inefficient’ market outcome, it may reduce job opportunities for certain 
members of the community particularly in employment terms. By retaining land in 
manufacturing use and by resisting change to other uses, the development potential of 
the land remains at the value of manufacturing and so higher value uses, which may 
consume the land in a free market will not be permitted. There may therefore be reason 
to assume that the pursuit of such policies will have implications for rates of 
manufacturing employment decline, because authorities which have explicitly attempted 
to protect manufacturing land may have experienced less job loss than would otherwise 
have been the case.
Concern for the role of planning policy in the protection of manufacturing jobs has 
arisen following changes made to the UCO and GDO in the 1980s. It is useful to 
introduce this example here, as it was drawn upon in the LPA survey presented in 
chapter five for reasons that will be discussed later. By way of illustration, it is enough 
here to provide a brief summary of the changes made to these orders. Appendix three 
provides a more detailed account of the origins of the UCO and GDO, of their 
legislative roles, and of the specific changes made to them in the 1980s.
Prior to the late 1980s planning permission was required for any change of use between 
the classes of light industry, general industry, and office use, defined under the 1972 
UCO. In 1987, the UCO was modified to create a single ‘business use’ class, entitled 
Bl, which allowed the consent free interchange of light industrial use, research and
82
development use, and certain kinds of office uses.1 Modifications to the GDO in 1988 
provided a further deregulation measure, allowing general industrial land to change any use 
within the B1 class. Effectively, the revisions placed the control over these changes of use
I
outside the normal scope of LPA development control. As regards manufacturing use, LPAs
!
i can no longer control a change of use from general to light manufacturing use, or more 
importantly, from general or light manufacturing use to B1 office or research and 
development uses. In this respect, the changes provide an example of the potential importance 
of land use regulation for manufacturing use change because their introduction allows for 
some differences to be determined between the ‘policy on’ environment, when these changes 
were subject to LPA approval, and the ‘policy off environment, when they were not.
Perhaps the most widely discussed implication of the recent changes has been the 
reduction in the ability of local planning authorities to influence the location and 
structure of economic activity in their areas (Home, 1989; LPAC, 1990, Daniels, Bobe, 
1991, Wootton Jeffreys, 1991). Commenting on the proposals for the B1 class, the RTPI
(1986) argued that the creation of a business class might frustrate the effects of LPA 
policies which had been aimed at restricting some types of economic activity in their 
areas at the expense of others. In fact even Central Government recognised that this 
would be the case. The PAG report (PAG, 1985) specifically rejected employment 
protection policies arguing that they were unimaginative and desperate, and that “local 
authorities should not be concerned with fine judgments within the uses of the business 
class since the market should be allowed to determine its own solutions” (PAG, 1985,
23). Indeed PAG felt that the effects of these policies were important enough to 
specifically mention that one beneficial consequence of the introduction of the business 
class would be to frustrate LPA attempts at pursuing these objectives.
All three examples of employment protection policy research outlined above found that 
the removal of planning control under the UCO and GDO changes had adversely
1 Specifically, these were intended to be office uses other than those within class A2 (financial and 
professional offices) and which did not provide a direct service to visiting members o f  the public. Grant 
(1989) points that while uses B1 (b) (research and development) and B1 (c) (light industrial), are defined 
rather flexibly, use B l(a) is much more specific. However, Grant also argues that the dividing line will be 
extremely difficult to draw since it will depend, for legal purposes, upon the tenuous criterion o f the 
extent to which services are, or have been, provided to visiting members o f the public.
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effected the performance of these policies. For example, the LPAC (1990) study of 
industrial land in London concluded that with the exception of Kingston, the 
employment protection policies of the boroughs had been made impossible to enforce 
since the revisions to the orders were made (LPAC, 1990). Likewise, Daniels and Bobe 
' (1990) found that in London the changes had “ removed a great deal of planning control from 
j the boroughs. Planners are finding it nearly impossible to prevent the incursion of B1 
developments into residential areas or onto sites previously earmarked for light industrial use. 
While the B1 category does contain light industrial uses, applications within this class are 
almost exclusively for office use” (Daniels, Bobe, 1990, 19).
The effects of the changes can also be detected in the workings of the land market. This 
is because the displacement of industrial and light industrial uses may be encouraged by 
the rental and land value increases consequent upon the changes. Land 
previously held in general industrial use has since the use order changes, been granted 
planning permission to change to Bl. Given that B1 includes office uses which 
command considerably higher rentals than industrial uses, an incentive exists to convert 
general industrial space to Bl, or light industrial space to office use, to realise higher 
rates of return (Home, 1989; LPAC, 1990; Oatley, 1991). In placing changes of use 
outwith planning control the price of industrial land has been increased by raising its 
development value and thus allowing possibilities for higher rentals.
The effect of changes in land values was specifically mentioned by the Government in 
relation to the business use class. The PAG report argued that the amalgamation of 
classes into the business class, “could lead to a rise in certain light industrial rents in a 
manner which might affect the prospects or even viability of certain firms, especially 
certain small workshop businesses which occupy studio and other properties particularly 
suitable for office use. Our impression is that this effect would be transitional, and 
would not in any case be so substantial as to detract from the manifest advantages of 
deregulation in the nature we propose” (PAG, 1985, 40).
In fact, the tailoring firms of Savile Row in the London borough of Westminster 
managed to force an adjournment debate in the House of Commons prior to the
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introduction of the 1987 UCO on the grounds of land value effects (Home, 1989). The 
M.P. for Westminster (North) put forward the argument that if increase in rental values 
were to cause the displacement of the tailoring firms from Westminster there would be a 
detrimental effect on the commercial activity of the area because they formed a central 
component of the economic network of Westminster, and as such, were interlinked with 
retail functions, art galleries and professional and commercial services, and consumed 
by people in an interrelated way. The government replied that rental values were not a 
planning concern and the tailors failed to achieve any modifications to the business 
class.
Oatley (1991) argues that LPAs are experiencing difficulties in maintaining an adequate 
supply of sites and premises for new industrial activity and that the appearance of Bl 
has contributed to this problem. Furthermore, “institutions and developers that already 
owned buildings in industrial land and property benefited from an increase in land and 
property values” (Oatley, 1991, 22). Both Oatley and LPAC (1990) have found 
evidence of pressure to convert general and light industrial accommodation to office 
space. In fact, the government themselves have published research results which have 
shown important land value implications arising from the introduction of the Bl class 
and related permitted development. The DoE commissioned Wootton Jeffreys Planning 
Consultants (1991) to examine the impacts of the UCO and GDO changes. The 
consultants conducted surveys of LPAs, and the users and developers of property in 6 
case study areas, including the West End and City Fringe areas of London. The report 
stated that following revisions to the orders “every site with a light or general
industrial use or allocation is potentially an office location. The choice between uses is 
no longer something that planning can seek to determine, but is entirely a market 
decision, to be made on the usual criteria of location and demand. With the return from 
office space significantly greater than other types of business space, then if the location 
is right, it will be office space that is built” (Wootton Jeffreys, 1991, 21). Their survey
research showed that industrial land values and rents had been raised as a result of the 
changes, even on sites where industrial space would be more appropriate to market 
conditions. They also found evidence to suggest that the introduction of the new orders 
had provided an incentive to land use change from industrial use and had
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adversely affected the ability of LPAs to influence employment opportunities in their 
areas.
This brief discussion of the impacts of the changes to the UCO and GDO has shown that 
there are reasons to believe that LPAs have sought to protect manufacturing jobs and 
that land use planning regulation may have an important role to play in influencing 
economic change. By deregulating the changes of use outlined above, LPAs are 
restricted in the extent to which they pursue economic objectives through development 
control, for example, in relation to employment. Furthermore, by restructuring the land 
and property development market incentives may be provided to investors and 
landowners to convert existing industrial land and premises to Bl to realise higher 
rentals from other uses, notably office use. In other incidences, rental increases 
consequent upon the revisions made to the orders may cause the displacement of 
manufacturing activity by office use as rental increase render sites too expensive for industrial 
manufacturing, and thus, the process of sequential occupation is initiated through the 
outbidding of space from competing uses. The blighting of industrial sites may be another 
land use implication of the changes as developers discourage industrial uses on their sites and 
premises in the hope of attracting higher value Bl uses.
3.4 The substantive and theoretical relevance of employment protection policies.
This section highlights the substantive and theoretical relevance of employment 
protection policies with respect to London’s industrial change and to contemporary 
theories of urban manufacturing change. It shows that important research questions 
about manufacturing employment decline in the capital arise from a consideration of the 
effects of land use planning controls.
The substantive contribution offered through the examination of employment protection 
policies is apparent from the discussion in section 3.3 above, however, it is worth 
clarifying some issues here. The basic reason for assuming that land use planning may 
have an influence on the composition and location of intra-urban economic activity, and 
by extension the diversity of employment opportunities, is straightforward. One of the 
basic resources required for any economic activity to function is land, and as outlined
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above, the development and use of land is regulated by the town and country planning 
system. In certain situations, LPAs may wish to manipulate land use controls to achieve 
desired outcomes in relation to the economic base of their areas. The discussion in the 
previous section has shown that LPAs may have attempted influenced the course of 
employment change and it is this issue which the thesis seeks to explore.
Chapter one discussed the deindustrialisation of London, reviewing previous literature 
which has emphasised the scale and diversity of manufacturing employment decline in 
London. The use of employment protection in London over the 1980s offers a means of 
understanding the extent to which planning intervention can impinge upon employment 
change. As mentioned previously, these policies have been designed by LPAs as a direct 
reaction to the labour market consequences of structural economic change. In this 
respect, they are directly relevant to the London case where deindustrialisation has 
radically altered the demand for labour in the London economy.
Some research questions may be developed through a focus on the planning response to 
deindustrialisation. First, is to what extent have employment protection policies been 
practiced throughout the Greater London area? Second, have these policies been able to 
influence the extent of manufacturing employment decline, and if so, can boroughs be 
differentiated in terms of manufacturing job loss by the degree to which policies were 
developed and implemented to protect manufacturing employment? Third, and equally 
important, have LPAs been successful in achieving employment protection objectives, 
and if not, why not?
Thus, the substantive relevance of these policies arises primarily from the desire to 
explore how important land use planning regulation may be for manufacturing 
employment change, however, it is also hoped that the understanding of London’s 
industrial change may be advanced through an exploration of why employment 
protection policies are successful or not. This leads on to the relevance of the research in 
relation to the theoretical perspectives of urban manufacturing change outlined in 
chapter two. The theories reviewed drew upon a wide variety of factors in attempts to 
explain urban manufacturing change, most of which are not relevant to the issue of land
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use planning regulation. However, two of the theoretical perspectives provide important 
contexts within which the emphasis on employment protection policies may be justified.
First, is the space constraint thesis which was described under the structural explanations in 
chapter two and is associated with the work of Fothergill and Gudgin. This thesis 
supposes that against a backdrop of falling employment densities induced by increased 
use of capital, urban and rural areas have differed in rates manufacturing employment 
change due to the opportunities allowed for the expansion and growth of industrial 
activity. Cities, it is argued, often do not have adequate levels of space required for new 
manufacturing firms or for the expansion of other firms, and these space constraints in 
cities have been instrumental in creating the urban rural manufacturing contrast. This 
thesis is clearly directly relevant to the planning case. If LPAs in London have been 
pursuing employment protection policies which have protected sites earmarked for 
manufacturing industry, then the space constraints on industrial expansion or location 
may not be as stringent as Fothergill and Gudgin have imagined. In other words, if 
Fothergill and Gudgin’s theory is accurate then planning could conceivably intervene to 
influence the manufacturing decline of cities by simply regulating the amount of space 
available for manufacturing industry.
The second, and perhaps most relevant, theoretical perspective is that of the global city 
interpretation of manufacturing change. Here it was argued that the decline of 
manufacturing and the growth of service sectors functions, and particularly those related 
to London’s role as a ‘global city’, are inextricably linked. This is because the growth of 
service industries has resulted in competition for resources with manufacturing industry 
at the urban level, and Sassen believes that manufacturing has been ‘crowded out’ 
because it cannot compete effectively for investment and space. Land use planning 
regulations of the type to be examined in this thesis are directly relevant in relation to 
intra-urban competition for space. LPAs have the option of attempting to intervene in 
the type of competition arising from structural economic change which Sassen outlines 
to achieved desired labour market objectives. Furthermore, it has been argued earlier 
that one of the main effects of land use planning controls is that a refusal of permission 
will tend to dampen the development value of land, and if this is the case, then the 
argument that structural economic change ‘revalues’ space in the city becomes more
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complex. Essentially, the ‘crowding out’ effect is in many respects a pre-requisite in the 
rationale for the use of employment protection policies, and if these policies have been 
successful, then it may add another dimension to the ways in which we understand the 
crowding out process.
In sum, some additional research questions may be developed through consideration of 
these two perspectives. Space constraint thesis cites the lack of available space for 
industrial expansion in urban areas as an important explanatory variable in the much 
higher rates of manufacturing employment decline in cities. However, if LPAs are 
specifically allocating land for manufacturing use and existing change to any other uses, 
has this not lessened the effects of space constraint ? Likewise, the ‘global city’ 
explanation for manufacturing decline is that much industrial activity was ‘crowded out’ 
of London by the growth of service sector functions. If London LPAs have pursued 
employment protection policies which restrict changes of use from industrial land, then 
has this policy stance inhibited the extent of crowding out ? More fundamentally, the 
examination of employment protection policies may shed some light on the extent to 
which the two perspectives are actually happening in London, if at all.
The other theoretical perspectives which broadly emphasised such factors the 
importance of industrial costs, changes in the nature of external economies, and changes 
in the nature of production itself, would be less easily influenced by employment 
protection policies. If these types of processes have been more important in determining 
the outcome of manufacturing change in London then the research may discover that 
these provide explanations for the lack of success of employment protection policies. 
Alternatively, the investigations to be conducted may generate new theories of the 
dominant processes at work in London’s manufacturing change.
This section has demonstrated the substantive and theoretical contributions that may 
arise through the study of London’s industrial change with respect to the pursuit of 
employment protection policies. Clearly, there are other policy options available to 
London local authorities if they wish to influence manufacturing employment loss, 
particularly in terms of promotional activities. However, emphasis in the thesis is on 
employment protection policies as advanced through the development control system,
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because they offer a useful perspective through which one can explore and challenge the 
empirical and theoretical understanding of London’s industrial change.
3.5 Conclusions.
This chapter has argued that planning controls can be used to protect manufacturing 
jobs, offering a means by which LPAs can ‘respond’ or ‘react’ to structural economic 
change, and that in many cases these responses may have been important particularly in 
London. Chapter five presents the results of a survey of London LPAs which explores 
the use of employment protection polices over the 1980s, outlining the ways in which 
authorities have reacted to manufacturing employment decline, what policies they have 
pursued, and how successful the authorities perceive these policies to have been. Before 
doing so however, it is important to quantify the scale and extent of industrial 
employment change in London over the 1980s, providing an empirical context for the 
examination of employment protection policies.
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Chapter 4 : Employment change in London’s manufacturing, 1981 to 1991.
4.0 Introduction.
Chapter four presents an analysis of employment change in the London manufacturing sector over the 
1981 to 1991 period, using workplace-based employment data from the censuses of employment 
(CoE). A full description of this data source, and of the SIC under which it is classified, can be found 
in appendix oneA. This chapter has three main sections. The first compares and contrasts the 
employment fortunes of manufacturing with other sectors of the London economy outlining broad 
changes in the labour demanded across all industries defined at the division level of the SIC. Section 
two focuses on sectoral aspects of manufacturing in London showing which sectors have been the 
most important employers in London, and how change over the decade has affected different 
industries. Spatial aspects of manufacturing employment change are considered at the borough level 
in section three. This chapter shows that there has been a dramatic decline in the demand for 
manufacturing employment in the London economy over the 1981 to 1991 period, a much more 
severe decline than experienced in the nation as a whole. Furthermore, it is shown that manufacturing 
employment loss has, with minor exceptions, affected all industrial sectors in the capital and all the 
London boroughs. In this respect, the analysis sheds some initial doubt on the success or influence of 
LPA employment protection policies.
4.1 Change in the labour demanded by the London economy, 1981-1991.
The London conurbation is the largest single concentration of jobs in Great Britain. The latest census 
of employment shows that in 1991, London contained over 15% of Britain’s total employment of
21,570,000 jobs. Important structural shifts in the labour demanded by the London economy have 
occurred over the 1980s characterised in broad terms by an enormous decline in the demand for 
manufacturing employment, and a rapid increase in jobs associated with activities within the banking, 
finance, insurance and business services division. The purpose of this section is to review these broad 
shifts in the structure of London’s employment.
A The Census o f Population also contains employment data. The CoE is the preferred source used here for two main 
reasons. First, the CoE data is entirely workplace based and thus relates to jobs provided by industries within the Capital 
rather than to the employment o f residents. The Census o f Population on the other hand is a resident based census, and 
while it does present employment data which has been geographically referenced by the workplace of employees, the 
industrial disaggregation is inferior to that provided under the CoE. Second, is that the CoE has been undertaken at 
regular intervals over the 1980s allowing for detailed analyses o f changes over time while the Census of Population is 
produced only every ten years.
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Table 4.1 shows change in the structural composition of London jobs over the 1981 to 
1991 period. At the beginning of the decade London’s employment structure was 
dominated by service industries. Over 3,560,000 people were employed in London in 
1981 and approximately three quarters of this employment was in services. However, 
the importance of manufacturing employment at this time should not be understated. 
Manufacturing industries accounted for 19% of total employment, providing more jobs 
than either the banking, finance, insurance, and business services sector, or transport and 
communications; and almost exactly the same number as in the distribution, hotels, and 
catering sector. In fact, London contributed over 11% of Britain’s total manufacturing 
employment in 1981. So while employment was clearly service sector orientated, 
manufacturing still formed an important component of the capital’s aggregate labour 
demand.
This initial employment structure changed radically over the decade. Just under 9% of 
London’s total jobs were shed over this ten year period, however, most striking is the 
severe absolute loss of manufacturing employment. Over 300,000 jobs were shed in 
London’s manufacturing industries, reducing these jobs in the capital by almost half, 
from approximately 684,000 to 359,000. In fact, manufacturing employment decline 
accounted for 67% of the gross job loss in London over the eighties. Severe 
employment decline was apparent in all three sectors of manufacturing defined at the 
division level of the SIC, and was a consistent feature of change in all four census 
periods between 1981 and 1991.
In total, service sector employment expanded. However, the growth rate was modest, 
only 3%, or an increase of 81,000 jobs, and was equivalent to only approximately one 
quarter of the total job loss in the manufacturing sector alone. As Table 4.1 shows, two 
of the four service industries actually shed employment over the 1980s - distribution, 
hotels, and catering; and transport and communications; which together saw the loss of 
some 110,000 jobs. In fact substantial absolute employment growth was narrowly 
concentrated in the banking, finance, insurance and business services division. In this 
sector of the economy the number of jobs increased by almost 30%, from 566,000 jobs 
in 1981 to 733,500 by 1991. Further analysis of the employment data at finer level of 
disaggregation shows that the main contributors within this sector were in business
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Table 4.1 : Change in the employment structure of Greater London, 1981 to 1991.
0 Agriculture, Forestry and fishing
1 Energy and Water Supply Industries
Total Primary
2 Extraction of Minerals other than Fuels; Manufacture of Metals, 
Mineral products and chemicals
3 Metal goods, Engineering and Vehicle Industries.
4 Other Manufacturing Industries
Total Manufacturing
5 Construction
6 Distribution, Hotels and Catering; Repairs
7 Transport and Communications
8 Banking, Finance, Insurance, Business services and leasing
9 Other services
Total Services 
Total Employment 
Source : Census of Employment (NOMIS)
Employment by Industrial Sector Change in Employment by Industrial Sector
1981 1991 1981- 1991
No. of Jobs % of Total No. of Jobs % of Total No. Of Jobs % Change
1771 0.0 1192 0.0 -579 -32.7
55504 1.6 40172 1.2 -15332 -27.6
57275 1.6 41364 1.3 -15911 -27.8
72838 2.0 35439 1.1 -37399 -51.3
301143 8.5 132954 4.1 -168189 -55.9
309970 8.7 190455 5.9 -119515 -38.6
683951 19.2 358848 11.0 -325103 -47.5
161407 4.5 118367 3.6 -43040 -26.7
686598 19.3 645955 19.8 -40643 -5.9
368288 10.3 307682 9.5 -60606 -16.5
565876 15.9 733513 22.5 167637 29.6
1034526 29.1 1049015 32.2 14489 1.4
2655288 74.6 2736165 84.1 80877 3.0
3560688 3254744 -305944 -8.6
services, such as legal services, accountancy, professional and technical services; and to 
a lesser, though still important extent, in banking and finance. The only other service 
sector defined at division level which experienced employment growth over the period 
was ‘other services’, experiencing a marginal expansion of only 1.4% or 14,500 jobs. 
Thus, significant job gains over the eighties in London’s service industries were 
narrowly sectorally based, being focused principally within the types of producer 
services as described in previous chapters.
The two remaining broad sectors of the London economy, the primary and construction 
industries, together provided only 6% of London’s total employment in 1981. Both 
sectors shed approximately 27% of employment over the decade, amounting to 16,000 
primary, and 43,000 construction jobs.
Table 4.1 also compares London’s employment structure in 1981 with that of 1991, to 
demonstrate how these absolute employment changes have affected the internal sectoral 
composition of employment. Major shifts are apparent in the relative importance of the 
manufacturing and service sectors. The share of London employment in manufacturing 
decreased from 19.2% to 11% between 1981 and 1991, while the relative importance of 
employment in the service sectors increased dramatically, from 74.1% of total 
employment to 84.1%. The demand for labour in the London economy has become 
much more orientated towards service industries, and particularly towards employment 
in the banking, finance, insurance and business services sectors, and at the same time 
has moved away from manufacturing industries. However, given that growth in total 
service employment was only 3% in absolute terms, it would seem that manufacturing 
decline has been the dominant factor in creating the relative sectoral shifts. The result is 
that London’s employment structure in 1991 was very different to that of 1981. Then, 
the importance of manufacturing was roughly equivalent of that of hotels, distribution 
and catering, and actually greater than that of banking, finance, insurance and business 
services. This is certainly not now the case. Manufacturing employment in London has 
declined severely in absolute terms, but also relative to other sectors of the economy.
A comparison of London’s employment structure and performance with that of Great 
Britain is shown in table 4.2. The table expresses employment in London as a location
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Table 4.2 : A comparison of employment change in Greater London and Great Britain, 1981 -1991
London employment 
location quotients
1981 1991
0 Agriculture, Forestiy and fishing 0.03 0.03
1 Energy and Water Supply Industries 0.48 0.63
Total Primary 0.32 0.38
2 Extraction o f Minerals other than Fuels; Manufacture o f Metals, 0.48 0.36
Mineral products and chemicals
3 Metal goods, Engineering and Vehicle Industries. 0.63 0.43
4 Other Manufacturing Industries 0.81 0.67
Total Manufacturing 0.68 0.52
5 Construction 0.89 0.81
6 Distribution, Hotels and Catering; Repairs 1.00 0.92
7 Transport and Communications 1.57 1.54
8 Banking, Finance, Insurance, Business services and leasing 1.96 1.86
9 Other services 1.06 1.03
Total Services 1.21 1.18
Total Employment
Source : Census o f  Employment (NOMIS)
Employment change 
by sector 1981 -1991
London employment 
as % o f British employment
London Britain
-32.7 -21.8
-27.6 -38.8
-27.8 -32.9
-51.3 -29.2
-55.9 -28.2
-38.6 -17.9
-47.5 -24.5
-26.7 -10.9
-5.9 13.0
-16.5 -5.4
29.6 51.0
1.4 14.8
3.0 16.9
1981 1991
0.5 0.4
8.0 9.5
5.4 5.8
8.0 5.5
10.5 6.5
13.6 10.1
11.3 7.8
14.8 12.2
16.8 14.0
26.3 23.2
32.7 28.1
17.6 15.6
20.3 17.9
- 8.6 1.2 16.7 15.1
quotient for each industrial division relative to Great Britain as a whole, compares rates 
of change in employment by sector, and shows London’s employment in each sector as 
a percentage of the total British employment in that sector.1
The 1981 location quotients for London indicate a highly specialised structure of 
employment relative to the nation. At this time, only the service sectors were over­
represented in London and two sectors in particular stand out. First, is financial and 
business services, which accounted for 32.7% of total British employment in these 
industries. London specialised in this sector more than any other as is indicated by the 
location quotient value of 1.96, reflecting the concentration of financial and business 
services associated with the ‘City’ and the presence of much headquarters business 
activity. Second, is transport and communications, with London industry providing 
26.3% of total British employment in this sector. The high location quotient of 1.57 
reflects the key position that London holds in the national transport network, but also its 
own vast internal transportation system. The remaining service sectors were 
approximately as important in the London economy as they were nationally. 
Employment in manufacturing, construction and the primary industries was, to various 
degrees, under-represented in the capital relative to Britain. Thus, London’s 
employment structure has been distinctive relative to the nation for some years, 
appearing skewed towards services, with manufacturing being considerably less 
important than it is nationally.
Comparing employment change over the 1981 to 1991 period, table 4.2 shows 
important differences between the performances of London and Britain. While total 
British employment grew by just over 1%, the number of jobs in London declined by 
just under 9%, and in fact, with the exception of the energy and water supply industries, 
London’s employment performance has been unfavourable relative to the nation in all 
sectors of industry defined in the table. London’s rate of employment loss in 
manufacturing was almost double that of the nation as a whole, and more than double in
1 The location quotient is an index o f the relative concentration of an industry in an area and is calculated 
as fo llow s:
LQ = London’s employment in industry X / total London employment 
Britain’s employment in industry X / total British employment 
a location quotient o f less than 1.0 indicates under-representation o f industry X in London relative to the 
nation, o f greater than 1.0 relative over-representation, and o f 1.0 an identical share.
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the construction industries. Even in the banking, finance, insurance and business service 
sector where London experienced a strong employment growth of 29.6%, the growth 
performance was still poor relative to the nation where jobs grew by 51%.
However, in splitting the decade into two periods, 1981 to 1987 and 1987 to 1991, it 
seems that London’s employment growth in banking, finance, insurance and business 
service employment was roughly equivalent to that of the nation in the former period, 
just over 33%. While employment in this sectors continued to grow in the nation as a 
whole by 13% in the latter period, the impacts of recession are apparent in London, 
where employment fell by just under 3%. Interestingly, this difference between London 
and the nation is not evident in other sectors, and particularly not in manufacturing, 
where London continually shed more jobs than the nation throughout the decade.
The outcome of these differentials in the employment performance of the capital and the 
nation over the eighties is that with the exception of the energy and water supply 
industries, London’s share of national employment has fallen in all sectors of industry 
defined at this level of disaggregation. In total services, London share of British 
employment fell from 20.3% to 17.9%, in manufacturing from 11.3% to 7.8%, and in 
construction from 11.3% to 7.8%. A further interesting component of London’s 
employment change is that London actually became less specialised in service 
employment. Comparing the 1981 and 1991 location quotients reveals that London is 
now less specialised in all four service industries relative to the nation than it was in 
1981. In other words, national employment change has actually been even more 
narrowly focused than London’s experience.
This section has provided a brief account of employment change in different sectors of 
the London economy over the 1981 to 1991 period. Some interesting aspects of change 
have been identified, most of which, particularly in relation to services, are outwith the 
scope of this thesis (see Graham, Spence, 1995 for a discussion of broad trends). 
However, hopefully what this section has demonstrated is that manufacturing 
employment in London has declined both in its relative importance to total London 
employment, and in absolute terms. More importantly, the decline of manufacturing 
employment in London has been the instrumental factor in bringing about the broad
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shifts in the structure of employment over the 1980s that were shown above. In addition, 
London’s manufacturing employment loss has been much greater over this period than 
that experienced by the nation as a whole. While London’s employment either grew 
more slowly, or declined faster than the nation in almost all industrial divisions, the 
extreme nature of job loss in the manufacturing sector has meant that regardless of the 
poor relative performance of other sectors, London now specialises in manufacturing 
considerably less than it did at the beginning of the decade. In employment terms, 
London has relatively and absolutely deindustrialised over the 1980s.
4.2 A sectoral analysis of London manufacturing, 1981-1991.
The following section provides a detailed sectoral analysis of manufacturing 
employment change in London over the 1981 to 1991 period. The objectives are to 
show which sectors of London manufacturing are important in the capital and to 
examine any variations in rates of employment change between the different industries.
Before going on to look in detail at London’s manufacturing sectors, it is worth briefly 
outlining some general characteristics of the composition of London’s manufacturing 
employment. Throughout the 1980s, approximately 90% of London’s manufacturing 
jobs have been in full-time employment. Of these, just over 75% have been male and 
just under 25% female. Of the 10% of total manufacturing jobs in part-time 
employment, approximately 75% have been female and the remaining 25% male. In 
comparison to the nation, the London figures are similar in the part-time and full-time 
split of employment, and in the gender division of full-time jobs. London differs from 
the nation in the gender division of part-time jobs, where the proportion of females in 
Great Britain is slightly higher than in London. However, generally the composition of 
manufacturing jobs in the capital does not differ greatly from the nation. In this chapter, 
the focus is on detailed sectoral and spatial aspects of manufacturing employment 
change. The data suggest that only minor changes have occurred in the four way 
composition of employment over the decade, and since use of this breakdown would 
add an unnecessary degree of complexity to this detailed analysis, it has not been 
attempted here.
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Great differences are apparent in the relative internal importance of different 
manufacturing sectors in London. The percentage share figures in table 4.3 show that 
for both 1981 and 1991, the majority of London’s manufacturing jobs have been within 
just a few of the 21 sectors. If employment were distributed evenly each industry 
defined at the class level of the SIC would comprise approximately 4.8% of total 
manufacturing employment. In both 1981 and 1991, six sectors consistently held 
employment shares above this hypothetical average. These were the manufacture of 
paper and paper products, printing and publishing; electrical and electronic engineering; 
food drink and tobacco industries; mechanical engineering; chemical industries; and 
footwear and clothing industries. In 1981, employment in these six sectors alone 
accounted for 68.4% of total manufacturing jobs in London, and by 1991 this figure had 
increased to 70.4%. The paper, printing and publishing industry is a particularly 
significant employer, providing over a quarter of all London’s 1991 manufacturing 
employment. Industrial sectors which employ less people in London include : the 
extraction and preparation of metalliferous ore, the production of man made fibres, the 
extraction of minerals, the manufacture of leather goods, textiles manufacture, metallic 
and non metallic manufacturing, and the manufacture of transport equipment other than 
vehicles.
The location quotients, which indicate London’s industrial specialisation relative to the 
nation, emphasise many of the industries which are internally important. For both 1981 
and 1991, the paper, printing and publishing industry registers location quotients of over 
2.0, indicating that it is over twice as important in London’s manufacturing as it is in the 
nation as a whole. In addition, the chemical industries, electrical and electronic 
engineering, and the footwear and clothing industries all have location quotients greater 
than 1.0 for both years. However, London also has high location quotients in a number 
of industries which were not found to be internally important. The other manufacturing 
industries, which includes jewellery and coins, musical instruments, photographic and 
cinematographic equipment, toys and games and stationers goods, the manufacture of 
office machinery and data processing equipment, and instrument engineering, were all 
over-represented in London in both 1981 and 1991. However, the industries which were 
found to have held extremely low share of London’s total manufacturing employment
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Table 4.3 : Sectoral composition and specialisation o f manufacturing employment in London 1981 and 1991, (Class Level 1980 SIC).
absolute numbers of jobs % of total manufacturing employment location quotients relative to Great Britain
1981 1991 1981 1991 1981 1991
21 Extraction/preparation:metalliferous ore 14 2 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.03
22 Metal manufacturing 11497 3895 1.68 1.09 0.38 0.36
23 Extraction of minerals (Other) 528 355 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.17
24 Manufacturemon-metallic products 12937 5262 1.89 1.47 0.51 0.39
25 Chemical industry 47487 25915 6.94 7.22 1.17 1.08
26 Production of man-made fibres 375 10 0.05 0.00 0.19 0.02
31 Manufacture of metal goods (Other) 36905 16270 5.40 4.53 0.79 0.74
32 Mechanical engineering 77200 33861 11.29 9.44 0.77 0.64
33 Manufacture:office machinery/D.P. equip. 16239 7781 2.37 2.17 1.90 1.37
34 Electrical/electronic engineering 108456 44200 15.86 12.32 1.45 1.13
35 Manufacture:motor vehicles/parts thereof 33374 17284 4.88 4.82 0.86 0.98
36 Manufacture of other transport equipment 12353 6443 1.81 1.80 0.30 0.38
37 Instrument engineering 16616 7115 2.43 1.98 1.31 1.03
41 Food,drink/tobacco manufacturing 77151 38751 11.28 10.80 1.02 0.94
43 Textile industry 6407 4258 0.94 1.19 0.21 0.32
44 Manufacture of leather/leather goods 3615 1592 0.53 0.44 1.15 1.27
45 Footwear/clothing industries 39785 18554 5.82 5.17 1.14 1.05
46 Timber/wooden furniture industries 28078 14181 4.11 3.95 1.16 0.87
47 Manufacture of paper/paper products; etc 117408 91424 17.17 25.48 2.04 2.54
48 Processing of rubber/plastics 16916 10940 2.47 3.05 0.76 0.69
49 Other manufacturing industries 20610 10755 3.01 3.00 2.08 1.95
683951 358848
Source : Census of Employment (NOMIS)
are, with the exception of leather goods, also those which are markedly under­
represented in London relative to the nation.
London therefore, appears to have important industrial specialisations within 
manufacturing, and while the SIC does not indicate the precise nature of activities being 
undertaken, with recourse to the brief history of London’s industrial development 
included in the introduction to this thesis, two broad types of manufacturing which had a 
strong presence in London may still be identified. First, are the traditional craft 
industries identified by Hall (1962; 1964), which may include printing and publishing; 
footwear and clothing industries; the furniture industry; and the jewellers, stationers and 
musical manufactures found within the other manufacturing industries class. Second, 
there are the industries more generally associated with factory production including 
electrical and electronic engineering; the manufacture of office machinery and data 
processing equipment; the chemical industries; food, drink and tobacco manufacture; 
vehicle and vehicle part manufacture; mechanical engineering; and instrument 
engineering.
As was shown above, manufacturing employment in London declined by just under 
50% between 1981 and 1991. One characteristic of this decline is that it has been 
consistent across almost all industrial sectors. Of the 210 manufacturing activities 
defined at the most detailed level of the SIC employment in London expanded in only 
18. Furthermore, altogether employment growth in these 18 activities created only 9,770 
jobs, while gross employment decline in the remaining 192 sectors was of the order of 
334,900 jobs. Interestingly, over half the employment growth that did occur was within 
just two activities, the printing and publishing of books, and the printing and publishing 
of periodicals. However, the general indication from the detailed employment data is 
that with the exception of these two sectors, and ignoring sporadic small employment 
changes, decline has been a feature of employment change for all industries in London. 
This sectoral consistency does not in itself make London’s manufacturing performance 
unique. For Great Britain as a whole, only 39 of the 210 activity headings experienced 
employment growth over the 1981 to 1991 period. What is perhaps most remarkable 
about the London experience is that in 175 of the 210 sectors the capital’s share of total 
British employment declined.
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The activity heading level of the SIC provides a very high degree of industrial detail. 
However, for the efficient presentation of data the use of 210 sectors is impractical, and 
as such results at the class level of the SIC are presented here. Table 4.4 shows absolute 
job loss and rates of employment change for each manufacturing class over the 1981 to 
1991 period. Immediately it can be seen that employment decline has affected every 
manufacturing sector in London. Unsurprisingly, the industries with the most jobs in 
1981 have generally shed the highest absolute numbers of jobs over the decade. These 
include electrical and electronic engineering; mechanical engineering; food, drink and 
tobacco industries; paper publishing and printing industries; the chemical industries; and 
the footwear and clothing sector. Approximately two thirds of London’s total 
manufacturing job loss was shed from these six sectors alone, some 214,800 jobs. 
Industries which provided few jobs in London in 1981 have generally shed less absolute 
numbers of jobs over the decade. For example the combined job loss in textiles, leather 
goods, man-made fibres, the extraction of minerals, and the extraction and preparation 
of metalliferous ore, accounted for only 1.4% of total London manufacturing job loss.
In terms of rates of change, there appears to be considerable variation between the 
sectors. The mean rate of employment loss for all sectors over the 1981 to 1991 period 
is 52.9%. Ten sectors have rates of loss above this average, and eleven below. The 
production of man made fibres, and the extraction and preparation of metalliferous ore, 
experienced particularly severe rates of job loss, with 97.3% and 85.7% of jobs 
respectively being shed over the decade. Of the industries which experienced above 
average rates of employment decline four accounted for particularly large shares of 
overall employment loss. These were : the electrical and electronic engineering 
industries, which lost 59.2% of employment, contributing 19.8% to total job loss; 
mechanical engineering which shed 56.1% of jobs, 13.3% of total job loss; and the 
manufacture of metal goods other than transport, and the footwear and clothing 
industries, which both lost over 53% of employment, and contributed over 6% each to 
total manufacturing employment decline. The remaining six industries with above 
average rates of employment decline accounted for 8.4% of total London manufacturing 
job loss.
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Table 4.4 : Manufacturing employment change by sector, Greater London 1981 - 1991. (Class Level 1980 SIC)
No. o f Jobs % Change
21 Extraction/preparation:metalliferous ore
22 Metal manufacturing
23 Extraction of minerals (Other)
24 Manufacture:non-metallic products
25 Chemical industry
26 Production of man-made fibres
31 Manufacture of metal goods (Other)
32 Mechanical engineering
33 Manufacture:office machinery/D.P. equip.
34 Electrical/electronic engineering
35 Manufacture:motor vehicles/parts thereof
36 Manufacture of other transport equipment
37 Instrument engineering
41 Food,drink/tobacco manufacturing
43 Textile industry
44 Manufacture of leather/leather goods
45 Footwear/clothing industries
46 Timber/wooden furniture industries
47 Manufacture of paper/paper products; etc
48 Processing of rubber/plastics
49 Other manufacturing industries
-12 -85.7
-7602 -66.1
-173 -32.8
-7675 -59.3
-21572 -45.4
-365 -97.3
-20635 -55.9
-43339 -56.1
-8458 -52.1
-64256 -59.2
-16090 -48.2
-5910 -47.8
-9501 -57.2
-38400 -49.8
-2149 -33.5
-2023 -56.0
-21231 -53.4
-13897 -49.5
-25984 -22.1
-5976 -35.3
-9855 -47.8
-325103 -47.5
Source : Census o f Employment (NOMIS)
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Of the eleven sectors which experienced below average rates of decline, in only five was 
the difference in decline sufficient to actually increase their relative share of London’s 
manufacturing employment over the decade. The paper, publishing and printing 
industry stands out in this respect. This sector experienced the lowest rate of 
employment decline over the period of 22.1%, well under half the mean rate, and as 
mentioned previously, two activities within this class did achieve employment growth in 
London over the decade. Due to the sheer size of this sector in 1981, this relatively 
lower rate of decline still contributed just under 8% of total job loss, however, by 1991 
the share of total London employment in this sector had increased from 17.2% to 
25.5%. The other four sectors that increased their shares of total employment over the 
decade are the chemicals industry, the processing of rubber and plastics, the textiles 
industry, and the extraction of minerals. In all four cases the actual increase in share was 
very small.
Comparing employment change across sectors is actually extremely difficult. For 
example, a decline in employment of 85.7% in the extraction and preparation of 
metalliferous ores led to an absolute loss of only 12 jobs, while a 22.1% decline in 
employment in publishing and printing industry involved the loss of almost 26,000 jobs. 
The problem in the interpretation of the figures arises from the fact that relative and 
absolute job loss are dependant to a large extent on the number of jobs that existed in 
the base year. In fact, correlating sectoral shares of jobs in 1981 with sectoral share of 
job loss between 1981 and 1991 produces a positive Pearsons correlation coefficient of- 
0.9. This indicates that job loss has been to a large extent proportionate to the number of 
jobs in each industry in the base year, and as such relatively evenly spread across the 
manufacturing sectors. This is consistent with the figures presented in table 4.3 which 
generally show only marginal changes in the relative positions of the manufacturing 
sectors over the decade. The exceptions which can be picked out in this respect are the 
paper printing and publishing industries, which performed well in relation to other 
manufacturing sectors, and electrical and electronic engineering, and mechanical 
engineering, which both shed employment severely in absolute and relative terms. 
Clearly, degrees of variation in change do exist between the different sectors, however, 
these should not be over-emphasised. The data presented in table 4.4 are consistent with
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previous studies of London’s manufacturing which have shows that all manufacturing 
sectors have contributed to London’s decline
The use of data at the class level of the SIC is adequate for describing general sectoral 
trends in London manufacturing. However, an important issue that requires analysis at 
the most detailed level of the SIC relates to the employment performance of high- 
technology manufacturing. The distinction between low and high-technology 
manufacturing industries used here, is that proposed by Hall et al (1987) which 
comprises activities within the broader classes of chemical manufacture; the 
manufacture of office machinery and data processing equipment; electrical and 
electronic engineering; and the manufacture of other transport equipment, (see appendix 
one)
In 1981, high-technology industries accounted for over 13% of manufacturing jobs in 
the capital. By 1991 this figure had fallen to 10.5%. Table 4.5 shows that as a whole, 
high-technology industry experienced higher rates of employment loss over the 1981 to 
1991 period than low-technology. It would appear that those industries which were the 
largest employers in 1981 have also suffered the most severe rates of decline. Thus 
activities 3443, 3453 and 3441 all suffered above average rates of decline, together 
accounting for the loss of some 34,454 jobs, or 63% of total high-technology job loss. 
Only three of the industries shown in table 4.5 have shed jobs at a slower rate than the 
average for all manufacturing industries, and six were substantially above it. Thus, 
unevenness in rates of decline is evident amongst the high-technology industries, and in 
contrast to low-technology manufacturing, this has radically altered the relative 
importance of each industry over the decade. The conclusion must be that the 
performance of the high-technology sectors is very much part of London’s 
manufacturing employment decline.
Finally in this section, it is worth investigating how London’s sectoral employment 
change compares to the national experience. To do this, standard shift-share methods are 
used to assess the degree to which the patterns of manufacturing employment change 
outlined above, have been influenced by either the structural composition of the London 
economy, or by some locational or competitive effects within London. The shift-share
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Table 4.5 : Greater London high technology industry, 1981 - 1991, (activity heading level 1980 SIC).
2570 Pharmaceutical products
3302 Electronic data processing equipment
3441 Telegraph/telephone apparatus/equipment
3442 Electrical instruments/control systems
3443 Radio/electronic capital goods
3444 Components:electronic equipment
3453 Active components/sub-assemblies
3454 Electronic consumer goods/etc (Other) 
3640 Aerospace manufacture/repairing
Employment 
1981 1991
No. of jobs % total H-T No. of jobs %
12463 13.59 7338
8833 9.63 6586
12065 13.16 1444
6659 7.26 2747
16932 18.46 6388
1672 1.82 642
16053 17.51 2764
9337 10.18 4131
7688 8.38 5584
Employment Change
1981- 1991
H-T (No. o f Jobs) (% change)
19.50 -5125 -41.1
17.50 -2247 -25.4
3.84 -10621 -88.0
7.30 -3912 -58.7
16.98 -10544 -62.3
1.71 -1030 -61.6
7.35 -13289 -82.8
10.98 -5206 -55.8
14.84 -2104 -27.4
Total High Tech 
Total Low Tech
91702
592249
37624
321224
-54078
-271025
-59.0
-45.8
Source : Census of Employment (NOMIS)
technique compares the actual employment performance of a region, with what would have 
happened had the region changed at the same rate as some benchmark area, normally the 
country as a whole. Essentially the technique standardises and summarises data in order to 
arithmetically isolate the significance of the industrial structure of a region in its employment 
performance. It does this by identifying three components of actual employment change in a 
region. First, the regional share component, which is the amount by which total employment 
in a region would have changed had it changed at precisely the same rate as total employment 
in the wider benchmark area; second, the structural shift component which describes the 
change expected in a regions employment if each industry had grown at its own national rate, 
less the rate of growth for all industry nationally; and third, the differential shift component, 
which is a residual left over after the regional share and structural components have been 
subtracted from actual employment change. The differential component has traditionally 
been explained in terms of the local competitive advantages of a region. Comprehensive 
accounts of the shift-share method can be found in Vickerman (1984), Armstrong and Taylor 
(1985), Fothergill and Gudgin (1979a), Ashby, (1968; 1970), Randall (1973) and Townroe 
(1969).
Reservations over the use of shift-share have been expressed, particularly in relation to its 
sensitivity to industrial disaggregation and its disregard for inter-industry linkages, but also
2 Using notation similar to Casler (1989), the shift-share identity (employment change = regional share + 
differential shift + structural shift) is expressed algebraically as :
X .* , = X  * +2,a  ,  (x * , -X  * ,)+ £ < x , (x *, -X *).
Where X is employment, i denotes an industry, j  a region, and * growth rates, while a y  is the share o f region 
/  s total employment in industry i in the base year. It is worth stressing that structural effects are calculated with 
respect to the composition o f employment in the base year. This means in effect that the shift-share is 
comparing actual employment change in London over the 1981 to 1991 period to what would have happened in 
London had employment in each industry changed at the same rate as in the nation as a whole given the initial 
structure o f London industry. In other words the shift-share analysis conducted here does not take into account 
changes in London’s industrial structure which may have taken place over the period being examined. This 
deficiency o f the standard shift-share method has prompted criticism in the literature with some authors 
proposing that middle and end year values should be incorporated within the analysis (Stillwell, 1969; Ashby, 
1968, Townsend, 1969). Here the purpose is simply to examine how the structure o f London industry at the 
beginning o f the 1980s might have influenced employment change given national sectoral job change. Clearly, 
London’s industrial structure has altered over the 1980s as described above, and additional shift-share analyses 
could be conducted which consider the influence o f structural effects at different points over the decade. 
However, given that the figures presented in table 4.3 suggest that only minor differences have occurred in 
shares o f total manufacturing employment held by each sector over the 1981 to 1991 period, it is not anticipated 
that the choice o f year used to measure structural effects should radically alter any conclusions reached about 
their influence.
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because it is essentially a-theoretical and as such does not indicate what the proper 
interpretation of the differential component should be (Buck, 1970; Richardson, 1978b; 
Houston, 1967; Holden, Swales, Naim, 1987). However, strong counter arguments have been 
put forward, stressing that the criticisms have arisen though the mis-use and mis­
understanding of shift-share analysis (Fothergill, Gudgin, 1979a; Stillwell, 1970; Simpson and 
Bishop, 1972). The main conclusion from this debate is that shift-share is not of itself a theory 
of regional change, nor does it provide an explanation for such change. However, even the 
most ardent critics of shift-share analysis, for example Buck (1970), concede that “there can 
be little objection to shift and share as a descriptive tool which summarises information 
concisely, and can be of considerable value if employed on a sector by sector basis” (Buck, 
1970,450). This is precisely the purpose for which it has been used here.
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and share as a descriptive tool which summarises information concisely, and can be of 
considerable value if employed on a sector by sector basis” (Buck, 1970, 450). This is 
precisely the purpose for which it has been used here.
Separate shift-share analyses were carried out individually for the London 
manufacturing sector at the class and activity heading levels of the SIC, using Great 
Britain as the benchmark area. Remarkably similar results were generated at each level 
of industrial disaggregation, and results from the class level analysis are presented here.
Table 4.6 : A shift-share analysis of manufacturing employment change between 
London and Britain, 1981-1991.
absolute change % change
actual change -325,103 -47.5%
total shift -157,675 -23.1%
regional share -167,428 -24.5%
structural component +34,552 +5.1%
differential component -192,227 -28.1%
London’s manufacturing sector has experienced a significantly higher rate of 
employment decline than the total national rate of change. The total shift figure for 
London indicates that the manufacturing sector lost almost 157,700 jobs or 23.1% of 
total employment over and above the loss of 167,428 jobs that can be attributed to 
national trends of manufacturing job loss. This is despite the indication of the structural 
component, which although weak, suggests that on the basis of London’s compositional 
mix in 1981, a relatively less severe employment decline should have been experienced 
in London than in Great Britain as a whole. The detailed results showed that London’s 
structural advantage lay in the large proportion of jobs within the chemical, paper and 
printing, and footwear and clothing industries. The total structural effect is, nonetheless, 
minor and this is due to structural disadvantages particularly related to employment in 
the manufacture of metal goods, motor vehicles, and transport equipment. In fact the 
shift-share analysis clearly indicates that the dominant effect in London’s severe 
manufacturing employment decline has been generated by factors other than industrial
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structure. These are captured in the high negative value of -28.1% in the differential 
component. London’s manufacturing employment has changed such that its 
compositional mix, though favourable, has been over-shadowed by factors which have 
been unfavourable to job growth. London’s poor employment performance cannot be 
explained by the compositional mix of industries.
The profile of London’s manufacturing employment change presented in this section is 
one of consistent and severe decline. The figures presented have verified the finding of 
previous research discussed in chapters one and two which showed that London’s 
employment loss is largely not sectorally specific, but has, with few exceptions, been a 
feature of all industrial sectors in the capital, and of both low and high-technology 
industry. This section has also demonstrated that the structure of manufacturing 
employment in the capital, cannot explain the severity of decline relative to the nation as 
a whole. In sum, manufacturing employment decline has been particularly severe in 
London with no systematic sectoral variation, and it would seem that explanations for 
the London experience over the 1980s need to be sought in factors inherent to the 
capital, and in its particular types of manufacturing industries
4.3 Spatial aspects of manufacturing employment change in London, 1981 to 1991.
The following section is concerned with aspects of manufacturing employment change 
at the borough level. Initially the research for this section was produced graphically in 
the form of maps. However, this medium of presentation was found to be inappropriate 
for two main reasons. First, it required the reduction of numerical detail to an 
unacceptable level due to the need to allocate spatial observations within a limited range 
of value classes. Second, the London boroughs are administrative and not economic 
spatial units with wide internal differences, and thus the identification of spatial patterns 
comprising these units my be unrealistic.
Table 4.7 describes the distribution of borough manufacturing employment in 1981. The 
table shows the absolute number of manufacturing jobs that existed in each borough in 
1981 and the percentage share of London manufacturing jobs that each boroughs 
contained. If manufacturing jobs had been evenly distributed across the boroughs, each
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Table 4.7 : Manufacturing employment in the London boroughs, 1981.
The borough contribution to London manufacturing employme
absolute no. % o f  total Londo
of jobs manufacturing jojbs
City o f London 35005 5.12
Camden 29988 4.38
Hackney 21829 3.19
Hammersmith 10824 1.58
Haringey 15558 2.27
Islington 26002 3.80
Kensington and Chelsea 4009 0.59
Lambeth 11091 1.62
Lewisham 9320 1.36
Newham 19172 2.80
Southwark 24148 3.53
Tower Hamlets 20936 3.06
Wandsworth 11320 1.66
Westminster 43434 6.35
Barking and Dagenham 38796 5.67
Barnet 15845 2.32
Bexley 14724 2.15
Brent 34157 4.99
Bromley 13441 1.97
Croydon 31667 4.63
Ealing 35007 5.12
Enfield 31205 4.56
Greenwich 11480 1.68
Harrow 12581 1.84
Havering 11522 1.68
Hillingdon 29425 4.30
Hounslow 35652 5.21
Kingston 13783 2.02
Merton 21627 3.16
Redbridge 12526 1.83
Richmond 11048 1.62
Sutton 10087 1.47
Waltham Forest 16742 2.45
Greater London Total 683951
Source : Census o f Employment (NOMIS).
110
would have contain 3.03% of total London jobs. Seven of the 14 inner London 
boroughs held shares above this hypothetical mean. Only three of these were 
significantly higher. These are the cities of Westminster and London, which contained 
6.4% and 5.1% of London’s manufacturing employment, or 43,400 and 35,000 jobs 
respectively; and the borough of Camden which contained 4.4% of manufacturing 
employment, some 30,000 jobs. Of the seven inner boroughs with below average shares 
of manufacturing employment, Kensington and Chelsea stands out as being most 
deficient, containing only 0.6% of the London total in 1981, or just over 4,000 jobs. 
However, Wandsworth, Lewisham, Lambeth and Hammersmith also held relatively low 
shares of between 1.4% to 1.7%.
The largest shares of manufacturing in outer London were to be found in the boroughs 
of Barking and Dagenham (5.7%), Ealing (5.1%), Hounslow (5.2%), Brent (5.0%), 
Croydon (4.6%), Enfield (4.6%), and Hillingdon (4.3%). Together, these seven 
boroughs contained over one third of London’s manufacturing employment, some
236,000 jobs. The only other outer borough to have held a share of London’s 
manufacturing above the hypothetical mean of 3.03%, was Merton, but the value was 
not significantly higher, only 3.2%. Of the 11 outer boroughs which held below average 
shares of London’s manufacturing, all were within a range containing between 1.5% and 
2.5%.
The figures in table 4.7 indicate that less variation existed between the outer than inner 
boroughs. The two broad areas are difficult to compare due to the wide differences that 
exist in character, size, location and so on. However, the average borough share of 
manufacturing tends to be slightly higher in outer London, 3.1%, than inner, 3.0%. It is 
interesting that such a considerable proportion of manufacturing employment was 
located in the Central London boroughs of the cities of London and Westminster in 
1981. The employment data do not distinguish between headquarter or productive 
functions, so the extent to which the Central London manufacturing reflects office 
employment rather than factory or workshop employment is uncertain. However, an 
examination of the industrial structures of the City and Westminster at finer levels of 
industrial disaggregation reveals the presence of particular industries. For the City, the 
vast majority of manufacturing employment in 1981 was in the printing and publishing
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of newspapers, books and periodicals, which provided over 85% of the City’s 35,000 
manufacturing jobs. These were the industries which were centred around Fleet Street 
and the surrounding area, and were involved in productive manufacturing in the sense 
that they produced material goods for sale. The extent to which the other 15% of 
manufacturing employment in the City was in headquarters or productive activities is 
unclear.
In the case of Westminster, again the printing and publishing industry was prominent, 
providing 11,728 jobs or 27% of manufacturing employment, the footwear and clothing 
industry provided 5569 jobs or 13%, and the food, drink, and tobacco industry just over 
6% of all jobs. These industries which are well established in Westminster are likely to 
be workshop trades rather than headquarter activities. It is impossible to say from the 
SIC what proportion of the remaining employment would be in headquarter activities. 
However, the City of Westminster planning authority have emphasised the importance 
of productive manufacturing industry in the borough, defining a specialist industrial 
area to help protect these activities (City of Westminster, 1991). At this stage, it has to 
be accepted that headquarter activities may be important to some degree, and this issue 
is returned to later in the thesis and discussed in relation to a variety of data sets in 
appendix one.
The relative importance of manufacturing employment in each borough in 1981 is 
shown in table 4.8, expressed both as a percentage of total borough employment, and as 
a location quotient relative to London as a whole. At one extreme, over 54% of Barking 
and Dagenham’s total employment was in manufacturing, while the same figure for 
Kensington and Chelsea is just under 5%. The location quotients show that twenty 
boroughs were over-represented in manufacturing jobs relative to London as a whole, 
while thirteen were under-represented. Generally, the outer London Boroughs tended to 
be more specialised in manufacturing employment while inner were less specialised. 
Only four of the 19 outer London boroughs - Greenwich, Bromley, Barnet and Havering 
- were under-represented in manufacturing industry and all had location quotients within 
the 0.5 to 1.0 range. Very high location quotients of between 1.5 and 2.0 were recorded 
in Merton, Enfield, Brent and Ealing; and Barking and Dagenham was clearly the most 
specialised borough of all in manufacturing employment with a location quotient of
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Table 4.8 : The internal importance of manufacturing in the London boroughs, 1981
manufacturing location quotients
as %of all jobs relative to
City of London 10.91 0.57
Camden 14.38 0.75
Hackney 26.88 1.40
Hammersmith 13.67 0.71
Haringey 25.42 1.32
Islington 22.91 1.19
Kensington and Chelsea 4.82 0.25
Lambeth 8.42 0.44
Lewisham 15.09 0.79
Newham 25.58 1.33
Southwark 18.56 0.97
Tower Hamlets 24.82 1.29
Wandsworth 13.95 0.73
Westminster 8.48 0.44
Barking and Dagenham 54.64 2.84
Barnet 16.39 0.85
Bexley 26.56 1.38
Brent 31.38 1.63
Bromley 16.06 0.84
Croydon 22.06 1.15
Ealing 29.86 1.55
Enfield 36.23 1.89
Greenwich 17.00 0.88
Harrow 22.57 1.18
Havering 18.55 0.97
Hillingdon 27.00 1.41
Hounslow 26.61 1.39
Kingston 22.22 1.16
Merton 36.36 1.89
Redbridge 20.43 1.06
Richmond 20.20 1.05
Sutton 20.29 1.06
Waltham Forest 28.47 1.48
Greater London Total 19.21
2.84. In contrast, nine of the 14 inner London boroughs were under-represented, 
including Kensington and Chelsea, Lambeth and Westminster, all of which registered 
extremely low location quotients of below 0.5. The inner London boroughs which were 
over-represented were all in inner North East London and all in the 1.0 to 1.5 range. 
Thus, the seven boroughs specialising most in manufacturing employment were all in 
outer London, where manufacturing employment contributed between 27 % and 55 % 
of total employment; and the five specialising least were all in inner London where 
manufacturing was between 5 % and 14% of total employment. Of course, these 
specialisation figures are as much an indication of the location of service employment as 
they are of manufacturing.
To repeat, just under 50% of London’s manufacturing jobs were lost over the 1981 to 
1991 period. Table 4.9 shows how this change affected the 33 boroughs. With the single 
exception of Kensington and Chelsea, every borough in London has experienced 
manufacturing employment decline over the decade. The table confirms the findings of 
previous research (for example, Dennis, 1978; GLC, 1983) which has shown that 
manufacturing employment decline is a feature of the whole conurbation. In fact, there 
is little evidence even of any broad distinctions between inner and outer boroughs in 
absolute or relative decline. Over the decade as a whole, inner London shed 48.2% of 
total manufacturing employment, some 136,250 jobs, while outer London shed 47.1% 
or 188,850 jobs. Thus, no differences in rates of manufacturing employment decline can 
be identified between the two broad areas.
However, there is still some variation between the boroughs in their manufacturing 
employment performance. The absolute extent of job loss is highly correlated (0.9) with 
the number of jobs that existed in the borough in the base year. Given that relatively 
severe decline in manufacturing employment was experienced in all but one London 
Borough the existence of this association is not surprising. Table 4.9 shows that the ten 
boroughs which contained most manufacturing employment in 1981 are the same ten 
boroughs which lost most jobs, albeit that their relative positions within each ranking 
may be different. For the purposes of spatial comparison here, it is useful to focus on the 
rate of change figures.
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Table 4.9 : Manufacturing employment change in the boroughs, 1981 to 1991.
Employment change Percentage share of London's manufacturing employment
% point difference
abs. % 1981 1991 1981-1991
City o f London -30244 -86.40 5.12 1.33 -3.79
Camden -15807 -52.71 4.38 3.95 -0.43
Hackney -10787 -49.42 3.19 3.08 -0.11
Hammersmith -5371 -49.62 1.58 1.52 -0.06
Haringey -8185 -52.61 2.27 2.05 -0.22
Islington -11194 -43.05 3.80 4.13 0.32
Kensington and Chelsea 2175 54.25 0.59 1.72 1.14
Lambeth -2979 -26.86 1.62 2.26 0.64
Lewisham -5665 -60.78 1.36 1.02 -0.34
Newham -9727 -50.74 2.80 2.63 -0.17
Southwark -7164 -29.67 3.53 4.73 1.20
Tower Hamlets -4827 -23.06 3.06 4.49 1.43
Wandsworth -5542 -48.96 1.66 1.61 -0.04
Westminster -20935 -48.20 6.35 6.27 -0.08
Barking and Dagenham -18342 -47.28 5.67 5.70 0.03
Bamet -9801 -61.86 2.32 1.68 -0.63
Bexley -7055 -47.91 2.15 2.14 -0.02
Brent -19638 -57.49 4.99 4.05 -0.95
Bromley -5704 -42.44 1.97 2.16 0.19
Croydon -16736 -52.85 4.63 4.16 -0.47
Ealing -16801 -47.99 5.12 5.07 -0.04
Enfield -14356 -46.01 4.56 4.70 0.13
Greenwich -5610 -48.87 1.68 1.64 -0.04
Harrow -4418 -35.12 1.84 2.27 0.44
Havering -3431 -29.78 1.68 2.25 0.57
Hillingdon -14457 -49.13 4 30 4.17 -0.13
Hounslow -16616 -46.61 531 5.30 0.09
Kingston -5334 -38.70 2.02 2.35 0.34
Merton -9522 -44.03 3.16 3.37 031
Redbridge -6653 -53.11 1.83 1.64 -0.19
Richmond -4693 -42.48 1.62 1.77 0.16
Sutton -3324 -32.95 1.47 1.88 0.41
Waltham Forest -6360 -37.99 2.45 2.89 0.45
Greater London Total -325103 -47.53
Source : Census o f Employment. (NOMIS)
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The City of London shed the largest proportion of manufacturing jobs in both absolute 
and relative terms. Manufacturing employment declined in the City by over 86%, a loss 
of some 30,244 jobs over this ten year period. Analysis of the data at finer levels of 
industrial disaggregation shows that this loss was almost entirely due to the loss of
printing and publishing employment as long established newspapers left Fleet Street. 
Other boroughs with extremely high rates of job loss include Lewisham and Barnet, 
which each shed over 60% of manufacturing jobs over the decade. Seventeen of the 33 
boroughs experienced employment decline of between -45% and -60%, including many 
of those boroughs which were relatively large manufacturing employers at the 
beginning of the decade. Of these 17 boroughs, Brent suffered the most severe loss, 
shedding 57.5% of its total manufacturing employment, almost 20,000 jobs. The other 
16 boroughs were clustered in a fairly narrow range of decline from -46% to -52%.
Thirteen boroughs experienced relatively favourable rates of change which were below 
that for London as a whole. Most of the outer South West London boroughs, as well as 
Bromley, Islington, Harrow and Waltham Forest shed between 30% and 45% of jobs, 
while Tower Hamlets, Lambeth, Southwark and Havering, all experienced particularly 
low rates of decline, shedding between 23% and 30% of total manufacturing 
employment. In Tower Hamlets and Southwark, more disaggregated data show that 
lower rates of decline were related to quite significant expansions in the printing and 
publishing employment due to the movement of printing works out of the City. In 
Lambeth, lower rates of decline were related to employment growth in the manufacture 
of office machinery, and in Havering through job growth in chemicals and instrument 
engineering.
Manufacturing employment actually grew by 54% in Kensington and Chelsea over the 
decade, although in absolute terms this only involved a net gain of over 2,000 jobs. 
Further analysis of the figures show that this growth was in the expansion of printing 
and publishing jobs, and the borough planning authority have verified that this was due 
to the relocation of the Evening Standard newspaper printing works within the borough 
boundary.
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Table 4.9 also compares the share of London’s manufacturing employment in each 
borough in 1981 with that of 1991, demonstrating the impact of the differentials in 
relative rates of change upon the borough distribution of manufacturing employment. 
Generally, the actual borough shares of manufacturing employment have not changed 
radically. Of course boroughs which declined at a more severe rate than London as a 
whole have experienced a negative percentage point change in their share of 
manufacturing, while those declining less acutely have expanded their percentage point 
shares. However, only four boroughs experienced a change in the share of London’s 
manufacturing employment of over 1% point. These were, the City of London, which 
actually fell from being the fifth largest manufacturing employer in London in 1981, to 
being the second smallest in 1991; and Tower Hamlets, Southwark, and Kensington and 
Chelsea, which all increased their shares of London’s manufacturing by over 1% point.
Finally in this section, manufacturing employment change in the London boroughs over the 
1980s is analysed in more detail, using shift-share methods to determine the influence of 
structural and competitive effects. Table 4.10 shows the results of a shift-share analysis of 
borough manufacturing employment change, using Greater London as the benchmark area. 
The results presented were generated at the activity heading level of the SIC. Finer levels of 
industrial disaggregation are generally thought superior when small areas are the focus of 
interest (Fothergill, Gudgin, 1979a). This is because the actual composition of more 
aggregated categories are likely to vary widely when fewer firms are involved. For example, 
any borough’s manufacturing may be dominated by a small number of large employers in a 
very specific manufacturing sector and this could constitute either a structural advantage or 
disadvantage. At the more aggregated level such advantages or disadvantages would be 
hidden because in effect the employment in one specific sector would be spread across a 
number of sectors and thus the structural component would not be properly represented.
| Fothergill and Gudgin (1979a) point out that this problem in the representation of the 
l structural effect is unlikely to be relevant at the regional level and above since “no one 
employer is likely to dominate employment enough to distort the results” (Fothergill, Gudgin, 
1979a, 313).
I
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Table 4.10 : Shift-share analysis of manufacturing employment, London boroughs - Greater London, 1981 - 1991.
regional share total shift
(absolute) (absolute)
City of London -16638 -13606
Camden -14253 -1554
Hackney -10375 -412
Hammersmith -5145 -226
Haringey -7395 -790
Islington -12359 1165
Kensington and Chelsea -1905 4080
Lambeth -5272 2293
Lewisham -4430 -1235
Newham -9112 -615
Southwark -11478 4314
Tower Hamlets -9951 5124
Wandsworth -5380 -162
Westminster -20644 -291
Barking and Dagenham -18440 98
Bamet -7531 -2270
Bexley -6998 -57
Brent -16235 -3403
Bromley -6389 685
Croydon -15051 -1685
Ealing -16639 -162
Enfield -14832 476
Greenwich -5456 -154
Harrow -5980 1562
Havering -5476 2045
Hillingdon -13986 -471
Hounslow -16945 329
Kingston -6551 1217
Merton -10279 757
Redbridge -5954 -699
Richmond -5251 558
Sutton -4794 1470
Waltham Forest -7957 1597
structural component
(%) (absolute)
-38.9 127
-5.2 3768
-1.9 468
-2.1 -466
-5.1 -1261
4.5 823
101.8 680
20.7 796
-13.3 -620
-3.2 841
17.9 2570
24.5 -281
-1.4 41
-0.7 4113
0.3 -874
-14.3 -2831
-0.4 -832
-10.0 489
5.1 565
-5.3 -751
-0.5 -3089
1.5 -3510
-1.3 -123
12.4 368
17.7 160
-1.6 -1445
0.9 -582
8.8 697
3.5 576
-5.6 -997
5.1 455
14.6 54
9.5 76
(%)
differential component 
(absolute) (%)
0.4 -13730 -39.2
12.6 -5320 -17.7
2.1 -878 -4
-4.3 241 2.2
-8.1 471 3
3.2 343 1.3
17 3400 84.8
7.2 1497 13.5
-6.7 -615 -6.6
4.4 -1455 -7.6
10.6 1744 7.2
-1.3 5405 25.8
0.4 -202 -1.8
9.5 -4402 -10.1
-2.3 975 2.5
-17.9 561 3.5
-5.7 776 5.3
1.4 -3890 -11.4
4.2 120 0.9
-2.4 -932 -2.9
-8.8 2928 8.4
-11.2 3987 12.8
-1.1 -30 -0.3
2.9 1194 9.5
1.4 1886 16.4
-4.9 975 3.3
-1.6 913 2.6
5.1 520 3.8
2.7 182 0.8
-8 298 2.4
4.1 103 0.9
0.5 1417 14
0.5 1522 9.1
Seventeen of the 33 boroughs have negative total shift values, and have thus 
experienced less favourable manufacturing employment change than they would have 
done had they changed at the same rate as London as a whole. However, what is of 
particular interest are the influences of structural and competitive in borough 
employment change. From the shift-share results presented in table 4.10, boroughs may 
be categorised in the following way :
Table 4.11: A categorisation of boroughs on the basis of a shift-share analysis of 
manufacturing employment change between the boroughs and London, 1981-1991.
Inner London Outer London
+ve structural 
+ve differential
Islington, Southwark, 
Kensington and Chelsea, 
Lambeth
Bromley, Harrow, 
Havering, Kingston, 
Merton, Richmond, 
Sutton, Waltham Forest
+ve structural outweighs 
-ve differential
+ve differential 
outweighs 
-ve structural
Tower Hamlets Barking and Dagenham, 
Enfield, Hounslow
-ve structural outweighs 
+ve differential
Hammersmith, Haringey Barnet, Bexley, Ealing, 
Hillingdon, Redbridge
-ve differential 
outweighs 
+ve structural
City of London, Camden, 
Hackney, Newham, 
Wandsworth, Westminster
Brent
-ve differential 
+ve structural
Lewisham Croydon, Greenwich
The boroughs in the top three sections of the categorisation above have positive total 
shifts, or in other words they have achieved more favourable employment change than 
London as a whole, the bottom three less favourable. The above categorisation shows 
that 12 boroughs have registered positive total shifts in situations where the influence of 
the structural and differential components have both been positive. For these boroughs, 
the performance of manufacturing employment over the decade has been more
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favourable than would have been expected solely on the basis of industrial structure, and 
for Kensington and Chelsea, Lambeth, Sutton, Harrow, Havering and Waltham Forest 
the differential was the dominant component within the total shift. In fact, strong 
differential components have been very influential in creating favourable employment 
change amongst the boroughs. Of the remaining 4 boroughs with positive total shifts, 
strong positive differentials have worked against negative structural components to 
produce favourable rates of change. The implication of this are that for boroughs in the 
top three sections of the categorisation, industrial structure alone cannot explain 
employment performance, and some competitive or locational attributes have worked to 
produce favourable rates of manufacturing employment change in relative terms.
Of the 17 boroughs which experienced less favourable rates of employment change, 
industrial structure has been either entirely or partly influential in the poor performance 
of 10 boroughs. Lewisham, Croydon and Greenwich, all registered negative structural 
and differential components which contributed more or less equally to produce total 
shifts of -13%, -5.3 %, and -1.3 % respectively. The influence of industrial structure is 
therefore apparent in all three cases, though locational or competitive factors have also 
been important in producing less favourable employment performances than would have 
been expected. In the other seven boroughs where industrial structure was influential, 
positive differential components worked against the negative influence of industrial 
structure to produce employment declines that were more favourable than expected. In 
Ealing, Bexley and Hillingdon, the influence of the differential was quite dramatic, 
reducing the effect of negative structural components to produce marginally negative 
total shifts. For the remaining four boroughs with negative total shifts, the differential 
was the sole influence in decline. Favourable structural components were displaced by 
stronger competitive effects which worked to escalate manufacturing employment 
decline.
The categorisation used above is useful in examining the different ways in which the 
structural and differential effects have featured in employment change, however, it does 
not make clear the spatial manifestation of these effects. Returning to table 4.10, and 
considering firstly the structural components, it can be seen that the borough distribution 
of negative and positive values is diverse. Of the 33 boroughs, 19 registered positive
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values for the structural component, a disproportionate number of which (10) were in 
inner London, and five of these inner boroughs held the highest positive structural 
values. Only four inner London boroughs had negative structural component values, and 
of these only in Haringey and to a lesser extent Lewisham were they significant, with 
negative values of 8.1% and 6.7% respectively. However, an inner outer London 
distinction in structural values is not readily identifiable. While inner London boroughs 
have in general tended towards positive structural values, the outer London boroughs 
are clearly divided in the direction and influence of the structural component. Nine outer 
London boroughs had positive structural components and ten negative. The table shows 
no broad consistency in the outer borough structural values.
In contrast, the distribution of the differential component values shows a relatively clear 
geographical pattern. In interpreting the geography of this component, however, it is 
useful for the moment to ignore the official definition of the inner and outer London 
boroughs. Considering the figures in table 4.10, and referring to Figure 1.1 in chapter 
one, it can be seen that with the exception of Croydon, all boroughs on the periphery of 
London and many directly adjacent to these have registered positive differential shifts; 
while a ring of negative differential components, broken in parts, can be identified 
within the conurbation running from Brent to Newham in the North, excluding Islington 
and Tower Hamlets, and from Greenwich to Wandsworth in the South, excluding 
Southwark and Lambeth. Consistencies in the spatial distribution of the differential 
component suggests that locational or competitive factors have influenced rates of 
manufacturing decline in different ways within London. In the peripheral and adjacent 
boroughs they have operated such as to produce more favourable rates of change, and in 
the non-peripheral boroughs less favourable rates of change.
Anomalies do exist within this general pattern. Croydon was the only peripheral 
borough to register a negative differential component. Closer examination of the data 
provides little evidence to explain exactly why this should have happened, though it 
would seem that the bulk of the negative differential was composed of strong negative 
values in electrical and electronic engineering and in the manufacture of office 
machinery. Six of the officially categorised inner London boroughs also have positive 
differential values. For Kensington and Chelsea the strong positive differential is almost
121
entirely explained by the movement of the Evening Standard to the borough. Also, in 
Hammersmith and Islington the printing and publishing classes of the SIC had very high 
differential values, though in these two cases negative differentials in almost every other 
manufacturing sector produced overall marginal components. In the other inner London
| boroughs with positive differential values: Tower Hamlets, Southwark and Lambeth, the 
composition of the positive differential was more multi-sectoral, including electrical and
electronic engineering, mechanical engineering, the chemical industry, and food drink
and tobacco. However, it appears that in general overall positive differential values in
the inner London boroughs are very narrowly sectorally composed, with most industrial
manufacturing sectors registering negative values. The result of this shift-share analysis
have to be interpreted with caution. The values of the differential are extremely sensitive
at the borough level, and it should be bome in mind that when analysing small areas
with such little manufacturing employment, the inward movement of one establishment
over the period can have the effect of creating positive differentials when other
manufacturing sectors have declined at a higher rate than London as a whole.
Despite these anomalies, if the official definition of inner and outer London is ignored, 
then of the ten boroughs which registered negative differential component values, nine 
could be described as non peripheral, with only Croydon as the exception. This shows a 
clear and consistent geographical distinction in borough propensity towards favourable 
and less favourable rates of manufacturing employment decline.
Several factors could explain what the negative differential values in London as a 
whole, and in particular in inner London, are measuring. It could be indicative of the 
urban space constraints of London, or of the growth of service sector activity causing 
the spatial displacement of manufacturing activity, or perhaps of the high costs 
particularly in the inner area relative to other cities. From the data used in this chapter it 
is impossible to answer these questions, although they are addressed elsewhere in the 
thesis. What can be concluded from the analysis presented in this secticbi is that London 
is losing manufacturing employment at a most severe rate , and that this
i
loss is largely a result of locational influences which have been shown to be most 
marked in inner London. However, severe decline in manufacturing employment has 
affected all boroughs. While employment in manufacturing has halved and the relative
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shares of the boroughs in this decreased employment has changed in detail, with a few 
notable exceptions, overall changes have not been so drastically different between 
boroughs as to radically alter the geography of manufacturing employment in London. 
Essentially, industrial decline is a metropolitan characteristic, with only one radical 
departure at the borough level from the general conurbation trend.
4.4 Conclusions.
This chapter has demonstrated the scale and extent of job loss in the London 
manufacturing sector over the 1981 to 1991 period. It has been shown that the fall in the 
demand for manufacturing employment in London has been instrumental in creating 
radical shifts in the overall composition of London’s employment. With few exceptions, 
this decline has affected all manufacturing industries within the capital, and has been a 
consistent feature of change in all but one of the 33 boroughs. In addition, this chapter 
has demonstrated that London’s manufacturing employment has declined at a much 
faster rate than the nation as a whole, and that this differential cannot be explained by 
the compositional mix of industries within the capital. As regards employment, London 
has deindustrialised in absolute and relative terms in the most severe way.
The results of this chapter accord with the theoretical perspectives reviewed in chapter 
two which emphasised the severe and consistent decline of urban manufacturing. The 
explanations for London’s manufacturing employment decline cannot focus on internal 
sectoral or spatial aspects, but must seek to address why it is that employment has been 
shed in all sectors of manufacturing and in all areas of London. This scale and 
consistency of decline, particularly at the borough level, may suggest that employment 
protection policies for manufacturing have not been practised in the capital over the 
1980s, or if they have, that they have been extremely unsuccessful. The following 
chapter presents the results of a survey of the London LPAs, which explores these and 
other related issues.
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Chapter 5 : The planning response to manufacturing employment decline in 
London : the borough planning authority perspective.
5.0 Introduction.
Chapter three argued that the British town and country planning system, through the 
powers of development control, allows LPAs to respond to, and possibly influence, the 
nature of economic change within their areas. Under circumstances of industrial decline 
LPAs may adopt a restrictive approach towards changes of use from industrial land and 
premises in the hope of protecting manufacturing jobs. Previous literature suggests that 
these policies may have been used in London and chapter three speculated as to their 
importance. However, chapter four has shown that severe decline has comprehensively 
characterised London’s manufacturing change over the 1980s, both sectorally and 
spatially. This would suggest that London planning authorities have either not tried to 
protect manufacturing jobs, or have been remarkably unsuccessful in doing so.
This chapter explores the LPA policy response to manufacturing employment decline in 
London over the 1980s. It presents the results of a postal questionnaire survey designed 
to explore the ways in which local authority land use planning controls have been used 
to influence manufacturing employment decline in London. The chapter begins by 
discussing aspects related to the scope of the survey. Results are then organised into 
four main sections. First, the borough planning authority perspectives on manufacturing 
employment decline are outlined. Planning policies that were developed to protect 
manufacturing jobs in London are next discussed, highlighting differences in LPA 
approaches. Section 5.5 then goes on to consider how important these policies actually 
were to the LPAs, how much emphasis they were awarded in development control 
practice, and the reasons why LPAs believe that they have been successful or not. The 
implications of land use regulation for manufacturing employment change are then 
investigated further within the context of the introduction of the business use class 
legislation. Section 5.7 then reflects upon the research implications of the main findings 
of the survey, and discusses borough perceptions as to the main mechanisms underlying 
manufacturing employment decline in London, before conclusions are drawn.
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5.1 The scope of the survey.
The purpose of the survey was to investigate how London LPAs had responded to 
manufacturing employment decline over the 1981 to 1991 period, focusing in particular 
on the use of employment protection policies. The survey sought to determine the 
extent of their use, how they have been implemented, and why LPAs view these 
policies to have been successful or not. The survey was predominantly concerned with 
these general themes, although it also asked LPAs to comment on issues surrounding 
the introduction of the business use and class and related permitted development to 
provide a further means of addressing the issues raised in the survey. In fact, the 
emphasis on these changes can be compared in many ways to a ‘case study’, 
since they have effectively created a ‘policy-on’ and ‘policy-off situation for the 
regulation of specific land use changes related to manufacturing industry. An 
opportunity is therefore presented to actually ask LPAs what difference it makes to 
regulate land use, albeit for a specific case, and also to consider the land use 
implications of deregulation
The use of a survey-based approach to the research is attractive because it provides a 
potentially rich source of information which would otherwise not be available.
However, in relation to the particular issue to be examined, there were two main reasons 
for the adoption of this particular methodology. First, it was anticipated that this was 
likely to be the most appropriate means of directly addressing the relationship between 
land use planning controls and manufacturing employment decline. Planning policy, or 
the ‘output’ of the planning system is extremely difficult to examine or evaluate 
empirically, largely because it is non-quantifiable. Given the highly discretionary nature 
of the British planning system, even the aspects of planning which appear to be capable 
of empirical analysis, such as development control data, actually indicate little about 
planning policy because there could be any number of reasons underlying any 
development control decision in the individual case. In essence, the issues to be 
explored in this chapter are qualitative, and although they may have quantifiable 
impacts, they must be explored through qualitative research techniques. It is therefore
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not the intention here to attempt a quantitative evaluation of the employment effect of 
planning policy.1
The second reason for the use of a survey method, is that it is capable of generating 
much anecdotal evidence and gathering valuable local knowledge. Existing published 
data only tells so much about what is happening to London’s manufacturing industry, 
and it was thought that the survey would be of considerable value if it could be used to 
complement, and provide a sound basis for, further empirical investigations. Thus, the 
data obtained from the survey will be useful in guiding the empirical research, in 
developing testable hypotheses and in validating and reflecting upon results obtained in 
this thesis, and in previous literature.
This highlights an important aspect about the scope of the survey. It is not intended that 
the survey should generate quantitative data, or that it should be available for statistical 
analysis. The issues to be investigated are not of a quantifiable nature, and are more 
appropriately addressed by discussion of the answers given by LPAs, rather than by 
attempting to determine any statistical significance. The survey population is relatively 
small, and thus allows for a detailed discussion of the results obtained rather than the 
use of statistical methods for data reduction.
A final issue that requires consideration concerns the stringent limitation on the scope 
of policy analyses that arises in the absence of knowledge about the ‘counter-factual’
1 Two attempts at quantitative evaluation were in fact made in early stages o f the research. First, 
following a method similar to that used by Fothergill and Gudgin (1979b) and Moore and Rhodes 
(1973), it was thought that the boroughs could be categorised in terms o f the ‘intensity’ or ‘degree’ to 
which they had pursued employment protection policies at different points in time, given responses in the 
survey. For each category, ‘expected’ average employment change figures could be calculated and 
applied to the boroughs within, having standardised for the effects o f industrial structure, and could be 
compared to actual employment change figures to determine the relevance o f the categories created and 
by implication the importance of policy stances. However, results generated in this way were 
unconvincing and the categorisation was not as straightforward as had been anticipated. The second 
quantitative method attempted used development control data to construct indices for the boroughs 
reflecting the degree o f ‘restraint’ in planning decisions towards change o f use from manufacturing. This 
index was included in a regression analysis model, along with other variables thought to influence 
employment change, to test the significance o f planning decisions. However, the absence o f data required 
to reflect some known important influences on employment change at this detailed spatial level seriously 
undermined the validity o f the results generated. In general, attempts at quantitative evaluation were 
pursued no further because it appeared that boroughs were particularly prone to enormous employment 
shifts from unknown ‘non-policy’ effects, and that the impacts of recession at the end o f the eighties and 
the absence o f knowledge about the time lag effects of policy, placed serious limitations on the scope for 
quantitative investigations.
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(Gould, 1969; Prince, 1971). The counter-factual refers to a hypothetical situation 
which would have occurred had the events to be examined not taken place. For the 
present research, the counter-factual problem emerges when attempting to investigate 
the manufacturing employment effects of planning policy in the absence of knowledge 
about what would have happened to employment had policy not been in operation. This 
hypothetical situation of ‘no policy’ cannot be accurately determined. As Gould (1969) 
remarks “a counter-factual by its very nature can never be subjected to any empirical 
tests by realising its antecedent” (Gould, 1969, 196). The problem of the counter-factual 
is prominent in policy evaluation research. For example, in seeking to evaluate the 
effects of regional policy in Britain, Moore and Rhodes (1973) pointed out that the 
greatest difficulty lay in attempting to measure what would have happened had there 
been no regional policies, or policies of some other intensity; while Diamond and 
Spence (1983) note that much regional policy evaluation in general has suffered from
“the most fundamental conceptual problem [the] assumption about the behaviour of
employment in the counter-factual or expected employment situation” (Diamond, 
Spence, 1983, 52).
In presenting the survey results, it is recognised that the problem of the counter-factual 
places important limitations on the robustness of any conclusions reached about the 
actual effects of employment protection policies. However, as mentioned previously, it 
is not the intention in this chapter to attempt a strict evaluation of the employment 
effects of planning policy. Instead, the survey seeks to attain the LPA perspective on the 
use and success of these policies and the reasons why LPAs hold these views. Thus 
from the information generated in the survey, employment change in the absence of 
policy remains only the opinion of local experts, in this case the LPAs, and does not 
attempt to reflect the actual counter-factual. The use of the B1 business use class ‘case 
study’ is, however, important in this respect. By creating a practical ‘policy-on’ and 
‘policy-off situation it is hoped that the inclusion of this issue can go some way 
towards allowing the LPAs to reflect more accurately on the importance of land use 
planning policy.
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Having consulted with LPAC and four of the London borough LPAs over the content and 
scope of the proposed survey, a preliminary questionnaire was designed and pilot-tested in the 
hope of identifying any important design deficiencies. The four borough planning authorities 
that had assisted with the construction of the survey at the consultation stage were chosen as 
the pilot population and a survey form was mailed to each, (see appendix 4) The returned 
questionnaires were adequately answered and the final questionnaire was drawn up. The only 
changes in the questionnaire from pre to post-pilot stage were first, that additional space was 
allocated to allow for written explanations to answers given, and second, that some points of 
clarification raised by the pilot population were incorporated in the survey form. Thus, the 
pilot-survey pre-test suggested that the questionnaire required minimal modifications before 
being sent to the borough LPAs. To some extent this may indicate the usefulness of the early 
consultation over survey design undertaken with the four LPAs and LPAC, particularly in 
helping to construct a relevant and answerable survey, and this would be consistent with the 
advice of Kidder and Judd (1986).
The survey was then sent to all 33 planning authorities in the Greater London area with a 
covering letter which explained broadly the purposes of the study and asked the LPAs
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for their assistance in this matter. Of the 33 questionnaires, 24 were returned, thus yielding an 
overall response rate of 73%, which is particularly successful given that response rates to surveys are 
typically very low (Moser, Kalton, 1987). The nine borough LPAs that did not respond were 
Lewisham, Newham, Tower Hamlets, Wandsworth, Brent, Ealing, Enfield, Hounslow, and Merton. 
There is no indication of any systematic response bias in terms of the geographical or political 
characteristics of non-responding boroughs. Indeed, the survey has been relatively successful in 
capturing a diverse cross-section of London boroughs and it is thought unlikely that the non­
responding boroughs exhibit extreme characteristics which are not adequately represented by the 
types of boroughs that did respond. In addition, it should be borne in mind that the survey population 
is relatively small and for this reason detail is sought from each of the responding ‘units’ obviating 
the need for the generalisation of results across the population. In this respect the issue of response 
bias takes on slightly less importance than it would in a survey of larger scale where the 
generalisation of results is essential.
Further aspects of the survey design and the precise methodology used are described in appendix 
four, and a sample copy of the questionnaire sent to the boroughs is reproduced. The discussion of 
survey results in the following sections is guided by the most appropriate analytical structure for this 
chapter, and does not follow the actual organisation of the questionnaire.
5.2 Borough planning authority perspectives on manufacturing employment decline.
The use of planning controls to influence manufacturing employment change, is likely to be guided
by the extent to which any authority is actually concerned about industrial job loss. Manufacturing
employment change data at the class level of the SIC for the period 1981 to 1991, were reproduced
for each borough and attached to the survey questionnaires. The LPAs were asked to refer to the data
for their areas, and to express the authorities view of manufacturing job loss in terms of it being :
2 ,extremely disadvantageous, disadvantageous, unimportant or beneficial. The results of answers to 
question one are shown in table 5.1.
2 In the case o f Kensington and Chelsea the question had to be rephrased because, as was shown in the previous chapter, 
manufacturing employment actually increased in this borough over the 1981 to 1991 period. This increase was entirely 
within the printing and publishing sector. Kensington and Chelsea LPA were asked to ignore this specific job growth for 
the moment, and to answer question one with respect to the other sectors of manufacturing industry in which 
employment had been declining over the decade.
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Table 5.1 : How does the borough planning authority view manufacturing 
employment decline ?
extremely
disadvantageous disadvantageous unimportant beneficial
City o f London 1
Camden 1
Hackney 1
Hammersmith 1
Haringey 1
Islington 1
Kensington and Chelsea 1
Lambeth 1
Southwark 1
Westminster 1
Barking and Dagenham 1
Barnet 1
Bexley 1
Bromley 1
Croydon 1
Greenwich 1
Harrow 1
Havering 1
Hillingdon 1
Kingston 1
Redbridge 1
Richmond 1
Sutton 1
Waltham Forest 1
Total 10 12 2 0
Percentage 42% 50% 8% 0%
Twenty-two of the 24 respondents, just under 92% of LPAs, viewed the loss of 
manufacturing jobs as either extremely disadvantageous or disadvantageous. No 
boroughs thought that the loss of manufacturing jobs was beneficial, and only the City 
and Bromley considered it unimportant. Interestingly, the results indicate that inner 
London boroughs are generally more concerned about manufacturing job loss than outer 
boroughs. Of the responding inner boroughs, 70% felt that manufacturing was 
extremely disadvantageous, while only 21% of outer boroughs expressed such a degree 
of concern. However, the clear indication from table 5.1 is that manufacturing job loss 
is generally an important issue for London planning authorities.
The LPAs were asked to provide a written explanation for the answer given to this 
question. The City and Bromley, who regarded manufacturing job loss as unimportant, 
both stated the primary reason that service sector jobs were more suitable within their
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areas. The City LPA stressed that office-based financial and business services 
development was of much greater importance, and that manufacturing was largely 
unimportant to the economic composition of the City. Indeed, the City felt that non­
office manufacturing uses were much better suited to neighbouring boroughs, which 
were “less densely developed and better suited to the bulk movement of raw materials 
and finished goods.”
The dominant concern amongst the remaining 22 respondents was that manufacturing 
employment decline was serving to reduce overall levels of employment within the 
boroughs, resulting in unemployment and a much more limited range of job 
opportunities. There was also a general consensus that manufacturing industries were 
more likely to employ local residents than other forms of economic activity, and that the 
loss of manufacturing jobs had created a mismatch between resident skills and local 
employment opportunities. Many respondents specifically mentioned that this mismatch 
raised distributional and equity issues, with particular sections of the population bearing 
the brunt of the consequences of manufacturing employment decline. For example, 
Hackney stated that “small-scale manufacturing businesses are a way of providing self- 
employment for those (e.g. ethnic groups) otherwise excluded from the workplace”, 
while Lambeth pointed out that “manufacturing predominantly employs local people. 
The decline in manufacturing employment within the borough has resulted in large 
numbers of unemployed whose skills are not easily transferred to new service jobs.”
Two of the respondents highlighted important local economy consequences that have 
arisen from manufacturing loss. Haringey LPA stated that “Haringey, Tottenham in 
particular, has historically been a centre of manufacturing. The entire local economy 
used to be organised around it. With the decline of manufacturing the borough has lost 
its lead economic force.” Westminster were apprehensive about the multiplier effects of 
manufacturing decline pointing out that “the retention of specialist manufacturing 
activity in Westminster is important in the functioning of important sectors of the West 
End economy e.g. tailoring, film production, sound recording, and photography.” Other 
authorities, including the outer boroughs of Harrow, Redbridge, Kingston and 
Hillingdon, were concerned about the increasing ‘out-commuting’ from the borough 
that has resulted from the reduced internal demand for manufacturing labour. In fact the
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London borough of Harrow LPA stated that one important concern about manufacturing 
job loss was that it had led to travel-to-work behaviour which was not “in line with the 
principles of PPG 13”, being the planning policy guidance note concerned with 
reducing the need to travel through land use and transport planning.
Unemployment and narrowing job opportunity are generally considered to be the 
aspects of manufacturing employment decline which are of central importance. While 
Redbridge and Sutton LPAs qualified their concerns over these issues by adding that the 
loss of industrial employment might be important in attaining an improved residential 
environment, the general indications are first, that London’s LPAs are most concerned 
about manufacturing job loss, and second that they predominantly view this issue in 
terms of equity and distributional concerns.
5.3 Planning policies for manufacturing jobs in London in the 1980s.
This section explores the types of land use policies that borough LPAs developed with 
respect to manufacturing employment change over the 1980s. Previous literature, 
reviewed in chapter three, has provided an indication of the types of policies the survey 
should seek to investigate. The extent to which boroughs had tried to ‘protect 
manufacturing’ jobs was of central importance, however the survey also asked about 
other policies that London LPAs had towards manufacturing industry.
The first question posed in this section sought to determine how many of the LPAs had 
pursued planning policies with the intention of protecting manufacturing jobs over the 
1980s.
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Table 5.2 : Did the planning authority develop policies with the specific intention 
of protecting manufacturing jobs in the borough ?
yes no
political
1982-1986
control *
1986-1990
City o f London 1 N/A N/A
Camden 1 LAB LAB
Hackney 1 LAB LAB
Hammersmith 1 NOC LAB
Haringey 1 LAB LAB
Islington 1 LAB LAB
Kensington and Chelsea 1 CON CON
Lambeth 1 LAB LAB
Southwark 1 LAB LAB
Westminster 1 CON CON
Barking and Dagenham 1 LAB LAB
Barnet 1 CON CON
Bexley 1 CON CON
Bromley 1 CON CON
Croydon 1 LAB CON
Greenwich 1 LAB LAB
Harrow 1 CON CON
Havering 1 CON NOC
Hillingdon 1 CON NOC
Kingston 1 CON NOC
Redbridge 1 CON CON
Richmond 1 NOC LIBDEM
Sutton 1 CON NOC
Waltham Forest 1 NOC LAB
Total 16 8
Percentage 67% 33%
* LAB = labour, CON = Conservative, LIBDEM = Liberal Democrats, NOC = no overall control, N/A = 
not applicable.
Table 5.2 shows that 16 of the 24 LPAs, or two-thirds, attempted to respond to 
manufacturing job loss in this way. Thus, in contrast to what may have been expected 
given the results of the spatial analysis of manufacturing employment change presented 
in the previous chapter, planning mechanisms have been widely used in London to 
respond to employment decline. Columns four and five of table 5.2 indicate the political 
orientation of the borough councils over the 1980s. It was thought that the political or 
ideological stance of the boroughs might provide an explanation for why some chose to 
intervene to protect manufacturing jobs while others did not. However, it would appear 
that this is not a consistent explanatory variable. Seven of the ten councils under Labour 
control over the 1980s, and six of the twelve under Conservative control, had developed 
employment protection policies for manufacturing. It is therefore not possible to
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attribute political motivation to the development of employment protection policies, and 
this is consistent with results obtained for the nation as a whole by Oatley (1991).
What perhaps may be a more important factor is the location of the borough within the 
London conurbation. For example, table 5.2 shows a broad difference between the inner 
and outer London boroughs. While all inner borough respondents pursued employment 
protection policies for manufacturing industry, including the City LPA, only 6 of the 14 
outer London borough respondents, under 50%, explicitly attempted to protect 
manufacturing jobs. There are, many reasons why boroughs may, or may not, have 
developed policies for manufacturing employment, but one locational factor that may 
be important is the extent of development pressure that exists from other uses, since this 
is likely to be more intense in inner than outer London.
The inner-outer London distinction raises another important issue. The differential 
components of the shift share analysis presented in table 4.9, indicated that after 
standardising for industrial structure, inner London boroughs were more prone to less 
favourable rates of employment change than outer boroughs. Yet it can be seen from 
table 5.2 that all inner London respondents pursued employment protection policies. 
Thus, as a general point, it would seem that many London LPAs have tried to protect 
manufacturing jobs, but for whatever reasons, have been largely unsuccessful in doing 
so.
There are many issues that need to be taken into account before reaching any conclusion 
about the influence of planning on employment change. The scope of the policies, 
particularly with regard to the actual types of policies, the areas to which they applied, 
and the sectors of industry which the policies sought to protect, are of critical 
importance. The boroughs were asked to outline the specific types of policies that they 
had pursued with the intention of protecting existing manufacturing jobs over the 
1980s. As mentioned previously, 16 of the 24 respondents had developed employment 
protection policies, however only 15 were able to provide detailed information about
the policies, the exception being the borough of Haringey. Many authorities sent excerts 
of policies from plans, others simply outlined their main approaches Examples of the 
protection policies pursued by each LPA are summarised in table 5.3. In three of the 15
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cases, the City, Harrow and Kingston, the policies were designed to protect not only 
manufacturing jobs but also warehousing employment. These two uses, and their 
employment generating effects, appear to have been treated as much the same for 
planning purposes, with no indication of any preference between the two uses being 
given within policy statements.
Table 5.3 Examples of land use planning policies for the protection of 
manufacturing employment in fifteen London boroughs over the 1980s.
City o f London to ensure continuity in the provision o f suitable accommodation for 
warehousing and industry
Camden change o f use or redevelopment o f industrial floorspace for any other 
use will not be permitted
Hackney to protect existing manufacturing firms and jobs
Hammersmith to retain land for employment generating uses and for industrial uses 
within specified employment zones
Islington Council will not normally permit development which results in a loss 
of industrial floorspace
Kensington and Chelsea strong presumption to refuse planning permission for applications 
involving the loss o f an existing industrial use particularly within the 
specified industrial areas
Lambeth to restrict changes o f use from industrial land and buildings
Southwark planning permission will not normally be granted for either 
development proposals, or a change o f use, that will result in a loss o f  
industrial floorspace (within and outside Industrial Consolidation 
Areas)
Westminster general policy to protect manufacturing uses (1980-1988) to retain 
industry in the Specialist Industrial Area (1988 to present)
Barking and Dagenham protection of manufacturing jobs in specified industrial areas
Harrow resist land use change from industrial and warehousing uses 
(particularly in industrial/warehousing areas)
Havering to resist proposals which would involve a change o f use from industrial 
land or floorspace. or land which in the Council’s opinion is suitable 
for industrial development, to other uses.
Kingston within the industrial and warehousing areas premises and sites will be 
retained in industrial/warehousing
Richmond permission is not normally granted for a change o f use or 
redevelopment for other purposes o f industrial premises
Sutton to protect established industrial sites
A theme common to all policies in table 5.3 is that they all seek to protect 
manufacturing use by implying a ‘restrictive’ stance in development control decisions. 
However, detailed differences are apparent in the wording of the main policies, 
particularly with respect to the clarity of the LPA intentions. At one extreme, the 
policies of Camden and Kensington and Chelsea LPAs are expressed strongly and in a 
‘negative ‘fashion, stating clearly, that planning permission which involves a loss of
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existing manufacturing uses will not be granted. At the other extreme the City of 
London LPA policy has the more modest, and less specific, intention of “ensuring 
continuity in the provision” of floorspace for industry. In between these two extremes, 
the policies of LPAs vary in the degree of intensity to which they stress the objective of 
protecting manufacturing jobs. Islington, Southwark and Richmond have fairly strong 
policies which will “not normally” grant permission for applications which involve a 
loss of industrial floorspace, while the remaining eight LPAs pursue objectives which 
are more ambiguously worded, for example, stating an intention simply to ‘protect’, 
‘resist’, ‘restrain’, or ‘retain’, without mention of the likely development control 
outcome.
However, for most authorities the main employment protection policies do not represent 
the only planning statement, and ambiguity is often accompanied by related statements 
of clarification. LPAs were asked to outline any exceptions or qualifications to the 
employment protection policies. The responses indicated that while employment 
protection is clearly important to the LPAs, a number of related concerns enter into 
policy, and development control decisions. These include desires to reduce the 
environmental impacts of industrial uses, to enforce the separation o f ‘non-conforming’ 
uses, to ensure an adequate up-take of land, or to ensure that adequate provision still 
exists for the expansion of other employment generating uses. For example, in addition
to Camden LPA’s main policy objective outlined above, they also state that “changes of 
use from industrial to other uses may be allowed if the premises or site has been vacated 
and a reasonable attempt to find alternative acceptable industry has been made.” 
Likewise, in Kensington and Chelsea, the “strong presumption to refuse planning 
permission for applications involving the loss of an existing industrial use” stands, 
although if industry is creating ‘nuisance’ in a residential area then change of use will 
be allowed. In most cases, authorities have sought to protect manufacturing 
employment, but have done so within the constraints of also avoiding the emergence of 
‘negative’ externalities in other areas of land use planning concern.
Another important dimension of employment protection policies lies in the extent to 
which they have been orientated through a geographical focus. Some authorities have 
developed employment protection policies which express a general objective for the
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borough as a whole. Others have approached the issue through the definition of 
particular industrial areas within the borough. For example, Hammersmith, Kensington 
and Chelsea, Southwark, and Harrow all seek to protect existing manufacturing 
employment, although there is an indication that such policies may be more strongly 
adhered to when any application to be decided falls within a defined industrial area. In 
the case of Barking and Dagenham, Kingston, and Westminster, employment protection 
policies have been developed which are expressed only for particular areas within the 
boroughs. In other instances, specific areas may have not been defined, although the 
LPAs have adopted policies which suggest that industrial land use change will be more 
strongly resisted in areas of predominant existing use. As with the policy qualifications 
outlined above, these spatial strategies can generally be conceptualised as attempts to 
minimise negative externalities.
Manufacturing industry is not an homogenous group, and it was anticipated that LPAs 
may attach different degrees of importance to the protection of jobs in different sectors 
of industry. If this was the case, then the operation of different types of protection 
policies in different areas of London could be determined, thus obtaining a better 
perspective on the scope to which planning control is applied. Authorities were asked 
whether the policies they developed had attempted to protect all manufacturing jobs, or 
whether they had placed more importance on some sectors of manufacturing than 
others. Table 5.4 show responses to this question.
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Table 5.4 : Do the LPAs employment protection policies place more importance on 
some types of manufacturing than others ?
yes no
City o f London 1
Camden 1
Hackney 1
Hammersmith 1
Haringey 1
Islington 1
Kensington and Chelsea
Lambeth 1
Southwark 1
Westminster 1
Barking and Dagenham 1
Harrow 1
Havering 1
Kingston 1
Richmond 1
Sutton 1
Total 3 13
Percentage 19% 81%
Of the 16 boroughs which pursued employment protection policies, the vast majority, 
over 81%, were concerned with manufacturing jobs generally and did not distinguish 
between different types of manufacturing employment. Only the City of London, 
Islington and Barking and Dagenham claimed to have placed more importance on some 
types of manufacturing activity than others. A ‘follow-on’ question asked the LPAs to 
consider a breakdown of employment at the class level of the SIC, and to attempt to 
specify from this breakdown what types of manufacturing were either very important, 
important, or not important in policy terms. The City of London LPA indicated that all 
categories of manufacturing employment defined at this level of the SIC were 
unimportant, although they did specify that they had generally intended that policy 
should protect ‘light’ manufacturing industry such as printing, machinery repair, and the 
fur industry. Islington LPA were unable to provide detailed information, although again 
the indication is that light industry was more important. Barking and Dagenham 
specified only two sectors of employment that were unimportant in policy terms, both 
of which were involved in extraction, and the general indication was that while degrees 
of importance existed between different sectors, the loss of just about all manufacturing 
jobs that existed in the borough was considered important. Thus, most LPAs have 
pursued ‘blanket’ protection policies, and it seems fair to say that, with the exception
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only of the City and Islington, the LPAs considered manufacturing generally to have 
been of importance. In this respect, there is little indication that any differences in the 
effectiveness of employment protection policies could be explained by their sectoral 
coverage.
The survey also sought to identify other policies for manufacturing that had been 
developed by the London LPAs over the 1980s. The final results to be discussed in this 
section were obtained by asking each authority to outline any land use planning policies 
for manufacturing, or related to manufacturing, which they had developed over the 
1980s, but which were not solely concerned with employment protection. In addition to 
the fifteen boroughs that had attempted to protect manufacturing jobs, this question was 
answered by the boroughs of Bexley, Bromley, Croydon, and Hillingdon. All 
authorities that responded to this question cited examples of ‘promotional’ policies, 
aimed at encouraging and attracting manufacturing uses. These policies were either 
specified in general terms, simply indicating that the council will ‘encourage’ or 
‘promote’ manufacturing uses or floorspace, or in more specific terms, where for 
example the authority states a development control presumption in favour of industrial 
development. In both cases, more often than not, the policies were accompanied by 
either specific qualifications of the types outlined above, or by the identification of clear 
geographical locations to which new development would be channelled. Kensington 
and Chelsea and Kingston LPAs sought to encourage developments which involved a 
range of unit sizes, while Harrow specifically welcomed applications for the 
development of high-technology manufacturing premises. Other types of general 
‘promotional’ policies mentioned sought to identify particular sites for industrial 
development; to channel the development of other uses away from existing industry; to 
assist in the improvement of existing industrial areas; and to encourage the expansion, 
rebuilding and improvement of existing firms.
To summarise, this section has shown that many London LPAs had developed policies 
over the 1980s which had the explicit intention of protecting manufacturing jobs. These 
planning authorities were attempting to respond to London’s deindustrialisation in the 
broadly the same way as suggested in previous literature reviewed in chapter three. 
Detailed differences exist between the LPAs in the ways in which they have developed
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policies to protect manufacturing jobs. Most importantly, it is clear from the discussion 
above that other land use and locational planning concerns impinge upon the extent to 
which the LPAs implement these policies. Manufacturing employment protection is not 
pursued in isolation and simply because a policy is included in a plan does not mean 
that it will be applied in every, or indeed any, specific development control case. Thus 
the survey results highlight the discretionary nature of planning and in this respect 
verify the need for the use of a survey methodology to determine the actual operations 
of policies. The discussion has also shown that many authorities in London have tried to 
protect manufacturing jobs, and while specific differences may be defined, the broad 
thrust of the policies is much the same. Having established that these policies were 
pursued, the next question must be whether the LPAs view these policies to have been 
successful or not, and why this is the case.
However, before this, another particularly important finding presented in this section 
relates to the widespread use of ‘promotional’ policies reported in the LPA responses. 
Contrary to what had been anticipated at the stage of survey design, employment 
protection policies do not necessarily dominate planning for manufacturing in London, 
and in fact more boroughs have actually pursued policies to encourage and manage new 
manufacturing developments than simply react to decline. Thus, it seems that even in 
the 1980s, when manufacturing jobs in London declined by 50%, LPAs were not only 
involved in the prevention of manufacturing loss, but were also channelling and 
encouraging new developments. The implication may be that London’s manufacturing 
change is not quite so uni-directional as suggested by the employment experience 
shown in chapter four, and by the theoretical perspectives reviewed in chapter two.
5.4 The perceived importance and success of employment protection policies.
The results presented in this section explore issues relating to the actual implementation 
of employment protection policies, and to the degree of success in ‘saving’ jobs. 
Questions were asked with respect to the perceived importance of policy, to what extent 
authorities had attempted implementation through development control, and with what 
success. Most importantly, this section of the survey investigated the reasons why 
authorities believe the policies to have been successful or not. Given the employment
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results presented in the previous chapter, it would be fair to hypothesise that 
employment protection has not worked. This section presents the LPA view on whether 
this is, or is not the case, and why it is so.
The LPAs were asked whether they viewed the use of planning controls to achieve the 
objective of protecting manufacturing jobs as being very important, important, or 
unimportant.
Table 5.5 The perceived importance of planning regulations for the protection of 
manufacturing employment.
very important important not important
City o f  London 1
Camden 1
Hackney 1
Hammersmith 1
Islington 1
Kensington and Chelsea 1
Lambeth 1
Southwark 1
Westminster 1
Barking and Dagenham 1
Harrow 1
Havering 1
Kingston 1
Richmond 1
Sutton 1
Total 9 4 2
Percentage 60% 27% 13%
The table shows that only two LPAs, the City of London and Sutton, regarded the use 
of employment protection policies as unimportant. Although these types of policies 
were specified in their plans, these two authorities did not attach any importance to 
them. In the case of the City, this is entirely consistent with responses reported in 
previous sections. Nine of the respondents, or 60%, viewed employment protection as 
very important, and 4, or over 26% as important. Interestingly with the exception of the 
city, all other inner boroughs included in the table above have indicated that the 
protection of manufacturing employment was a very important planning objective, 
while excluding Richmond, the outer London boroughs have generally expressed less 
enthusiasm for employment protection. Nonetheless, the table does show that the use of
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land use planning controls for the protection of manufacturing jobs was taken seriously 
by 13 of the 15 responding LPAs.
The survey next attempted to determine how this perceived importance translated into 
the practice of development control. Authorities were asked to describe the extent to 
which the objective of employment protection was adhered to in development control 
decisions, under the categories very strongly, strongly, not strongly, or not adhered to at 
all. Kingston LPA were not able to provide any information on this question. Table 5.6 
shows the responses to this question.
Table 5.6 : To what extent was the objective of employment protection adhered to 
in development control practice?
very strongly strongly not strongly not at all
City o f London 1
Camden 1
Hackney 1
Hammersmith 1
Islington 1
Kensington and Chelsea 1
Lambeth 1
Southwark 1
Westminster 1
Barking and Dagenham 1
Harrow 1
Havering 1
Richmond 1
Sutton 1
Total 1 10 2 1
Percentage 7% 71% 14% 7%
Of the 14 authorities shown in the table, one LPA, Richmond, followed employment 
protection policies very strongly in development control decisions, while 10, or 71.4% 
strongly adhered to these policies. Two LPAs have indicated that employment 
protection policies were not so important in development control decisions, and Sutton 
LPA claimed not to have followed these policies at all in practice. In fact, the results 
above are broadly consistent with the levels of importance that LPAs attached to 
employment protection policies. Authorities that considered employment protection to 
be very important have generally strongly adhered to these policies in development 
control practice. The only exception is Westminster planning authority, which despite
141
expressing concerns over manufacturing jobs loss, and despite developing policies 
which they regarded as important to respond to this problem, have not attempted a 
strong implementation of these policies in practice.
An interesting aspect of the responses is that so few LPAs have attempted to implement 
the policies in a very strong way. The survey did not pursue reasons for these answers, 
seeking simply to find out if the policies were actually enforced. However, it may be 
that the issue raised earlier about other planning concerns impinging on the pursuit of 
employment protection is important in this respect. In other words, while employment 
protection is important or very important to most authorities, the types of policy 
qualifications outlined above must enter into development decisions and thus while the 
protection of jobs may form an important objective, it is not the only planning 
consideration.
However, what can be established from the previous two questions is first, that the use 
of land use planning mechanisms to protect manufacturing jobs was considered very 
important or important by 13 LPAs, and that 11 of these attempted to strongly enforce 
these policies through development control.
Thus, for many authorities, employment protection has been taken seriously and 
implemented as an important planning response to manufacturing job loss. What 
difference have the LPAs actually been able to make ? Authorities were asked if they 
thought they had actually been successful in protecting manufacturing jobs. The results 
are shown below.
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Table 5.7 : Has the authority been successful in protecting manufacturing 
employment?
yes no
City o f  London 1
Camden 1
Hackney 1
Hammersmith 1
Haringey 1
Islington 1
Kensington and Chelsea 1
Lambeth 1
Southwark 1
Westminster 1
Barking and Dagenham 1
Harrow 1
Havering 1
Kingston 1
Richmond 1
Sutton 1
Total 5 11
Percentage 31% 69%
Table 5.7 presents extremely interesting results, which are consistent with the
anticipations of chapter four. It can be seen that most borough LPAs do not think that 
they have been successful in attempting to protect manufacturing employment through
land use regulation. Only five of the 16 LPAs, just over 31%, believe that they have
been successful, and perhaps most surprising is that the boroughs of Camden, Hackney,
Kensington and Chelsea, Lambeth, Southwark and Harrow all believe that they have
not been successful in protecting manufacturing jobs, despite the fact that they viewed
these policies as being important and adhered to them strongly in development control
practice.
Most interesting are the written explanations that authorities gave for their answers. Of 
the five LPAs which stated that they had been successful in protecting manufacturing 
employment, only Hammersmith and Richmond were actually clear that land use 
regulation had played an important role. Hammersmith LPA stated that their restrictive 
policy stance had managed to resist pressure for residential development on industrial 
sites, while Richmond felt that the “development control machinery, backed by the 
local plan policies, had succeeded in protecting industry to a reasonable extent.” 
However, the boroughs of Islington, Barking and Dagenham, and Havering were more
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circumspect about the actual achievements of the planning system. Islington and 
Havering felt that while land use regulation may have played some role in employment 
protection, the loss of manufacturing jobs in this area was viewed as a trend of the 
‘market’ and to some extent outside the realms of planning controls. To quote Islington 
LPA, “the policy was reasonably successful in the cases where it was applied, but 
obviously planning policies by themselves cannot reverse major structural change.” 
Similarly, Havering argued that “the decline in manufacturing employment over the 
1980s would appear to have been related to market forces rather than planning policy.” 
Barking and Dagenham LPA also stressed the ‘limits’ of planning intervention. While 
they had applied ‘restrictive’ land use change policies for employment protection, the 
actual employment loss that took place was not really a ‘regulation’ or ‘restraint’ issue 
because “the main loss experienced in manufacturing employment was confined to the 
contraction of the Ford workforce. In other respects, any losses were countered by new 
jobs created.” Thus, even amongst the LPAs who believe that planning policy has been 
successful, there is a feeling that the degree of success in protecting jobs through land 
use regulation is limited.
This theme was emphasised in the explanations given by those LPAs that felt they had 
not been successful in protecting manufacturing employment. Indeed, there was a 
general dismissal of planning regulations as an important factor. Many LPAs stressed 
the limitations of planning, pointing out in particular that employment tends to change 
in ways which are either not reflected in land use, or which planning cannot hope to 
influence. For example, Lambeth LPA pointed out that “development control cannot 
stop firms from contracting or closing down” and Southwark cited the relocation, 
rationalisation and closure of manufacturing establishments as important processes in 
employment change which were outwith the scope of land use planning control. The 
borough of Harrow made the point most strongly stating that “planning policies can 
only try to prevent land and buildings from being irrevocably lost to non-employment 
uses....they cannot change the most fundamental problems which cause firms to close 
down or move, or which lead in some way to employment loss.” In fact, only two LPAs 
cited planning related factors in explaining why they had not been successful. Camden 
stated that manufacturing land had been lost to other uses because the LPA were 
sometimes unable to demonstrate demand, and Sutton argued that the protection of
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manufacturing employment through land use regulation was seriously hindered by the 
fact that national Government guidance had lent no support to these types of policies.
Another important strand running through many of the explanations was that 
manufacturing decline is essentially not a local issue. Many LPAs viewed 
manufacturing jobs loss as a ‘wider’ structural economic change, which was determined 
above local levels, being a consequence of ‘national structural change’, or simply a 
trend that was occurring all over London. The indication from many of the responses 
was that it was difficult even to understand how planning was supposed to respond, 
never mind influence, these trends. For example, Southwark planning authority argued 
that they had lost many manufacturing jobs as a result of ‘knock-on’ effects due to 
industrial decline in other areas of London or even the nation as a whole. As such they 
felt that local controls over manufacturing job loss could realistically only be expected 
to have a marginal influence in protecting jobs. Likewise, Hackney pointed out that 
“development control is only one factor influencing the success and/or locational 
decisions of industry. It cannot be divorced from wider economic factors”, and 
Haringey LPA stated that “employment decline has hit the borough across all sectors 
(not only manufacturing) and that is a reflection of the general performance of the 
economy, rather than local variables.”
The results presented in this section are extremely important from the point of view of 
this thesis. Most London planning authorities feel that the role for land use planning in 
protecting manufacturing employment is limited. LPAs appear to believe this for two 
principal reasons. First, because the mechanisms of structural change which underpin 
employment loss are not thought to be determined at local levels, and as such broader 
occurrences in the regional or national economy are seen as being more critical to 
employment loss than any local factors which borough planning could conceivably 
influence. Second, because the planning system cannot regulate the closure, contraction, 
or relocation of manufacturing establishments, and as one LPA mentioned, cannot 
generally influence the profitability of manufacturing firms operating within the capital.
Research implications arise from these LPA responses. It would seem that land use 
change, which LPAs can attempt to regulate, may not be as critical in influencing
145
employment change as other factors. What these other factors may be is not yet 
apparent, however if this thesis is to understand why London’s manufacturing 
employment has declined in such a severe and consistent manner, then it will be 
necessary to investigate as far as possible the ways in which industry in London is 
actually changing. This issue is returned to in section 5.7 of this chapter, when the 
factors which LPAs believe have underpinned employment decline in London are 
discussed. However, it should be stressed here that the planning authorities themselves 
have emphasised the importance of the ‘market’ and the processes of ‘structural 
economic change’. The next section moves on to consider a specific case of the 
relationship between land use regulation and manufacturing employment change - the 
introduction of the business use class and related permitted development in London.
5.5 The implications of land use regulation for manufacturing employment 
change : the case of the introduction of the Business use class and related 
permitted development in London.
Using a ‘case study’ of the introduction of the business use class and related permitted 
development, the survey attempted to further explore the operations of land use regulation, 
and the relationship with manufacturing employment change in London. It was first 
considered important to obtain an indication of how the introduction of the new orders may 
have affected borough employment generally, and not just in terms of manufacturing jobs. In 
other words, does deregulation have any effects on jobs ? LPAs were asked to describe the 
labour market consequences of revisions as being either beneficial, detrimental, both 
beneficial and detrimental, or not important; and were also asked to explain their answers. 
Twenty-three LPAs answered this question, the borough of Haringey being unable to provide 
any information. The results are shown in table 5.8 below.
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Table 5.8 : In what ways has the introduction of the business use and related 
permitted development affected employment opportunities within the borough ?
beneficial detrimental
both 
beneficial and 
detrimental
not
important
City o f London 1
Camden 1
Hackney 1
Hammersmith 1
Islington 1
Kensington and Chelsea 1
Lambeth 1
Southwark 1
Westminster 1
Barking and Dagenham 1
Barnet 1
Bexley 1
Bromley 1
Croydon 1
Greenwich 1
Harrow 1
Havering 1
Hillingdon 1
Kingston 1
Redbridge 1
Richmond 1
Sutton 1
Waltham Forest 1
Total 2 8 6 7
Percentage 9% 35% 26% 30%
A diversity of opinion was expressed about the impacts of the changes, seemingly related to 
differences in the general nature and extent of borough employment, and to differences in 
planning objectives. Bromley and Redbridge for example, regarded the employment effects of 
the business class to have been purely beneficial, because it had encouraged the development 
of ‘flexible’ office accommodation which had provided jobs suitable to the skills of the 
residents. As shown above, these two LPAs had not attempted to protect manufacturing jobs 
| and generally felt that the introduction of the business class was in line with the broad land 
use planning employment objectives.
j
Eight authorities, or 35% of respondents, considered the introduction of the business class to 
| have had a purely detrimental effect on employment within the borough. The main reasons 
cited related to a loss of manufacturing and manual jobs, and to a general
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reduction in the range of employment generating uses, trends which were not consistent with 
LPA policy. In most cases this was thought to have created problems in relation to resident 
skills and this is true even in Central London. Westminster LPA stated that “there must have 
been a reduction in the range of jobs available for those without academic qualifications.” In 
addition, some LPAs stated that new jobs generated under the deregulation measures were 
often taken up by workers from outside the borough. For the eight authorities, it seems that 
some industrial land was lost to office uses, particularly during the ‘boom’ at the end of the 
1980s, but that much of this office space is now vacant and so has not generated an adequate 
amount of new jobs. However, a general point of consensus amongst these authorities was 
that these employment effects were more an ‘acceleration’ of existing trends than something 
entirely new. For example, Camden LPA cited the loss of small scale ‘traditional’ 
manufacturing uses in Fitzrovia and Hatton Garden as the main planning concern, although 
they did add that it was “debatable whether this loss is due to land use relaxation or due to 
changes in the nature of the market for industrial land.”
The introduction of the business class was viewed as being both detrimental and beneficial by 
six of the 23 respondents. It would seem that while employment opportunities had been 
reduced in some economic sectors, important gains had been made in others. For example, 
Southwark LPA pointed out that while they may have lost some manual jobs from industrial 
land use change, they probably had gained more office employment and that this was 
particularly suitable to female residents. Similarly, Richmond planning authority felt that 
while “the introduction of the new B1 class provided a platform for losing some industrial 
premises, at the same time premises that could have remained vacant and redundant due to a 
lack of industrial uses were readily taken up by office uses which also provide employment, 
although for a different class of residents.” Thus, while the changes may have had a 
detrimental impact on existing industrial sites, it had also allowed for the expansion of office 
uses, and in many cases generated an uptake of vacant sites, perhaps creating an overall 
increase of land in employment use.
Slightly over 30% of the LPAs did not regard the business class changes as being important. 
In these instances the responses indicated that this view was expressed largely because of the 
nature of land use within these boroughs. In most cases it was felt that development
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pressure from office uses was generally not important, or at least not on existing industrial 
sites. For example Barnet stated that the introduction of the business class was unimportant 
because the “nature of the borough has little pressure from office development or from B1 
uses, and there has not been a problem of office uses on industrial land.” Other general 
reasons cited for the insignificance of the deregulation measures were that many industrial 
premises within boroughs were not suitable for B1 uses due to problems of conversion, and 
that while it may result in some industrial employment loss, in many cases it was an 
insignificant factor relative to the pressure on industrial land from other uses such as retailing 
and residential.
No consensus exists across London then, on the general employment effects of the 
introduction of the B1 class and related permitted development, however, the majority of 
boroughs appear to believe that is has made some difference. Authorities were next asked how 
the changes have affected the ability to protect manufacturing employment through land use 
planning regulation.
Table 5.9 : How has the introduction of the business class (UCO) and related 
permitted development (GDO) affected the LPA’s ability to protect 
manufacturing employment through land use regulation ?
seriously undermined
undermined not affected
City o f London 1
Camden 1
Hackney 1
Hammersmith 1
Islington 1
Kensington and Chelsea 1
Lambeth 1
Southwark 1
Westminster 1
Barking and Dagenham 1
Bromley 1
Harrow 1
Havering 1
Kingston 1
Richmond 1
Sutton 1
Waltham Forest 1
Total 10 2 5
Percentage 59% 12% 29%
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The results of table 5.9 show that the majority of LPA respondents, 12 or 71%, believe that 
the introduction of the business class has undermined their ability to protect manufacturing 
employment. Only five LPAs suggested that the changes had no effect, and amongst these 
were Bromley, Sutton and Waltham Forest who had not attempted to implement employment 
protection policies, and Harrow and Havering who were more concerned with the loss of 
manufacturing land and premises to residential and retailing uses than any effects from the B1 
class. It is interesting however, that such a high proportion of the respondents believe the 
changes to have undermined their ability to protect manufacturing jobs, particularly because 
many of these same boroughs had indicated that they had not been successful in implementing 
these policies. In fact, the City in particular did not even attempt to follow employment 
protection in development control decision relating to manufacturing. However, the responses 
need not be inconsistent or contradictory. What the LPAs appear be suggesting is that while 
their policies have not been successful, what success they could have achieved has been 
undermined by the introduction of the deregulation measures. In other words, any outcomes 
that they may have been able to influence, albeit marginally, have since the introduction of the 
B1 class been lessened. This raises an important point about land use planning regulation and 
manufacturing employment change. What the LPAs are not saying is that land use planning 
cannot respond to employment loss, but rather that in most cases these responses have 
marginal or negligible effects, given the scale of job loss over the period.
Authorities were asked if they could conceivably attribute certain types of land uses within 
their boroughs to the introduction of the new business class. Three simple land use changes 
allowed under the new changes were specified, from general industrial use to office use, from 
general industrial use to light industrial use, and from light industrial use to office use.4 The 
purpose was to attempt to gain an insight into what the dominant land use change processes 
affecting manufacturing had been since the deregulation measures, and how these varied 
spatially across the capital.
3 For the purposes o f this question research and development uses were included within offices. This was
for reasons o f  simplification and also because detail was sought elsewhere on the specific types o f  
activities involved in each broad use change.
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Table 5.10 : Can any of the following types of land use within your borough be 
attributed to the introduction of the B1 business use class and related permitted 
development ?
general industry 
to offices
general industry 
to light industry
light industry 
to offices
City o f  London yes no yes
Camden no no yes
Hammersmith yes no yes
Islington yes no yes
Kensington no no yes
Lambeth yes no yes
Southwark yes no yes
Westminster no no yes
Barking no yes yes
Bamet no no no
Bromley no no yes
Greenwich yes yes no
Havering no no no
Hillingdon yes no no
Redbridge no no no
Richmond yes no yes
Sutton no no no
Waltham Forest no no no
The results indicate that of the three land use changes specified, the least common 
following the introduction of the business class has been change from general to light 
industrial use. In only two authorities, Barking and Dagenham and Greenwich, has this 
type of land use change taken place. It would seem that the change of general, and 
particularly light, industrial land and premises to office uses, have been the main land use 
implications of the deregulation measures. This is consistent with the arguments presented 
in chapter three which suggested that when planning regulations are removed the 
development potential of land may be realised for uses which command higher land and 
rental values. It is likely in this case that office uses would be of higher value than either 
light and general manufacturing, and so it is not surprising that these should be the 
predominant end use implication of the changes.
! The broad land use change implications specified by the LPAs are not uniform throughout 
London. While all inner London respondents cited land use implications from the 
introduction of the business class, half of the outer London LPAs stated that none of the 
specified changes were important. Every inner London LPA believes that they are losing 
manufacturing land to office uses and that this can be
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attributed to the introduction of the business class. Intuitively this would appear to make 
sense, since it would be expected that the development pressure for office uses is higher in the 
inner London boroughs, and thus the possibility for office development offered through the 
deregulation measures should be seized upon to a larger extent in inner than outer London. 
Five inner LPAs cited instances of change from general industrial use to office use, however 
the most consistent land use change specified in inner London has been the conversion of 
light industrial land and premises to office uses. The nine inner London respondents attributed 
this type of land use to the introduction of the business class, compared to only two of the 
outer London respondents. It is likely that this is at least in part a reflection of the different 
nature of inner and outer London manufacturing with perhaps a higher proportion of inner 
London manufacturing sites being classed as Tight manufacturing’ than in outer London.
I
It is interesting that such a high proportion of the outer London LPA respondents, 50%, 
have indicated that they could not attribute any of the land use changes specified to the 
introduction of the business class. Again the dependant variable here is likely to be the 
level of development pressure affecting any borough. In essence, table 5.10 shows that 
while important land use change implications appear to have arisen, they are not 
uniform, and have not even been manifest comprehensively across the capital. For 
example, over 50% of the LPAs that responded to this question have stated that the 
change of use of general manufacturing land cannot be attributed to the introduction of 
the new orders. The implication of this may be that the development value effects 
which may arise from deregulation can only be realised feasibly in certain areas, and 
from certain premises and land. For example, as was mentioned previously, some outer 
London LPAs felt that the deregulatory changes were largely unimportant either 
because there was little development pressure for offices, or because the borough’s 
industrial sites and premises because they could not be easily developed for office 
uses.
i
To examine this issue further, authorities were asked to describe the types of industrial 
| land and premises that had been most prone to change, if there were any specific 
| location within the borough where changes of use arising from the changes had been 
most prominent, and detail was sought on the particular types of uses involved in 
change. Unfortunately, many LPAs replied that they did not have detailed information
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of this type, and the response to this question was generally poor, particularly from the outer 
London boroughs. The information that was received however, suggested that some LPAs 
could distinguish premises and land which have been most prone to use change, and that it 
was not simply any industrial land and building in any location that had been affected. In 
particular, many LPAs stressed that it was older and smaller industrial premises, rather than 
factory accommodation, that have tended to change to office uses. Furthermore, the inner 
London respondents have indicated that locations bordering, or within, the City and West End 
have probably experienced the most important effects from the introduction of Bl. For 
example, Islington has lost older industrial premises to offices uses in the area of the borough 
which borders the City, and both Southwark and Lambeth emphasised that older industrial 
premises had been converted to office uses in the northern parts of the Boroughs. Within the 
City itself, it has mainly been smaller old buildings, as well as the newspaper printing works 
in Fleet Street and the surrounding environment, while Westminster has experienced the 
conversion of workshop premises to office uses predominantly within the West End. The two 
outer boroughs that answered this question, Barking and Dagenham and Hillingdon, both 
stated that most use change had occurred through the redevelopment rather than conversion of 
industrial sites and premises. This was because industrial premises were generally not seen as 
suitable for conversion to office use.
The final results to be discussed in this section relate to how much importance the LPAs 
would place on the regulative changes within the overall context of manufacturing 
employment decline. Manufacturing employment change figures were quoted for each 
authority over the 1987 to 1991 period, in all cases jobs had been lost. Each LPA was asked to 
consider how important they thought the changes had been within this overall decline. The 
results from all 24 respondents are shown in table 5.11 below.
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Table 5.11: Within the overall manufacturing employment decline experienced in the 
borough, how important have the implications of the new business class been ?
extremely
important important insignificant not related
City o f London 1
Camden 1
Hackney 1
Hammersmith 1
Haringey 1
Islington 1
Kensington and Chelsea 1
Lambeth 1
Southwark 1
Westminster 1
Barking and Dagenham 1
Barnet 1
Bexley 1
Bromley 1
Croydon 1
Greenwich 1
Harrow 1
Havering 1
Hillingdon 1
Kingston 1
Redbridge 1
Richmond 1
Sutton 1
Waltham Forest 1
Total 2 7 11 4
Percentage 8% 29% 46% 17%
Only two of the 24 respondents, Kensington and Chelsea and Lambeth, considered the 
introduction of the business class to have been extremely important for the overall 
decline of manufacturing employment in the borough, and a further 7 considered it to 
have been important. Eleven boroughs viewed the changes as being insignificant in 
relation to overall manufacturing employment decline and four as not related. A fairly 
clear difference is shown between inner and outer London responses in table 5.11, with 
12 of the 14 outer London respondents, 85.7%, stating that effects of the deregulation 
measures are insignificant or unrelated, compared to only 3 of the ten inner London 
LPAs.
The results in table 5.11 require careful consideration. They do indicate that the majority 
of respondents, 62.5%, view the introduction of the B1 changes as being either 
insignificant or not related to overall manufacturing job loss, and this is broadly
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consistent with the results of earlier sections of the survey. However, given the responses 
presented in table 5.7 we may have expected this percentage to have been higher. For 
example, both Kensington and Chelsea and Lambeth consider the introduction of the changes 
to have been extremely important in the context of overall manufacturing employment 
decline, yet both these authorities also stated that land use regulation had not been successful 
in protecting manufacturing jobs. This is also true of Hackney, Southwark, Westminster, 
Greenwich and Kingston, where the LPA has stated that the business class changes are of 
importance. If land use regulation is unimportant, then why does this deregulation have such 
an effect for some boroughs ?
There are at two issues that need to be considered in this respect. First, is that while boroughs 
may feel that land use regulation is not a critical influence, previous studies of the Business 
class, reviewed in chapter three, have suggested that deregulation of this type often induces 
development which would not otherwise have taken place. In other words, the actual 
deregulation stimulates the property market to undertake development by changing the 
relative positions of ‘actors’ in the development process. If so, the effects of the changes are 
not so much an issue of local planning controls, but are related to changes in the nature of the 
property market, where the introduction of the new class has perhaps induced the 
development of new types of property in areas where it is viable. This is perhaps particularly 
so in inner London boroughs were the effects of the changes were most apparent. This would 
explain why LPAs feel that they may not have been successful in protecting manufacturing 
employment, but that the deregulation measures have had adverse effects. The second 
important issue is that the categories defined in table 5.11 clearly have no actual quantitative 
meaning and reflect nothing more than the general perceptions of the LPAs. It would be 
impossible to assign any type of figure of to what ‘important’ actually means. As stated 
previously in this section, many LPAs felt that the changes had ‘accelerated’ existing trends, 
and thus while a few authorities may cite the UCO and GDO changes are important, that is 
not to say that they actually constitute a new and dominant force within employment change.
The utilisation of the business class case study in the survey has raised a number of
issues. It has shown that this deregulation of planning controls has undermined the
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ability of many London LPAs to protect manufacturing jobs, and in some cases is thought to 
have had had an important effect on manufacturing jobs loss. However, the land use changes 
deregulated do not appear to have had a consistent impact across all boroughs in London. In 
fact, even within the boroughs where it may be important, it is perhaps only relevant to a 
certain proportion of industrial land and premises located in particular areas. Furthermore, the 
extent to which the deregulation actually matters for land in any location in any borough is 
dependent to a large extent on the development pressure that exists for higher value uses. The 
point is, that while some LPAs feel it has had significant effects, these are not uniformly felt 
across London, within boroughs, or indeed across the range of industrial property. The study 
of the business class has shown that land use regulation cannot be dismissed and it is likely to 
significant to some extent. However, given the objectives of this chapter, the most critical 
finding in this section is that the effects of the changes are limited, and that the majority of 
boroughs still feel that even such a significant deregulation is not a significant factor in 
manufacturing employment change.
5.6 Discussion.
This chapter has shown that most borough planning authorities in London are concerned 
about manufacturing employment decline. Many have attempted to intervene to protect 
manufacturing jobs, and have taken this objective seriously, largely out of concern about the 
increasing inequity of the labour market. However, the pursuit of these policies is generally 
considered by London’s LPAs to have been unsuccessful because the factors underpinning 
manufacturing employment change are regarded as being outwith the scope of planning 
control. While the study of the deregulation measures introduced under the business class and 
related GSO modifications indicated that land use planning regulation may be important to a 
limited extent, it does not appear to be critical.
i
! ' ■
i
In this respect the survey verifies the anticipations of chapter three : that the influence 
of planning controls is likely to be small. However, the use of planning controls should 
not be dismissed as irrelevant. Clearly, they are not regarded as critical given the severe 
scale of employment decline, but in many cases they may actually have protected
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manufacturing jobs. The case study of the business class highlighted that deregulation 
was an important factor in some boroughs, and particularly in the inner boroughs where 
development pressure is likely to be most intense.
The fundamental research question raised by results of the survey is what is the nature 
of the relationship between employment change and the facets of economic change 
which planning authorities can control ? The final results to be presented in this chapter 
shed some light in this issue. Authorities were asked to consider the importance of four 
factors in causing manufacturing employment loss in the borough, and were asked to 
rank each factor independently on a scale of one to four. An additional category 
specified as ‘other’ was included in this question. The results are presented in table 
5.12.
Table 5.12 : How important are the following factors in creating manufacturing 
employment loss in your borough ?
closure of relocation of displacement of shedding o f jobs
manufacturing manufacturing manufacturing within existing
establishments establishments by service uses establishments
City o f  London 2 4 3 1
Hammersmith 1 1 3 3
Haringey 2 1 2 3
Kensington and Chelsea 1 3 3 1
Lambeth 2 1 3 3
Southwark 3 1 2 4
Westminster 3 4 4 4
Inner London Rank 14 15 20 18
Barking and Dagenham 2 0 0 3
Barnet 4 0 1 3
Bromley 3 2 1 4
Croydon 1 2 2 3
Greenwich 4 3 2 3
Harrow 1 2 3 4
Hillingdon 2 1 0 3
Kingston 1 3 0 2
Redbridge 3 0 2 1
Richmond 3 0 4 2
Sutton 4 3 4 2
Waltham Forest 1 2 0 3
Outer London Rank 29 18 19 33
Total Rank 43 33 39 51
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The results to this question verify earlier findings of the survey which showed that 
factors underpinning manufacturing employment decline were often regarded as being 
outside the realms of planning control. However, the responses are still surprising. The 
‘contraction’ of manufacturing plants, or the loss of jobs from existing establishments 
has the highest overall rank of any factor, being clearly the most important in outer 
London and second in inner London. This implies that in many instances employment is 
likely to be in decline without corresponding floorspace loss, and thus completely 
outwith planning control. The second most crucial factor overall is the closure of 
manufacturing establishments, and again this cannot be influenced by the planning 
system. It is interesting that this factor ranks higher than ‘relocation’ for the experience 
over the 1980s, as this is consistent with results for earlier periods in London discussed 
in chapter two. In the City, Westminster and Kensington and Chelsea however, the 
relocation of establishments has been extremely important. The ranks for the 
‘displacement’ category are unsurprising given responses elsewhere in the survey. This 
has been an extremely important factor in inner London where development pressure 
for these uses in most intense, and much less important in outer London. ‘Other’ factors 
cited included land and rental value increases, as well as the replacement of 
manufacturing uses by residential, warehousing and retailing uses.
Table 5.12 shows that authorities believe that some of the main processes underlying 
London’s manufacturing employment change are outwith the scope of planning control. 
The table provides no definitive evidence of the actual extent to which these processes 
are occurring, being simply the perceptions of borough LPAs, with no empirical basis. 
However, it does at least give some preliminary ideas for why the LPAs believe that 
employment protection policies have been so unimportant.
5.7 Conclusions.
The conclusion from this chapter must be that little evidence has been found to suggest 
that the use of planning controls have had any systematic influence on manufacturing 
employment change. The implications are that more complex factors are at play in 
London’s manufacturing employment change than a simple one way relationship which 
is expressed in land use change. This raises interesting issues about the two theoretical
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perspectives which stressed the importance of ‘space constraints’ and ‘crowding out’ 
processes in urban manufacturing change. While the survey has not directly addressed 
these theoretical accounts, the indication for the results is that these processes may not 
be as critical in urban manufacturing employment change as expressed in the literature. 
The survey has determined that many London LPAs have protected manufacturing land 
and have attempted to resist change of use to other activities, yet have been 
unsuccessful in protecting manufacturing jobs. If the two processes of space constraint 
and crowding out were happening in London then it is logical to suppose that land use 
planning could make a big difference, and this requires further attention.
The survey results have also indicated that the experience of manufacturing change in 
London may not be the straightforward process of decline described in chapter four, and 
assumed in the theoretical perspectives reviewed in chapter two. Over the 1980s, 
borough planning authorities have developed policies to guide or channel the location 
of new manufacturing developments, and this indicates that manufacturing land and 
premises may still be being demanded in the capital. If so, then the validity of 
perspectives on urban deindustrialisation may be questioned in the extent to which they 
have underplayed the dynamism of manufacturing change in cities and placed an over­
emphasis within explanations only on processes of decline.
Another important aspect of the results for the development of the research is that a 
focus on planning and land use issues is unlikely to uncover what is really happening to 
London’s manufacturing. Planning policy appears from the results of the survey to be of 
secondary concern, and to play down the importance of economic processes appears to 
be an erroneous way of approaching London’s manufacturing employment decline. 
Indeed, the LPAs have indicated that while planning control in London operates at the 
‘local’ level of boroughs, the processes behind the decline of manufacturing jobs are not 
likely to be local in nature. However, the focus on employment protection policies 
through land use regulation raises research questions which may be pursued in a 
quantitative fashion. What are the dominant processes that underpin London’s 
employment change? Is land use changing in different ways to employment, and could 
this offer and explanation for the lack of success in employment protection?
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Thus, one of the most important conclusions from the survey is that the specific 
orientation of the research must change, from focusing on the potential effects of policy 
alone to attempting to uncover the empirical context within which policies work. To 
determine why London has lost jobs in such a consistent and severe manner the research 
must consider as far as possible changes in the nature of London’s manufacturing itself, 
and explore a wide variety of different facets of manufacturing change, and not just in 
relation to job loss. In this way it is hoped that the reasons why planning policy may not 
have had such a critical influence on manufacturing employment change may be 
uncovered. Hence, the thesis now turns to consider trends in different indicators of 
industrial change in London over the 1980s with a view to understanding the dominant 
processes underpinning manufacturing job loss, and thus the context within which 
planning policy operates.
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Chapter 6 : Aspects of change in London’s manufacturing industry : an 
investigation into circumstances surrounding decreasing labour demand.
6.0 Introduction.
The previous chapter has raised a number of important issues concerning manufacturing 
employment change and planning in London, principally suggesting that many borough 
LPAs believe that the processes which underpin job loss are to a large extent outwith 
the scope of planning control. This chapter moves away from a narrow focus on 
employment alone to consider aspects of manufacturing change in London related to 
land use and floorspace, firm entry, and output change. As mentioned previously in this 
thesis, a quantitative analysis of employment protection policy effects using aggregate 
data sources would be extremely difficult to do as well as being a potentially misguided 
exercise. This is not attempted here. Rather, a variety of evidence is presented which 
examines different dimensions of change in London’s manufacturing industries, 
allowing conclusions to be reached about the nature of employment change, and thus 
reasoned hypotheses to be advanced about why LPAs believe that land use planning can 
have only a marginal influence on job loss. In this respect, the emphasis of analysis 
changes somewhat. The boroughs believe that they cannot exert a significant influence 
on manufacturing employment decline. It therefore seems logical to examine the 
circumstances surrounding employment change and what this may mean for planning 
policy, as opposed to asking what policy means for employment change.
The analysis is also presented with a view to testing the crowding out and space 
constraint hypotheses. These two theoretical accounts provided good reasons for 
believing that land use planning regulation may be important in manufacturing change. 
Guiding the inquiry with respect to these two perspectives provides a frame of reference 
within which to interpret the results, and it also presents a useful means of exploring 
land use planning consequences.
The chapter begins by outlining a spatial framework for analysis. Section 6.2 then sets 
out explicitly to explore the crowding out hypothesis of manufacturing change in 
London. The chapter moves on to consider floorspace and land use aspects of
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manufacturing change in the capital, commenting on the space constraint and crowding 
out hypotheses where appropriate. Surprising trends in firm entry, output and labour 
productivity change are then presented. Finally, conclusions are drawn and further 
research implications are discussed.
6.1 Geographical scales of analysis.
A number of different data sets are used in this chapter which are not available at 
identical levels of spatial and industrial disaggregation (see appendix one). As with any 
empirical research, the analysis is necessarily limited and fashioned by the scope of the 
available data. It is worth stressing here that one consequence of the empirical nature of 
this chapter is that the presentation of results at the borough level becomes impractical. 
Due to the wide scope of issues to be examined, space does not permit such a detailed 
discussion of geographical differences within London. Guided largely by the need for 
comparison amongst results from the different data sets, a spatial framework has been 
adopted which, for the purposes of presentation, divides Greater London into three 
broad areas : Central London which comprises the Cities of London and Westminster; 
Inner London which is made up of the remaining 12 inner boroughs; and Outer London 
contains 19 boroughs (see Figure 1.1).
Moving away from the borough level analysis was found essential for the presentation 
of the following results, however it does raise difficulties in itself, and two limitations 
of the adopted framework should be made clear. First, and most obviously, the 
definition of Central London is at best inaccurate. A more appropriate definition of this 
area would be that used by Frost and Spence (1991a) which captures the area bounded 
by the main railway termini. However, Frost and Spence were considering trends in 
employment, where the data may be extracted at very fine levels of geographical detail, 
and many of the data sets used in the following analysis are only available at the 
borough level. Central London cannot be defined by boroughs and this is well 
understood here, however it has been considered important to treat the City and 
Westminster separately from the rest of Inner London due to their unique economic 
significance within the capital. The second major limitation lies in the use of the 
standard inner and outer London distinction. It is recognised here that it is only an
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artificial boundary that defines these two areas. However, the previous survey chapter 
has indicated that important distinctions may exist in this respect and spatial detail can 
be flagged in the text to supplement the framework when required.
Given these limitations, it was finally decided that the empirical work should actually 
be conducted at the borough level where possible, but could be presented in terms of 
Central, Inner and Outer London, accompanied by discussions of important borough 
differences and by the presentation of borough and even ward results achieved through 
statistical methods to reduce the data. The spatial framework should therefore be 
understood within the limitations of the data, and only as a tool for presentation. It is 
not presented as a definitive geographical concept of the London conurbation, but is 
used simply to highlight the broad, yet important, differences in economic structure and 
change within the capital, whilst allowing for the different data sets to be compared 
geographically. Most importantly the spatial framework is not rigidly applied. Borough 
and even ward level detail is specified in the text where possible if the defined 
framework appears to be masking important observations. The spatial focus of the 
thesis does change in this chapter. However, given that the London LPAs generally 
believe that manufacturing job loss is not directed by local phenomenon, the issues that 
the research seeks to investigate also must change if the thesis is to advance the 
understanding of what is happening to London’s manufacturing industry. In this respect 
it could be argued that it is no longer simply a borough issue that is being examined, 
because appropriate data and methods must be used regardless of whether they permit a 
borough focus.
6.2 The ‘global city’ crowding out effect: manufacturing, producer service, and 
non-producer service employment change in London, 1981 to 1991.
The chapter turns first to consider a specific sub-set of the ‘crowding out’ hypothesis : 
that manufacturing activity in London is being ‘squeezed out’ of the capital due to the 
spatial expansion of the tertiary sector.1 This hypothesis deserves explicit attention. It is
1 As discussed in chapter two, a further aspect o f the crowding out hypothesis relates to the issue o f  
sectoral selectivity. Sassen (1991) argues that not all manufacturing sectors will be affected by crowding 
out, but that some industries will retain a comparative advantage by remaining in London. This issue is 
not investigated here, because it has been adequately shown in chapter four that severe manufacturing
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one of the most up-to-date comments on manufacturing change in the capital, and is 
directly relevant to the issues of structural economic change, and the role of land use 
planning, that the thesis seeks to investigate. Are spatial trends in London’s economic 
growth and decline causally related ? This question is extremely difficult to answer 
categorically. In this section, the issue is approached through an analysis of 
employment data. These data are used here to determine the degree of spatial and 
temporal association of sectoral growth and decline within London. In other words, has 
manufacturing employment been declining where, and when, services or producer 
services have been growing.
Table 6.1 outlines general employment trends in London for two periods between 1981 
and 1991, and for three categories of industry : manufacturing, producer services, and 
non-producer services. The purpose of the table is to provide a description of 
employment change in London, and within this context, to highlight any spatial and 
temporal coincidences in the trends of service and producer service employment growth 
and manufacturing employment decline in London over the 1980s. Considering first 
London as a whole, it can be seen that producer service employment has expanded quite 
substantially by 28.3%, or by 143,000 jobs over the 1981 to 1991 period. From 1981 to 
1987, the per annum rate of growth in London’s producer services was approximately 
5.8%, however the effects of recession are apparent in the later period when 
employment actually began to decline by around -1.2% per annum. Non-producer 
service employment in London increased marginally by 0.4%, or by only 9420 jobs in 
the first period of the 1980s defined in the table, and subsequently declined by -3.3% in 
the later period. As a result there was a net loss of some 62,300 non-producer service 
jobs in the capital over the ten year period as a whole.
Some spatial variations in the general trends of employment change can be identified.
In terms of manufacturing jobs, Central London experienced the most acute relative 
decline of over 65% between 1981 and 1991. In Inner London just over 40% of 
manufacturing jobs were lost, and in Outer London 47%. The Central area, then, stands
employment decline has affected all sectors o f industry within the capital. It is however, discussed in a 
published version o f this chapter (Graham, Spence, forthcoming a).
2 London’s employment trends have been described in chapter four, though not with respect to the 
categories of producer and non producer services (see appendix one), nor with respect to the areas of 
Central, Inner and Outer London.
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Table 6.1 : Employment change in manufacturing, producer services and non-producer services in Central, Inner, Outer and London, 1981 to 1991.
Central
1981-1987
1987-1991
Manufacturing
abs.
-32938
-18241
%
-41.99
-40.09
Producer services 
abs.
68783
-58861
%
25.60
-17.44
Non-producer Services
abs. %
-23871 -5.23
-61986 -14.34
1981-1991 -51179 -65.25 9922 3.69 -85857 -18.82
Inner
1981-1987
1987-1991
-58387
-26686
-28.59
-18.30
51321
20786
41.98
11.98
12240
-36433
1.56
-4.57
1981-1987 -85073 -41.66 72107 58.99 -24193 -3.08
Outer
1981-1987
1987-1991
-111141
-77710
-27.69
-26.78
55757
5417
48.14
3.16
21051
26673
2.32
2.87
1981-1991 -188851 -47.06 61174 52.82 47724 5.26
London
1981-1987
1987-1991
-202466
-122637
-29.60
-25.47
175861
-32658
34.70
-4.78
9420
-71746
0.44
-3.32
1981-1991 -325103 -47.53 143203 28.26 -62326 -2.90
Notes :
(1) Producer services are as defined by Sassen (1991). Non-producer service employment is total service employment less producer service employment (see appendix one).
Source : Census o f Employment (NOMIS)
out in terms of relative loss, shedding almost 20% more jobs than any other area. 
However, in absolute terms the Outer area lost the highest number of jobs, almost 
190,000, over the ten year period, while Inner and Central London lost 85,100 and 
51,200 jobs respectively. In all areas, decline occurred in both periods defined in the 
table although losses accelerated in the later period. In fact, in the case of Central and 
Outer London rates of per annum loss between 1987 and 1991 were almost double that 
of the 1981 to 1987 period. In Inner London rates of job loss increased only slightly in 
the later period, and more detailed analysis of the census data indicates that this can be 
explained by the movement of paper and printing industries from Central to Inner 
London between 1987 and 1989. Despite this, manufacturing employment decline has 
generally been substantial and consistent over both time and space.
Producer service employment increased considerably in all areas in the 1981 to 1987 
period. In absolute terms Central London experienced the largest growth in employment 
of almost 69,000 jobs, while employment in Inner and Outer London grew by 51,321 
and 55,757 jobs respectively. This growth of producer service employment in Inner and 
Outer London represented vast relative increases of 42%, or 6% per annum, and 48%, 
or 6.9% per annum, respectively. In the 1987 to 1991 period, however, producer service 
growth rates slowed to 3% per annum in Inner London and 0.79% in Outer London 
creating 20,786 and 5,417 jobs in each area over this four year period. In Central 
London, severe declines in producer service employment were experienced in this later 
period. Approximately 59,000 producer service jobs were lost in Central London, some 
17.4% of the 1987 total. Thus, over the ten year period as a whole the net growth of 
producer service employment in Central London appears modest, with an increase of 
only of only 3.7%, or 10,000 jobs. Employment trends in this latter period are heavily 
influenced by the impacts of recession and it is interesting to note that as regards 
producer service employment, the recession clearly led to reduced growth rates of 
employment in Inner and particularly Outer London, but that it was really Central 
London that bore the brunt of the downturn.
In the non-producer service industries, employment trends have differed in each area of 
London defined. In the Central area employment declined by -5.2%, or by almost 
24,000 jobs in the 1981 to 1987 period. This was followed by a further extremely large
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contraction of -14.4%, or 62,000 in the 1987 to 1991 period. In Inner London non­
producer service employment expanded by 1.6%, or by 12,000 jobs over the 1981 to 
1987 period, however this was more than offset by a decline of -4.6% in the latter 
period, resulting in a net loss of 24,000 jobs over the ten year period as a whole. In 
contrast, non-producer service employment in Outer London expanded in both periods 
defined. Between 1981 and 1987 the per annum rate of growth of these industries in 
Outer London was 0.3%, creating almost 21,000 jobs over this seven year period, and 
this rate of growth actually increased to 0.71% per annum in the 1987 to 1991 period 
producing an additional 32,100 service jobs in Outer London.
Clearly, table 6.1 demonstrates two broad employment trends which are consistent over 
the areas defined. First, severe absolute and relative manufacturing employment decline 
occurred in both periods defined in the table. Second, the rapid expansion of 
employment in specialist producer services took place although this trend was only 
fully evident across space in the 1987 to 1991 period. Trends in non-producer services 
have not been consistent across time or space. However, the important issue in table 6.1 
is to what extent the coincidence of these two broad trends could be indicative of a 
causal relationship as suggested in the global city hypothesis. If employment data is a 
useful surrogate for actual changes in economic activity, then the indication from table 
6.1 would be that a negative causal relationship is difficult to establish over both 
periods within the decade. In all three areas manufacturing employment decline was at 
its most severe in the 1987 to 1989 period when producer service employment growth 
slowed down, or in one case actually substantially declined. However, over the 1981 to 
1987 period it would seem that producer service employment growth has been broadly 
coincidental with manufacturing employment decline in the three areas of London 
defined, while non-producer service change has not.
Assuming for the moment that employment trends over this period are, to a realistic 
extent, indicative of actual economic changes, then simply for the purposes of 
investigating the crowding out hypothesis further the possibility of causal relationships 
may be considered. The level of spatial analysis included in table 6.1 is insufficient to 
indicate potential causality as the processes of growth and decline could be highly 
concentrated within the three broad areas defined, and thus potentially spatially
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independent. However, if a very detailed spatial coincidence between producer service growth and 
manufacturing decline could be determined for each broad area of London, then the possibility of a 
causal relationship could be considered, although not established, in a more sophisticated fashion.
Employment data were extracted at the most detailed geographical level available, which divides the 
capital into some 779 wards - 48 in Central London, 274 in Inner London, and 457 in Outer London. 
These data were available from 1984, and the period from 1984 to 1987 was considered. During this 
period employment in producer services grew substantially in all areas while manufacturing 
employment declined. Since the extreme spatial detail of the data renders their presentation 
inappropriate here, simple correlations were conducted to examine spatial coincidence in Central, 
Inner and Outer London. Manufacturing employment change was correlated separately with producer 
service employment change for each broad area. Given the small numbers of jobs that often exist at 
this detailed spatial level, absolute rather than relative change was found to be the more appropriate 
measure. In general terms, problems will of course arise in using employment data to indicate 
economic activity and this issue is returned to throughout the chapter. However, correlations of this 
type do allow for the data reduction required, but should only be regarded as a starting point in 
exploring the spatial coincidence of sectoral growth and decline.
Given that the data being used in the correlations is of interval-ratio measurement the Pearson’s 
product moment procedure is preferred to the non-parametric rank correlation. Rank correlation 
necessarily reduces detail within the data, and in assuming equal cascading values of rank tends to 
understate the importance of extreme values. For Central London the correlation of manufacturing 
employment change with producer service produced a Pearson’s coefficient of -0.27, for Inner 
London -0.32, and for Outer London 0.1. None of the correlations were statistically significant at an 
acceptable level. These results, although tentative and exploratory rather than conclusive, suggest 
two important points for the crowding out hypothesis. First, that the degree of spatial association of 
producer service employment growth and manufacturing employment decline identified in Central 
and Inner London does not provide a strong indication of the possibility of a causal relationship. In 
other words, it may have been important in some areas but does not seem to be a consistent spatial 
trend. Second, that in Outer London, which contained approximately 60% of London’s 
manufacturing employment in 1984 and 1987, and in which manufacturing employment decline and 
producer service growth have been clearly apparent over the 1980s, the detailed spatial
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coincidence of these trends has not been strong enough to allow a negative causal relationship to be 
established. However, the results do have to be considered in light of the possibility of ‘lag’ effects in the 
relationships arising because of the existence of an intervening period in development activity between 
the closure or relocation of manufacturing and the development of new service uses. The existence of 
such lag effects would render crowding out processes very difficult to detect through the procedures used 
above because some appreciable period of time would exist between the decline of manufacturing 
employment and the growth of service sector employment. However, the use of the three year period 
within the correlations conducted above is particularly important in this respect and it is hoped that this 
relatively broad time period will have assisted to a large extent in accounting for the importance of lag 
effects.
The limited extent to which employment can be used as an actual index of economic change is made 
clear when other indicators of economic change are introduced in subsequent sections of this chapter. 
Nonetheless, as a starting point for examining the crowding out hypothesis, the employment analysis 
allows for at least speculation that if the ‘crowding out’ hypothesis has been such an important facet of 
urban economic change, then stronger relationships should have been detected at such fine levels of 
spatial detail.
However, while it has been demonstrated that there may not be a strong relationship between producer 
service employment growth and manufacturing employment decline at a detailed spatial level, on the 
basis of this information alone it cannot be concluded that in London’s recent economic change 
manufacturing decline is not causally associated with service sector growth in aggregate terms. 
Particularly regarding employment change, it may be that an economic maturity effect, as discussed in 
chapter two, has been occurring in London over the 1980s which would have no discernible intra-urban 
effects. Specifically, increased competition between economic sectors in shared labour markets could 
have induced price implications which are important in explaining manufacturing employment decline. 
For example, relative to Great Britain, data from the New Earnings Survey (NES) (DE, 1984 - 1991) 
shows that manual manufacturing wages in London are significantly higher. In 1984, weekly wages for 
male manual manufacturing workers in London were 10% higher than in Britain, and 5.9% higher for 
female manual workers. By 1991 this wage gap between London and Britain had increased, with male 
manual wages in London being 16% and female manual wages 11% higher in London than in the nation. 
Wages in non manual banking, insurance, finance and business services, the nearest category to producer 
services defined in the NES, were 16.2% higher in London than Britain for males and 19.3% higher for 
females in 1984, and by 1991 these figures had increased to 28.4% and 32% respectively.
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Whether the manual wage growth is causally related to the banking and finance wage 
growth as a result of labour competition is not clear. However, the data do show that the 
ratio of manufacturing manual wages to banking, insurance, finance and business 
service non manual wages in London was 0.7 for males and 0.7 for females in 1984, 
and in Britain 0.7 and 0.8 respectively. By 1991 the London ratios were 0.5 and 0.6 and 
in Britain 0.6 and 0.7. Thus the London manufacturing manual wages have grown at a 
slower rate relative to banking, insurance, finance, and business services, than in 
Britain. The NES data do not permit a full examination of any causal trends, however in 
general the higher costs of labour in London may be important to some extent in 
London’s manufacturing decline. Alternatively, high manufacturing wages may also be 
indicative of higher labour productivity which is discussed later in this chapter.
However, employment change in general need not be indicative of actual industrial 
change, and the use of employment data alone may be viewed as deficient and 
inadequate to comment on the ‘crowding out’ hypothesis of urban manufacturing 
change.
6.3 Floorspace and land use aspects of manufacturing change in London.
The following section considers floorspace and land use aspects of manufacturing 
change in London. These issues are of critical importance in understanding the 
relationship between planning and economic change and are also useful in commenting 
upon the crowding out and space constraint hypotheses. Unfortunately, sources of land 
data at the urban level are scarce and in the data that do exist industrial disaggregation 
tends to be poor. Floorspace and land use related data have been derived from two basic 
sources which are described in full in appendix one. The first is the Commercial and 
Industrial Floorspace Statistics (CIFS) which are available from 1981 to 1985, and the 
second is the London Development Monitoring System (LDMS) which is available 
from 1987. Both sets of data are geographically disaggregated at the borough level but 
are not compatible in the information they provide or in the way the data is collated. For 
this reason they are analysed separately.
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In London as a whole in 1981, the share of the total industrial and commercial 
floorspace surveyed by the CIFS in manufacturing use was just under 32%, a larger 
share than the other uses of warehousing (26%), shops and restaurants (19%), or even 
commercial uses (24%). Spatially, the proportion of total floorspace in manufacturing 
and commercial uses differed substantially. In Central London under 2% of floorspace 
was in manufacturing while 72% was in commercial uses, in Inner London 29% of 
floorspace was in manufacturing use and 19% in commercial use, and in Outer London, 
manufacturing was by the far the dominant employment use in floorspace terms 
occupying over 45% of total floorspace, while commercial uses occupied only 11% of 
total industrial and commercial floorspace.
Table 6.2 shows the changes in the floorspace occupied by manufacturing and 
commercial office uses in Central, Inner and Outer London, as recorded by CIFS
between 1981 and 1985. In 1981 London as a whole contained approximately 22.5
2
million metres of manufacturing floorspace, some 9.6% of the total in England. Outer
2
London contains 66% of the total, 14.8 million metres . The share in Inner London was
2approximately 33%, 7.5 million metres , and in Central London just under 1%, 0.1
2
million metres . By 1985, little change is evident in the shares of manufacturing 
floorspace held by these areas with only a slight decline in Outer London and slight 
increase in Central London. In fact, all areas in London lost manufacturing floorspace 
during this period. Outer London lost the largest share, almost 10%, followed by Inner 
London with just under 8%, while Central London experienced only a marginal loss of 
2 .1%.
The distribution of commercial floorspace in London in 1981 was very different from 
that of manufacturing floorspace. The two boroughs that comprise Central London 
contained just under 50% of all commercial office floorspace, Inner London contained 
28.6%, and Outer London 23%. As with manufacturing floorspace, by 1985 the shares 
of commercial floorspace held by each area were broadly the same. However, 
commercial floorspace actually expanded in all areas over the 1981 to 1985 period.
Interestingly, Outer London experienced the largest relative and absolute growth in
2
commercial floorspace of 17%%, or 0.7 million metres . In inner London, commercial
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Table 6.2 : Commercial and industrial floorspace changes in Central, Inner, Outer and London, 1981 - 1985.
Manufacturing 1981 
Manufacturing 1985
Change 1981 - 1985
Commercial offices 1981 
Commercial offices 1985
Change 1981 - 1985
abs)
(%)
abs)
'o /„ \
Central
197.5
0.88
193.4
0.95
Inner
7459.7 
33.16
6871.8 
33.60
Outer
14838.2
65.96
13387.1
65.46
London
22495.4
20452.3
abs)
fo/.\
-4.1
-2.08
-587.9
-7.88
-1451.1
-9.78
-2043.1
-9.08
abs) 8084.8 4781.3 3846.6 16712.7
(%) 48.38 28.61 23.02
abs) 8294.7 5438.9 4518.7 18252.3
(%) 45.44 29.80 24.76
abs) 209.9 657.6 672.1 1539.6
'0 1 2.60 13.75 17.47 9.21
N otes:
(1) Absolute figures are in thousand square metres
2
floorspace increased by 14% or by 0.7 million metres , while in Central London a
2
marginal growth in floorspace of 2.6%, or 0.2 million metres was experienced.
Thus it would seem, that over this four year period manufacturing floorspace was 
declining in each area of London, while commercial office use floorspace has been 
expanded. The first issue to be addressed is whether these trends may be causal, and as 
with employment data, this cannot be considered at such a broad spatial level. Using the 
borough as the basic unit of geographical analysis, simple correlations were again 
conducted for the purposes of data reduction, and as a means of indicating the degree of 
spatial association of commercial office floorspace growth and manufacturing 
floorspace decline. The correlation of the two variables, in relative terms, for each 
borough over the 1981 to 1985 period produced a coefficient of -0.1. Thus, while the 
form of the relationship was found to be negative, as suggested in the crowding out 
hypothesis, the association was extremely weak and not statistically significant. 
Furthermore, it would appear from a scatterplot of the two variables that the 
determination of the association was not affected by any important outliers in the data.
However, over the 1981 to 1985 period, floorspace in other uses was expanding in 
London. Warehousing floorspace grew by 10% and shops and restaurants floorspace by 
3.2%. Could the expansion of these uses be important in explaining the decline in 
manufacturing floorspace? The ‘global city’ account of the crowding out effect focuses 
on the growth of producer services, although the expansion of land use in restaurants, 
and what are less clearly described as ‘ancillary’ business uses, are also thought to be 
important. Warehousing expansion was not cited as an important causal influence. 
Correlating shops and restaurant floorspace change on manufacturing floorspace change 
produced a statistically insignificant coefficient of -0.04, and again outliers were not an 
important influence on the relationship. However, correlating warehousing floorspace 
change on manufacturing floorspace change produced a coefficient of -0.36, suggesting 
a moderately strong negative association between these sectors in growth and decline, 
and the correlation was statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
The industrial categories of the CIFS are not nearly as specific as those permitted with 
employment data, and clearly the correlations presented above provide little more than
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an indication of how spatially associated sectoral growth and decline is in London. 
However, they may indicate two important points about London’s manufacturing 
change. First, a distinct relationship between manufacturing floorspace decline and the 
growth of commercial office floorspace, as suggested in the global city literature, is 
absent. While the time series of the data used is relatively short, given the importance 
attached to the crowding out effect, at least a moderately strong spatial relationship 
would have been expected. Second, it would seem that rather than office orientated 
activities competing for industrial land, warehousing uses have may been more 
important. These uses are not those associated with London’s global city role, but are 
lower value activities which, perhaps in many instances, have the same locational 
requirement as manufacturing industry. What these relationships of borough data reveal 
would seem to support results presented in chapter five, and that is that by and large 
commercial offices will not compete for the same land as manufacturing, because they 
have different locational requirements, both within London and even within individual 
boroughs.
Another aspect of change in London manufacturing worthy of consideration is where 
the pressures for manufacturing floorspace or land use change may originate from in 
terms of types of use. The LDMS data are not particularly well founded, simply 
comprising the numbers of planning applications submitted for changes from and to 
manufacturing land use, but they are helpful in this respect. The uses in the LDMS are 
categorised according to the 1987 UCO. The definition of manufacturing used here is 
the same as that used by Cowan and Gordon (1993), and comprises use classes B2 
(general industrial) and B3 (special industrial), (see appendix one)
Three points of caution should be raised. First, it is recognised that developments dealt 
with by the land use planning system will not be the same as the sum of all 
development activity in London. With manufacturing especially, attention has been 
focused on the consent free development which arisen following the introduction of B1 
business use class and related permitted development, (see appendix three) For this 
reason the following analysis offers little more than a broad guide to manufacturing- 
related development trends in London. Second, for manufacturing, a definitional 
problem exists with the UCO, as class B1 can now represent certain types of office
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uses, research and development uses, as well as light manufacturing. However, the LRC 
have attempted to make a distinction within the B1 class by allocating all 
manufacturing related uses to the B2 class which consists of general industry. This 
leaves the business use class as essentially comprising a range of activities which are 
typically office-based and do not provide services direct to visiting members of the 
public. Examples would included specialist consultancies to business, advertising 
companies, sales services, design activities and the like. The remaining uses classified 
under the UCO are self explanatory (Home, 1989). Finally, some more general 
problems exist with the use of development control data. Two of the most common uses 
of such data have been, to provide an index of ‘development pressure’ and, to evaluate 
the impacts of land use planning policies, and these have led to debate over their 
shortcomings (Hebbert, 1989; McNamara, Healey, 1984; Brotherton, 1984; McNamara, 
McNamara, Mathrami, 1989; Rydin, 1989). Here the data are used to examine planning 
applications submitted both for change out of, and into, manufacturing use in London 
by borough. This produces a geography of expressed demand for these uses, and no 
claims are made towards measuring development pressure.
Table 6.3 shows the numbers of applications submitted, granted and refused for changes 
from manufacturing use in Central, Inner and Outer London between 1987 and 1991. 
Inner London received 385 such applications, 48.5% of all in London, Outer London 
received 359 applications, 45%, while in Central London only 49 applications for use 
changes from manufacturing, 6%, were submitted. Of the 793 applications submitted in 
London for change from manufacturing use between 1987 and 1991, 188, or 23.7% 
were refused. The Central London refusal rate was 18%, and in Inner and Outer 
London, 24%. The fact that many applications for change from manufacturing were 
refused does indicate that planning authorities can make a great deal of difference to 
land use change, however, the importance of development control for employment 
change is a much more complex issue as discussed in chapter five.
3 At an earlier stage o f the research attempts were made at a decisions analysis o f planning applications 
submitted for manufacturing land use change at the borough level. Borough refusal rates were compared 
to results from the survey which showed the degree to which the LPAs had attempted manufacturing 
employment protection. However, no systematic relationship could be determined. For example, o f the 
16 boroughs which had pursued employment protection policies it was found that 9 had above average 
refusal rates and 7 below, and the eight authorities which had not attempted to protect manufacturing 
jobs were equally divided above and below the average borough refusal rate. These results highlight the 
discretionary nature o f  planning decisions and caution against interpretation through decision analysis.
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Table 6.3 : Number o f  applications decided for change from manufacturing use in Central, Inner, Outer and
London, 1987- 1991.
Number of
Percentage 
of London
applications total
Central 49 6.18
Inner 385 48.55
Outer 359 45.27
Number of 
applications per 10,000 
square metres of floorspace
2.48
0.52
0.24
London 793 0.35
N otes:
(1) The number of applications do not include those which involved a change 
from manufacturing to manufacturing
(2) Figures for applications per 10,000 square metres of floorspace have been calculated 
using the 1986 floorspace totals from CIFS.
Source : London Development Monitoring System (see appendix one)
An Inner-Outer London distinction in the numbers of applications submitted for change 
from manufacturing use is not apparent, which is surprising given that Outer London 
contained so much more manufacturing floorspace in 1986. More applications may be
expected from areas where more manufacturing is located but this relationship is not
2
apparent in the numbers of applications per thousand metres of floorspace. Instead, 
relative to existing floorspace, Central London received a high number of applications, 
and Inner London received over twice those of Outer London.
In fact data at the borough level reveal that the relationship between the amount of 
floorspace within a borough and the level of applications for change of use received is 
weak, and while it may be important in some cases it does not appear to be spatially 
consistent. However, many boroughs which received few applications are also those 
which had below average shares of industrial floorspace, notably Kensington and 
Chelsea, Sutton, and Redbridge. The location of the boroughs, relative to the main 
concentrations of economic activity, also appears to be an important factor. The four top 
ranking boroughs in terms of numbers of applications were Islington (97), Tower 
Hamlets (63), Hackney (53) and Southwark (41), all of which border the City of 
London, and may be the result of pressure from services activities exploiting the market 
potential of the City.
Disaggregating the applications by their proposed uses, table 6.4 offers further insights 
into the broad patterns of proposed developments. Each application which contained 
manufacturing as an existing use was selected and the relevant proposed uses were 
recorded and scored 1. The absolute figures use in part (a) of the table are the sum of the 
scores awarded each time any use was cited on an application. For example, shops have 
a score of 57, which means they were one of the proposed uses in 57 of the applications 
for change of use from manufacturing. The percentage figures used in part (b), indicate 
the percentage of total applications in which a use was cited.
Only five proposed uses were important in manufacturing change : shops, business, 
industrial, warehouses and residential. The business uses are particularly prominent, 
being cited on 490 applications, 61% of the total applications for manufacturing use 
change. Residential use formed a proposed use in 240 applications (30%), industrial in
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Table 6.4 : The incidence o f  proposed uses for manufacturing land use change in Central,
Inner, Outer and London, 1987-1991.
(a) Incidence o f proposed use
Central Inner Outer London
Shops 13 10 34 57
Financial and professional offices 0 0 0 0
Restaurants 1 0 0 1
Business 48 258 184 490
Industrial 2 34 114 150
Warehouses 1 28 79 108
Non-Residential institutions 0 0 0 0
Leisure 0 0 0 0
Hotels 0 1 0 1
Residential institutions 0 2 1 3
Residential 6 117 117 240
Sui generis 0 0 1 1
(b) Percentage o f total applications in which use was cited
Shops 26.53 2.60 9.47 7.19
Financial and professional offices 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Restaurants 2.04 0.00 0.00 0.13
Business 97.96 67.01 51.25 61.79
Industrial 4.08 8.83 31.75 18.92
Warehouses 2.04 7.27 22.01 13.62
Non-Residential institutions 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Leisure 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hotels 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.13
Residential institutions 0.00 0.52 0.28 0.38
Residential 12.24 30.39 32.59 30.26
Sui generis 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.13
N otes:
(1) The figures in the lower part o f the table are derived by dividing the figure for each area shown 
in part (a)by the number o f applications received by each area for change o f use in manufacturing.
Source : London Development Monitoring System (see appendix one)
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150 (19%), warehouses in 108 (14%), and shops in 57 (7%). In Central London, 
interest in manufacturing sites has been dominantly expressed by business uses, with 
slightly under 100% of applications submitted containing business amongst the 
proposed uses. The incidence of shops is also high in Central London applications; and 
residential uses were important, but much less so than in London as a whole. Industrial 
and warehousing uses have not expressed a high demand for manufacturing land in 
Central London planning applications. In Inner London, the pattern is slightly different. 
Business uses are still dominant, but industrial and warehousing uses, and to a larger 
extent residential uses, have all been heavily cited. In Outer London, the share of 
applications which propose business uses is again slightly less, the incidence of 
residential after uses is similar to Inner London, but the warehousing and particularly 
industrial uses are here expressing a significant interest in manufacturing land.
The results from the LDMS analysis are broadly consistent with those of chapter five in 
the sense that they show interest from business uses being expressed throughout 
London, but particularly focusing on the central and inner areas, while residential uses 
express more interest in the inner and outer areas. However, it would also seem that 
warehousing uses are proposed fairly frequently in Inner London, but much more so in 
Outer London, presumably as a result of lower land values. These spatial trends may be 
indicative of a crowding out effect of manufacturing floorspace, with industrial property 
in the inner areas surrounding the West End and City most under threat from business 
uses interested in locations which allow for the efficient exchange of services to these 
concentrations of economic activity. More surprisingly, there has been an interest in 
manufacturing land expressed by manufacturing uses. This suggests some ‘recycling’, 
but is also indicative of continued demands in London for manufacturing space that was 
raised as a surprising aspect of LPA policy in the previous chapter.
Table 6.5 develops this theme further, showing the numbers of applications submitted 
for change into manufacturing use over the 1987 to 1991 period in the three areas of 
London. The vast majority of applications for manufacturing use have been submitted 
to outer London planning authorities. This broad area has received 275 such 
applications or just under 71% of the London total. The inner London LPAs decided 
107 applications for manufacturing use, or 28% of the total, while the central London
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Table 6.5 : Number o f  applications decided for change into manufacturing us
London, 1 9 87 - 1991.
Number of
Percentage 
o f  London
applications total
Central 6 1.50
Inner 107 27.58
Outer 275 70.88
London 388
Notes :
(1) The number o f applications include those which involved a change 
from manufacturing to manufacturing
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authorities received a very small number of applications, only 6, or 1.5% of the total. 
Data at the borough level reveals that a large proportion of these applications were 
submitted within relatively few boroughs. For instance, applications received in the five 
boroughs of Brent, Ealing, Hillingdon, Enfield and Hackney accounted for almost 40% 
of London’s total applications for manufacturing use. These five boroughs are all 
prominent locations for manufacturing use and it would seem that in contrast to changes 
from manufacturing, the extent of existing manufacturing floorspace in any borough 
does appear to influence the locations of applications submitted. Correlating the 
borough proportions of total applications received with the proportion of existing 
floorspace from the CIFS data, produces a moderately strong Pearson’s coefficient of 
0.55. However, this result does not indicate that manufacturing land in London is 
simply being ‘recycled’ for the same use. Analysis of the LDMS data undertaken by the 
LRC themselves, reveal that of the 388 applications submitted for manufacturing use, 
238, or just over 61%, did not contain manufacturing as an existing use. (Cowan, 
Gordon, 1993) This is an interesting spatial trend, implying that new manufacturing 
uses in London tend to locate next to existing and established industrial sites, while 
evidence presented earlier showed that the extent of existing industrial floorspace in any 
borough does not strongly influence the number of applications received for change 
from manufacturing use. The suggestion may be that pressures for change from 
manufacturing land are highly spatially specific affecting only some locations, and that 
new manufacturing developments tend to have their own locational requirements which 
broadly coincide with existing industrial sites. In other words the expansion of 
commercial uses and the decline of manufacturing may be trends that are to a large 
extent spatially independent.
The fact that applications for change of use to manufacturing are still being submitted in 
London suggests that much more complex processes are occurring in London’s 
manufacturing than the simple eradication of manufacturing through a crowding out 
effect. Indeed, it also suggests that space constraints on manufacturing growth and 
expansion in the capital may not be as stringent as Fothergill and Gudgin have implied, 
and certainly not 100%. Furthermore, it has been shown that London LPAs have 
refused just under 24% of total applications for manufacturing use change, and this 
must have an important influence on the supply of industrial land in London and on the
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extent to which crowding out actually takes place. Comparing the floorspace data 
presented at the start of this section with the employment data presented in the previous 
section provides evidence to suggest that change in London’s manufacturing may not be 
as straightforward as assumed in crowding out and space constraint hypothesis.
Unfortunately, employment data are only available for the years 1981,1984 and 1987, 
and so a comparison of employment and floorspace change is only really feasible 
between 1981 and 1984. Table 6.6 shows that in all areas floorspace has declined at less 
than half the rate of employment. Inner and Outer London exhibit almost identical 
trends, with employment declining by about 18% and floorspace by about 7%. In 
Central London, the difference between the two changes is more exaggerated, with 
employment declining at over five times the rate of floorspace decline.
As regards employment densities, Inner and Outer London also have almost identical
2
ratios of jobs to floorspace, approximately 27 jobs per thousand metres of floorspace
2
in 1981. However, Central London differs having over 397 jobs per thousand metres of 
floorspace. It is tempting to conclude that the reason for this is the presence of 
manufacturing headquarter establishments in the City and West End. However, in 1981 
52% of Central London’s manufacturing was in the printing and publishing industries, 
and a further 10% within clothing, office machinery manufacture, and certain 
electronics sectors. In fact the figure is likely to reflect headquarter activity to some 
degree, but is probably also indicative of the presence of certain types of smaller 
manufacturing establishments. Here space constraints and high land values may well 
provide an efficient environment only for sectors with low space demands and higher 
value-added products. To some extent such factors are likely to affect most
manufacturing in London and this is reflected in the lower job to floorspace ratios found
2
in England as a whole of 22.6 jobs per thousand metres of floorspace in 1981 and 20.7 
in 1984.
The figures for change in employment density show reductions in the job to floorspace
ratio in all areas of London. In Central London, there were almost 19 less jobs per
2
thousand metres of floorspace by 1984, and a decline of approximately 3 jobs per
2
thousand metres in the rest of London. As a whole, London by 1984 had 10.3% less
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Table 6.6 : Changes in manufacturing employment density, 1981 - 1984.
Central Inner Outer London
Employment change 81-84 (abs)
(%)
-4675
-5.96
-37395
-18.31
-72880
-18.16
-114950
-16.81
Floorspace change 81-84  (abs)
(%)
-2300
-1.16
-538100
-7.21
-1088800
-7.34
-1629200
-7.24
Employment per thousand square 
metres of floorspace 1981 397.16 27.37 27.05 30.40
Employment per thousand square 
metres of floorspace 1981 378.28 24.10 23.89 27.27
Percentage change in employment per 
1000 square metres of floorspace -4.75 -11.96 -11.68 -10.31
Sources : Census of employment (NOMIS)
DoE (1986): Commercial and Industrial Floorspace Statistics. London : HMSO.
2jobs per thousand metres of floorspace than in 1981. This implies that one tenth of 
manufacturing jobs in the capital were lost without corresponding floorspace loss. Inner 
and Outer London again show similar trends with the job to floorspace ratio decreasing 
by approximately 12%, while in relative terms Central London experienced a low rate 
of reduction of just under 5%, but still comparably large given the large ratio in the base 
year.
The important issue here is the differences between rates of change in employment and 
floorspace in London. The rates of floorspace decline, while still significant and greater 
than the nation as a whole, were much less dramatic than employment decline. These 
trends suggests two major possibilities. First, that plants which are highly labour 
intensive have closed or have left London in search of less constrained and cheaper 
environments, and perhaps cheaper labour, and so reducing the ratio of jobs to 
floorspace. Second, that labour productivity may be increasing in London’s 
manufacturing as suggested by the borough LPAs. This may be due to the introduction 
of new technology or through the re-classification of certain service jobs that used to be 
provided in-house in manufacturing, and are now in free-standing service industries. Or, 
it may be due to the rationalisation and intensification of work processes. In fact these 
possibilities are generally consistent with the explanation of urban manufacturing 
decline put forward by Fothergill and Gudgin (1982) where manufacturing employment 
falls in urban areas, while the employment of technology and capital in remaining 
plants induces a rising floorspace to worker ratio.
Caution is required in the interpretation of these results. It is tempting to conclude that 
changes in employment density verify the LPA views that the factors that underlie 
employment change are outwith the scope of planning control because jobs are being 
lost without corresponding losses in floorspace. However, there is no indication in the 
CIFS data that manufacturing land in London is not lying vacant. The important point at 
this stage is that indicators other than employment may not signify the complete 
eradication of the London manufacturing base. It appears that more complex processes 
may be at work than the ‘crowding out ‘of manufacturing establishments or the physical 
constraint on growth, and this requires further attention because it may be crucial in 
understanding the relationship between land use planning controls and manufacturing
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change in London. The use of employment and floorspace data have only permitted 
j examination of particular aspects of London’s manufacturing. The demand for labour and land 
from manufacturing industries are each derived demands required by firms to manufacture 
outputs. A more direct dimension of analysis would consider the actual numbers of firms, and
i
output and productivity change, in London’s manufacturing.
!
6.4 Firm entry, output and productivity change in London.
The following section focuses only on manufacturing industry in London, exploring aspects 
of change directly related to productive capacity. The purpose is to probe deeper into what has 
been happening to London’s manufacturing sector in the context of manufacturing firm entry, 
output, and productivity. Net change in the stock of manufacturing firms is examined using 
data on businesses registered for VAT between 1981 and 1991. Gross value-added data are 
used to examine changes in manufacturing output and are available for London for the years 
1984 to 1991, and at the borough level from 1987 to 1991.
A full description of these data sets is provided in appendix one. However, it is worth 
stressing here two important points relating to the VAT and GVA data sets respectively. First, 
is that the definition of manufacturing in the VAT data is not consistent with other sources 
used in the thesis. A category called ‘production’ is defined which comprises divisions 1 to 4 
of the 1980 SIC, rather than the official definition of manufacturing which includes divisions 
2 to 4. Using data which describes the number of reporting units to the CoE, it was found that 
in 1991 only 2.5% of total units in London involved in ‘production’ were classified within 
division one. Thus, while there is a definitional anomaly, the scale of industrial activity within 
division one in London is extremely small and this should mean that the VAT data still
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provide a good indication of manufacturing activity.A The second point to be made clear 
concerns the availability of time-series in the GVA data set. The CSO do not publish the 
regional and district data in constant prices because inflation is thought to vary spatially 
throughout the country. For analysis here, time-series comparison was essential. The CSO 
provided a consistent national price index of manufactured output from 1984 to 1991 in 
constant 1990 prices. This deflator has been cited in the literature as the most appropriate for 
GVA data (Borooah, Lee, 1991), and has been used to estimate the figures in real terms. Thus, 
some unavoidable inaccuracy may have been created in applying a national deflator to the 
regional and district data.
A Three additional points concerning the use o f VAT data for the analysis o f firm formation should be stressed. 
First, is that the data exclude firms not registered for VAT either because they trade mainly in exempt or zero­
rated goods or services. Second, is that firms do not have to register for VAT if they have a turnover below the 
required threshold which is currently set at £45,000. This means that changes in the stock of firms do not 
necessarily correspond to firm births or deaths, as a firm may have been trading for some time without having 
reached the turnover threshold or may dip below the threshold and thus deregister but continue trading. A third 
problem with the VAT data relates to their suitability for time series analysis. The turnover threshold has been 
subject to change in the past as has the definition of the goods and services which are exempt or zero rated. This 
may have the effect o f causing some definitional inconsistencies over time. Despite these important limitations, 
the VAT data are one o f the most comprehensive sources o f information that exist on firms and have been 
widely used in geographical studies o f firm change.
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(Borooah, Lee, 1991), and has been used to estimate the figures in real terms. Thus, 
some unavoidable inaccuracy may have been created in applying a national deflator to 
the regional and district data.
Table 6.7 shows the change in the stock of manufacturing firms in London for two 
periods, 1981-1987 and 1987-1991. Greater London exhibits some surprising results 
given the scale of employment decline in the capital over the period. Between 1981 and 
1987 there was a net exit of 1,200 manufacturing firms in London. Relative to the 
employment decline over this period of -30%, the decrease in the stock of firms is 
extremely small, amounting to only 5% of the 1981 base. More surprising is that 
between 1987 and 1991 an actual net entry of firms in manufacturing took place, the 
stock of firms increasing by just under 1%, while employment continued to fall by over 
-25%. For both periods Britain saw a much more favourable relative performance in the 
change in the stock of firms compared to London. Nonetheless, the birth to death ratios 
show that new manufacturing firms were still being established in London over the 
1980s, and that at certain times over this decade the entry of these firms more than 
compensated for the exit of other firms.
The comparison with employment change is interesting. Graham and Spence (1995) 
have examined establishment and employment data from the Census of Employment, 
showing the increasingly small scale nature of London’s manufacturing establishments. 
These data were available over the 1987 to 1991 period. It was found that in 1987 the 
average number of employees per firm in London was 24.2 and in Britain 34.7. By 
1991 these figures had changed to 19.8 and 30.1 respectively. Furthermore, the 
proportion of London manufacturing establishments in the 1 to 4 employee range 
increased from 38.9% to 43.6% over the period, and in the 5 to 10 employee range from 
25.1% to 25.5%. The proportion of establishments in all larger sizeband categories 
decreased. Relative to Britain, London’s manufacturing establishments now employ on 
average considerably less people, and are more concentrated within smaller sizebands. 
Unsurprisingly, further examination of the data show that the average number of 
employees per establishment is falling in all London boroughs.
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Table 6.7 : Change in the stock o f  manufacturing firms in London, 1981 to 1987 and 1987 to 1991.
Net change in stock Births to deaths ratio
1981- 1987 1987- 1991 1981-1987 1987-1991
(abs) (%) (abs) (%)
Central -2600 -56.64 -630 -31.66 0.54 0.59
Inner 1060 11.50 530 5.16 1.09 1.08
Outer 340 3.57 310 3.14 1.05 1.05
London -1200 -5.14 210 0.95 0.95 1.01
Great Britain 18666 15.11 12872 9.05 1.20 1.19
Source : DTI Business registrations and deregistrations. (NOMIS)
The spatial breakdown in table 6.7 allows the performance of each area of London to be 
differentiated. Over both periods net firm exit in manufacturing industries occurred in 
Central London. The early period saw Central London losing 2,600 manufacturing 
firms (57%) and the later period some 630 firms (32%). In complete contrast, net firm 
entry occurred in both Inner and Outer London over both periods. For Inner London this 
increased the stock substantially, by 11.5% in the first period and 5.2% in the second. 
Analysis of data at the borough level shows that of the 12 inner boroughs, decreases in 
the stock of firms occurred only in Camden and Islington. In Outer London, the stock 
increased by 3.6% in the first period and by 3.1% in the second. Thus, by the end of the 
decade more manufacturing firms were operating in Inner and Outer London than in 
1981, while Central London had significantly less.
These trends in firm entry and exit raise important issues about manufacturing change 
in London. First, the spatial variation in the change in the stock of businesses indicate 
that, if manufacturing is being crowded out of London, this effect is most detectable in 
Central London, and as mentioned earlier, is likely to be linked to the movement of 
printing and publishing. In Inner and Outer London a crowding out effect may well be 
taking place in selected areas, but it has not adversely affected the number of 
manufacturing firms operating within these broad zones of the capital. Second, and 
perhaps more important, the evidence does not support the view of manufacturing 
change associated with the space constraint thesis, or indeed that expressed in the 
employment analysis presented in chapter four. The trends in manufacturing 
employment and firm entry are somewhat irreconcilable. Change in manufacturing 
activity in London has not simply been one of decline, which has been predominantly 
characterised by establishment closure. The birth to death ratios shows that while 
London may have a high death rate of manufacturing firms, it also has high birth rates. 
The implication is that it is not simply decline which characterises London’s 
manufacturing change, but a mixture of both growth and decline, with new and perhaps 
smaller firms being formed at a relatively high rate.
These results broadly support the findings of the LPA survey. Authorities cited the 
closure of manufacturing firms as an important process underpinning employment 
decline, yet most had policies which sought to guide or influence the location of new
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manufacturing developments. The VAT data are surprising in the extent to which they 
challenge the received wisdom described in chapters one and two that London’s 
experience of manufacturing change is one only of decline, and that space is largely not 
available for manufacturing growth and expansion in the capital.
Considering now change in the output of London’s manufacturing industries, surprising 
trends are also shown (Table 6.8). Over the 1984 to 1991 period, London’s 
manufacturing output declined by 9.6%, or by £980m in 1990 prices. While substantial, 
this decline has to be compared to a loss of 36.9% of manufacturing jobs over the same 
period. The yearly figures show particularly interesting trends. In the first year output 
grew by 1.2% and subsequently declined by 1.7% between 1984 and 1985. In years 
following, output increased quite substantially so that by 1989, the level of output in 
London’s manufacturing industries was actually greater than that of 1984. With the 
onset of recession at the end of the decade GVA felt quite substantially. In fact, given 
the growth that occurred throughout the 1984 to 1988 period, the decline in output since 
1988 accounts almost entirely for the rate of loss over the period as a whole. Labour 
demand by London’s manufacturing industries conversely exhibits consistent decline.
The differences between output and employment change are important and require 
further attention. It was mentioned previously that the demand for employment can 
essentially be thought of as a derived demand, in the sense that labour is required by 
manufacturing to produce a given output. If output was to decline one may expect 
employment to fall, while output growth may be expected to stimulate an increase in the 
demand for labour. There is however, no reason to assume that labour demands will be 
temporally or spatially constant. It must be that over time, less employees are required 
to produce a unit of output because labour productivity has increased, or it may be that 
labour productivity is higher in some locations than in others. If so this would have 
important implications for London’s manufacturing employment change.
Productivity may be defined and measured in different ways often depending upon the 
units of factor inputs which are considered (see Diewert, 1992). For example, labour 
productivity measures output per unit of labour, capital productivity measures output 
per unit of capital, and total factor productivity measures output in units of all inputs to
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Table 6.8 : Gross valued added in London's manufacturing industries 1984 to 1991.
Gross Value Added Yearly change in output
(£s million) (£s million) (%)
1984 10165
1985 10290 84-85 124 1.22
1986 10116 85-86 -173 -1.68
1987 10277 86-87 160 1.59
1988 10704 87-88 427 4.16
1989 10913 88-89 288 2.69
1990 9905 89-90 -1088 -9.89
1991 9186 90-91 -719 -7.26
1984-1991 -980 -9.64
VOo
Source : CSO (1986 - 1993): Regional Accounts. London : HMSO.
production. For the moment, the productivity of an economy can be broadly thought of 
as the value of output produced by a unit of input, and thus, labour productivity growth 
occurs when the output per employee is greater in one period than in the previous 
period. Within the discipline of economics, this measure of total output per unit of 
labour is referred to as the average product of labour or average productivity of labour, 
as distinct from the marginal product of labour which describes the incremental 
contribution of output made by the addition of one unit of labour assuming that the 
amounts of all other factors of production are held constant. (Bowers, Baird, 1971) This 
is an important distinction which is drawn upon in chapter seven in models used to 
explain spatial productivity differences. In this thesis, as in much of the urban 
economics productivity literature introduced in the next chapter, unless otherwise 
specified, the expression ‘labour productivity’ refers to the average product of labour. In 
certain circumstances the measurement of average productivity is associated with 
‘short-run’ economic analyses in which the level of capital is given as fixed. The use of 
the average productivity measurement of labour productivity does not imply that labour 
is the only variable factor of production, and it is understood that changes in ratio of 
output to labour could be induced by changes in the utilisation of other factor inputs, as 
well as a variety of other variables. Indeed, it is these potential effects that are of 
interest.
The differences between manufacturing employment and output change are examined in 
Table 6.9, Comparing output and employment change between London and Britain 
shows that in each aspect of manufacturing change London’s performance has been 
poor. Britain actually experienced a growth in manufacturing value added of £5,240m 
(5.66%), and subsequently the share of national manufacturing output in London fell 
from 11.0% in 1984 to 9.4% by 1991. However, the output change figures also show 
that in both Britain and London the most severe declines occurred in the recessionary 
1989 to 1991 period. In employment terms, rates of decline were again much higher in 
London than in Britain in all periods defined over the 1980s.
Bringing together change in the two indicators as a measure of labour productivity, in 
units of output per employee, provides an extremely important index of manufacturing 
change. Table 6.9 shows that in 1984, the output per employee in London’s
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Table 6.9 : Employment, output, and labour productivity in manufacturing industry
in London and Britain.
1984-1987 1987-1989 1989-1991
Output change London 1.10 6.96 -16.44
Britain 10.80 9.80 -13.06
Employment London -15.38 -7.86 -19.11
change Britain -4.12 0.72 -11.08
1984 1991
Labour Productivity London 17.86 25.60
(£s thousand) Britain 17.38 21.39
(£s thousand) (%)
Change in
labour Productivity London 7.74 43.34
Britain 4.00 23.07
Sources : Census o f Employment (NOMIS)
CSO (1986 - 1993): Regional Accounts. London : HMSO.
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manufacturing of £17,860 was only slightly higher than that for Britain at £17,380. By 
1991, productivity levels were significantly higher in London than Britain, £25,600 
compared to only £21,390. Manufacturing employees in the capital were producing 
over £7,700 more in real terms than they were in 1984, a phenomenal growth in labour 
productivity of around 43%. In Britain workers were producing approximately £4,000 
more by the end of the decade (23%). Thus in London, labour productivity has grown at 
almost twice the rate of the nation as a whole, and however accomplished, it must have 
had a substantial impact upon rates of employment decline within the capital, both 
relative to the nation, and in absolute terms. The main difference between London and 
Britain in the ways in which productivity gains have been achieved is that in London 
both manufacturing value-added and employment were less in 1991 than in 1984, while 
in Britain, value added actually grew slightly while employment declined. Thus, 
London’s outstanding rate of productivity growth cannot be explained by superior 
output growth but instead by exceptionally high rates of employment loss in 
manufacturing industry.
The differences between London and Britain remain, and manufacturing industry in 
London now has significantly higher labour productivity than the nation. Using data 
available at the local authority district level for the 1987 to 1991 period, a spatial 
dimension can be introduced to the changes in manufacturing production discussed 
above. The spatial shares of manufacturing value-added in 1987 were similar to those 
for employment. Central London contributed about 11% of output, Inner approximately 
29% and Outer 60%. In Central London, rates of loss of output and employment 
between 1987 and 1991 have been very similar, around 40% (Table 6.10). In Inner 
London output actually grew by 8.5%, while employment declined by 18%; and in 
Outer London both output and employment declined, though the latter declined at a 
much faster rate than the former. The result of these changes is that output per employee 
has increased significantly in Inner London and to a lesser extent in Outer London, but 
only marginally in Central London. It is highly likely that these similarities in rates of 
decline in output and employment in central London result from the relocation of the 
printing and publishing industry shown in chapter two. The increases in Inner London’s 
output and productivity are consistent with this possibility. The highly productive
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Table 6.10 : Output, employment and labour productivity in manufacturing in central, inner, outer and Greater London, 1987 - 1991.
Central Inner Outer
1987 (£s million)
o
1173 2952 6148
(%) 11.42 28.73 59.85
1991 (£s million) 747 3203 5233
(%) 8.14 34.88 56.99
■1991 (£s million) -426 250 -915
(%) -36.32 8.48 -14.88
Output change 1987-1991 -36.32 8.48 -14.85
Em ployment change 1987-1991 -40.09 -18.30 -26.78
Labour productivity 1987 25.78 20.25 21.19
(£s thousand) 1991 27.40 26.89 24.63
Change in labour productivity (abs) 1.62 6.64 3.44
(%) 6.30 37.81 16.25
Sources : Census o f Employment (NOMIS)
CSO (1983 - 1993): Regional Accounts. London : HMSO.
London
10271
9183
-1088
-10.59
-10.59
-25.47
21.33
25.59
4.26
19.96
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printing industries of Central London have moved into inner boroughs raising the 
overall levels of output and labour productivity.
Two important points about manufacturing change in London arise from the 
examination of the evidence presented in this section. First, it would seem that the 
effects of crowding out trends within London appear highly spatially specific, being 
identifiable only really in Central London and perhaps to a small extent in Inner 
London. While the expansion of functions related to London’s role as a ‘global city’ 
may have been important in displacing manufacturing activity from some areas of 
London, it has not been clearly shown by the indicators used here, especially for Outer 
London where most manufacturing is. Thus, a question exists over any interpretation of 
London’s manufacturing change which views land competition as a dominant influence. 
There is no sound reason to assume that the boroughs which held the largest shares of 
manufacturing employment and output over the decade, for example Barking and 
Dagenham, Ealing, Enfield and Hillingdon, have lost manufacturing through its 
displacement by global city functions. So while crowding out is likely to provide at 
least some explanation for the decline of manufacturing in specific areas of London, it 
is likely to be much less important in others.
Second, the indicators presented in this section demonstrate that to view London’s 
manufacturing as a sector in terminal decline which has stringent physical constraints 
on growth and expansion, as is often predicated on the basis of employment trends, may 
well be a mis-interpretation of change. The performance of London4 s manufacturing 
industries appear much more favourable in firm entry, output and productivity terms 
than in employment terms. Evidence presented in this chapter indicates that one factor 
which represents a more important trend is increased productivity. The exact ways in 
which productivity growth has been achieved are not wholly apparent here, but a 
number of distinct possibilities exist. First, it may be that labour has been replaced by 
capital. Second, the rationalisation and intensification of labour inputs to manufacturing 
may be important. Third, and partly related to the last possibility, productivity gains 
may have been created through the contracting-out of service functions which were 
previously provided in-house in manufacturing. The loss of jobs entailed may show up 
as a productivity increase because employment data do not distinguish between
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productive and non-productive manufacturing employment while the GVA data do. In 
London, the existence of a highly specialised and developed service sector perhaps 
offers increased scope for this than elsewhere. Finally, it may be that Sassen is correct 
in arguing that selectivity has been occurring in London’s manufacturing change, with 
lower value output industries moving out of London or closing down, leaving behind 
higher value activities, and perhaps some headquarter establishments, where the output 
to labour ratio is high. Given the CoP has attempted to exclude non-production 
activities however, and that headquarter functions are not thought to enter into the 
published figures (see appendix one), this issue should not be over-emphasised.
A recent study of change in the London economy over the 1980s has argued that higher 
rates of growth in labour productivity in both the manufacturing and services sectors 
could explain London’s poor employment performance relative to the nation, in almost 
all sectors of the economy (Graham, Spence, 1995). Furthermore, it was shown that 
when output and employment are considered together spatially in a measure of 
productivity, the usefulness of basic concepts in economic geography such as 
deindustrialisation and tertiarisation can be challenged. More importantly, it was argued 
that for a regional economy, very high rates of productivity in certain sectors were not 
necessarily beneficial if the consequences were expressed in acute job loss, and thus 
unemployment
It may be therefore that employment trends provide a distorted account of London’s 
actual manufacturing change, and that in fact, productivity growth has been a major 
influence within London’s vast decline in the demand for manufacturing labour. Some 
modest possibilities exist through regression analysis to demonstrate the importance of 
increased productivity for London’s manufacturing employment performance. Using 
data at the borough level the influence of productivity change on manufacturing 
employment change across London can be examined. Since the spatial scale of analysis 
is at borough level and since boroughs do not comprise self-contained economic 
entities, the specification of a production function or a model of labour demand would 
be theoretically unsound and so is not attempted here. Instead, a very simple regression 
has been conducted, which, it should be stressed, is severely limited by the extent and 
quality of data at the borough level.
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The dependent variable in the regression is borough manufacturing employment change 
(MEC), expressed in relative terms. The independent variables, also expressed in 
relative terms, are productivity change (MPC), a variable reflecting the borough’s 
industrial structure (SME), and producer service employment growth (PSEC).4 Thus,
| the regression hypothesises that manufacturing employment change varies by borough, 
dependent on the extent to which productivity growth destroyed jobs, on the extent to 
which the industrial structure of the borough contained industries in which employment 
change in London as a whole has been below or above the average for all 
manufacturing, and on the extent of producer service employment growth reflecting a 
crowding out effect. Borough data were available from 1987 to 1991, and the regression 
was conducted over the 1987 to 1989 period to determine the relationship, as far as 
possible, outside the special context of the recession period.
The results of this regression, with the t-ratios in brackets, are provided below :
MEC = constant - 0.37MPC + 1.07SME - 0.07PSEC R2 = 0.86
(-12.24) (2.48) (-0.87)
The forms of the relationships determined in the regression are much as expected.
Productivity growth was negatively associated with employment change, and the t-ratio 
was significant at the 0.01 level. In other words, the boroughs with a relatively 
favourable employment performance were those with lower rates of productivity 
growth. The regression also indicates that a favourable industrial structure is spatially 
associated with a favourable employment performance, and the t-statistic for this 
variable is significant at the 0.05 level. However, as with correlations conducted earlier 
in this chapter, a negative spatial relationship can be determined between manufacturing 
employment decline and producer service growth, but it is not statistically significant as 
shown in the t-statistic above.
The above represents nothing more than a simple attempt to highlight broad spatial 
relationships. However it does demonstrate that productivity growth appears to be an
4 The variable reflecting industrial structure, similar to that used by Keeble (1976), comprises a set o f  
structural components from a shift share analysis o f borough manufacturing employment change, using 
Greater London as the benchmark area. Correlation between this variable and the productivity variable 
was not detected.
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extremely important influence in manufacturing employment change across the capital. 
As with the rest of the evidence presented in this section, the main conclusions are that 
crowding out and space constraint effects do not offer a single explanation for spatial 
trends in manufacturing, and that changes in productivity, output and firm stock, 
indicate a dynamic change in London’s manufacturing which is not expressed in these 
accounts.
6.5 Discussion.
This chapter has examined various different aspects of manufacturing change in London 
to indicate some of the processes that may underlie decreasing demand for 
manufacturing employment in the capital. It has been shown that causal relationships 
resulting from land competition and space constraints are not fully demonstrated by the 
existing evidence. Furthermore, this chapter has presented materials which indicate that 
trends in manufacturing change also involve new firm formation, productivity gains, 
and new demands for land within London, all additional to the trends of decline 
emphasised in previous literature.
Important implications arise in light of the LPA survey results presented in chapter five. 
It would seem that land use planning controls may indeed be able to exert only a minor 
influence on manufacturing employment change in London. Job loss and land use 
change may to a large extent be independent of one another. Employment decline seems 
to be highly influenced by output and productivity change as well as floorspace change, 
and clearly, as the survey suggested, LPAs cannot hope to influence fundamental 
changes in the nature of production processes. The important point is, that the demand 
for both labour and land are derived demands, and the component which must be of 
central importance in London’s manufacturing change is the demand for output. In this 
respect, it could be argued that only limited success could be achieved in attempting to 
influence the derived demand for labour through land use regulation, because ultimately 
these demands are a function of change in manufacturing output, and furthermore the 
relationship between value added and derived demands appears be changing over time.
198
The chapter has also demonstrated the land use planning implications of manufacturing 
change through a consideration of the crowding out and space constraint hypotheses. 
One of the main problems identified with the crowding out hypothesis is that in essence 
it assumes spatial uniformity in a ‘squeezing out’ effect of manufacturing across 
London. The use of the employment and LDMS data have shown that while it may be 
important in certain locations within the capital, particularly Central London and some 
inner boroughs, it cannot offer a comprehensive explanation for change. In particular, 
‘global’ functions, like manufacturing activities, tend to have their own intra­
metropolitan locational requirements, and the data presented in this chapter have not 
indicated a great deal of coincidence with manufacturing decline. Indeed, one of the 
most important dimensions of the analysis presented in this chapter is the indication that 
explanations for London’s severe manufacturing employment decline should be sought 
elsewhere. The LDMS data in particular have shown that while applications submitted 
for change from manufacturing use are not strongly influenced by the extent of borough 
industrial floorspace, those for change into manufacturing are. This suggest two 
important points. First, that not all manufacturing land across London is under threat of 
use change, and second, that new industrial developments will tend to locate where 
manufacturing already exists, and thus that they have their own, perhaps separate, 
locational requirements. Hall (1962) argued that the historical development of 
manufacturing and service industries in London occurred in locations which were 
largely complementary. It may be that to a large extent this is still the case.
The chapter has also shown that employment densities are falling across London 
because manufacturing employment is declining at a much faster rate than floorspace.
In addition, many areas of London have experienced a net entry of manufacturing firms 
over the decade, and evidence exists to show that industrial land is still being demanded 
in London over the 1980s despite such severe job loss. These trends are suggestive of a 
much more dynamic change in London’s manufacturing than one would conclude on 
the basis of employment trends alone, and are inconsistent with space constraint 
hypothesis. In essence, the ways in which industrial manufacturing are measured are 
crucial to any interpretation of change. Certain manufacturing firms still want to be 
located in London, and a fuller understanding of these trends is likely to produce a more 
accurate account of manufacturing change than simply viewing it as a process of
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decline, and basing analyses on that assumption. The crowding out and space constraint 
hypotheses focus largely on decline, and in doing so present an account of change 
which cannot readily explain the trends and counter-trends of manufacturing change 
that have been outlined in this chapter. Indeed, the empirical investigations suggest that 
the general concept of urban deindustrialisation emphasised in the theoretical 
perspectives reviewed in chapter two may need to be re-evaluated in light of these 
inconsistencies in manufacturing change.
What would appear to be an extremely important trend, and one which has powerful 
potential to explain, or at least reconcile, the inconsistent magnitude and direction of 
change in aspects of the London manufacturing over the 1980s, is the issue of higher 
and increasing labour productivity. Productivity growth demonstrates that the indicators 
of output and employment are changing in very different ways, and in this respect it 
may well be the key to understanding why there are continuing demands for 
manufacturing land in London, why employment densities have been falling across 
London, why manufacturing establishments now employ considerably less people, and 
why the stock of firms does not appear to be diminishing as rapidly as might be 
expected. It has been argued above that productivity growth underpins employment 
decline across London and this supports borough responses presented in chapter five 
which ranked the shedding of jobs within existing establishments as significant. Most 
important, the chapter has shown that London exhibits higher rates of productivity and 
productivity growth than the nation as a whole. This difference between London and the 
nation is crucial as it may provide an explanation for the severity of London’s 
employment decline. The shift share analysis of manufacturing employment in chapter 
four produced strong differential components which resulted in lower rates of 
employment change in the capital than in the nation as a whole. It may be that to some 
extent these differential values reflect the higher growth of labour productivity within 
London.
6.6 Conclusions.
To conclude, labour productivity in the London manufacturing sector requires 
additional attention in this thesis, because it appears to be a central characteristic of
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change over the 1980s which holds potential to explain the experience of manufacturing 
employment decline in the capital. That London exhibits higher productivity and 
productivity growth than the nation is an extremely surprising result given the emphasis 
placed on the deindustrialisation of London in previous literature. On the surface, the 
indication may be that London’s manufacturing sector is actually rather efficient, with 
higher rates of return to labour. The issue of spatial differentials in productivity has 
received little attention in the mainstream economic geography literature largely 
because output data at the urban level has not been available until recent years. 
However, it does raises a number of important research questions which offer the 
potential to further the understanding, not only the relationship between land use 
planning controls and manufacturing employment change, but the actual unique nature 
of change in London’s industrial manufacturing sector. For example, if productivity in 
the capital is so superior, then why has London seemingly lost so much manufacturing 
activity over the past three decades through, for example, the urban rural shift? In other 
words, if London is so productive then why does more manufacturing not exist here? To 
what extent is employment data be ‘overstating’ the industrial decline of London? Are 
agglomeration effects the dominant factor behind London’s increased productivity, and 
if so then why is productivity increasing at such a phenomenal rate when agglomeration 
economies for manufacturing are supposedly in retreat? Or, is the process of urban 
manufacturing change sectorally specific? Are cities losing labour intensive industries 
and retaining higher value added activities with higher rates of return to labour?
These issues are tackled in the following two chapters. Chapter seven begins by asking 
the simple question : why does London exhibit such a high level of labour productivity 
in manufacturing today? With resort to a literature which specifically considers the 
issue of labour productivity in cities, it is possible to explore this question and to test 
the significance of some explanatory variables. Results generated then feed into chapter 
eight, where dimensions of productivity change in London are considered, particularly 
with respect to changes in the structure and specialisation of London’s manufacturing.
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Chapter 7 : An empirical analysis of London’s manufacturing labour 
productivity : the production function approach.
7.0 Introduction.
Labour productivity in the London manufacturing sector is now considerably higher 
than in the nation as a whole. This appears to be an extremely important characteristic 
of London’s manufacturing, holding the potential to reconcile many of the seemingly 
inconsistent aspects of change in the London industrial base over the 1980s. The 
following chapter investigates some reasons why London exhibits such a high level of 
productivity. To do this, a body of research which has set out explicitly to explain the 
reasons behind the observed higher rates of manufacturing productivity in urban areas is 
considered. Techniques set out in this literature are applied to the British case in an 
attempt to pin down the influence of a set of explanatory variables on spatial 
productivity differences through econometric modelling within the theoretical 
framework of the production function. To use such techniques it is necessary that the 
analysis be conducted over spatial units which comprise the nation, rather than simply 
for London alone. It is argued in this chapter that this type of modelling approach 
allows a more sophisticated analysis of the factors underlying spatial productivity 
differences than would be possible by simply continuing to examine ratios of output to 
labour.
The chapter begins by outlining previous spatial productivity research and the 
production function methodology. It then goes on to present a statistical design which 
applies these modelling techniques to Britain. Issues related to the data and models used 
are next considered. Results from the models are presented in section 7.5 and the 
implications of the findings for London are then discussed. Conclusions are drawn in 
section 7.7.
7.1 Previous spatial productivity research and the production function approach.
To date research on spatial productivity has been most advanced by the disciplines of 
urban economics, regional science, and economics more generally. Excellent summaries
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of this literature can be found in Gerking (1994) and Moomaw (1983a). The majority of 
this research has been conducted in the US and has focused on manufacturing industry 
due in both cases to the availability of appropriate data.
Research has concentrated on assessing the significance of a defined set of variables on 
spatial differences in levels of labour productivity. These may include the ratio of 
capital to labour, access to technology, the age of capital stock, the skills base of the 
workforce, and the role of scale economies internal to the firm arising from optimum 
plant size. A specific branch of this work has been concerned with ‘urban effects’, 
where labour productivity is related to the size of cities and the influence of 
agglomeration economies, in addition to the other defined variables (Shefer, 1973; 
Sveikauskas, 1975; Segal; 1976; Caralino, 1979; Moomaw, 1981a; 1981b; 1983a; 1985; 
1988; Louri, 1988; Soroka, 1994).
The urban productivity research is of direct relevance here because it has sought to 
explain the general observation that large cities do tend to exhibit higher levels of 
labour productivity in manufacturing (Gerking, 1994; Henderson, 1988).
Agglomeration economies have formed an important component of explanation, 
describing the productive advantages of spatial concentration in urban areas resulting 
from two distinct types of scale economies. First, urbanisation economies, which arise 
through industrial location in large population centres with expansive and variously 
skilled labour markets and specialised service sectors to interact with manufacturing 
industry. Second, localisation economies, which are generated through the increased 
scale of industries operating in an area, and generate efficiency gains reflecting 
economies of inter-industry specialisation, labour market economies, and ease of 
communication between firms (Mills, 1972; Richardson, 1978a). Thus, urbanisation 
economies are those which are external to the firm and the industry but internal to 
cities, while localisation economies are external to firms but internal to the industry.
A large body of research has tackled the issue of why spatial differences in productivity 
exist. Of particular importance is that in various empirical contexts analysts have shown 
that large cities tend to have higher productivity in manufacturing and this is directly 
relevant to the findings of the previous chapter. Before reporting some of the main
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research results, it is first worth discussing the general methodology used in spatial 
productivity studies.
Empirical studies of spatial productivity differences have tested the significance of 
explanatory variables through multiple regression analyses within the framework of a 
production function. A production function describes, essentially, the relationship 
between inputs and output in production, and the technical conditions under which 
firms or industries operate (Doll, Orazem, 1984; Bowers, Baird, 1971). It maps from 
inputs onto the maximum feasible level of outputs, in what Bemdt (1991) describes as 
“an engineering relationship, reflecting technology and the laws of nature” (Bemdt, 
1991, 63). For example, in spatial productivity research, a production function is 
usually specified which takes the following general form :
Q = , [1]
where Q is value added, g  denotes Hicks-neutral productivity or Total Factor 
• • 2Productivity (TFP) , A is a vector of variables which affect productivity, K  is capital 
input, and L is labour input. What [1] above actually means for any one point in time 
is that output is a function of the level of capital and labour employed, as well as all 
other factors linked to the total volume of production represented by g(A) (Caralino, 
1979). Thus, the effects of city size, and the other spatially differentiated variables, 
which are used to explain spatial patterns of labour productivity other than labour and 
capital, would enter the production function under A. In this case, g  (A) can be 
interpreted as simply the residual increase in productivity after allowance has been 
made for the use of factor inputs labour and capital.
2 Hicks-neutral productivity describes technology, in a very broad sense, which enters the production 
function in such a way as to increase the efficiency o f both labour and capital, but to leave the optimal 
combination of the two unaffected, so that the marginal rate of substitution remains the same (Bowers, 
Baird, 1971; Layard, Walters, 1978). TFP refers to differences in overall productive efficiency after 
accounting for differences in the efficiency o f factor inputs (Moomaw, 1981a; 1981b; Borooah, Lee, 
1991; Vagionis, Spence, 1994). Bowers and Baird (1971) describe distinct way in which technology is 
thought to enter the production function. For example, Harrod-neutral technological growth describes 
the situation in which labour efficiency, but not that o f capital, increases with technology (labour 
augmenting technology), while Solow-neutral describes the opposite situation (capital augmenting 
technology). The assumption o f Hicks-neutral productivity in the spatial productivity research simply 
provides a convenient means o f estimating the effects o f external economies on overall productive 
capacity separately from those that arise through changes in factor inputs.
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Various different mathematical specifications of the production function are used. 
Excellent summaries of the functions and their main properties can be found in Chiang 
(1984), Birchenall and Grout (1984) and Bemdt (1991). It is unnecessary here to 
provide a detailed discussion of production functions. However, at this stage it is worth 
taking examples of two of those most commonly used, the Cobb-Douglas and Constant 
Elasticity of Substitution (CES) functions. These will serve to illustrate the theory of 
production functions and to introduce the two main types of functions discussed in this 
chapter.
The Cobb-Douglas function takes the general form :
Q = A K *I?,
m
where Q is output, K  is capital and L is labour. A is an efficiency parameter of the 
function which is related to the state of technology, such that for given values of K  and 
L the magnitude of A will proportionally affect the level of Q, and the remaining 
parameters, a  and p, are positive fractions. In fact these exponents of K  and L are the 
partial elasticities of output with respect to each input. The main properties of the Cobb- 
Douglas function are first, that it is homogenous of degree (a +p), implying that if each 
input is changed by a multiple m, total output will be changed by m(ct+p), second, that in 
the special case where (a +p =1) it is linearly homogenous and thus displays constant 
returns to scale (CRS), and third, that it is characterised by a constant unitary elasticity 
of substitution between the factors L and K. This third property implies that relative 
factor shares will change in a proportionate way to changes in factor input prices.
The CES production function differs from the Cobb-Douglas in that although it still 
displays a constant elasticity of substitution this is not unitary, and so can take a value 
other than one. The CES function takes the form :
Q = A^K-p + (l-5)rpJ1/p ,
[3]
where Q is output, K  and L are the factors of production, A is the efficiency parameters, 
and 6 is the distribution parameter which describes the relative factor shares and is 
equivalent to a  and f> in the CRS specification of the Cobb-Douglas function. However, 
it is the substitution parameter p in the CES production function which determines the
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value of the constant elasticity of substitution, and for which there is no counterpart in the 
Cobb-Douglas specification. An additional difference between the CES outlined in [3] above 
and the Cobb-Douglas is that it is homogenous of degree one, and thus, like all linearly 
homogenous production functions, displays CRS. However, while the ‘standard’ CES 
function such as described in [3] is CRS, this is not a requirement of the CES function 
generally and it is possible to define and estimate a CES under non constant returns to scale.
The Cobb-Douglas and the CES are the two types of production function considered in this 
chapter. It is however worth mentioning briefly here the Translog function, which is 
sometimes used in the estimation of production function parameters in the spatial productivity 
literature (Louri, 1988; Henderson, 1988). The Translog function is essentially obtained by 
taking a second order Taylor-series expansion of some arbitrary production function, thus 
avoiding the need to specify any particular functional form by allowing for a higher order 
approximation under Taylor’s theorem. ( Chiang, 1984). The advantages of the Translog 
specification is that it is a very general and flexible form which avoids unnecessary 
restrictions and assumptions for example in relation to returns to scale and to the elasticity of 
factor substitution.
Particular specifications of production fuinction, therefore, have their own unique 
mathematical properties which translate into specific economic meanings, for example, in 
relation to returns to scale or the elasticity of factor substitution. However, the main use of 
production functions in the spatial productivity literature has been simply to determine the 
effects of external economies on the efficiency parameter of the function, given the 
assumption of Hicks-Neutrality. In fact the main justification for the use of the production 
function approach in this literature is that it provide a theoretically sound framework which 
controls for factors inputs to production allowing for the examination of how external factors 
affect the efficiency of production.
Various specifications of production function have been used in the literature, including 
Cobb-Douglas (Aaberg, 1973; Segal, 1976; Moomaw, 1985; Henderson, 1988), Constant 
Elasticity of Substitution (CES) (Shefer, 1973; Sveikauskas, 1975; Caralino, 1979; Moomaw, 
1983b), as well as Taylor-series expansion (Louri, 1988). The choice of production function
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framework is frequently determined by data availability, particularly in relation to data on 
capital services which is often not available at a detailed spatial level. For example, 
Sveikauskas and Shefer have opted to use variants of the CES class of production function 
where it is possible to estimate the influence of spatial effects in the absence of information on 
capital. Other authors have criticised this method and attempted to create proxies for capital, 
such as non-labour costs per unit of labour (Aaberg, 1973, Soroka, 1994), or have even 
constructed estimated measures of capital, for example through the perpetual inventory 
method (Harris, 1983; Garofalo, Fogarty, 1987). Summaries of the methods used in these 
cross sectional analyses can be found in Moomaw (1983a) and Gerking (1994). Here, it is 
worth briefly outlining some of the main findings, focusing on the city specific effects, which 
are of most relevance to London.
The studies of spatial productivity in manufacturing, particularly in the US, have found that 
significant regional differences exist in levels of labour productivity. In addition to city 
specific characteristics the research has pointed to a variety of ‘key’ measurable factors 
which underpin these differences. Regional productivity advantages have been found to 
be associated with variables reflecting the education and age structure of the labour 
force, the structure of industry, the rate of growth in capital to labour ratios, the effects 
of infrastructure spending, and the influence of regional policies (Moomaw, 1983a; 
Williams, Moomaw, 1989; Soroka, 1994; Vagionis, Spence, 1994). The size of
manufacturing establishments has also been found to be of importance although not in 
a consistent fashion. For example, Henderson (1986) and Caralino (1979) found weak 
negative associations between the size of manufacturing plants and labour productivity, 
while Soroka (1994) in a study of Canada found positive and significant internal 
economies of scale.
The influence of agglomeration economies has been a prime focus in much of the
research. Shefer (1973) examined the effects of localisation and urbanisation 
economies on manufacturing productivity for the US Standard Metropolitan Statistical
Areas (SMSAs) for the years 1958 and 1963. He showed that localisation economies
induced higher productivity in most manufacturing industries found in metropolitan
locations, and that the rate of return to urbanisation economies was estimated at 20%.
Caralino (1979) used a Dhrymes type production function (see section 7.5) to estimate
returns to scale parameters separately for 19 different manufacturing industries in 68
SMS As for the years 1961 to 1970. He found that internal economies of scale could not
account for returns to scale that accrue to urban manufacturing, and that localisation
effects were positive and significant in eight of the 19 industries, and urbanisation
economies in twelve.
Sveikauskas (1975) and Segal (1976) examined the effects of urbanisation economies 
alone. Using population as a surrogate for the urbanisation effect, Sveikauskas 
estimated Hicks-neutral productivity independently within the framework of a CES 
production function assuming that separate estimates of g  and/([l] above) could be 
obtained. He found that Hicks-neutral productivity increased by approximately 6% with 
every doubling of the population of an SMSA. Moomaw (1981b) drew a comparison
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between the approach taken by Sveikauskas and that of the Swedish study by Aaberg 
(1973) and concluded that Sveikauskas estimates were biased upwards. Nonetheless, 
Moomaw’s results did still show an important effect from urbanisation economies with 
productivity increases of approximately 1.5% with every doubling of the population of 
an SMSA. Segal (1976), utilising a Cobb-Douglas production function found CRS in 
manufacturing and estimated that Hicks-Neutral productivity was 8% higher in SMSAs 
with a population over 2 million in comparison to those with populations ranging from
250,000 to 2 million. Thus, many of the studies undertaken in the 1970s found evidence 
which suggested that agglomeration effects were important in creating increased 
productivity advantage in urban manufacturing.
More recent research has also highlighted the effects of agglomeration diseconomies on 
manufacturing productivity (Caralino, 1985; Moomaw, 1985; 1988; Soroka, 1994). 
Moomaw (1988) used labour-demand equations to explore the influence of localisation 
and urbanisation economies on manufacturing productivity in the US SMSAs. His 
results indicated that in certain manufacturing sectors localisation economies are often 
offset by urbanisation diseconomies, and that in particular industries, no benefits from 
external economies were evident. However, the results also showed that urbanisation 
and particularly localisation effects were still important for a significant proportion of 
manufacturing industries. Similarly, Soroka (1994), in a study of change in productivity 
and city size in Canada between 1975 and 1985, found growing diseconomies in a small 
number of industries from urban population density. In addition, the author’s results 
indicated a weak and declining effect of city population (urbanisation) on productivity 
over the period studied, even though large cities were still found to exhibit a 
productivity advantage.
The indication from many of the North American studies seems to be that while 
urbanisation diseconomies may be evident, they tend to co-exist with localisation and 
urbanisation economies. Furthermore, recent results from Japan, Greece and Brazil have 
indicated that particular agglomeration effects are still strong. Nakamura (1985), used a 
Cobb-Douglas production function to estimate the effects of agglomeration economies 
across Japanese cities. The author’s general conclusions were that light industries 
benefited most from urbanisation economies, while heavy industries tended to benefit
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from localisation economies. In the Greek case, Louri (1988) concluded that 
urbanisation economies had a significant role in the productivity of manufacturing 
industry, while studies of Brazil and the US by Henderson (1986; 1988) have shown 
that localisation economies continue to provide productive advantages for 
manufacturing industries. The important point is that much of the research into 
productivity and city size indicates that urban manufacturing may still benefit from 
agglomeration economies. This represents an extremely important finding, and contrasts 
with the emphasis placed on urban deindustrialisation in much of the geographical 
literature reviewed in chapter two.
So far discussion of the relationship between productivity and city size has mainly 
focused on North American studies, largely because this is where the majority of the 
research has taken place. Since the present chapter focuses on London it would be 
useful to consider similar research for British cities. However, the scope of existing 
spatial productivity research in Britain is limited due to the absence of reliable data at 
fine spatial levels. No cross sectional studies addressing the issue of productivity and 
city size have been undertaken, and the spatial econometric studies that do exist are 
mainly regional analyses (Harris, 1982). The only direct attempt to examine 
econometrically aspects related to the productivity of cities is by Tooze (1976) who 
estimated CES functions for the conurbations using a data series from 1968. However, 
Tooze did not directly examine spatial patterns of productivity, instead the focus of his 
research was on the relationship between wage differentials in manufacturing and 
elasticities of factor substitution.
Three other British studies of spatial differences in productivity are of relevance. 
Fothergill et al. (1984) examined differences in the profitability of manufacturing 
between the conurbations and other areas of the UK, and found the conurbations to be 
operating at a lower levels of profitability. Tyler and Rhodes (1986) used conurbation 
data from 1968 to consider broad differences in labour productivity and found that 
while the cities had started out with higher productivity than their surrounding 
hinterlands, this pattern had been reversed for many urban areas by the end of the 
period. Finally, Tyler, Moore and Rhodes (1988) examined geographical variations in 
input costs and productivity between urban and non-urban areas in England in the early
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1980s. The main findings were that overall input costs tended to be higher in large 
conurbations than in their surrounding hinterlands and that the conurbations were less 
attractive in productivity terms than less urbanised areas. On this basis the authors 
claimed that the “results counter one conventional view that any cost disadvantage in 
the cities could be more than offset by above average levels of productivity” (Tyler et 
al., 1988, 123). However, Tyler et al.’s analysis did not include any direct attempts at 
measuring labour or capital productivity levels for any area, but was based on detailed 
descriptive evidence of indicators used to reflect only one potential influence on 
productivity, the characteristics of the labour force.
For Britain and the UK then, spatial productivity research to date has largely been of a 
descriptive nature and the issue of city size, with respect to localisation and urbanisation 
economies remains un-examined. This is almost certainly due to the lack of appropriate 
published data which would allow such analyses. However, recently the CSO have 
published a variety of economic data at detailed spatial levels which permit attempts to 
explore aspects of agglomeration and productivity. For the present research, 
agglomeration economies, and the other spatially differentiated variables described 
above, may prove important in explaining London’s much higher levels of labour 
productivity in manufacturing and are worthy of consideration.
7.2 A spatial statistical design for the examination of geographical influences on 
labour productivity.
The discussion of previous spatial productivity research has shown that methodologies 
exist which provide a useful means of examining the factors underpinning spatial 
productivity differences. In the context of this thesis there are at least three main 
reasons for attempting a similar type of analysis. First, is that the issue of agglomeration 
economies in London manufacturing needs to be addressed and this can only be done 
by considering London in relation to other areas. Second, the modelling approaches 
described can take account of, or at least control for, other factor inputs to production, 
and in this respect provide a more robust theoretical basis than would be possible by 
simply analysing spatial differences in the ratio of output to labour input. Third, 
modelling spatial productivity differences in Britain should be useful in pointing to a
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variety of explanatory variables which are important in the London case. Thus, the 
method should provide a way of determining which factors affect spatial differences in 
productivity and how London compares to other areas of the country, but will also 
provide an input into further empirical investigations in the following chapter which 
returns to look at London alone. It is not anticipated that the models will explain 
definitively why London has higher productivity. It is hoped, however, that they will 
give at least some indication of factors which are important or not in this respect.
This section presents a statistical design which permits an investigation into spatial 
differences in the productivity of manufacturing industry in Britain, and specifically 
sets out to determine how London conforms to any estimated relationships. The purpose 
is to attempt to isolate the influence of a defined set of factors on spatial productivity 
differentials. Clearly, an enormous number of factors are potentially important in 
influencing the aggregate labour productivity of manufacturing industry within any 
area. In this chapter, as was the case with the productivity research discussed above, 
only the influence of a small set of directly measurable variables can be examined. 
Specifically, the focus is on the spatial influences on productivity which may arise from 
differences in urbanisation and localisation economies or dis-economies, capital to 
labour ratios, industrial structure, labour skills and the proportion of part time 
employment, and internal economies of scale as reflected in the average size of industry 
operating within an area. Other factors such as levels of entrepreneurship, public policy 
decisions, government investment, even climatic and social factors, may well have 
important spatial effects on productivity. However for the present, and previous 
analyses, the fact that these variables are not observable precludes their inclusion in the 
empirical investigations.
US studies of productivity with similar objectives have been discussed above, where the 
observations for the models were the SMSAs, which represent individual cities or 
metropolitan areas. The availability of accurate data at this level has permitted 
sophisticated analyses in these studies, and allowed detailed comparisons of city 
productivity to be undertaken. Since the present research is concerned with London, an 
analysis which examines productivity in relation to other cities holds attraction, not
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least because it approaches the comparison of like with like and allows for 
characteristics such as the size of cities to be explicitly linked to productivity.
However, in Britain relevant data are not available for urban areas. The only detailed 
spatial disaggregation of data which permits adequate modelling of the type attempted 
here is at county level, and clearly, the counties of Britain do not correspond 
to cities. However, if the influence of spatially differentiated variables on levels of 
productivity are the primary focus of investigations, then it is not necessary that each 
observation be a city. On the contrary, it is possible to determine whether London, or 
other urban areas conform to any estimated relationship over non or semi-urban areas, 
or alternatively whether there is something special about London.
This may be done by introducing a London specific dummy variable into a model based 
on county observations to determine the extent to which London is over or under­
estimated in a relationship which is not city specific. London is a very large city which 
contains more jobs and people, and more manufacturing firms, output and employment, 
than any other county of Britain in a relatively small continuous area. The logic of a 
county based model with a London dummy variable is that these attributes of London 
make it unique, or at least different to the other counties. As such it may be expected 
that London would not conform to a general relationship determined over counties. For 
example, if agglomeration economies do increase with city size and are stronger where 
industry is concentrated than where it is sparse, then London should not conform to the 
estimated relationship. Thus, the method does not simply determine the significance of 
variables at the county level and by extension assume that these factors affect London in 
the same way, but makes London explicit in the model and considers its under or over­
estimation in relation to the county model.
A further justification exists for the use of counties rather than cities. Beeson (1990) 
argues that focusing solely on cities, rather than including non-urban areas, may in fact 
be a very limited comparison. This is because while productivity in cities may be 
increasing with size any group of large cities may be declining relative to the rest of the 
country. The county model contains a variety of areas, ranging from those which have 
very little dense urban development, to the metropolitan counties and London. Thus, the
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model can be interpreted as containing a less restrictive set of observations within 
which to consider the uniqueness of London than would be the case with urban 
observations alone.
A particular note of caution should, however, be stressed about the use of county 
observations in regression analysis, regarding the issue of spatial autocorrelation (Cliff, 
Ord, 1973; 1981; Goodchild, 1986; Griffith, 1987). Spatial autocorrelation refers to a 
situation in which observations for contiguous areas tend to be correlated. In a 
regression model, where the observations are individual geographical units, spatial 
inter-dependencies could lead to autocorrelation in the random error term. This type of 
autocorrelation differs from serial correlation in that the direction of inter-dependency is 
not uni-directional as with time, but may be multi-directional in space. A similar type of 
problem is discussed in the econometrics literature regarding interdependencies in 
cross-sectional models where any one cross-sectional unit may be influenced by the 
values of other units (Maddala, 1988).
In the published spatial productivity research, issues of spatial autocorrelation have 
received very little attention. However, as Johnston (1978) notes, most spatial analyses 
and spatial data in general will be conducted in the presence of autocorrelation and in 
fact the potential problems posed may not be serious. Johnston (1984) and Cliff and Ord 
(1981) show that in the presence of an autocorrelated disturbance term inefficient 
parameter estimates may be obtained, although the estimates themselves will remain 
unbiased. To quote Griffith (1987) “..estimates of the parameters of geographic 
distribution remain unbiased, whereas spill-over effects [externalities] introduce bias 
into the standard errors of these parameter estimates” (Griffith, 1987, 4). Consequently, 
values of t and F  may be overstated in the presence of positive spatial autocorrelation, 
and understated in the presence of negative (Cliff, Ord, 1981). This is due to potential 
bias introduced into the estimates of residual variance which appears in the denominator 
of the F  and t test statistics.
Various measures have been proposed which attempt to determine the extent of spatial 
autocorrelation and models have been developed which incorporate the effects of spatial 
inter-dependency (Cliff, Ord, 1981). These methods are cumbersome and complex to
213
undertake and since the following empirical work is predominantly concerned with 
London alone, rather than attempting to gain an insight into the fundamental 
dependencies between areas implied by the presence of autocorrelation, they have not 
been attempted here.
However, it is still recognised that spatial regression models require special 
consideration. To guard against, and detect, potential problems of spatial 
autocorrelation in the estimated models two main precautions were taken. First, regional 
dummy variables were included in the models where it was appropriate to do so 
differentiating the regional nature of the data. The purpose of these variables was 
generally to capture region specific effects which are not included in the regression, an 
example of which may be interdependencies between counties within a region. Maddala 
(1988) suggests that the inclusion of dummy variables should serve to reduce potential 
problems of spatial autocorrelation. As a second precaution, the residuals from each 
model were saved and examined to determine if any consistent spatial patterns could be 
found. Cliff and Ord (1981) recommend this method citing examples of the types of 
spatial patterns that may be detected. However, for the present empirical work no 
consistent spatial patterns were found.
The issue of spatial autocorrelation could conceivably occupy the research of an entire 
PhD thesis, and thus the measures taken here represent only the first stage. However, as 
is common with other problems in regression analysis such as multi-collinearity or 
serial autocorrelation, it is important that attention is paid to the confidence intervals of 
estimated coefficients and to the residuals from each model. Since various models of 
different specification have been attempted, and given the precautions taken, it is not 
anticipated that spatial autocorrelation should radically alter any overall conclusions 
drawn.
7.3 Specification and measurement of explanatory variables.
The empirical investigations which follow seek to examine the influence of a defined 
set of variables on labour productivity and to determine how London conforms to the 
estimated relationships. Previous spatial productivity research described in section 7.1
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above, has provided a variety of variables which may be used to explain productivity 
and which are directly measurable. These are urbanisation economies, localisation 
economies, capital to labour ratios, internal economies of scale and the structure of 
industry. In addition, two variables have been constructed to standardise for spatial 
differences in labour ‘quality’, one reflecting the proportion of part time employees and 
the other reflecting and the skills of the labour force. Other variables which are not 
directly measurable may also influence spatial productivity differentials. For this 
reason, regional dummy variables were included as independent variables to capture 
region specific effects where they were found to be appropriate. These effects are 
thought to include : inter-dependencies between spatial areas, output and raw material 
prices, climatic differences, differences in the quality and quantity of natural resources, 
public policy decisions and public investment, differences in the social attitudes of 
managers and employees, and the like (Moomaw, 1981b). In this way it is hoped at 
least some of the effects which cannot be quantified will have been controlled for.
It is worth discussing the data used to reflect each of the defined explanatory variables 
outlined above. Urbanisation economies are fairly straightforward to measure, being 
proxied in previous analyses of spatial productivity, by either the population or total 
employment of an area. Experimenting with both these proxies produced almost 
identical results, and population figures taken from Regional Trends are used here.
Localisation economies proved more difficult to model. Many studies have represented 
this variable with either the total number of manufacturing firms operating in an area, or 
the number of firms per thousand people in the population. These two proxies were 
constructed using establishment unit data for manufacturing industry from the CoE (see 
appendix one). In both cases, it was found that these particular specifications were 
collinear with other independent variables. After experimentation with different proxies 
the preferred measurement in the models presented here is establishment density. In 
fact, it may make more sense to specify this variable in density terms since localisation 
economies should theoretically be stronger in areas where industry is densely 
concentrated than where it is sparse. However, simply calculating these density figures 
over entire counties could be misleading as there are likely to be substantial internal 
differences in levels of concentration. To increase the degree of measurement accuracy
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this variable was constructed from detailed district level data by calculating establishment 
density within each district, weighting these by the proportion of units in each county within 
the districts, and then summing the weighted values to produce a county figure. To represent 
internal economies of scale the average number of employees per establishment was used for 
each area. This is the standard measure used in the spatial productivity research.
Two labour force standardisation variables were constructed. The first simply recorded the 
proportion of part-time manufacturing employees in each county from the CoE in an attempt 
to standardise for differences in worker hours. It is important that this variable is included 
given that the productivity figures are caluculated on the basis of the number of workers rather 
than in terms of worker hours. To some extent the part-time employee variable may be 
indicative of industrial structure or worker skills, however given that these two influences are 
also included in the model they should be adaquately accounted for within the estimation.The 
second sought to reflect the skills of the manufacturing labour force. For this variable, many 
previous analyses have used the proportion of the economically active population who are 
educated to median level (Soroka, 1994; Sveikauskas, 1973; Moomaw, 1981b). However, it 
was considered that this particular specification may be too strongly associated with the 
compositional mix of manufacturing and service industries within an area, and thus, 
potentially not indicative of the skills of the manufacturing work force. Instead, data were 
taken from the Census of Population on the occupational structure of residents employed in 
manufacturing. The specific skill variable constructed recorded the proportion of residents 
employed in skilled or professional occupations within manufacturing.
The capital stock variable represents a specific problem in the type of empirical analysis 
conducted here. Gerking (1994) points out that the absence of reliable stock data has provided 
a consistent source of difficulty for almost all spatial productivity research. Three main 
methods have been used to get round the capital measurement issue : to avoid the use of this 
data, to proxy capital, or to estimate capital. The problem posed by the measurement of capital 
is such that it was the main factor in experimentation before the final choice of models used in 
this analysis was made. A modification of the proxy used by Aaberg (1973), Soroka (1994) 
and Moomaw (1983b) was finally included. The reasons behind the choice of the particular
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proxy are more appropriately discussed in section 7.4 below which describes various stages in 
the formulation of the models.
Finally, a variable reflecting the structure of industry has been included. Given that due to 
data limitations it was not possible to run the models for separate sectors of manufacturing, 
the structure variable is extremely important. The logic behind this variable is that overall 
levels of productivity in manufacturing industry will be dependent to a large degree on the 
structure of industry in each area, such that some counties will contain higher proportions of 
more productive industries than others. To model this effect, a variable was constructed which 
measures the expected aggregate level of labour productivity in manufacturing in each area, 
given the structure of employment and given national sectoral productivity. For each sector of 
industry at the class level of the SIC, national labour productivity figures were calculated 
from the CoP. At the county level, these national productivity figures are weighted for each 
sector of industry by the share of total manufacturing employment in that industry. The 
weighted figures are then summed to provide an expected figure for each area. The variable 
should allow for influence of the industrial composition of areas to be isolated.
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manufacturing, the structure variable is extremely important. The logic behind this 
variable is that overall levels of productivity in manufacturing industry will be 
dependent to a large degree on the structure of industry in each area, such that some 
counties will contain higher proportions of more productive industries than others. To 
model this effect, a variable was constructed which measures the expected aggregate 
level of labour productivity in manufacturing in each area, given the structure of 
employment and given national sectoral productivity. For each sector of industry at the 
class level of the SIC, national labour productivity figures were calculated from the 
CoP. At the county level, these national productivity figures are weighted for each 
sector of industry by the share of total manufacturing employment in that industry. The 
weighted figures are then summed to provide an expected figure for each area. The 
variable should allow for influence of the industrial composition of areas to be isolated.
The scope of the analysis is limited by the data available to create these variables. As 
mentioned previously, it is only in recent years that official data of sufficient quality has 
been published to allow for the estimation of production function models. In addition, 
many of the variables required, for example the structure variable, require the use of 
extremely detailed data which is only available for the years in which a census has been 
undertaken. For these reasons, it has not been possible to attempt time-series analysis, 
or to run separate models for different sectors of manufacturing industry. The models 
presented in this chapter relate to aggregate manufacturing across the counties of Britain 
for the year 1991. There are 66 counties in Britain, although for reasons of data 
availability and accuracy, the Scottish Island areas were amalgamated and the Isle of 
Wight and West Glamorgan counties excluded, leaving 61 county observations.
7.4 Models used and estimation techniques.
Two separate models were finally used to examine factors underlying spatial 
differences in the productivity of manufacturing. Both models used logarithmic 
transformations as is common in most spatial productivity research for reasons of 
convenience in the estimation of production function parameters. The validity of this 
functional form was verified by means of a RESET test conducted to determine if the 
log-linear estimating form of each model was mis-specified and the null hypothesis of
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correct functional form could not be rejected (Stewart, 1991). Both models have been 
estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).
The models presented in this chapter are within the framework of the production 
function approach described in section 7.2 above. As mentioned previously, one of the 
main problems encountered in spatial productivity research is the absence of reliable 
capital stock data required for the estimation of certain production functions. For the 
models presented here, data did not permit the estimation of reliable capital stock data 
and so of the three options discussed by Gerking (1994) it was only the avoidance or 
proxy of capital that was feasible. As will be demonstrated, it is due to this data 
limitation that the distinction between marginal and average labour productivity, 
introduced in chapter six, must be drawn in the discussion that follows.
It was first thought that following the method of Sveikauskas (1975) and Astrakianaki 
(1995) the need for capital data could be eliminated from the production function. This 
could be done by assuming that each area faces an identical production function, 
specified in CES form such as in [3] above, but that the efficiency parameter of the 
function is Hicks-Neutral and varies by area. In this way Sveikauskas argued that 
separate estimates of g  and/  from [1] above could be obtained. Since g  is not 
observable, Sveikauskas proceeded by substituting a measure of labour productivity, 
value added per unit of labour. In essence, the Sveikauskas approach simply leaves a 
multiple regression which relates average manufacturing labour productivity to a variety 
of explanatory variables thought to enter the production function under the Hicks- 
Neutral efficiency parameter.
2 The RESET test is a general procedure, designed primarily to detect the choice o f an inappropriate 
functional form. Stewart (1991) points out that if the wrong functional form is adopted the square o f one 
or more o f the regressors might be expected to improve the explanatory power o f the model. The RESET 
test uses the square of the predicted values as an additional regressor. If the estimated coefficient on the 
square o f  the predicted values is statistically significant the estimated equation is mis-specified (Stewart, 
1991, 71-72). For the models defined in [8] and [11] the coefficients on the squares o f the predicted 
values, with t-statistics, were 0.18 (0.70), and -0.72 (-0.5) respectively, both o f which are not statistically 
significant. These results indicate that the log linear estimating form has not been mis-specified.
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The estimating equation used for the first model was :
In (V/L) = lnoc + P^nf/FF + P2lnLOC + f>3\nSIZE + f>4\nSKILL + f>5\nPART + 
P6\nSTRUCT+ $1\nDLON+ PglnZ); .... + P16 + H , . [4]
where V/L is value added per employee, URB is the urbanisation variable, LOC the 
localisation variable, SKILL the skills base of the manufacturing workforce, PART the 
proportion of part-time manufacturing employees, STRUCT the structure of industry, 
DLON a dummy variable for London, D ] to Dg a set of regional dummy variables for 
the regions of Britain and p a random error term. The inclusion of the regional 
dummy fixed effects was verified by conducting an F-test between the restricted and 
unrestricted models.3 This test calculated an F-statistic of 2.65 significant at the 0.05 
level providing evidence of the need to differentiate the regional nature of the data. No 
multicollinearity or extreme outlier problems were detected.
model. Aaberg (1973), Soroka (1994) and Moomaw (1983b; 1995) proxied capital 
intensity per worker by calculating value added less payroll per production worker. 
Although these authors do not specifically mention Euler’s theorem, it is upon this logic 
that the proxy is essentially based. Euler theorem is discussed in Chiang (1984), 
Birchenall and Grout (1984) and Bowers and Baird (1971). For the purposes of this 
thesis, it is sufficient to note that for a linearly homogenous function such as Q — /
(K,L) the partial derivatives of Q with respect to K  and L are the marginal products of 
capital and labour respectively.
3 F-tests between the restricted and unrestricted models are calculated using the following formula 
(Matyas, Sevestre, 1992):
F = fRSSp - RSS^l / (m-k)
RSSy / (n-m-1)
where RSSr and RSSy are the residual sum o f squares o f the restricted and unrestricted models 
respectively, k is the number o f explanatory variables in the restricted model, m the number o f  
explanatory variables in the unrestricted model, and n the total number o f observations. Dougherty 
(1992) shows that F  statistic may be expressed verbally as :
F =  Improvement in fit / Extra degrees o f freedom used up
Residual sum o f squares remaining / Degrees of freedom remaining
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Euler’s theorem suggests that the value of Q of a linearly homogenous function can be 
broken down into two additive components - the total payment to capital and the total 
payment to labour:
2 = £ —  + £ — . [5]
8K SL
The theorem assumes that under conditions of CRS, and within the confines of perfect 
competition, if each factor input is paid the amount of its marginal product, the total 
value of output (Q) will be exactly the same as the sum of each factor’s marginal product 
times the quantity of that factor employed. Under the assumption that the wage rate is 
equal to the marginal product of labour, then subtracting total payroll from value added 
should, according to [5] above, leave a measure of the payment to capital.4
With this additional variable a production function was specified in Cobb-Douglas 
form. Applying the condition of CRS leads to the following linearly homogenous 
relationship :
Q = A K a Ll~a , [6]
and allows for the division of both sides of the equation by L yielding :
— = 4  —L V LJ
\  a
[7]
Since A is assumed to be Hicks-Neutral and influenced by the same variables as in [4] 
above the estimating equation for this model, shown in [8] below, was identical to [4] 
except that a variable reflecting payment to capital per employee {CAP) is included.
4 That the wage rate is equivalent to the marginal product of labour derives from the marginal 
productivity theory of distribution. (Layard, Walters, 1978) The proposition is that under conditions of  
perfectly competitive equilibrium the profit maximising firm will hire labour to the point where the 
marginal productivity o f labour equals the wage rate. Indeed, the theory holds for any factor input such 
that it will be hired to the point where its marginal productivity equals what must be paid for it. Much use 
has been made o f the non-labour cost capital intensity proxy in the urban productivity literature because 
of the absence o f reliable capital data (see for example Caralino, 1979; 1985; Shefer, 1973; Sveikauskas, 
1975; Moomaw, 1981; Soroka, 1994). The main assumption underlying this proxy is that the rate o f  
return to capital is the same in all geographical locations. Moomaw (1983b) contends that this is not an 
onerous assumption, and found that estimates based on the non-labour cost proxy to be superior to those 
based on the perpetual inventory measure o f capital stock.
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The difference between the two models is that in [7] a full production function is 
estimated, rather than simply trying to capture effects on the efficiency parameter as 
in [4].
In (V/L) = lna  + f>{\nURB + P2lnLOC + ^InSIZE + P41ilSKILL + P5lnPART + 
P6lnSTRUCT+ p?lnCAP + PglnDLON+ P9lmD] .... + p1?lnD9 + n , [8]
Again an F-test verified the inclusion of fixed effects variables. In this case an F- 
statistic of 7.06 was calculated significant at the 0.01 level. As with the previous 
model, no multicollinearity or extreme outlier problems were detected.
Clearly, the critical assumption implicit in the measure of capital used is that the rate of 
return to capital is constant across space and this may not in fact be the case in a real 
world economy. The capital intensity variable may therefore be a rather crude proxy, 
however, in the absence of more reliable data it is the best option available. Obtaining 
separate estimates from [4] and [8] above it was found that the inclusion of the capital 
to labour ratio proxy variable in the Cobb-Douglas estimation substantially improved 
upon the explanatory power of the first model, and also appeared to have produced 
results which were more theoretically robust. In addition, the estimates obtained were 
generally found to have lower standard errors and higher f-statistics than those obtained 
by the Sveikauskas method. Conducting an F-test between [4] and [8] produced an F- 
statistic of 68.2 significant at the 0.01 level, showing that the improvement in fit by 
including the capital variable was significant, and thus, that this variable should be 
included in the model. The effects of omitting a relevant variable are discussed in the 
literature and can create serious econometric difficulties (Judge et al., 1988; Stewart, 
1991; Maddala, 1988). In short, it leads to biased estimates because variables in this 
restricted model tend to have dual effects. One the one hand the estimates represented 
the direct effects of each variable on the dependent variable, on the other they represent 
the effects of the omitted variable as the restricted model variables may be acting as 
proxies. Thus, the estimates obtained under the Sveikauskas method are likely to be 
biased since they may have been reflecting effects induced in the production function 
both under the efficiency parameter and due to the capital to labour ratio, and the two 
cannot be separated. The indication is that Moomaw (1981a, 1981b) is correct in 
arguing that Sveikauskas’ method of obtaining separate estimate of g  in [1] above is
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unsatisfactory. However, the important point is that the estimates obtained in this way 
had to be rejected and the Cobb-Douglas estimation with capital to labour ratio proxy 
was used instead.
Having decided to use one model with a proxy for capital intensity per employee and 
under the assumption of CRS, it was thought important to search for another model 
which would further explore productivity and provide a check on the results obtained. 
For this purpose an additional production function was specified which is often used in 
spatial productivity research precisely because it avoids the need for capital data and the 
returns to scale parameter is free to vary (Shefer, 1973). Dhrymes (1965) set out to test 
some of the assumptions implicit in the CES class of production function. For this 
purpose he developed a generalisation of the CES production function which may be 
written as :
Q -  f  (K , L) = = < £ ,£ “  + a 2£“ ] ' \  [9]
where c is an efficiency parameter, a /’s are the distribution parameters, h the 
homogeneity parameter, and 5 the substitution parameters. Differentiating with respect 
to labour and employing the condition for labour market equilibrium, such that the 
marginal product of labour is equivalent to the wage rate, leads to the Cobb-Douglas 
type relationship :
W = A Q i D .  [10]
The Dhrymes function simply states that the incremental increase in output which arises 
through the addition of one unit of labour, is a function both of the level of output and 
the level of labour, as well as of other variables which enter the production function 
under the efficiency parameter^. Since data on wage rates are available for each county 
in Britain for the year 1991 [10] above can be easily estimated by OLS. The Dhrymes 
model is extremely useful because it avoids the need for capital data and also provides 
another dimension to the productivity analysis in considering marginal as well as 
average labour productivity, allowing for the determination of the components that 
affect the wage rate. However, it is particularly helpful because it does not assume 
constant return to scale and thus provides a check on the assumption of the Cobb- 
Douglas estimation.
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Indeed. Dhrymes has shown that from [10] above the homogeneity parameter h of 
equation [9] may be estimated as :
h = [11]
i - P
The estimation of this parameter is very important because it provides a direct 
indication about the relationship between wages, and output and labour. In the spatial 
productivity research, the estimate of h has been interpreted as a direct measure of the 
returns to scale from factor inputs (Caralino, 1979; 1985; Shefer, 1973). In the case 
where y = -p [9] above would be homogenous of degree one, and would therefore be 
equivalent to the standard CES production function [3] which displays CRS.
In these respects, the Dhrymes model provides a useful means of verifying some of the 
assumptions implicit in the results of the Cobb-Douglas estimation. The estimating equation 
for the Dhrymes production function was :
In W = lncx + p jn  GVA + P2lnLAB + P3ln URB + P4lnLOC + $JnSTRUCT+ $JnSKILL +
P7lnPART+ p>8\nSIZE+f>9\nDLON+ii. [12]
where in addition to the variables already defined, W is the average wage rate, GVA is gross 
value added, and LAB is labour input. Interestingly, the F-test for regional dummies provided 
no evidence for the inclusion of these fixed effects and so the restricted model had to be 
accepted. No evidence of problems arising from multicollinearity or extreme outlier values 
were detected.
Thus, the results of two separate models were finally chosen, one examining average 
productivity within the framework of the Cobb-Douglas production function, and the 
other exploring marginal productivity within the Dhrymes production function.
7.5 The results.
In the following section the results derived from the two models described above are 
presented. The discussion focuses on the defined set of explanatory variables and the 
London dummy variable. The regional dummy variables are less relevant to the
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objectives of this chapter and are not discussed below. This section simply presents the 
county results. Their relevance with respect to London is discussed in section 7.7.
The results of the Cobb-Douglas estimation ([8] above) are shown in table 7.1 below.
Table 7.1: Estimated regression results using the Cobb-Douglas production 
function.
Number of observations = 61
R2 = 0.94 F = 45.24 SigF= 0.0000
variable coefficient standard error t-ratio
constant5 -0.834 0.331 -2.516**
CAP 0.398 0.022 18.106***
URB -0.018 0.015 -1.231
LOCE 0.006 0.008 0.713
SIZE 0.039 0.031 1.252
SKILL 0.192 0.100 1.914*
PART -0.098 0.036 -2.765***
STRUCT 0.459 0.102 4.249***
DLON 0.042 0.048 0.864
(*** - 1 significant at 0.01, ** - 1 significant at 0.05, * - 1 significant at 0.1)
2
The explanatory power of this first model is high as shown by the R value of 0.94 and 
the F  statistic shows that this value has not arisen by chance. For most coefficients, the 
associated standard errors are low indicating fairly precise estimates.
The capital intensity per employee proxy (CAP), which is the only variable that is not 
thought to enter the production function under the efficiency parameter, behaves as 
theory predicts. The estimated coefficient on this variable verifies that counties tend to 
have higher labour productivity in manufacturing if more capital is employed in relation 
to labour. In fact the model predicts that the level of capital has an extremely important
5 Since the regression is specified in log-linear form, the constant is actually an estimate o f ln<z, and thus 
to obtain a, the anti-log must be calculated. Strictly speaking the constant represents the value o f the 
dependent variables when the independent variables are equal to zero. Dougherty (1992) points out that 
in the estimation o f an economic function such as [7] above, although the constant represents a 
multiplicative factor it has no straightforward interpretation. Its function is simply to help predict values 
o f the dependent variables given values of the independent variables.
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effect on aggregate levels of labour productivity in manufacturing. Specifically, the 
estimated elasticity suggests that a 1% increase in the capital to labour ratio leads to a 
0.4% increase in labour productivity. The standard error on this variable is small, and 
thus the estimated beta coefficient can be assumed to be fairly robust, within the 
confidence range (0.420, 0.376) at the 0.01 level.
Interestingly, the model does not determine returns to scale from either urbanisation 
economies (URB) or localisation economies (LOCE) and labour productivity in county 
manufacturing. Indeed statistically insignificant estimates were obtained for both 
variables. In fact the results suggest that urbanisation diseconomies may exist, although 
the estimated coefficient of -0.018 is extremely small, indicating only that a 10% 
increase in the population of a county would correspond with a -0.2% decline in 
aggregate labour productivity. The standard error associated with this estimate is 
relatively large rendering its accurate interpretation invalid. This is also true of the 
localisation estimate. In sum, the model has not detected significant influences from 
these external effects, and these results are consistent with the types of conclusions 
reached in most of the geographical literature, and indeed with some of the urban 
productivity literature (Caralino, 1985; Moomaw, 1985; 1988; Soroka, 1994).
Two variables have the clearest statistically significant influence upon the efficiency 
parameter, the variable reflecting the proportion of part-time manufacturing employees 
(.PART) and the variable that reflects the structure of industry (STRUCT). The 
proportion of part-time manufacturing employees has a significant negative influence 
on levels of productivity although the estimated beta coefficient is quite small. The 
model indicates that a 10% increase in the proportion of part-time manufacturing 
employees across the counties would lead to a decrease of under 1% in labour 
productivity. However, the result is theoretically satisfactory because the level of output 
per employee should be smaller in areas where more part-time jobs existed. It should be 
stressed that this expectation is not an indication that part-time employment is less 
‘productive’, but simply arises from the fact that the aggregate productivity figures are 
calculated on the basis of all employees.
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The second important influence on the efficiency parameter arises through the structure 
of industry (STRUCT). The model predicts that the structure of industry in each area is 
strongly positively associated with the overall level of labour productivity. Due to the 
way in which the variable has been constructed it is not immediately obvious how it 
should be interpreted. However, what the beta coefficient essentially means is that if the 
industrial structure of an area was to change such that it created a 10% increase in its 
expected level of labour productivity given national productivity, actual labour 
productivity would increase by just under 5%. The standard error associated with this 
variable is 0.102, again suggesting a precise estimate. The industrial composition of a 
county is clearly important in influencing its overall level of manufacturing labour 
productivity, and furthermore, the sign on the coefficient is theoretically acceptable, as 
areas which contained a higher proportion of industries which are nationally more 
productive would be expected to have higher levels of labour productivity.
The internal economies of scale (SIZE) and labour force skills variables (SKILL) are 
both positively associated with labour productivity, however, the estimated coefficients 
were not statistically significant at an acceptable level. As regards workforce skills, the 
standard error does indicate a fair degree of certainty that the skills of the labour force 
are positively associated with labour productivity and that the estimate lies within the 
range of 0.09 to 0.29. Given that the data used to create this proxy were resident rather 
than workplace based, it may be that the model could not determine statistical 
significance due to implicit measurement error rather than being indicative of an 
economic reality.
The final result shown in table 7.1, and the one of most interest in this thesis, relates to 
the London dummy variable that was included in the model (DLON). The estimated 
coefficient for this variable indicates that while relationships determined over the 
counties have underestimated London’s manufacturing productivity they have not done 
so to a large extent, or indeed, to an acceptable degree of statistical significance. In 
contrast to expectations, London does conform to the county relationships determined. 
This is an extremely important result, showing that after allowing for the capital to 
labour ratio and the defined set of variables which affect the efficiency parameter of the 
production function, productivity is not significantly higher in London than in the rest
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of the country. The suggestion is, that the factors which can explain productivity 
differences across the counties of Britain also provide an adequate explanation for the 
high level of productivity in London.
In sum, this model provides some interesting results. First, it would seem that 
agglomeration economies, both urbanisation and localisation, have not been identified 
for manufacturing industry across the counties of Britain. Second, it would seem that 
the industrial composition and the ratio of labour to capital within any area are of 
critical important in creating spatial productivity differentials. It is not clear that the 
internal economies of scale or the skills of the workforce have any significant 
influences on labour productivity. Finally, it would seem that London has been 
underestimated in the general county relationships, but that the degree of 
underestimation is not significant. In other words, London does not appear to be quite 
so radically different in the labour productivity relationships which have been tested.
The results obtained through the estimation of the Dhrymes production function are 
shown in table 7.2 below.
Table 7.2 : Estimated regression results of the Dhrymes production function.
Number of observations = 61
R2 = 0.68 F =  13.900 S igF= 0.0000
variable coefficient standard error t-ratio
constant 8.666 0.785 11.040***
GVA 0.263 0.071 3.709***
LAB -0.251 0.082 -3.048***
URB 0.048 0.015 3.113***
LOCE -0.007 0.011 -0.675
SIZE 0.042 0.041 0.909
STRUCT 0.563 0.173 3.246***
SKILLS 0.404 0.119 3.373***
PART -0.114 0.044 -2.587***
DLON 0.037 0.069 0.535
(*** - 1 significant at 0.01, ** - 1 significant at 0.05, * - 1 significant at 0.1)
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2The explanatory power of the model is high, with an R value of 0.68 and an F-statistic 
of 13.9. Some very interesting results emerge from the model. First, it be can be seen 
that the estimated elasticities of labour and gross value added with respect to wages are 
of almost identical magnitude but of opposite sign. The model determines that a 10% 
increase in labour employed would lead to a -2.5% decrease in wages, while a 10% 
increase in value added would create a 2.6% rise in wages. For both elasticities the t- 
statistic is significant at the 0.01 level. Thus, using [11] above the homogeneity 
parameter of the function is so close to 1.0 that under the interpretation suggested by 
Dhrymes, and used in spatial productivity research, it would seem manufacturing across 
the counties of Britain displays CRS with respect to factor inputs. In this respect, it 
would seem that the assumption of CRS required for the Cobb-Douglas estimation was 
not overly restrictive. In addition, Dhrymes points out that a production function such 
as [9] above “will lead to a Cobb-Douglas type relationship between wages, output, and 
labour which is not homogenous of degree zero in output and labour except in the 
linearly homogenous case” (Dhrymes, 1965, 362). The elasticities estimated 
approximate a linearly homogenous case, and thus, the function is homogenous of 
degree zero in output and labour. This means, as one would expect, that a proportional 
change in the levels of output and labour employed will not affect the marginal 
productivity of labour.
Of the explanatory variables which are thought to enter under the efficiency parameter 
A, four appear to have a statistically significant influence. In contrast to the Cobb- 
Douglas estimation the model suggests that the population of the counties has a 
significant influence on the average wage rate, such that a 10% increase in population 
will tend on the whole to have a 0.4% increase in the wage level. This is an interesting 
result because it indicates that wages will differ dependent on the size of any county, 
and this is consistent with previous research which has found much higher wages in 
urban areas (Fuchs, 1967; Quinn, McCormick, 1981) and clearly has implications for 
the London conurbation.
As with the results presented in table 7.1, the Dhrymes model indicates that structure of 
industry, the skills of the workforce, and the proportion of part time employees are 
clearly important in determining the marginal product of labour. For industrial
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composition, the estimate indicates that counties in which industries are concentrated 
which are nationally very productive tend on the whole to have higher aggregate wages 
in manufacturing. It was found that the skills of the workforce are strongly and 
significantly correlated with the average wage as would intuitively be expected. The 
model suggests that a 10% increase in the proportion of skilled and professional 
manufacturing employees in the counties of Britain leads to a 4% increase in the 
marginal productivity of labour. The proportion of part-time manufacturing employees 
has a significant negative influence on the wage rate. Counties with more part-time 
employees have lower average wage rates in manufacturing, and the estimated 
coefficient suggest that an increase of 1% in the proportion of part-time employees 
would lead to 0.11% decline in the average wage rate.
None of the remaining variables were found to have a statistically significant 
relationship with marginal labour productivity and the standard errors associated with 
these estimates are sufficiently large to negate interpretation. However, again it can be 
seen that London has been underestimated in this model, but it is not a substantial
underestimation, nor is it statistically significant. The implication of this is that the 
aggregate wage rate in manufacturing in London is adequately explained by the levels 
of output and labour employed as well as by the skills of the workforce, the population 
of London, and the structure of industry within the capital.
7.6 Discussion.
This chapter set out to examine the influence of a defined set of variables on spatial 
differences in manufacturing labour productivity and how London fits within 
relationships estimated over the counties of Britain. The empirical investigations have 
provided nothing more than a general indication of how a variety of factors may 
influence spatial levels of average and marginal labour productivity in manufacturing. 
Given that the spatial observations in the model were not optimal, that some variables 
were proxies, and that many effects on spatial productivity could not be measured, 
nothing more can be expected. Nonetheless, the models have produced some important 
findings. The following section considers what the results obtained actually mean for 
the analysis of London’s labour productivity.
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The most important aspect of the results for this thesis are those related to the London 
dummy variable. The previous chapter has shown that aggregate manufacturing in 
London now operates at a considerably higher level of average labour productivity than 
in the nation as a whole. Yet the results of this chapter have shown that London does 
conform to the relationships estimated over the counties and contrary to what may have 
been expected, London does not appear to be operating in particularly unique 
circumstances. It cannot be assumed from the results of the models that the London 
dummy variable beta coefficient is any different than zero, although the direction of the 
sign on the coefficient did indicate that London was being under-estimated. Thus, the 
strict conclusion must be that the models explain London’s productivity as much as any 
other area and it must therefore be assumed, as with the other counties, that the results 
presented above are relevant to London. It is worth considering the main implications of 
the results for London.
The first interesting aspect of the results is that positive agglomeration economies are 
not related to higher levels of average labour productivity in manufacturing across the 
counties of Britain. In fact, the results presented in table 7.1 above suggest that 
urbanisation dis-economies may be evident in manufacturing industry leading to the 
conclusion that counties with larger populations tend on the whole to have lower labour 
productivity in manufacturing. The implication is that London does not enjoy higher 
labour productivity because of external agglomeration economy effects as traditionally 
defined. This result may seem surprising, however, it can be verified by closer 
examination of conurbation data shown in table 7.3 below.
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Table 7.3 : Relative labour productivity in London and the British conurbations in 
1991.
UK=100
relative labour productivity
London 119
Tyne and Wear 101
West Midlands 84
Greater Manchester 95
Merseyside 97
West Yorkshire 85
South Yorkshire 81
Source : CSO (1994) Regional Trends. London. HMSO
It can be seen of the seven metropolitan counties in England, only London and Tyne 
and Wear have higher value added per employee than the nation as a whole. In fact, the 
West Midlands, West Yorkshire and South Yorkshire are significantly below the 
national level. The relationship suggests that explanations for London’s high levels of 
average labour productivity should not be sought in traditional concepts of 
agglomeration economies because it is not simply because of the fact that London is a 
big city that manufacturing is highly productive.
Of the variables that were thought to enter the production functions under the efficiency 
parameter A , three were found to have a statistically significant influence. First, is the 
variable reflecting the proportion of part-time manufacturing employees, although the 
estimated coefficient associated with this variable suggests that it actually has a very 
small influence on levels of average labour productivity. In fact this variable does not 
provide a good explanation for the London case as the data reveal that that while 7.74% 
of manufacturing jobs in London were part time in 1991, this has to be compared to a 
mean figure of 7.34% for all counties. As mentioned in chapter three, the proportion of 
part-time employees in London has not differed significantly from the nation as a whole 
over the 1981 to 1991 period. However, the importance of this variable should still be 
borne in mind particularly in relation to individual manufacturing sectors examined in 
the next chapter. The two most relevant variables for London that enter under A appear
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to be the skills of the labour force and the structure of industry in which London does 
have significantly higher values than the county average in both respects, and these 
characteristics of industry are worthy of further attention.
However, perhaps the most critical factor in differentiating average labour productivity 
in the counties was the capital to labour proxy variable and this would appear to be 
highly relevant to London. The indication from the Cobb-Douglas estimation is that in 
addition to influences arising from the structure of industry and the skills of the labour 
force, it is factors internal to production that can explain London’s high average labour 
productivity, rather than any agglomeration or specific London location effects. This 
chapter has demonstrated that capital data is extremely difficult to obtain, and this 
places important limitations on the extent to which this finding can be pursued. 
However, data from Regional Trends do show that in 1981 capital expenditure per 
employee in London’s manufacturing sector indexed to the UK(=100) was 88.6 but that 
by 1991 this had increased to 129.4. Graham and Spence (forthcoming a) have shown 
that while expenditure in capital in manufacturing in Britain has increased by 35% over 
the decade, London’s capital expenditure grew by 44%. Clearly, capital expenditure is 
not equivalent to the payment to capital but it would seem that London’s manufacturing 
has over the 1980s invested in much more capital relative to the number of employees 
than in the nation as a whole, and this may have had two important and entirely related 
effects. First, substitution into capital would result in reduced labour demands, and 
second, a reduction in the number of employees required in manufacturing would raise 
the marginal productivity of labour and thus the wage rate.
However, the direction of causality is not clear and it may in fact be that high London 
wages have induced substitution into capital. The ratio of capital intensity to labour in 
London is extreme relative to the county average, and appears to provide a good 
explanation for London’s much higher average productivity such that the London 
dummy variable is no longer relevant. To obtain the measurement of payment to capital, 
total payroll is simply subtracted from value added as suggested by Euler’s theorem.
The estimate of payment to capital for London achieved in this way does not form a 
significantly higher proportion of total value added than the average for all counties. In 
London the payment to capital is 42% of total value added, and in the nation the
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proportion is 40%. It is only when the payment to capital proxy is divided by the 
number of employees that London appears very different than the nation because it 
yields a much higher ratio.
Thus, the related effect of high capital intensity is that London’s manufacturing actually 
employs so few people and is characterised by substantially higher wages than in the 
nation as a whole. The fact that the estimate of payment to capital for London does not 
differ from the nation as a whole implies that total labour costs are also not so different. 
This is in fact the case. The point is that London may not employ many people in 
manufacturing but it pays employees such significantly higher wages that the actual 
cost of labour input in manufacturing is not so much smaller. This can be demonstrated 
by considering the relative unit labour cost of producing a manufactured good in the 
capital.6 Data from Regional Trends show that relative to the UK, and where the 
national figures equal 100, London’s manufacturing value added per employee was 119 
and its average wage in manufacturing was 116. Dividing the wage rate by the average 
productivity to calculate the relative unit cost of labour yields the figure 0.98. Thus, the 
actual difference between London and the nation is greatly, though not absolutely, 
reduced, and although London’s manufacturing employs fewer people the cost of 
employing those few is also much higher than it would be nationally.
In essence, these findings indicate that higher average productivity in the capital does 
not imply that external effects from a London location will induce higher levels of 
output in all manufacturing industries. It seems instead, that London’s labour 
productivity may be explained by higher waged and higher capital intensity industries 
and by the structure and skills base of industries within. In this respect London may not 
be a much more ‘efficient’ location for producing manufactured goods in general terms,
but rather the structure of London’s industry is disproportionally characterised by 
high skills, high capital intensity and high wages.
6 The relative unit labour cost is defined as the ratio o f unit labour cost in the region over unit labour cost 
in the nation. It is often used as a measure o f regional competitiveness, identifying the relative 
importance o f  changes in wages and productivity. For region r it is calculated as :
Relative unit cost o f labour in r = [wage in region r / wage in the nation]
[labour productivity in region r  / labour productivity in the nation]
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This leads to the related question of why wages, and thus the marginal product of 
labour, are higher in London than in the nation as a whole. In addition to effects arising 
from capital intensity, the estimation of the Dhrymes model has suggested a number of 
important factors in this respect. It would seem that there is an association between the 
wage rate and the level of population within a county. This result need not be indicative 
of agglomeration external effects. Fuchs (1967) and Quinn and McCormick (1981) have 
shown that that factors such as congestion, the costs of living, and population density, 
often result in higher wage rates in urban areas. Hence, the urbanisation effect may well 
indicate that supply side factors in the labour market are raising wages higher than 
would be expected given the relationship with levels of output and labour, and indeed 
the absence of urbanisation effects in average productivity suggests that this is likely to 
be the case. As regards London, the association between the level of population and the 
wage rate may imply that wages are ‘artificially’ high in manufacturing because of the 
size of the city, and may have been an important influence on the rate of substitution 
into capital.
However, also critical is that wages are strongly associated with both the skills of the 
workforce and the structure of industry. Bringing together results of both models, the 
indication for London may be that it is structural differences in the nature of 
manufacturing that underpin its higher productivity. In terms of change over the 1980s, 
it may be that the structural composition of London industry has changed such that 
higher skilled and less labour intensive industries increasingly employ less people but 
provide jobs that are highly paid and highly skilled. This would explain why payment to 
capital per employee in London is now so much higher in London and why skills and 
structure are so critical. More importantly, it may yield an insight into why London’s 
employment change has been so severe without a corresponding scale of output decline. 
The important point is that consideration may need to focus upon how comparative 
advantages from a London location may arise for some sectors of industry, and how this 
has influenced the change in the average productivity of labour. In other words, the 
increase in London’s average labour productivity may in reality be a function of 
manufacturing decline created through the selective closure or out-migration of 
particular sectors of industry which cannot offset the higher costs of locating in London 
with the increased marginal productivity of labour.
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This chapter has explored spatial differences in labour productivity for only one year. In 
order to determine how productivity has impacted upon labour demand in London’s 
manufacturing it is necessary to consider productivity change over time. Many of the 
findings above, particularly in relation to capital to labour ratios and the skills of the 
manufacturing labour force, cannot be examined in this way due to the absence of 
appropriate data. However, one important issue raised by this analysis that can be 
addressed, is how the structure of London’s industry is actually changing and what this 
has meant for average labour productivity and labour demand. This is a crucial issue 
because any of the variables found to be important in influencing spatial productivity 
could be geographically differentiated simply due to a particular compositional mix of 
industry. Analysis of change in the structure and nature of London’s manufacturing 
activities is not an easy task. It has been shown earlier in this thesis that employment 
data tend to indicate little variation in rates of decline between detailed sectors of the 
SIC. However, for the purposes of this thesis the CSO have provided unpublished GDP 
data for London manufacturing industry disaggregated at the section level of the 1992 
SIC, and this allows for the examination of structural changes in manufacturing over 
time from a productivity perspective. Furthermore, with the use of wage data inference 
can be made about the types of industries that now exist in London that is not possible 
by looking at employment alone. It is to these issues that the next chapter turns.
7.7 Conclusions.
This chapter set out to examine the influence of a defined set of variables on spatial 
differences in labour productivity in manufacturing and sought to consider how London 
conformed to any estimated relationships. The models presented have important 
limitations. It would have been preferable if data had been available to estimate the 
relationships over areas that were not simply defined by administrative boundaries, and 
for different sectors of manufacturing industry. However, the models have been useful 
in generating conclusions about London’s manufacturing productivity particularly in 
two related respects. First, the use of the production function framework has provided a 
much more robust theoretical and empirical analysis of productivity than could be 
achieved by using simple comparisons of average labour productivity across areas. It
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has allowed for the influence of a variety of factors to be tested and has shown how the 
‘illusion’ of London’s higher average productivity may be better understood within a 
framework which takes into account the influence of capital intensity as well as external 
effects. Second, the models have shown that what counts in the London case is not the 
total output produced by the number of units of labour but the amount these units are 
actually paid. Paradoxically, the models determine no specific London effect, but when 
the variables are considered in terms of what they actually mean for London, the 
indication is that it may be the changing structure and nature of manufacturing in the 
capital that is likely to provide the answer to why average productivity has grown at 
such a fast rate and employment declined so severely.
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Chapter 8 : Structure, specialisation and productivity led employment decline.
8.0 Introduction.
Chapter seven has shown that the high level of labour productivity in London’s 
manufacturing sector is not necessarily indicative of greater locational ‘efficiency’ in 
production. The results of the models indicate that agglomeration economies are difficult to 
identify in manufacturing across the counties of Britain, and that when average labour 
productivity is examined within a framework which controls for returns to capital, the main 
implication for London industry is that while it may produce more output per unit of labour, 
it is not so different from the nation in terms of output produced relative to the cost of 
labour input. London’s manufacturing simply faces much higher labour costs than other 
areas of Britain and it is highly likely that this is a crucial factor in explaining why 
London’s industry employs so few people. However, the fact that labour costs are higher in 
the capital in turn means that the marginal product of labour is higher, and the analysis 
presented in chapter seven suggests that this may have much to do with the nature of 
manufacturing in London.
The present chapter turns to explore change in the compositional mix of industry and labour 
productivity growth in London, identifying some characteristics of the type of 
manufacturing that now exists in the capital. It would be extremely useful here to conduct a 
detailed analysis of the influence of wages on London’s manufacturing change, particularly 
in relation to the numbers of people employed. However, as shown below, the wage and 
earnings data available at the urban level are not of sufficient quality to allow such an 
analysis. The chapter draws upon the wage data that do exist to demonstrate the potential 
importance of labour costs in London, however, the majority of the analysis utilises 
unpublished GDP data which disaggregates London manufacturing, to consider how 
compositional change has affected London’s average productivity. The chapter is divided 
into two parts. Part one examines how structure and specialisation have influenced average 
labour productivity in London using methods developed in the spatial productivity 
literature to categorise the data in order to answer some basic questions concerning the role
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of structural change in productivity growth and employment loss. Part two, develops a 
method for quantifying and evaluating the employment consequences of productivity 
growth and presents results for London.
It should be stressed here, that it is out of necessity and not choice, that this chapter returns 
to focus on average labour productivity rather than capital or wage related issues. At the 
level of industrial disaggregation required, it is simply not possible to explore these 
dimensions to a sufficient degree of accuracy. Thus, while considering the results presented 
here, the conclusions of chapter seven have to be bome in mind, and these are that 
productive efficiency does not appear to arise simply from a London location, but that it 
seems likely that the structure of manufacturing in the capital is disproportionately 
characterised by high wage, high skill, and high capital intensive industries.
8.1. Sources of data.
The data sources used in this chapter are described in appendix one. The wage data are from 
two sources. Average hourly earnings in London by manufacturing sector are taken from 
the New Earnings Survey (NES) which is a sample survey of the earnings of employees in 
employment carried out in April of each year by the DE, and national wage rates in 
manufacturing at the class level of the 1980 SIC have been taken from the CoP.
GDP and employment data for manufacturing industries are also used in this chapter. The 
GDP data, which have not previously been published, have been provided by the CSO. 
These data provide a breakdown of manufacturing GDP at factor cost at the section level of 
the 1992 SIC for London for the years 1984 to 1991. To estimate real GDP at constant 
prices the national implied price deflator of GDP in constant 1990 prices was applied to the 
London figures. In addition to issues discussed in appendix one a point worth mentioning is 
that the deflator is for all industries since at present the CSO does not disaggregate deflators 
by industry. Staff at the CSO who are currently working on the production of an 
industrially disaggregated deflator have advised that, with the exception of the oil industry, 
differences in deflation by industry are likely to be marginal particularly when using data
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aggregated at the section level of the SIC. In the case of the solid fuels and oil industry the 
CSO have cautioned that the oil crisis of 1985 created such price changes in the late 1980s 
that the use of a general industrial deflator would most likely produce inaccurate results. 
This industry has therefore been excluded from the following analysis of manufacturing 
productivity.
To allow compatibility with GDP data, employment data were required under the 1992 SIC. 
Although the 1995 Census data is now officially produced under this new classification the 
DE have decided not to reclassify data before 1991. However, certain commercial 
organisations have been permitted to do so by the DE and have been provided with 
extremely detailed data and help in producing a consistent set of time series data. One of 
these organisations is Business Strategies London Ltd., who were generous in allowing full 
access to their regional employment data sets from 1984 to 1994 which are disaggregated 
under the 1992 SIC.
Part I : Structure and specialisation in wages and labour productivity in London 
manufacturing.
8.1.1 Wages and the structural characteristics of change in London’s manufacturing 
1984 to 1991.
As mentioned previously, and as will become apparent in the analysis presented below, 
wage and earnings data for London are at best, of poor quality.1 However, given the results 
presented in chapter seven, it has been considered important to at least attempt to ask some
1 The most comprehensive source o f wage and earning data for manufacturing in Britain is the NES published 
by the DE. The NES does provide disaggregated data for London, however three particular problems were 
encountered with this data set. First, the data are divided into four full-time employee categories : male 
manual, male non-manual, female manual, and female non-manual. These categories are not compatible with 
the categorisation o f employment data. For this reason it is not possible to examine the relationship between 
wage and employment change by industry. Second, many entries for London are missing in the published 
data. In fact, it was found that it was only the male manual category which had a sufficient number o f entries, 
and given the importance attached to skills in the production function analyses, it would not be sufficient to 
simply examine this wage category alone. Third, the data were not compatible with output data which is 
disaggregated at the 1992 SIC and thus could not be used to estimate labour costs relative to the volume of  
output.
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basic questions about how the structure of London’s industry has changed in relation to 
labour costs. For example, can London’s higher wages in manufacturing industry be 
explained by the particular structure of industry that exists within the capital, and how has 
change in this structure has affected labour costs over time ?
By 1991, the average wage in the London manufacturing sector was 13% higher than for 
the nation as a whole. Table 8.1 shows wages per head in manufacturing industries for 
Great Britain in 1984 and 1991, and also shows London’s employment shares in each 
industry. The data in the table are ranked by industry on the basis of wage rates, and the 
purpose is really to determine whether London has employment in industries which 
nationally have higher wages and how this has changed over time.
In 1984, over 65% of London’s manufacturing employment was within industries in which 
the wage rate was higher than the average for total manufacturing. The comparative figure 
for Britain is 58%. Approximately 20% of London’s manufacturing jobs were in class 47, 
paper, printing and publishing, in which the wage rate nationally was approximately 19% 
higher than that for manufacturing as a whole; a further 7% in the chemical industry where 
the wage rate was 20% higher; 4.3% in the manufacture of motor vehicles where wages 
were 12% higher; just under 11% in mechanical engineering where wages were 9% higher; 
and over 15% in electrical and electronic engineering where wages were 1% higher 
nationally than the figure for total manufacturing. Thus it would seem that in 1984, 
London’s employment was disproportionately concentrated in industries in which labour 
was relatively highly paid nationally.
Table 8.1 shows that by 1991, London’s employment structure was still orientated towards 
these types of industries. However, most interesting is that there was actually a slight 
decrease in the absolute share of London’s manufacturing employment within higher wage 
sectors. By 1991 London had just over 64% of manufacturing jobs within relatively high 
wage sectors, a decline of just under 1% on the 1984 figure. Nationally, the share of 
employment in industries with above average wage rates fell even further by 7%, to 54% of 
total jobs.
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Table 8.1 : Wage rates in Great Britain and the employment structure o f  London industry, 1984 and 1991.
1984
Industry wage index* London
rate emp. share
21 Extraction/preparation: metalliferous ore 10468 136 0.02
26 Production o f man-made fibres 9972 130 0.03
33 Manufacture: office machinery/D.P. equip. 9524 124 2.56
25 Chemical industry 9245 120 7.04
47 Manufacture of paper/paper products; etc 9115 119 19.93
22 Metal manufacturing 8901 116 1.33
35 Manufacture: motor vehicles/parts thereof 8575 112 4.3
36 Manufacture of other transport equipment 8484 111 1.97
23 Extraction o f minerals (Other) 8359 109 0.11
32 Mechanical engineering 8344 109 10.71
24 Manufacture: non-metallic products 7785 101 1.97
34 Electrical/electronic engineering 7729 101 15.13
48 Processing of rubber/plastics 7478 97 2.56
37 Instrument engineering 7394 96 2.6
31 Manufacture of metal goods (Other) 7137 93 4.85
41 Food, drink/tobacco manufacturing 6997 91 11.36
46 Timber/wooden furniture industries 6970 91 4.1
49 Other manufacturing industries 5957 78 2.97
43 Textile industry 5598 73 0.8
44 Manufacture of leather/leather goods 5417 71 0.38
45 Footwear/clothing industries 4620 60 5.31
7674
* The index describes the sectoral wage rate relevant to that for all manufacturing where the to
** Wage data for class 21, extraction and preparation o f metalliferous ores, were not available
1991
industry** wage index London
rate emp. share
33 Manufacture: office machin 18638 139 2.17
25 Chemical industry 17177 128 7.22
26 Production o f man-made fib 16981 127 0
36 Manufacture of other transp 15970 119 1.8
35 Manufacture: motor vehicle 15489 116 4.82
22 Metal manufacturing 15458 115 1.09
47 Manufacture o f paper/paper 15199 113 25.48
32 Mechanical engineering 14620 109 9.44
23 Extraction o f minerals (Othe 14591 109 0.1
34 Electrical/electronic enginee 13591 101 12.32
24 Manufacture: non-metallic p 13243 99 1.47
37 Instrument engineering 13215 99 1.98
48 Processinng o f rubber/plasti 12845 96 3.05
31 Manufacture o f metal goods 12012 90 4.53
41 Food, drink/tobacco manufa 11748 88 10.8
46 Timber/wooden furniture in 11167 83 3.95
49 Other manufacturing industr 10081 75 3
43 Textile industry 9868 74 1.19
44 Manufacture o f leather/leath 9018 67 0.44
45 Footwear/clothing industries 7557 56 5.17
13398
manufacturing wages rate =100. 
r  Great Britain in 1991.
Sources: Department o f Trade and Industry (1984 - 1991): Census of Production. London : HMSO. 
Censuses o f Employment, 1984 and 1991.
One way of examining how change in the structure of London’s industry relative to the 
nation has affected average wages is to construct expected national average wage rates for 
each year which would result, if the nation had the same structure of employment as 
London. For 1984 these calculations indicate that the national average wage rate would be 
2.7% higher if the national structure of employment was the same as London, and only 
2.6% higher by 1991. The implication is that the structure of employment in London has 
not been moving towards nationally high wage sectors, and thus that the wage gap of over 
13% between London and the nation in 1991 cannot be explained solely by the structure of 
employment within the capital.
Using data from the NES it becomes apparent that the wage costs facing London industries 
are radically different than those in the nation as a whole, and it would appear that 
industrial structure, as reflected in the SIC categories, does not provide a full explanation. 
Table 8.2 shows hourly earnings for sectors of London manufacturing relative to the UK in 
the years 1984 and 1991. The poor quality of the NES London data is reflected in the large 
number of missing entries. The table shows hourly earnings only for selected sectors with 
the data for industries such as ‘other manufacturing’ not even being reported in the NES 
published tables. Focusing on the male manual hourly earnings it can be seen that in both 
years examined London costs were on the whole significantly higher than in the nation. For 
example, in 1984 the table shows that hourly earnings in London’s electrical engineering 
industries were between 5% and 9% higher for manual employees, and 14% and 16% for 
non-manual employees. In the manufacture of paper and printing industries London hourly 
earnings were approximately 33% higher for manual workers, and between 23% and 25% 
higher for non-manual workers. For all manufacturing industries, again London wages were 
significantly higher in 1984.
These observations are also true of 1991, and indeed in many categories the difference 
between London and the nation has increased over the seven year period. For example, 
hourly earnings for male-manual employees in electrical engineering are now 13% higher 
than the nation and for non manual-female 30% higher than the nation, and in the paper and 
printing industries the non-manual male and non-manual female earnings are significantly
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Table 8.2 : London's hourly earnings in manufacturing industries relative to Great Britain in 1984 and 1991
1984 employment
share
MM NMM MF NMF
Metals 1.34
Other minerals and mineral products 2.08
Chemical industry 100 7.04
Manufacture of metal goods n.e.s 109 4.85
Mechanical engineering 105 10.71
Electrical engineering 105 116 109 114 17.68
Manufacture of motor vehicles 108 4.3
Manufacture of other transport equipment 1.97
Instrument engineering 111 2.6
Food, Drink and Tobacco manufacture 110 11.36
Textiles 0.8
Footwear, Clothing, and Leather 101 5.68
Timber and wooden furniture industries 109 4.1
Manufacture o f paper/paper products; printing anc 133 125 123 19.93
Rubber and plastics 94 2.56
All manufacturing 105 118 119 130
1991 employment
share
MM NMM MF NMF
Metals 1.09
Other minerals and mineral products 1.57
Chemical industry 102 7.22
Manufacture o f metal goods n.e.s 4.53
Mechanical engineering 109 9.44
Electrical engineering 113 111 103 130 14.49
Manufacture o f motor vehicles 127 4.82
Manufacture o f other transport equipment 1.8
Instrument engineering 1.98
Food, Drink and Tobacco manufacture 112 120 10.8
Textiles 1.19
Footwear, Clothing, and Leather 5.61
Timber and wooden furniture industries 3.95
Manufacture o f paper/paper products; printing anc 129 128 132 25.48
Rubber and plastics 3.05
All manufacturing 115 120 110 133
Notes :
(1) The figures presented are the London hourly wages indexed to the same figures for Britain.
(2) Hourly figures have been used rather than weekly because more entries were available for London.
Source : Department o f Employment (1984-1991): New Earnings Survey. London : HMSO.
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higher now than they were in 1984. For all manufacturing industries, London wages have 
grown faster than the nation for male-manual and female non manual-employees. The 
important point demonstrated by table 8.2 is that despite the poor quality of the data, the 
general indication is that higher aggregate wages in London are not created solely by the 
compositional mix of industries defined at the class level of the SIC. London faces higher 
wages than the nation over and above the particular structure of costs created by industrial 
mix. Bearing in mind the results of chapter seven, it is highly likely that the reason for this 
is that a different type of manufacturing exists within the capital even within industrial 
sectors; one much more highly skilled, less labour intensive, and able to offset the higher 
operating costs of the capital with the increased marginal productivity of labour.
The changing structure of London industry needs to be examined in more detail, however 
clearly wage data are not adequate for this task and the chapter now turns to consider 
average labour productivity by manufacturing sector in London. It is worth mentioning at 
this stage that any analysis of industrial structure may be seriously limited by the scope of 
the SIC, since important structural differences, in the nature of industry, are masked by 
even the most detailed official classifications. In other words, perhaps its not so much 
structure, as type of activities within industrial structure, that would be ideally examined.
8.1.2 Structural characteristics of change in average labour productivity in 
manufacturing in London and Britain.
The purpose of this section is to explore structural influences on labour productivity 
change. Table 8.3 shows average labour productivity figures at the section level of the 1992 
SIC for manufacturing industries in London and Britain in the years 1984 and 1991. At the 
national level, some industries exhibit much higher average labour productivity than others, 
presumably because of the level of capital and related differences in the marginal product of 
labour. For Britain in the years described in the table, industries with the highest average 
labour productivity include chemicals and fibres, wood manufacture, food, beverages and 
tobacco, electrical and optical goods, machinery manufacture, and paper and printing. At 
the other extreme, the ‘other’ manufacturing industries, metal manufacturing industries, and
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Table 8.3 : Labour productivity in manufacturing sectors in Britain and London, 1984 and 1991. (section level 1992 SIC).
Britain London
1984 1991 1984
Food, beverages and tobacc 23.27 29.04 18.54
Textiles 10.72 13.36 12.42
Wood 33.49 36.68 38.39
Paper and printing 20.07 24.98 20.34
Chemicals and fibres 30.33 40.38 19.04
Rubber and plastics 17.16 24.98 14.46
Non metallic mineral produc 20.50 24.52 12.10
Metals 12.05 14.12 8.78
Machinery 23.75 25.02 25.86
Electrical and optical 21.80 27.77 19.32
Transport 18.01 25.56 17.17
Other manufacturing 6.11 7.03 8.51
Total manufacturing 18.84 23.62 17.65
change 1984-1991
1991 Britain London
(abs) (% ) (abs) (% )
32.31 5.77 24.78 13.78 74.33
14.00 2.65 24.70 1.58 12.68
46.04 3.18 9.50 7.65 19.92
30.96 4.90 24.43 10.62 52.22
44.19 10.04 33.11 25.15 132.10
21.05 7.82 45.57 6.59 45.59
15.05 4.02 19.62 2.95 24.38
13.62 2.07 17.16 4.84 55.15
31.41 1.27 5.35 5.55 21.47
30.04 5.97 27.37 10.72 55.50
22.36 7.55 41.91 5.19 30.25
14.70 0.92 15.05 6.19 72.77
27.56 4.78 25.35 9.90 56.10
textiles have levels of labour productivity well below that for all manufacturing. In fact, 
labour productivity in ‘other’ manufacturing is exceptionally low and it is not clear from 
the data why this is the case. The sector actually includes an industry described as 
‘recycling’ which appears to employ many people but which may not produce much output, 
and this is likely to be important in influencing the extremely low value. The point that can 
be made about the national figures is that such variation exists between the sectors that 
aggregate manufacturing productivity could be spatially differentiated at the regional level 
for ‘structural’ reasons, not because individual sectors display different labour productivity, 
but because the employment structure of the region is disproportionately concentrated in 
nationally higher or lower average labour productivity industries.
Turning to the London figures, it can be seen that structural factors do not provide a single 
explanation at the coarse level of industrial disaggregation permitted by the data. For both 
years shown, the sectoral labour productivity figures for London are very different from 
those of the nation as a whole. In 1984, the textile industry, wood manufacture, paper and 
printing, machinery manufacture, and ‘other manufacturing’ had higher levels of labour 
productivity in London than they did in the nation as a whole, and the remaining seven 
sectors had lower labour productivity in the capital. Yet by 1991, the situation had changed 
and, with the exception of the non metallic minerals industries, London displayed higher 
labour productivity in the remaining 11 sectors of manufacturing.
Table 8.3 also shows labour productivity change by sector in London and Britain over the 
1984 to 1991 period. The table shows that average labour productivity has grown nationally 
in all industries defined at this level of industrial disaggregation. Particularly large relative 
increases occurred in transport, rubber and plastics, electrical and optical goods, chemicals 
and fibres, textiles, and food, beverages and tobacco.
However, in all but four industries, labour productivity in London has grown at a faster rate 
in both relative and absolute terms than in the nation as a whole. Labour productivity in 
London’s textiles and transport industries grew well below the national levels in relative 
and absolute terms, while in the rubber and plastics and non metallic mineral products
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industries, relative labour productivity grew slightly higher than in the nation over the 
period defined, although this growth was smaller in absolute terms. Of the remaining eight 
sectors, labour productivity growth in London was exceptional compared to the nation, as is 
clear by a comparison of the figures, and particularly for the chemicals and fibres industry, 
food, beverages and tobacco, paper and printing, and ‘other manufacturing’.
Again, the indication is that ‘structural’ effects given national productivity change are 
difficult to identify. These effects can be usefully quantified and categorised using a shift- 
share analysis of growth in average labour productivity developed by Ledebur and 
Moomaw (1983). The ratio nature of productivity data renders traditional shift-share 
methods impossible to use, and Ledebur and Moomaw have developed a method which not 
only permits productivity change to be broken down into the traditional shift-share 
components but also allows some basic questions to be asked about the meaning of each 
component. Ledebur and Moomaw (1983) develop a shift-share analysis of productivity 
growth such that:
nn* = nN* + Jjtft [(R* + T* + T*R*) - N*] + [(r* + T*) + (t*r* - T*R*)]
where n(N) is regional (national) productivity in total manufacturing, rt(Rt)  is regional 
(national) productivity in the zth manufacturing sector, tt{T^ ) is the share of employment for 
the zth industry in the region (nation) and * indicates a proportional change. The three terms 
on the right hand side respectively represent the regional share component, the structural 
shift component, and the differential shift component.
What is perhaps most useful about this shift-share analysis is that Ledebur and Moomaw 
specify means of analysing the results obtained on structural and differential effects. They 
point out that there are three reasons why the structural effect may be positive :
1) if high productivity growth industries are concentrated in the region 
( i.e. if Y,tiriRi*> Z Tfifij*)
2) if high productivity industries that have increasing employment shares are concentrated 
in the region (i.e. if 'ZtiriT *>  Z TjRjT-*)
247
3) if high productivity growth industries that have increasing employment shares are 
concentrated in the region (i.e. if 'LtiriT *R *>'Z  TjRjTfR*).
A further three reasons are given for why the differential effect may be positive :
1) if productivity grows faster for industries in the region than for the nation 
(i.e. if 'Ztjt'i (r* - R*) > 0
2) if the redistribution of employment to high productivity industries is faster in the region 
than the nation (i.e. if Zty*, (/* - T*) > 0
3) if the interaction between employment shares and productivity growth is stronger for the 
region than the nation (i.e. if Zty*,- ( t f r f  - Tt* Rt*) > 0
Table 8.4 presents the results of a shift-share analysis of productivity change between 
London and Britain over the 1984 to 1991 period. The results indicate that London higher 
rate of productivity growth can be explained by both structural and differential effects, 
although the differential effect is clearly dominant. The positive structural effect appears to 
arise from London’s large shares of employment within paper and printing, food, beverages 
and tobacco, rubber and plastics, and chemicals and fibres. On the basis of the three reasons 
given for a positive structural effect, only 2 and 3 are relevant to London. In other words, it 
is not that nationally high productivity industries are concentrated in London, but that rather 
high productivity industries and high productivity growth industries with increasingly 
employment shares, are concentrated in the capital.
However, the differential effect is clearly the most important to London, and particularly 
large differences in growth rates between London and the nation can be found in the paper 
and printing industry, chemicals and fibres, and food, beverages and tobacco. In these 
sectors London’s growth in labour productivity has vastly outstripped the nation. Of the 
three reasons given for a positive differential shift component, the London case is simple 
and clear : productivity in London’s industries is growing faster than the nation, with no 
indication that the redistribution of employment or the interaction between employment 
shares and productivity growth has contributed to higher rates of productivity in London. In 
other words, of the three reasons given for the positive differential effect, only the first is 
relevant to London.
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Table 8.4 : A  shift-share analysis o f  productivity change between London and Great Britain 198
shift-share components for London
structural differential
Food, beverages and tobacco 0.12 0.77
Textiles -0.17 0.05
Wood 0.04 -0.03
Paper and printing 0.89 2.57
Chemicals and fibres 0.10 1.26
Rubber and plastics 0.14 -0.02
Non metallic mineral products -0.04 -0.03
Metals -0.08 0.14
Machinery -0.20 -0.07
Electrical and optical -0.25 0.08
Transport 0.01 0.05
Other manufacturing 0.01 0.10
Total 0.57 4.86
Total shift 5.43
Regional share 4.48
Actual productivity change 9.91
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The sectoral productivity figures make clear that structural effects, based on national levels 
of productivity and productivity growth, cannot explain the growth of average labour 
productivity in London manufacturing. London’s experience of industrial change has been 
very different to that of the nation as a whole. Until now the compositional mix of 
London’s industries has been examined relative to national levels of productivity. However, 
it may be that rather than ‘structural’ factors it is increasing specialisation in London that 
has induced productivity growth. Average labour productivity describes the ratio of output 
per employee, however it is important to break this measurement down into its two basic 
components in order to identify the fundamental dimensions of change.
8.1.3 The components of sectoral productivity change : specialisation and 
productivity-led employment decline.
The following section explores the components of average productivity change in London : 
change in employment and output by sector. The rationale for doing so is that to focus 
purely on the measurement of average labour productivity may be misleading. The 
aggregate figures presented in chapter six showed that both manufacturing employment and 
output in London have fallen over the 1980s, but that employment has fallen much faster, 
inducing increased labour productivity in the capital. Rather than examining how much 
output London workers now produce, it may be more fruitful to conceive the situation in 
terms of how much labour is now demanded to produce a unit of output, and how change in 
the sectoral composition of London’s industries may have affected labour demand.
Table 8.5 shows change in output and employment for the sectors of London manufacturing 
over the 1984 to 1991 period. Two periods are defined in the table to differentiate the 
recessionary from non-recessionary period. Considering first output change over the 1984
2
It should be stressed that this finding is not inconsistent with the results o f the models presented in chapter 
seven. The structure o f industry was found to be an important variable in influencing overall levels o f  
productivity across the counties o f Britain only after controlling for other factors. While the results presented 
in this chapter have shown that industrial structure cannot ‘explain’ London’s higher rates o f labour 
productivity growth in the manufacturing sector, that it is not to say that it does not still exert a considerable 
influence on levels o f productivity having taken into the account the influence o f other factors such as 
differences in capital intensity.
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Table 8.5 : The components o f productivity change in London.
manufacturing output in London
1984 1987 1991
Food, beverages and tobacco 1102 1308 1125
Textiles 504 480 346
Wood 296 336 227
Paper and printing 2274 2710 2849
Chemicals and fibres 751 993 1008
Rubber and plastics 221 256 207
Non metallic mineral products 135 132 78
Metals 462 444 373
Machinery 1060 795 721
Electrical and optical 1729 1636 1263
Transport 598 740 477
Other manufacturing 228 240 211
9360 10068 8885
manufacturing employment in London
1984 1987 1991
Food, beverages and tobacco 59452 47071 34808
Textiles 40588 40211 24714
Wood 7713 6767 4927
Paper and printing 111791 97619 92015
Chemicals and fibres 39463 30827 22799
Rubber and plastics 15261 15243 9832
Non metallic mineral products 11194 7512 5212
Metals 52667 38487 27414
Machinery 40994 33434 22959
Electrical and optical 89519 71112 42042
Transport 34824 27855 21349
Other manufacturing 26764 21790 14343
530227 437927 322413
change in London's manufacturing output
1984 -1987 1987 -1991 1984 -1991
206 18.69 -183 -13.99 23 2.09
-24 -4.76 -134 -27.92 -158 -31.35
40 13.51 -109 -32.44 -69 -23.31
436 19.17 139 5.13 575 25.29
242 32.22 15 1.51 257 34.22
35 15.84 -49 -19.14 -14 -6.33
-3 -2.22 -54 -40.91 -57 -42.22
-18 -3.90 -71 -15.99 -89 -19.26
-265 -25.00 -74 -9.31 -339 -31.98
-93 -5.38 -373 -22.80 -466 -26.95
142 23.75 -263 -35.54 -121 -20.23
12 5.26 -29 -12.08 -17 -7.46
708 7.56 -1183 -11.75 -475 -5.07
change in London's manufacturing employment
1984 -1987 1987 -1991 1984 -1991
-12381 -20.83 -12263 -26.05 -24644 -41.45
-377 -0.93 -15497 -38.54 -15874 -39.11
-946 -12.27 -1840 -27.19 -2786 -36.12
-14172 -12.68 -5604 -5.74 -19776 -17.69
-8636 -21.88 -8028 -26.04 -16664 -42.23
-18 -0.12 -5411 -35.50 -5429 -35.57
-3682 -32.89 -2300 -30.62 -5982 -53.44
-14180 -26.92 -11073 -28.77 -25253 -47.95
-7560 -18.44 -10475 -31.33 -18035 -43.99
-18407 -20.56 -29070 -40.88 -47477 -53.04
-6969 -20.01 -6506 -23.36 -13475 -38.69
-4974 -18.58 -7447 -34.18 -12421 -46.41
-92300 -17.41 -115514 -26.38 -207814 -39.19
to 1987 period in London, it can be seen that, for manufacturing as a whole, output grew 
by 7.6%. In the nation, national manufacturing output grew by over 15%. Of the twelve 
sectors defined at this level of disaggregation, seven experienced output growth over this 
period, and particularly large absolute and relative gains were to be found in four industries. 
Food, beverages and tobacco manufacture expanded output by 18.7% or by £206 million, 
the paper and printing industry by 19.2% or by £436 million, the chemicals and fibres 
industry by £242 million or by 32.2%, and the manufacture of transport goods by 23.8% or 
by £142 million. These were the only four sectors which experienced a substantial increase 
in the relative share of London’s output over this period. Output declined in the remaining 
five sectors over this period and particularly severely in metal manufacturing, where GDP 
fell by 25% or by £265 million.
In the second period defined in the table, 1987 to 1991, the fortunes of London’s industries 
changed somewhat in output terms, and total manufacturing GDP fell by just under 12%. 
Over this duration output declined in all but two of the twelve sectors. The paper and 
printing industry continued to grow, expanding output by just over 5% or by £139 million, 
and a minor expansion of output in the chemical and fibres industry of 1.5% or £15 million 
also took place over this period. For the remaining five sectors that experienced output 
growth in the earlier period, decline occurred between 1987 and 1991, and in fact, with the 
exception of the food, drink and tobacco, industry, was severe enough to push output below 
1984 levels by the end of the decade. Thus, the figures for the 1984 to 1991 period as a 
whole show output growth in only three sectors of industry, paper and printing, chemical 
and fibres, and food drink and tobacco, and these industries were the only ones in London 
to increase their relative shares of total output.
Compared to Great Britain, London’s output performance over the seven year period has 
been poor, since output actually expanded nationally by over 6%. However, of the twelve 
industrial sectors defined in the table, two actually performed well in London relative to the 
nation. Output in London’s paper and printing industry grew by over 25% relative to a 
national growth of just under 24, and the chemical and fibres industry expanded output by 
over 34% in London and by only 12% in the nation as a whole. These two sectors are
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clearly important in London’s manufacturing today. By 1991 the paper and printing 
industry output accounted for approximately one third of London’s total manufacturing 
output compared to a share of 24% in 1984, and the chemicals and fibres industry 
accounted for just over 11% in 1991 compare to 8% in 1984. Considering the three sectors 
that experienced output growth over the seven year period, by 1991 together they accounted 
for over 56% of London’s total manufacturing output compared to 44% in 1984. The 
important point is that it may be only three sectors of London’s manufacturing that have 
expanded output, but they account for over half of total manufacturing output in the capital.
The indication may therefore be that to some extent London’s manufacturing is becoming 
increasingly specialised in a limited range of sectors. The poor disaggregation of the output 
data does not allow this issue to be explored in any detail. However using the criteria of 
output growth and change in relative output share over the 1984 to 1991 period as a whole, 
the paper and printing industry, chemicals and fibres, and food, drink and tobacco 
manufacturing are clearly important in the capital today. Furthermore, it is in these three 
sectors that productivity has grown most rapidly. However, the figures presented above are 
to a large extent indicative of the contemporary macro-economic conditions, and 
particularly of the recession at the end of the 1980s. If the 1984 to 1987 period alone was 
used for analysis, industries such as the manufacture of transport goods, rubber and plastics, 
and wood manufacture would also have to be included as important output growth sectors 
in the capital. The issue of specialisation can be examined further by considering the second 
component of productivity change - employment decline.
Chapter three reviewed employment trends in London’s manufacturing. However, it is 
worth considering here the implications of change in the structure of London’s output for 
the labour demanded by these particular industries. Table 8.5 shows employment change 
figures for the eleven sectors of London’s manufacturing industry. Most noticeable is that 
any output growth achieved over the two periods defined in the table has not corresponded 
with an expansion in labour demand. Indeed, the figures show that for many industries 
employment has been changing in radically different ways to output. For example, in the 
food, drink and tobacco industry output grew over the seven year period by just over 2%
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while over 40% of jobs were shed, in paper and printing output expanded by 25% while 
employment declined by 18%, and in the chemicals and fibres industry output grew by 34% 
while 42% of jobs were shed. In a further five industries - rubbers and plastics, metal 
manufacturing, electrical and optical goods, transport good, and ‘other manufacturing - both 
output and employment fell although at very different levels of magnitude inducing 
substantial productivity gains.
For the remaining manufacturing sectors however, a greater degree of consistency in output 
and employment change can be identified. For example, in the textiles industry output 
decline by approximately 31% while employment declined by just over 39%, in the 
manufacture of wood output fell by 23% and employment by 36%, in non metallic mineral 
industries output declined by 42% and employment by 53%, and in the manufacture of 
machinery output fell by 32% and employment by 44%. In these four sectors, productivity 
grew because employment declined at a faster rate than output, however the direction and 
magnitude of decline is not radically different. The point is, that these sectors may be 
characterised by extreme decline in London, but this cannot be said for all types of 
manufacturing and again this is likely to be indicative of some degree of specialisation. The 
most important aspect of the data is that overall, large productivity gains in London have 
only been achieved at the expense of employment loss and even output growth in any sector 
at any time has not corresponded with increased demand for labour.
An equally important issue is the type of jobs that have been lost from the different 
manufacturing sectors. The aggregate data show that of manufacturing jobs shed in London 
over the 1984 to 1991 period, approximately 10% were part time, while for Britain as a 
whole only 6% were part time. However, comparing sectoral productivity figures calculated 
only on the basis of full-time workers as in table 8.6, shows very little difference from the 
figures calculated on the basis of all workers. Again, London aggregate average 
productivity growth is approximately twice that of the nation, and in all but four sectors 
London’s growth was significantly higher than the nation.
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Table 8.6 : Productivity growth in London and Britain calculated on the basis of full-time employment only, 1984-1991. 
(percent)
London Britain
Food, beverages and tobacco 67.85 23.46
Textiles 13.27 24.93
Wood 21.46 9.38
Paper and printing 45.23 24.81
Chemicals and fibres 129.77 32.55
Rubber and plastics 46.56 46.92
Non metallic mineral products 23.81 19.91
Metals 56.14 17.80
Machinery 21.61 5.57
Electrical and optical 55.50 27.38
Transport 31.05 42.79
Other manufacturing 73.33 14.82
54.31 25.65
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In examining the components of London’s productivity growth it would seem that there 
may be two important processes at work in London’s manufacturing. The first is the 
specialisation of output into a small number of manufacturing industries. Excluding the 
food, drink and tobacco industry, chemicals and fibres, and paper and printing from 
London’s output change, there would have been a net decline in manufacturing output over 
the 1984 to 1991 period of approximately 25%. These three sectors are the only 
manufacturing growth sectors in London today, and are to some extent masking the second 
most important trend from the aggregate figures - relative and absolute decline in 
manufacturing industry. Employment decline in London is the basic most important 
component of increased productivity. Output has increased in three sectors of London’s 
manufacturing, but even within these sectors employment decline still formed the most 
important component of productivity growth. If these three sectors were excluded from 
London’s manufacturing, productivity would still have increased in the residual 
manufacturing sector in London by approximately 38%, because while output would have 
declined by 25%, the number of jobs would have fallen by over 46%. For most sectors in 
London, and indeed for the manufacturing sector as a whole, increased productivity appears 
as a simple function of decline.
8.1.4 Discussion.
The purpose of this first part of the chapter has been to explore London’s labour 
productivity with respect to the changing compositional mix of industries within the capital. 
The most detailed data sets on output, employment and wages for London have been used, 
although even with these only limited success can be achieved. It is not the intention here to 
make final conclusions about London’s productivity. This is done in the next concluding 
chapter where evidence from the thesis as a whole is interpreted. However, some important 
conclusions may be reached on the basis of the analysis and discussion above.
First, it has been demonstrated that ‘structural’ effects arising from the compositional mix 
of industries in London relative to the nation do not provide a single viable explanation for 
manufacturing change in the capital. In terms of both wages and productivity, London
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operates, and has changed, in radically different ways to Britain as a whole because the 
interaction between manufacturing labour, output and wages in the capital is very different 
to that of the nation. The data do not make clear why this may be the case, but it would 
seem that increasing specialisation of manufacturing activities in London is likely to be 
important in this respect. It may be that the dual processes of decline and specialisation are 
linked, as manufacturing change in the capital becomes increasingly orientated towards 
activities which can offset the diseconomies of London, and the higher operating costs of 
London, with higher and increasing average marginal productivity of labour, perhaps at 
least partly induced through increased capital intensification. If this is the case, it would be 
broadly consistent with the arguments put forward in the global city hypothesis, however 
the point that appears to emerge from the analysis in this thesis is that the issue of 
comparative advantage may be of much greater importance than perceived in this literature, 
and that an analysis of labour productivity in London has the potential to further our 
understanding of these processes.
Specialisation has been demonstrated to some extent by identifying sectors which appear to 
be increasing output share, and those in which the indicators of both employment and 
output tend to indicate eradication from London. The printing and publishing industry, 
chemicals and fibres, and food, drink and tobacco manufacturing are critically important to 
London’s manufacturing today, providing over half of the capital’s total manufacturing 
output and being the only sectors to experience relative and absolute growth over the 1984 
to 1991 period as a whole.
However, the question remains as to what is actually happening within the twelve sectors 
defined. For many sectors, the differences in magnitude between employment and output 
change have been enormous, suggesting some degree of dynamism or perhaps 
! specialisation within. The existing data for London are simply not of the quality required to 
address this issue properly, and this must be another important conclusion of the discussion 
above. It seems increasingly likely that the categories defined by the SIC are inadequate to 
pin down the unique nature of London’s manufacturing. Although the data above are only 
disaggregated into 12 sectors, even at much more detailed levels of disaggregation the SIC
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can only describe manufacturing activities in terms of the associated end product. It is 
not possible to say anything on top of this about the nature of work conducted in any 
location, and it is highly likely that this would have significant implications for levels 
of productivity and productivity growth. For example, Hall’s Industries o f London 
showed that manufacturing activities in the capital tended to be involved in later 
stages of the productive process. Under the existing SIC, these activities would only 
have been defined with reference to their end product, however, the fact that the 
nature of manufacturing was unique must have had important implications for the 
wages paid to labour and for the average productivity of different sectors, as it is 
likely to have today.
These issues will be returned to in the conclusion of this thesis. Aside from specialisation it 
is hoped that the above analysis has also demonstrated the importance of productivity 
growth for London’s employment change. Employment decline in London can be 
conceptualised in terms of productivity growth, as it also can in the nation as a whole. Of 
course, London is losing jobs faster than the nation, but this should not be so surprising 
given that the wage rate is higher in London and thus the elasticity of employment with 
respect to wages is likely to be higher in the capital than the estimate obtained across all 
counties in the Dhrymes production function in the previous chapter. Furthermore, wages 
appear to be growing in London at a much faster rate than in the country as a whole. 
Perhaps the most important point is to view employment change and labour productivity in 
terms of labour costs, and as demonstrated in chapter seven, labour costs are not 
substantially different in London from the nation. London manufacturing 
employs less workers, and as wages grow at a faster rate than the nation, it continually 
employs less people. Again, this may be indicative of particular types of manufacturing 
activities which London specialises in, and not just with respect to the sectors available for 
analysis in the poorly disaggregated output data.
The important point is that labour is a derived demand, and that average labour productivity 
describes the relationship between the demand for labour, and wage and output change. In 
the second part of this chapter a methodology is presented which attempts to isolate the 
employment effects of productivity growth from those generated through output change.
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Part I I : Quantifying the employment consequences of change in average labour 
productivity : a productivity growth interpretation of the labour demand shift-share 
model.
8.2.0 Introduction.
The following section has two main related purposes. The primary objective is to attempt to 
quantify the employment consequences of productivity growth in London. However, in 
achieving this aim some methodology has been developed that may be used to examine 
productivity growth. The specific method used involves empirical and theoretical 
modifications to a labour demand shift-share model set out by Casler (1989) and outlined 
in full in Graham and Spence (forthcoming b). The method proposed is in itself interesting, 
and requires explanation prior to the presentation of results. The section therefore focuses 
first on methodological issues, and finally present results for London.
Shift-share analysis has been introduced in previous chapters of this thesis and requires no 
further discussion here. The technique was seemingly most popular in geographical 
analyses of the 1960s and 1970s. However, more recently a renewed interest in the method 
is evident in the literature, with modifications being proposed to overcome some of the 
apparent deficiencies, (Haynes, Machunda, 1987; 1988; Knudsen, Barff, 1991; Arcelus, 
1984; Barff and Knight, 1988; Berzeg, 1984).
One of the main criticisms of shift-share is that it is essentially a-theoretical. In a recent 
paper, one author has proposed a modification of the shift-share method which provides a 
sound theoretical context derived from the theory of the firm (Casler, 1989). In doing so 
Casler has created an extremely useful modification of the technique for urban and regional 
analysis of employment change. However, the precise shift-share method set out by the 
author may not provide meaningful results without further modification and extension. 
While it was recognised within the original paper that extensions of the model may be 
possible, in fact it is the case the model simply cannot function empirically or theoretically 
without further modification. The following section applies an extension to the model to
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allow for its implementation, and more importantly to extend its use to proper and sensible 
analyses of productivity growth. It begins by outlining the precise method set out by Casler, 
and illustrates the deficiencies of the basic method using an empirical example of one 
region. An extension to Casler’s method is then proposed and its theoretical and empirical 
implications discussed. This extension is then used to consider the employment 
consequences of productivity growth in London.
8.2.1 The theoretical context for shift and share analysis.
The purpose of Casler’s paper was to provide a theoretical basis for shift-share analysis by 
combining the method with a neo-classical model of labour growth. While other authors 
have pursued similar objectives (Andrikopoulos, 1980; Knudsen, Barff, 1991), Casler’s 
contribution is notable in its modest data requirements and ease of implementation. Casler 
begins by specifying the demand for labour in terms of a model of labour growth based on 
the theory of the firm, in which, assuming cost minimisation, labour is viewed as a derived 
demand. Developing his contribution with respect to the conventional shift-share identity, 
he produces an analytical model in which employment change is expressed in terms of 
output growth and the elasticity of employment with respect to output. It is worth outlining 
the precise method in detail.
Casler starts with the familiar shift-share expression (employment change = regional share 
+ differential shift + structural shift):
X-*j = X * + 2 > , ( x *, -X *,)+ „(X *, -X ♦) [1]
where X is  employment, i denotes an industry,/ a region, and * growth rates, while ay is the 
share of regiony’s total employment in industry i.
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Assuming cost minimisation for firms, subject to a fixed level of output and given input 
prices, the derived demand for labour is written as :
Xy X ,(Py , P2j >  P3 Pmj \  Qy [2]
thwhere : P^ = the k input price in region j
Qij = the level of output produced by industry i in region j
which in growth rates can be expressed as :
X^</ J_ = y  dX.jj 1 + dXy dQy 1
dt 'x, ^ d ? kj dt 'x, aq, A X /
Defining the elasticity of employment for industry i in region j  with respect to input price k 
as :
3X// Pu
[4]
and the elasticity of employment with respect to output for industry i in region j as :
E [5]
>JQ SQ, X ,
the employment growth expression may be written with elasticities as :
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For total employment growth in regions j ,  [6] appears as
x -*; = I , 2 >  % + 5 >  ,E WQ % [7]
and by defining the aggregate labour price elasticity of demand for industries in region j  
given a change in price k as :
E* - 5 > » Ei* [8]
equation [7] may be simplified as :
x * j  = £* Ei* p% Z/**i/E»eQ% • P]
Since the input demand equations which emerge from the process of cost minimisation are 
homogeneous of degree zero in prices, price elasticity effects on employment growth will 
be zero. Concentrating only the effects of changing output, the differential and proportional 
output shifts are defined respectively as :
Qs % = Q %  -Q*,
Q S  *  =  Q  *  _ Q  *
Thus output growth in industry i in region j  can be written as :
Q * , = Q * + Q 5 *,+Q**, .  [12]
and given the condition that the effects of proportional changes in the price of inputs are 
zero, [12] may be incorporated into [9] to give Casler’s modified shift-share equation :
X-*; = 2 >  ,Q  * E*e + 5 > * Q S % E«  + 2 > » Q s *, E*> • W
[10]
[11]
262
In defining the shift-share identity in this way the author has produced an analytical model 
which is superior in two important respects to the standard shift-share analysis. First, unlike 
the a-theoretical standard shift-share methodology, the demand for labour in Casler’s model 
is viewed as a derived demand. It is seen as a function both of the relative prices of other 
factor inputs to production and of the level of output demanded. This represents an 
important theoretical contribution in which “input growth is derived from the growth of 
outputs in that the production of outputs necessitates the use of inputs and output demand is 
the fundamental causal influence. Therefore, at least, the specification of shift and share 
components in terms of output is theoretically more sound than the definitions stated in 
terms of inputs” (Casler, 1989,46).
Second, since employment change in [13] becomes a function of the growth of output, the 
complexities of industrial change, such as differences in regional labour productivity, are 
introduced into the model. Standard shift-share techniques specify the components of input 
change in terms of that input, and in doing so they effectively assume a unitary elasticity of 
employment with respect to output across industries and regions. Casler illustrates this by 
showing that [13] above is identical to [1] under this assumption. In fact the definition of 
employment elasticities with respect to output, which eliminate the need for the assumption 
of constant elasticity, should yield a different set of figures for each area which measure the 
responsiveness of employment to output change by industry, and thus should allow for the 
special characteristics of regional industries to be incorporated into the model. Casler 
argues that the elasticities inherently reflect productivity, embodying differing 
technological characteristics of production by industry and area. Equation [13] then, is 
essentially different from [1] in that the differential and structural components depend not 
only on the structure of industry but also on the unique employment elasticities of each area 
and each region (Eyg), while the differences in the regional share effect are purely 
attributable to the elasticities.
However, while these two attributes are desirable in a shift-share model, in practice the 
specific method outlined in equation [13] does not produce meaningful results. The specific 
problem stems from the definition of the elasticities of employment with respect to output.
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Equation [13] allows for the calculation of these elasticities as simply the proportional 
change in employment divided by the proportional change in output, under which the 
arithmetic of the shift-share equation functions, in the sense that the components defined 
sum to actual employment change. While Casler does point out in the conclusion to his 
paper that estimation techniques may be used to calculate the elasticities, no shift-share 
method which incorporates this extension is set out in the paper, and in fact [13] is 
presented as a viable model and the use of estimated elasticities as optional. However, in 
defining the elasticities so broadly, they embody various factors which influence the 
responsiveness of employment to output change, and not simply the elasticity of 
employment in this respect. In particular, and as Casler himself points out, the elasticities 
also embody the technological characteristics of production which vary by industry and by 
region.
In sum, the calculation of the elasticities by a simple division of proportional employment 
by proportional output change, produces figures which quite simply comprise too many 
different influences upon employment change, and not just the influence of the ‘pure’ 
elasticity effect of output change. Consequently, important theoretical and empirical 
deficiencies of this precise method arise. It is worth illustrating the main deficiencies of the 
model in an empirical example.
8.2.2 The Casler shift-share methodology applied.
Table 8.7 shows stages in the formulation of a shift-share analysis of London’s 
manufacturing fortunes using equation [13] above. The first column in the table shows the 
elasticities of employment with respect to output for London, calculated by dividing 
proportional employment change in the capital over the 1984 to 1991 period by 
proportional output change. In the first instance, it can be seen that many of these 
elasticities are large, particularly in food, beverage and tobacco manufacture, rubber and 
plastic, and other manufacturing, with quite exceptional changes in employment occurring 
for a unit change in output. Furthermore, in three cases the elasticities are negative. This is 
because in these cases output was actually growing while employment was declining. In
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Table 8.7 : A shift share analysis o f  manufacturing employment change in London compared with the
performance o f  Great Britain, 1984 to 1991 (percent).
Shift-share components
elasticities regional share differential structui
E j j Q <*ijQ* a v ( Q*v - Q * , ) a i j  (Q*i - Q
Food, beverages and tobacco -19.86 0.70 -1.01 0.54
Textiles 1.25 0.48 -1.74 -1.13
Wood 1.55 0.09 -0.51 0.08
Paper and printing -0.70 1.32 0.30 3.71
Chemicals and fibres -1.23 0.47 1.66 0.42
Rubber and plastics 5.62 0.18 -1.18 0.82
Non metallic mineral products 1.27 0.13 -0.72 -0.30
Metals 2.49 0.62 -1.77 -0.77
Machinery 1.38 0.48 -2.31 -0.64
Electrical and optical 1.97 1.06 -4.51 -1.10
Transport 1.91 0.41 -1.80 0.06
Other manufacturing 6.22 0.32 -0.80 0.11
Total 6.26 -14.41 1.80
Total Shift -12.61
Actual Change -6.34
Shift-share components after multiplication by elasticities
regional share differential structural
(a ij Q*)  E  ijQ [<Zij - Q * ) E VQ
Food, beverages and tobacco -13.95 20.01 -10.71
Textiles 0.60 -2.18 -1.42
Wood 0.14 -0.79 0.13
Paper and printing -0.92 -0.21 -2.60
Chemicals and fibres -0.58 -2.04 -0.52
Rubber and plastics 1.01 -6.63 4.59
Non metallic mineral products 0.17 -0.91 -0.38
Metals 1.55 -4.40 -1.91
Machinery 0.67 -3.18 -0.89
Electrical and optical 2.08 -8.88 -2.16
Transport 0.79 -3.44 0.11
Other manufacturing 1.97 -4.98 0.67
Total -6.48 -17.64 -15.07
Total shift -32.71
Actual Change -39.19
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most other cases both output and employment were declining yielding a positive elasticity. 
The definition of a negative elasticity may not in itself be a major problem, but in the 
arithmetic to follow, as will be shown, it is simply not plausible in the shift-share model.
The basic shift-share components shown in the table are those before multiplication by the 
elasticities. In other words, they are the employment share weighted output change 
components. On the basis of these, national trends (regional share) would have created a 
growth of 6.26% in manufacturing output in London, locational or competitive effects as 
reflected in the differential component would have shifted output by -14.41%, while on the 
basis of the structure of London’s industry a modest growth of 1.80% would have been 
expected. These results then suggest that as regards London’s manufacturing output 
performance over the 1984 to 1991 period, the compositional mix of industries within the 
capital cannot explain the poor output performance, but some locational or competitive 
effects inherent within London are a more likely explanation.
Considering now the three components of the final shift-share equation proposed by Casler, 
it can be seen that much different results emerge. Arithmetically it is the case that the shift- 
share identity sums to actual employment change, which for London was -39.19% over this 
period. However the results produced are simply not plausible. For example, it would seem 
that the positive regional share component in output growth has created a decline in 
employment in London of -6.5%. But this is entirely due to the way in which the elasticities 
have been derived. In the food drink and tobacco industry, the employment share weighted 
output growth of 0.70% led to a estimated employment decline of -14% due to the 
extremely high negative elasticity. This problem is made even clearer in an examination of 
the differential and structural components. Using the Casler shift-share method London 
registers a relatively high negative differential shift of -17.6%, and this is accompanied by a 
strong structural effect of -15.1%. Again, concentrating on the food, beverages, and tobacco 
industry, the source of these results can be identified. In the case of the differential shift, the 
output differential component of -1%, shown in the basic shift-share components, when 
multiplied by the elasticity o f-19.9%, produced an expected employment share weighted 
increase in labour demand of 20%. In other words, although output is expected to decline in
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this sector, the model identifies a corresponding growth in employment, and as a result the 
strength of the negative differential shift is reduced massively. In the case of the structural 
component, the food, beverage and tobacco was again the dominant influence in the 
direction of the shift, which was in this case negative, despite a positive structural output 
growth in the basic shift-share component.
The food, beverage and tobacco industry in itself is not of any particular relevance to an 
examination of shift-share expression proposed in [13] above. It has simply proven to be a 
useful example in this case to demonstrate, not just the empirical, but also the major 
theoretical difficulty with this shift-share approach as it exists at present. From the example 
of London provided, it may appear simply that this model is a growth model, and that it is 
not suitable for conditions where output and employment are changing in fundamentally 
different directions. However, the problem with the model is more fundamental than that. It 
is fair to say that the elasticities, as defined at present, are not the actual elasticities of 
employment with respect to output, because they have not held technological change or 
growth in the intensity of use of capital constant. In other words, it may well be that growth 
in output corresponds with declines in employment, but theoretically this should not be 
regarded as the responsiveness of employment to output change because the main causal 
influences in such transformations in production are likely to be related to capital and 
technology. While in Casler’s labour growth model it is rightly shown that proportional 
changes in input prices will not affect the demand for employment, it must be the case that 
capital use over time, technological change, and the changing relationship of these factors 
to labour should be taken into account when estimating the elasticities of employment with 
respect to output. Elasticities calculated under these conditions should make more sense 
empirically. More important, they would also be more theoretically robust thus allowing for 
the factors of technology and capital to be influential in a model of the derived demand for 
employment.
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8.2.3 A modified shift-share analysis - some empirical and theoretical aspects.
To modify the shift-share method set out in equation [10], the option of utilising estimation 
techniques to calculate the elasticities of employment with respect to output has to be 
implemented and reworked into the shift-share model. The purposes of this estimation must 
be to obtain a set of elasticities which reflect, as closely as possible, the actual 
responsiveness of employment to output change, and that are not indicative of other 
influences on the demand for employment. For the purposes of estimation here, data were 
available on output and employment by industry for manufacturing in British regions, and 
regression analyses were conducted to estimate the elasticities. The following equation was 
estimated for each industry :
ln£„ = a  + p s5 f + Pe ln&, + p , /  + w, 
where :
Eit = employment in industry i in time t 
a = a region specific constant 
d; = is a set of region specific dummy variables 
Qit = output in industry i in time t
t = 1,2,3,4,5,6 ,7,8 etc. is a time trend for the years 1984 through to 1991.
Uj = a random error term
Cases in the equation comprised the eleven standard regions of Britain for each year 
between 1984 and 1991 inclusive, yielding 88 observations. The primary aim of the 
estimation is to obtain the beta coefficient (bQ) - the elasticity of employment with respect 
to output. Three points should be made about the specific model used for estimation. First, 
it can be seen that a fixed effects estimation technique has been used, where the differences 
between cross-sectional units, in this case regions, can be adequately captured by specifying 
a different intercept for each cross sectional unit (Judge et al., 1988, 468-489). In allowing 
the intercept to vary by region, the effects of regional differences in labour demand, other 
than through output growth, for example through differences in levels of capital stock and 
in the technological characteristics of production, should be controlled within the
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estimation.3 F-tests between the restricted and unrestricted models were conducted to 
determine if the cross sectional units did require different intercepts through a fixed effects 
model, and in all cases the F-test was significant providing evidence for the need to 
differentiate the cross-sectional nature of the data4 (Judge et al., 1988; Matyas, Sevestre, 
1992).
Second, the time trend included within the estimation is essentially a proxy for 
technological growth over time, and thus yields a beta coefficient which reflects the 
elasticity of employment with respect to technological growth over all regions. The time 
trend was included simply because the estimation uses cross-sectional time series data, and 
being thus a dynamic model requires a specification of time for the efficient estimation of 
the elasticity of employment with respect to output. The time variable is of no direct 
relevance in the formulation of the final modified shift-share model.
Third, in estimating the model across the regions of Britain for each industry, it is assumed 
that the elasticity of employment with respect to output is constant across space for each 
sector of industry, given constant levels of technology as reflected in the time trend. One of 
the benefits of [13] above stressed by Casler was that this shift-share was able to drop the 
assumption of constant elasticity, and was able to include variations in the technological 
characteristics of production. However, since the elasticities are calculated on the basis of 
fixed effects they should not include influences in the demand for employment other than 
through output change alone. If this is the case, then the rationale for assuming non-
3 It may be optimal in some cases to attempt to estimate a full labour demand function, in which the 
elasticities o f employment with respect to both capital and output could be determined. However, in the 
absence o f capital stock data, this estimation was not attempted here. Although estimates o f  capital stock 
could be obtained for manufacturing industries (see for example Vagionis, Spence, 1994), since it should be 
possible to extend the shift-share method to include service industries, for which capital data is largely non­
existent, it was though desirable to keep data requirements here to a minimum. In fact, the method should 
provide a sufficiently robust technique for estimation.
4 In all cases F  is distributed with 10 and 75 degrees o f freedom, and is significant at the 0.01 level. The 
results o f the F-test between the restricted and unrestricted models for each industry were : Food, beverages 
and tobacco (14.88), Textiles (15.19), Wood (89.28), Paper and printing (35.91), Chemicals and fibres 
(62.34), Rubber and plastics (26.82), Non metallic mineral products (84.38), Metals (98.56), Machinery 
(20.99), Electrical and optical goods (28.64), Transport (37.88), Other manufacturing (84.14).
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constant elasticity across the regions becomes less relevant. In other words, in holding 
constant differences between the regions in the technological capacity of industry it would 
seem reasonable to assume that the pure response of employment to output change (bg) will 
be constant over space.
Having estimated the elasticities, important theoretical and empirical implications arise 
from their substitution into the shift-share model set out in Casler’s paper. The use of these 
elasticities in a shift-share model, such as [13] above will yield four components rather than 
three. This is because the elasticities have been estimated whilst attempting to control for 
other influences in employment change, and as such they represent only the direct 
employment effect of output change. In Casler’s model the elasticities included the 
influence of all factors on employment change and not just those of output growth. For this 
reason, the multiplication of the three basic shift-share components by the elasticities 
summed to actual employment change in the Casler model. In the modified shift-share, the 
regional share, differential and structural components are still included, although in this 
case they break employment change down only in terms of the relationship between the 
estimated direct elasticities of employment with respect to output, and the three specifically 
regional components themselves. Thus, a fourth residual component is also calculated 
which represents the difference between actual employment change and that created by 
output change in the region.
In order to establish how this additional term may be interpreted empirically, it is worth 
returning to the neo-classical labour demand model. The labour growth theory set out in [2] 
above excludes an important influence on the demand for employment. In most neo­
classical growth models a term reflecting the level of technology, or the growth of 
productivity over time, is included as an important independent variable. The ways in 
which technology is thought to enter into the neo-classical growth model can be broadly 
classified into two categories (Bowers, Baird, 1971). First is embodied technological 
progress, which arises through new types of machines or more productive forms of labour, 
and the second is disembodied progress, in which new and different combinations of factor 
inputs cause output to increase. The distinction between these different types of
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technological progress is less relevant in the present context. However, it would seem that 
the inclusion of the growth pattern of technology generally, or in other words what may be 
termed productivity, should be entirely consistent with the additional shift-share component 
proposed in this chapter, This is because it captures the influences on employment change 
other than those created through output change.
Thus, the neo-classical labour growth model may therefore be re-written with an additional 
term as :
Qy = the level of output produced by industry i in region j  
t = a technology component which reflects the technology of production.
In growth rates this model is expressed with the additional technology component 
essentially forming a function of time giving the growth pattern of technology. Put another 
way, the labour growth model now expresses the changing demand for labour not only as a 
function of the change in the price of other inputs and the change in the level of output, but 
also of the productivity gains induced through the passage of time as the technological 
characteristics of production change :
[14]
where : = the fc* input price in region j
dXy 1
[15]
'* d?kJ dt Xy dQy dt Xy. a  Xy.
The original derivation of the shift-share equation as set out in Casler’s paper can be 
modified in a straightforward fashion on the basis of this growth rate model. The estimated 
elasticities can be substituted straight into [15] as :
[16]
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where (X*y)P q is the change in employment from technological growth over time holding 
the price of inputs and the level of output constant. Following [6] to [12] above, the 
resultant shift-share identity would be written, with an additional employment weighted 
technology or productivity component as :
X . V l / * , Q * E w % E „  + I ,a ,Q *  *, E,,e + X “ ,{X % X Q- [17]
Empirically therefore, it seems theoretically robust to interpret this additional residual 
component in the modified shift-share analysis as a derivative of the productivity or 
technology component in a modified neo-classical model of labour growth. Unlike the 
method proposed by Casler in [13] above, the shift-share analysis may now be decomposed 
broadly into two effects on employment change. The first is that which results purely from 
changes in the demand for regional output given the constant elasticities, and the second is 
that which is created by the regionally-specific productivity growth.
The results obtained for London through this extension of the Casler method are presented 
next.
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8.2.4 Results from the application of the shift-share extension to the London case.
The results of the estimations of the elasticities of employment with respect to output are 
shown in table 8.8 below.
Table 8.8 : Regression coefficients from estimation of the labour demand models.
R2
estimated 
elasticity (bQ) standard
error /-statistic
Food, beverages and tobacco 0.978 0.397 0.102 3.88***
Textiles 0.993 0.593 0.073
*** 1—H00
Wood 0.980 0.592 0.053 11.23***
Paper and printing 0.994 0.276 0.065 4 26***
Chemicals and fibres 0.987 0.111 0.060 1.94*
Rubber and plastic 0.977 0.687 0.083 8.23***
Non metallic mineral products 0.983 0.250 0.066 3.78***
Metals 0.989 0.228 0.065 3.51***
Machinery 0.983 0.488 0.084 5.81***
Electrical and optical 0.992 0.819 0.078 10.54***
Transport 0.987 0.102 0.067 1.52*
Other manufacturing 0.979 0.500 0.071 7.10***
(*** - 1 significant at 0.01, ** - 1 significant at 0.05, * - 1 significant at 0.1)
2
The R values presented in the table show that in all cases the explanatory power of the 
model was high. Fixed effects models do tend to increase the value of the R , however even 
with the omission of the regional dummy variables, R were not less than 0.76 for any 
industry and this is simply because the relationship between regional employment and 
output is so strong. However, it is really the estimated beta coefficients (bg) which are of 
interest in the present context. In all cases the estimated coefficients are positive and less 
than 1.0. Intuitively this would appear to make sense, in that a change in the number of 
people employed in an industry coincides with a change in output in the same direction but 
of lesser magnitude. This is consistent with the neo-classical model of labour growth set out 
in [14] above, where output growth is viewed as only one factor in changes in the demand
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for employment. The t-statistics show that for all but two industries, the estimated beta 
coefficients were significant at the 0.01 level, and the standard errors are fairly low 
suggesting relatively precise estimates. For the chemicals and transport industries however, 
the estimated beta coefficients were statistically significant only at the 0.1 level, and it 
would appear from the examination of scatterplots that this is simply due to a less direct 
regional correlation between employment and output within these sectors.
Table 8.9 shows a modified shift-share analysis of manufacturing employment change in 
London compared with that of Great Britain over the 1984 to 1991 period, utilising the 
estimated elasticities. The shift-share indicates that London has lost jobs due to both a 
falling demand for manufacturing output and through productivity growth. The regional 
share component indicates that on the basis of national output growth rates for all 
manufacturing, and given the estimated elasticities of employment with respect to output, 
employment in London’s manufacturing would have increased by 2.6%. However, the 
combined effects of the differential and structural components, was to reduce employment 
by -8.4%. Again assuming no productivity growth over the period, solely on the basis of the 
industrial structure of London, and given the elasticities of employment with respect to 
output a decline in employment of -0.2% would have been expected over the period. Thus, 
as regards London’s output performance, it seems that the structure of industry cannot 
account for a poor output performance, but that competitive effects have been dominant in 
this respect, creating a -8.3% decline in employment irrespective of productivity growth. In 
other words, it would seem that London is not generally a favourable location for 
manufacturing output growth and this has been an influential factor in employment decline.
However, the productivity component is clearly the most influential of all, destroying over 
30% of manufacturing jobs in the capital. In all manufacturing sectors within the capital 
less labour is being demanded over the seven year period. Particular industries contributing 
to productivity growth include those in which London’s output is becoming increasingly 
specialised such as food, beverages and tobacco, paper and printing, and chemical 
manufacturing. However, also prominent in this respect are electrical and optical goods and 
metal manufacturing. In sum, the indication from the shift-share analysis is that
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Table 8.9 : A modified shift share analysis o f manufacturing employment change in London compared with the performance in Great Britain,
1984-1991.
regional share differential structural productivity
( a i j Q * ) E ijQ (CLij [Q*tj - Q * ,] E UQ) (a i j  [Q*i- Q*] E ijQ) «</ (X*,j) p.Q
Food, beverages and tobacco 0.28 -0.40 0.22 -4.74
Textiles 0.28 -1.03 -0.67 -1.58
Wood 0.05 -0.30 0.05 -0.33
Paper and printing 0.37 0.08 1.04 -5.22
Chemicals and fibres 0.05 0.18 0.05 -3.42
Rubber and plastics 0.12 -0.81 0.56 -0.90
Non metallic mineral products 0.03 -0.18 -0.08 -0.91
Metals 0.14 -0.41 -0.18 -4.32
Machinery 0.24 -1.13 -0.32 -2.19
Electrical and optical 0.87 -3.70 -0.90 -5.22
Transport 0.04 -0.18 0.01 -2.41
Other manufacturing 0.16 -0.40 0.05 -2.15
Total 2.64 -8.28 -0.16 -33.39
Total shift -8.44
Actual change -39.19
employment loss in London manufacturing has been created partly by a fall in the demand 
for manufactured goods produced within the capital, but to a much greater extent by 
increased labour productivity. Furthermore, as regards the fall in the demand for 
manufactured goods, it would seem that this has not been influenced to any great extent by 
the compositional mix of industries within London.
It is worth considering how the results for London compare to other regions of Britain. 
Table 8.10 below, shows results from the labour demand shift-share model for standard 
regions compared with the performance of Great Britain for the period 1984 to 1991.
Table 8.10 : Results from a labour demand shift-share analysis of employment change 
in the standard regions compared to the performance of Great Britain, 1984 to 1991 
(percent).
employment consequences o f output change 
regional differential structural 
share component component
(a £ * )  EiJQ (a* [Q*u - Q*,] (a 9 [Q*. - Q *)
E'Jq) Eyq)
total
output
effect
productivity
effect
i^j (X*ij)p Q
East Anglia 2.64 2.63 0.05 5.32 -17.13
East Midlands 2.74 2.77 -2.27 3.24 -12.63
London 2.64 -8.28 -0.16 -5.80 -33.39
North 2.40 2.49 -1.03 3.86 -11.26
North West 2.50 -2.13 -1.00 -0.63 -14.63
ROSE 2.69 -3.14 -0.47 -0.92 -19.50
Scotland 2.59 0.84 -1.32 2.11 -14.76
South West 2.57 1.77 -0.26 4.08 -16.85
Wales 2.46 10.56 -0.65 12.37 -8.62
W est Midlands 2.30 3.40 -0.77 4.93 -16.28
Yorkshire and 
Humberside
2.43 2.63 -1.37 3.69 -10.50
Columns two to five show the employment consequences of output change assuming that 
no productivity growth occurs over the period. Considering firstly the total output effect
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(column five), it can be seen that in all but three regions, employment growth would have 
been generated by output growth, given the estimated elasticities and assuming zero 
productivity growth over the period. In these regions, any employment loss has not 
coincided with output loss, and thus jobs are being shed without any evidence of 
‘downsizing’ in the manufacturing sector. The results for London, ROSE and the North 
West region however, indicate that a certain proportion of employment decline can be 
attributed to poor output growth in the manufacturing sector. Again assuming no 
productivity growth over the period and given the estimated elasticities, output change 
would have led to a decline in employment of approximately -1% in ROSE, -0.6% in the 
North West, and just under -6% in London. These comparative figures highlight the poor 
output performance of the London manufacturing sector over the 1980s, and show that of 
total manufacturing job loss in the capital over the period, approximately 15% can be 
attributed to a loss of output irrespective of productivity growth.5
Columns three to five break down the employment consequences of output growth in to 
three shift-share components. The regional share component is less interesting here simply 
indicating the regional employment share weighted effects of national output growth in 
total manufacturing. There is very little difference between the regions in the regional 
share effect, creating an employment expansion of approximately 2.5% in all regions. It is 
worth concentrating on the differential and structural effects. London compares badly to the 
other regions with respect to differential effects. The London value of -8.3% is much higher 
than for ROSE (-3.14%) and for the North West (-2.13%); which were the only other 
regions with negative differential shifts. The implication is that in these three areas 
industrial structure cannot explain employment decline, but rather that some competitive 
effects have induced output to fall creating a decline in the labour demand, and this is most 
pronounced in the case of London. In the remaining eight regions, employment growth 
would have occurred assuming no productivity growth on the basis of competitive effects.
5 The results presented are for the 1984 to 1991 period and so clearly include the impacts o f recession. A 
separate analysis for the 1984 to 1987 period, would show employment generation from manufacturing 
output growth in London. However, London’s output expansion over this period was at slower rate than for 
any other region, indicating that even in periods o f growth, London has performed relatively poorly.
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Interestingly, the structural component has a negative influence in all regions with the 
exception of East Anglia, and here it was of minor importance. This is a surprising result. It 
indicates that the structure of industry in ten of the eleven regions has not been favourable 
in terms of output growth nationally, and that this has led to reduced rates of employment 
generation. With the exception of the East Midlands however, structural effects have been 
more than overshadowed by the strength of the regional differential component. Comparing 
London’s structural effect to other regions shows that London’s decreasing labour demand 
cannot be explained by an adverse employment structure.
The final column in the table shows the productivity effect. In all regions productivity has 
destroyed jobs over and above the effects from output change. Wales however, is an 
interesting case. Here, productivity trends have destroyed 8 .6% of jobs, but due to the scale 
of output growth over the period the region still managed to increase employment over the 
decade. Wales can be differentiated from the other regions in that both output and 
employment are increasing, while productivity growth is still taking place. The table shows 
that in another seven regions, any employment growth that would have been expected on 
the basis of output change, assuming zero productivity change, has been more than 
counteracted by increased productivity. While in the remain three regions, productivity 
growth has contributed to employment decline along with output decline, although London 
really stands out in this respect. London has lost over 33% more jobs than would have been 
expected given output change and the estimated elasticities of employment with respect to 
output. In other words, this is pure jobs shedding which cannot be directly explained by a 
decline in the capacity of London industry.
8.2.5 Discussion.
The analysis presented above demonstrates that the output performance of London’s 
industry has been poor relative to all other regions, and that this has contributed to 
manufacturing jobs loss in the capital. However, it has also been shown that productivity 
growth is an extremely important variable in explaining reduced demands for regional 
manufacturing employment. In many regions, 100% of aggregate job loss can be explained
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not by falling demand for regional manufacturing output, but by some productivity effects. 
London however, has experienced by far the most extreme productivity effect. Unlike other 
regions, London’s manufacturing employment cannot be purely explained by productivity 
growth because falling demand for the capital’s industrial output has also played an 
important role. Nonetheless, the scale of jobs lost through productivity effects in London, 
over and above those of output change, is unmatched in any other region in the country. In 
1984, London’s average productivity in manufacturing was below that for the nation as a 
whole and higher than only the East and West Midlands regions. By 1991, London’s 
manufacturing industry was operating at a higher level of average labour productivity than 
any other region in the country, and its productivity growth was exceptional relative to the 
other ten areas. The fact is that London industry may be performing badly relative to the 
regions, but change has happened in such a way as to create radical shifts in the relative 
position of London industry in labour productivity terms.
How can these trends in the capital’s manufacturing be explained? The figures do not 
indicate underlying processes, but clearly show that London’s employment change over the 
1980s can only be understood through the dual processes of manufacturing decline and 
exceptional labour productivity growth. In addition to possible productivity effects that may 
arise through the increased use of capital and technological change, the concept of 
increasing specialisation through selective out-migration and closure offers a plausible 
explanation for the London trends. The hypothesis that London’s industry is becoming 
increasingly highly waged, more productive in relation to labour input, and perhaps 
involved in higher value added activities, would explain why the industrial base is actually 
shrinking while the productivity of labour is continually rising. The issue of continuing 
comparative advantage for manufacturing in London has tended to be overlooked in 
previous research, yet the above results indicate that it may well be important in 
understanding London’s manufacturing change and the type of industry that exists in 
London today. Unfortunately, the data do not permit this aspect of change to be examined 
in any detail. Hopefully, the analysis presented in the above section has made clear that 
productivity growth has been an extremely important process underpinning London’s
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industrial change, and that London’s exceptional rate of manufacturing job loss cannot be 
explained solely by a decline in productive capacity within the capital.
A final point worthy of discussion relates to the usefulness of the modified labour demand 
shift-share model. The method developed above is a comparative one which puts all regions 
on an even surface in terms of the employment consequences of output change, and 
allocates remaining employment change to a region specific ‘productivity’ component. The 
proposed method does not offer a great deal of explanation for underlying trends, however, 
it does allow the analyst to broadly distinguish the employment consequences of output 
change from those of productivity change. In this way, two fundamental mechanisms 
behind employment change - changes in the demand for output and in the technological 
characteristics of production, and the spatial manifestations of these mechanisms - are 
included in the modified shift-share model. Thus, labour productivity is not examined 
simply in terms of change in the amount of output per employee. Instead, productivity 
growth over time, as expressed through job loss, can be compared to the overall output 
growth performance of a region, and this may be of considerable use in regional analyses of 
employment change.
8.3 Conclusions.
This chapter set out to perform two functions. First, to consider influences on wages and 
average levels of labour productivity that may have arisen through change in the 
compositional mix of London’s industries; and second, to demonstrate the employment 
consequences of manufacturing labour productivity growth in the capital. The chapter has 
raised some important points. It has been shown that the structure of London’s industry 
relative to the nation cannot provide a sole explanation for higher and increasingly higher 
wages, nor for higher levels of productivity and productivity growth. London industry 
simply faces very different structures of wages and average labour productivity than the 
nation as a whole. The data used in this chapter have not allowed a detailed investigation of 
these issues. However, they have shown that dual processes appear to be affecting the 
capital. On the one hand London has experienced an absolute decline in the productive
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capacity of some manufacturing industries, on the other, industrial specialisation and 
exceptional increases in wages and labour productivity have occurred in manufacturing.
The evidence presented in this chapter points towards a process of selective closure and 
out-migration in London manufacturing which has led to an increasing functional 
specialisation of London industry characterised by higher skills, higher wages, and higher 
jproductivity. These are characteristics which might be intuitively associated with sectors 
which may be able to offset the higher operating costs of the capital with the economic 
benefits which accrue from a London location. This issue is returned to in the conclusions 
which consider the viability of this explanation in relation to evidence generated elsewhere 
in the thesis.
The second part of the chapter was primarily orientated towards demonstrating the 
importance of productivity growth for manufacturing employment in London. It was shown 
that while manufacturing job loss can be associated with a decline in the demand for 
manufacturing output, productivity growth has occurred at an exceptional rate in London 
and is an extremely important process underpinning employment change. Again, the 
analysis of part two highlighted the importance of the coincidence of decline and 
productivity growth in London’s manufacturing change over the 1980s.
In important ways, the findings of this chapter support the argument presented in chapter 
six that London’s experience of industrial change is not simply one of decline. London’s 
manufacturing sector has experienced a more dynamic and complex change than indicated 
in employment terms alone, and today printing and publishing, food, drink and tobacco and 
the chemical industry comprise over 56% of London’s manufacturing output, with all three 
sectors expanding output over the decade.
Detailed explanations for the London experience, however, are more difficult to produce 
using existing published data. Indeed, a final conclusion from this chapter must be that SIC 
categories simply do not provide an adequate taxonomy to explore the intricate nature of 
London’s manufacturing change. Even at the most disaggregated levels, the SIC would be a 
limited tool in this respect because it only describes industry in terms of its end product. In
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London, it may be that it is the types of occupations, and the nature of the actual work 
being undertaken in manufacturing establishments, that holds the key to understanding 
some of the trends and processes outlined above.
It has not been the purpose of this thesis to consider the detail of London’s industrial 
change, focusing instead on questioning the broader processes affecting manufacturing in 
the capital. However, the conduct of the research raises a number of important un-answered 
questions, and in the next chapter these questions, and some possibilities for answering 
them, are discussed in relation to the findings of the thesis as a whole.
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Chapter 9 : Conclusions.
9.0 Introduction.
Chapter nine offers some conclusions on the main findings of the thesis and reflects 
upon the most important themes developed in the research. The thesis results are 
summarised, and the pursuit of employment protection policies by borough LPAs are 
considered in light of the evidence on labour productivity growth. This chapter also 
locates the thesis research within a wider context, highlighting contributions to existing 
interpretations of urban and regional manufacturing change. Finally some limitations of 
the research and future questions that arise from this study are discussed.
9.1 Summary of findings.
The first three chapters of the thesis provided an underlying theoretical and substantive 
context for the empirical research. Chapter one introduced the thesis research and 
provided an historical basis for the study, reviewing previous literature on the industrial 
development of London and on the decline of manufacturing that has taken place in the 
capital since the early 1960s. Chapter two reviewed some of the dominant theories of 
urban economic change that have featured in the geography and planning literature, 
emphasising perspectives which have focused on intra-regional processes and 
particularly those which have attempted to explain urban industrial change. The chapter 
showed that the dominant theme within this literature has been to emphasise that urban 
manufacturing changes in only one direction - that of decline. It was then argued in 
chapter three that there are good reasons to believe that land use planning regulations 
may be able to influence, or at least respond to, urban manufacturing employment loss. 
Examples of previous studies of employment protection policies were given and the 
theoretical relevance of these policies was outlined, particularly with respect to two of 
the most prominent contemporary theories of urban manufacturing decline - the space 
constraint and crowding out hypothesis.
The empirical work of the thesis was divided into five separate chapters. Chapter four 
reviewed sectoral and spatial trends in London’s manufacturing employment change
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over the 1980s. It was shown that employment decline has affected all manufacturing 
sectors in the capital, and that it has been largely consistent over time and across the 
boroughs. The phenomenal scale of job loss that took place in London was emphasised 
through comparisons with the nation, and the results were largely consistent with the 
theme of absolute urban decline developed in the theoretical perspectives reviewed in 
chapter two.
Chapter five explored the ways in which local authority land use planning controls have 
been used to influence manufacturing employment change in London over the 1980s. It 
was shown that many London LPAs had developed policies with the explicit intention 
of protecting manufacturing jobs, and the various types of policies were reviewed and 
the degree of importance attached to them discussed. Interestingly, it was found that the 
majority of LPAs had not considered the use of employment protection policies to have 
been successful. The London authorities argued that the forces underpinning 
employment change were largely outwith the scope of planning control and that 
planning policy could realistically only have a marginal influence on outcomes 
determined by the ‘market’ and by processes which were though to be operating at 
levels above the local. In addition, it was found that many LPAs had developed 
planning policies which sought to channel or direct the location of new manufacturing
developments. Thus, in contrast to the discussion of the previous chapter, the possibility 
emerged that London’s manufacturing change may be slightly more dynamic and not 
just a broad process of decline. The general implication was that manufacturing change 
in the capital was perhaps more complex than previous theories advocated, or the 
employment analysis of the thesis had suggested. The ultimate conclusion of chapter 
five was that this potential complexity deserved attention and that in this respect it was 
thought more fruitful to explore different dimensions of change in London’s 
manufacturing and then reflect on planning implications, rather than to continue with a 
pure focus on policy and to seek explanations in a secondary fashion.
Chapter six developed this theme, exploring aspects of manufacturing change in London 
related to land use and floorspace, firm entry, output, and productivity change. A 
quantitative analysis of planning policy was thought inappropriate and not attempted, 
however, the chapter did turn to reflect on the two theoretical perspectives which
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provided sound reasons for believing that land use planning controls could have been 
important in urban manufacturing employment change. The chapter argued that the 
space constraint and crowding out hypotheses did not appear to offer single viable 
accounts of manufacturing change in London. Indeed, the results presented in chapter 
six showed some very surprising trends. Exploring floorspace and land use aspects of 
change, it was found that manufacturing floorspace in London had been declining at a 
much slower rate than employment and that as a result employment densities were 
increasing. Through an analysis of London development control data it was shown that 
planning applications were still being submitted for manufacturing development in 
London, indicating in accordance with the results of chapter five, that London’s 
experience of manufacturing change should not be conceived in terms of absolute 
decline.
Chapter six moved on to consider aspects related to firm entry and output change in 
London’s manufacturing. These two indicators showed radically different patterns of 
change to those generated on the basis of employment data, indicating that at certain 
times over the 1980s London’s manufacturing had actually expanded output and that the 
numbers of firms had grown. Change in London’s manufacturing was analysed further 
by bringing together the indicators of employment and output into a measure of average 
labour productivity. It was shown that over the 1980s labour productivity in London’s 
manufacturing sector had grown at almost twice the rate of the nation, and that 
manufacturing industry in the capital now operates at a considerably higher level of 
labour productivity than in the nation as a whole. The chapter went on to demonstrate 
the potential importance of productivity growth for manufacturing employment at the 
borough level, and argued that to view London’s manufacturing change as an experience 
only of decline, as in the space constraint and crowding out hypotheses and other 
theoretical perspectives outlined in chapter two, could not explain the trends and 
counter-trends that had taken place. The trend of labour productivity, it was argued, had 
the potential to explain or at least reconcile the different aspects of change in London’s 
manufacturing.
The observation of higher and increasing labour productivity in London raised a number 
of important issues and research questions. It was argued that further insights into the
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factors underpinning productivity growth could improve an understanding of the 
relationship between urban planning controls and manufacturing employment change, 
and also provide explanations for the nature of manufacturing change in the capital. For 
these reasons, chapters seven and eight went on to examine aspects of labour 
productivity in detail.
Chapter seven sought to investigate why London’s manufacturing was now operating at 
such a high level of labour productivity relative to the nation. The chapter introduced a 
body of literature which has been concerned explicitly with the factors underpinning 
spatial differences in productivity levels. Much of this research had focused on 
explaining why cities tended to exhibit higher average labour productivity in 
manufacturing, and empirical work had emphasised the importance of agglomeration 
effects and had determined systematic relationships between city size and higher 
productivity. This literature was particularly relevant because it was consistent with the 
findings of the thesis, but it was also important because it contrasted with the types of 
analyses and conclusions that had been reached in much of the geographical literature 
reviewed in chapter two. In addition, the spatial productivity research had developed a 
useful methodology to examine directly spatial productivity differences and it was 
thought that this could be applied to the British case.
The empirical investigations of chapter seven involved the use of econometric methods 
to estimate the significance of a set of explanatory variables on average and marginal 
labour productivity differences across the counties of Britain for the year 1991. The 
econometric models were specified within theoretical frameworks provided by standard 
aggregate production functions. The models generated some interesting results. In 
contrast to expectations, it was found that London did not appear as a unique location in 
productivity terms relative to other counties in the sense that the explanatory variables 
included in the models tended to explain London as much as any other area. It was 
found that agglomeration effects, both localisation and urbanisation, were insignificant 
factors in explaining spatial differences in average labour productivity. Effects that were 
found to be important included the particular structure of industry in an area, the 
proportion of part-time employees, and the skills of the manufacturing labour force. 
However, the most important factor appeared to be the ratio of capital to labour. The
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chapter showed that in London capital expenditure had been increasing at a much higher 
rate over the 1980s than in the nation as a whole. It was also argued that while payment 
to capital per employee was much higher in London’s manufacturing than elsewhere, as 
a proportion of total output, payment to capital was not so significantly different than 
the county average. The main factor differentiating London from other areas was that so 
few people were employed, creating an extremely high capital to labour ratio which 
captured the ‘London effect’, and thus in turn, provides one explanation for the 
insignificance of the London location variable in the productivity model.
Further, it was shown that while London manufacturing employs relatively few people, 
wages in manufacturing are significantly higher. The chapter demonstrated that while 
London may be more productive in terms of the number of employees, this is not the 
case in terms of labour costs. A second model developed in the chapter showed that the 
marginal productivity of labour was significantly influenced by the structure of industry, 
the skills of the labour force, and by the size of any county. The implication appeared to 
be, that in addition to being located in a large high-waged city, London’s industry was 
highly skilled and highly paid, and that these characteristics, particularly with respect to 
the changing structure of London’s manufacturing, could provide a good explanation for 
the phenomenal rate of labour productivity growth experienced in the capital.
Chapter eight turned to look at productivity change. It attempted to develop the 
hypothesis that London’s industry had moved towards higher wage and higher 
productivity industries. The chapter was divided into two parts. The first examined 
the structure and specialisation of London’s manufacturing and the second 
developed a model which isolates the employment effects of productivity growth; and 
results were presented for London.
Part one first addressed the issue of industrial structure. It showed that, in terms of both 
wages and labour productivity growth, London’s change could not be explained on the 
basis of structural factors alone. London’s industries faced very different labour costs 
than manufacturing in the nation as a whole, and likewise, labour productivity change 
could not be explained with respect to industrial structure given national sectoral 
productivity growth. This part of the chapter next examined London’s compositional
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change in terms of the two components of productivity growth - output and employment 
change. It was shown that London appeared to have experienced dual processes of 
change in manufacturing over the 1980s. On the one hand, specialisation in London 
manufacturing output was indicated to some extent, and on the other, relative and 
absolute decline in productive capacity characterised other manufacturing sectors. 
However, the data used in the chapter did not permit a detailed analysis of these issues, 
and one of the main conclusions of part one was that analysis of change in more detail 
would have to look beyond the existing categories of the SIC.
Part two developed a method to explore the employment consequences of productivity 
change. The results for London highlighted the relatively poor output performance of 
the capital’s manufacturing and showed that jobs had been shed due to an overall 
decline in productive capacity. However, the results also demonstrated that productivity 
growth could explain the majority of manufacturing employment losses in London over 
the 1984 to 1991 period, and that the employment consequences of productivity growth, 
over and above those created through output change, were exceptional in London 
relative to the other regions of Britain. Again, the analysis highlighted the dual trends of 
decline and productivity growth, and in conclusion it was argued that selective closure 
or out-migration, and the continuing comparative advantage of a London location for 
some sectors of manufacturing, are processes which hold potential to explain these 
trends.
Having summarised the main thesis findings with respect to each chapter, it is important 
now to emphasise the main themes that arise from the thesis as a whole and by way of 
concluding, to highlight the substantive contributions of the research. This is undertaken 
in the following three sections. First, the implications of the research for understanding 
the nature of manufacturing and manufacturing change in London are outlined. The land 
use planning implications of productivity-led employment decline are discussed next, 
relating the perspectives developed about London’s manufacturing to planning policy 
for the protection of jobs. Section 9.4 then discusses the wider implications of the thesis, 
particularly with respect to existing theories and analyses of urban economic change. 
Finally, some limitations of the thesis research are discussed, and questions that remain 
unanswered and some future research issues are outlined.
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9.2 Labour productivity and manufacturing change in London.
Manufacturing employment has declined severely and consistently in London over the 
1980s, as it has since the early 1960s. Previous studies of London’s economic change 
discussed in the thesis have reported this trend, and have often focused on attempting to 
explain job loss through processes of decline which are thought to have affected the 
capital in a most acute way. This thesis has taken a different approach to the issue of 
London’s job loss. It has examined a variety of different economic indicators to produce 
a somewhat more complex and dynamic account of manufacturing change than has been 
found in previous studies. It is the contention of this thesis, that to focus on job loss 
alone, and to explain this trend only in terms of processes of decline, is an over-simple 
view of manufacturing change in London. Such a view is likely to miss many of the 
important processes that underlie such change, and may even lead to a mis­
interpretation of what has actually been happening to London’s manufacturing.
The thesis has shown that despite the exceptional rate of job loss many areas of London 
have experienced a net entry of manufacturing firms over the 1980s, and that in certain 
years of the period examined, manufacturing output in the capital has actually expanded, 
and quite significantly in particular industries. The point is that much of the evidence 
presented has shown that manufacturing firms still want to be located in London, and 
furthermore that the output capacity of manufacturing is not in terminal decline. The 
thesis does not dispute the fact that manufacturing employment in the capital has been 
shed at a remarkably fast rate over the 1980s, but emphasises that job loss does not 
equate to a loss of industry per se, and that a more accurate account of London’s 
manufacturing change has to reconcile trends and counter trends within a framework 
which is able to recognise processes of growth and decline and is able to produce a more 
dynamic account of change.
The thesis focused on the observation of high and increasing labour productivity in 
London’s manufacturing, and argued that it is through an examination of change in this 
respect that inconsistencies and contradictions in evidence of change may be 
understood. The scale of productivity growth in the London manufacturing sector over 
the 1980s is an extremely important and surprising characteristic of change. The thesis
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has shown that, while labour productivity has grown throughout the nation in 
manufacturing industry, London stands out in this respect, being able to shed vast 
proportions of employment while, excluding recessionary periods, holding steady or 
declining slightly in output terms. Such was the productivity growth in London over the 
1980s that it transpires that manufacturing in the capital now exhibits a higher rate of 
average labour productivity than in the nation as a whole, or indeed, than in any other 
region of Britain.
Evidence presented in the thesis has indicated reasons which may explain these 
aggregate trends. It does not appear that high labour productivity in London is directly 
associated with the simple fact that London is a big city or with localisation effects as 
captured in traditional concepts of agglomeration economies. Instead, it would seem that 
it is characterised by a high wage and highly skilled manufacturing sector and with the 
increased use of capital. The overall labour cost of manufacturing in London is not 
significantly different than the nation as a proportion of total manufacturing output. In 
this respect it is perhaps not be surprising that London’s manufacturing employs so few 
people. The thesis has not been able to explore every variable that could potentially 
influence labour costs, though it would seem in addition to factors that arise from the 
use of capital that the size of London, the skills of the labour force and the types of 
industries that now exist in the capital are important.
This leads on to the related question of how high levels of labour productivity equate 
with ‘efficiency’ in manufacturing production. Labour productivity is often used as an 
index of economic competitiveness or efficiency, particularly at the national level. 
However, the results for the London manufacturing sector suggest that this 
interpretation may not be helpful. One issue raised by the research is that one of the 
most effective ways to increase urban manufacturing productivity may be through the 
complexities and dynamics of decline. It may be that more labour intensive industries, 
activities, or even establishments, are closing down or moving from the capital, leaving 
behind a ‘hard core’ of functions which benefit from the operating environment of 
London and are characterised by high skilled, high waged, and perhaps high value- 
added activities. If it is true that London has somewhat higher operating costs for 
manufacturing activities as suggested in the cost-based explanations outlined in chapter
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two, then this concept of selective out migration or closure provides a viable 
explanation. Industries exist in London only if they can offset the higher costs of the 
capital with the benefits offered, but these sectors are not necessarily more efficient, 
simply different. A parallel may be drawn in this respect with the concept of profit- 
cycles put forward by Markusen (1985) as discussed in chapter two. Markusen notes 
that in a period of negative of profits in a particular industrial sector “the closure of the 
oldest plants raises the average degree of mechanisation, which will show up as worker 
productivity increases” (Markusen, 1985, 38). Clearly, this comment is intended to 
explain an entirely different situation and has no direct bearing on cities, however, the 
common ground is in the concept of productivity growth induced through decline from 
the closure or relocation of older and less productive plants.
The thesis has presented no direct evidence of this detailed processes taking place. To 
do so, would necessarily have involved analysis at the firm level and it was not the 
intention of this research to produce such a study. However, much of the analysis 
conducted points towards this interpretation of manufacturing change and particularly 
with regard to the identification of the dual processes of growth and decline in different 
empirical investigations. It is the identification of these types of broad trends that has 
much to offer the understanding of the nature of London manufacturing change, and of 
what type of manufacturing exists in the capital today. Previous studies have looked at 
decline and closure of London’s manufacturing and, while the global city interpretation 
of London’s manufacturing change did suggest that some selectivity may be occurring 
within overall decline, this process was awarded slight regard and was seen in essence 
as an issue of minor importance. Yet, in labour productivity terms, it would seem that it 
is the issue of which sectors can still retain a comparative advantage in London that may 
be the critical process of change leading to the type of manufacturing that London has 
today which is characterised by high waged, highly skilled, and high productivity 
sectors.
As mentioned in chapter six, there are other factors which this thesis has not examined 
which may be important in contributing to increased labour productivity in London. It 
maybe that London manufacturing firms are now using labour in a different way and the 
rationalisation and intensification of labour inputs in manufacturing may have been
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important. Another possibility is that productivity gains may have been created through 
an increased propensity to contract-out service functions which were previously 
provided in-house in manufacturing. In London, the existence of a highly specialised 
and developed service sector perhaps offers more scope for this than elsewhere. Finally, 
and as discussed in full in section 9.5 below, a note of caution should be stressed 
regarding the SIC and many of the data sets used in this thesis. The SIC provides an 
industrial taxonomy which is constructed with reference to the end of product of an 
industry, and is not open to interrogation about the nature of the work being conducted. 
In relation to the issue of manufacturing labour productivity, it may be that to some 
extent the London figures are skewed by the presence of activities which are classed 
under manufacturing but are actually involved in more service sector -based activities. 
The GVA data used in this thesis do supposedly exclude non-production activities, 
however, it may be that in some cases this has not been possible. There is little that can 
be done to evaluate or change official published data sources, and problems such as this 
are a potentiality in any analysis of urban and regional economic change.
These are again much more detailed issues than this thesis has been able to consider, 
and could only be properly addressed through a firm level analysis. As discussed below, 
such a study would provide an important component of further research into labour 
productivity in London’s manufacturing. This research has demonstrated and isolated 
the importance of productivity growth for London’s manufacturing employment change. 
The interaction between output, wages and labour in London’s manufacturing is of a 
unique nature, and provides a crucial component in understanding the exceptional rate 
of job loss that has taken place over the 1980s.
9.3 Land use planning implications of productivity led employment decline.
It is extremely difficult to isolate the employment consequences which may have arisen 
in London through the use of land use planning controls to protect manufacturing jobs. 
The thesis approached this issue in a direct fashion by surveying London’s LPAs, and it 
was found that the majority of authorities did not believe their employment protection 
policies to have been successful over the 1980s. However, responses from the survey 
can only realistically relate the perspective of the LPAs and they certainly cannot
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explain definitively why these policies have not been successful. This particular 
question was addressed in a more indirect fashion by attempting to uncover at least 
some of the empirical context within which the policies operate, providing a basis for 
exploring why policies are perceived as unsuccessful.
Despite the focus of much previous literature it has been shown in this thesis that 
London’s manufacturing change does not simply involve the closure and migration of 
establishments. Most borough planning authorities have developed policies which seek 
to channel and guide the location of new manufacturing developments, indicating a 
continued demand for industrial land and premises in London. Planning applications for 
industrial use are still being submitted in London, and the number of manufacturing 
firms operating in the capital has declined only marginally over the 1980s. As regards 
planning for the protection of manufacturing jobs, the importance of this is that there 
appears to be a continuing justification for attempting to retain land and buildings in 
manufacturing use. The assertion that London is no longer a viable location for 
manufacturing industry is inaccurate and it is conceivable that the objective of retaining 
manufacturing uses could be realised in many cases. Crucially, the conventional view of 
London’s manufacturing change cannot explain the lack of success in policy objectives.
However, the important point is that despite continuing demands for manufacturing land 
and regardless of the small net exit of manufacturing firms that has taken place over the 
1980s, manufacturing jobs are still being lost at a most severe rate, and it is in this 
respect that LPAs do not believe that they have made a great deal of difference. The 
issue of London’s high and increasing levels of labour productivity offers some 
explanation for the perceived lack of policy success. Employment decline in London 
has, to a large extent, been led by productivity growth, and it may be that only tenuous 
links that exist between job loss and land use change. In other words, LPAs may have 
been able to retain manufacturing uses by protecting industrial land, but given the scale 
of productivity growth that has taken place in the capital over the 1980s this does not 
imply that jobs will have been retained.
A useful way of looking at this issue is to view both labour and land as inputs to 
production. The demands for labour and land are both derived demands, dependent of
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course upon the supply and price of each commodity, but also upon the demand that 
ultimately exists for manufacturing output. Employment protection policies attempt 
essentially to intervene in the land market with the hope of inducing labour market 
outcomes. However, the issue of labour productivity growth suggests that the derived 
demands for land and labour may be changing in ways which are to a large extent 
independent of one another, consequent upon the level of output, the technology under 
which manufacturing operates, the relative prices of factor inputs, and change in the 
nature of manufacturing itself. The retention of manufacturing land cannot influence the 
basic relationship between labour input and manufacturing output, which is itself 
constantly changing, and in the London case radically so.
The point being made is a simple one, however, evidence presented in this thesis has 
shown that in the London case it may be of critical importance as can be illustrated. In 
the most simple case, it may be that labour is being shed within existing manufacturing 
establishments. There are several reasons why this may happen including a fall in the 
demand for the output of this establishment, or as a result of relative gains that may be 
made through the reorganisation of labour inputs and the replacement of labour by 
capital. Many LPAs in the survey cited this broad type of job loss as being of the 
highest importance and yet it is precisely this kind of employment change that land use 
planning can have no control over. Another example of labour productivity change 
which could have far reaching implications for levels of labour and land demand could 
arise from the selective closure and out-migration of manufacturing industries. The 
possibility that there may be continuing comparative advantages arising from a London 
location for particular types of manufacturing activities has been cited as a strong 
explanation for the growth of labour productivity in the capital, however, it may also 
have important implications for land use planning intervention. It certainly is the case 
that LPAs cannot influence or control job loss which results from establishment closure, 
and many authorities made this point explicitly in their survey returns. It is also the case 
that LPAs have little control over the specific nature of manufacturing that remains or 
takes up land on earmarked sites, specifically with regard to changing labour demands. 
If a ‘shake-out’ has taken place in the London manufacturing sector over the 1980s 
leaving behind a more compact, higher skilled, and higher productivity sector, then 
there is little LPAs can do to protect jobs. They may have found that reduced labour and
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possibly land demands have resulted while manufacturing output may not have changed 
to any great extent, but given the scope of intervention permitted under the planning 
legislation, authorities are at a loss to control these broad shifts in any meaningful way.
On a more general level, it seems that one of the main problems underpinning attempts 
to protect jobs through land use planning intervention may stem from the importance of 
the pricing mechanisms which influence derived demands and which may not be 
directly expressed spatially. The thesis has shown that total labour costs in London form 
approximately as large a component of total manufacturing output as they do in other 
counties of Britain. London’s manufacturing may simply have a much smaller level of 
labour demand in terms of number of employees because workers are paid such 
considerably higher wages. Empirical investigations have shown that this higher wage 
can be explained by factors such as the size of London, the skills of the workforce and 
the structure of industry, in other words, primarily factors outside the realms of planning 
control. The shift of the London manufacturing base towards a higher skilled and highly 
paid manufacturing sector with a high capital to labour ratio may in turn be related to 
selective closure and out-migration effects induced through the higher operating costs in 
the capital, and again land use planning has little control over these pricing mechanisms 
and the change in the nature of manufacturing activities that they create.
The thesis has been concerned with uncovering the broad context within which 
employment protection policies operate, and draws out policy implications on this basis. 
It has not explored specific examples of labour productivity implications for land use 
planning policy. However, it does seem that productivity growth in the London 
manufacturing sector provides sound reasons for why job loss is not directly expressed 
in land use change and thus why planning policy can only achieve limited success. 
Previous interpretations of London’s manufacturing change would perhaps suggest that 
the lack of policy success derives only from the fact that the closure and out-migration 
of manufacturing establishments are outwith the scope of planning control. While this is 
true, the argument presented in this thesis differs because it stresses that London’s 
manufacturing change is not just one of decline but is much more dynamic and has not 
necessarily involved a major scale of firm and output loss. Chapter eight has shown that 
employment decline in London has been more strongly influenced by labour
295
productivity growth than it has by a fall in the demand for manufacturing output. It must 
be that this phenomenal rate of growth in London’s manufacturing labour productivity, 
and its unique importance within overall employment decline, has had a fundamental 
influence on the ability of LPAs to protect jobs. Indeed, this argument is consistent with 
the responses of the London LPAs described in chapter five, where it was found that the 
fundamental bases of job loss were not perceived as planning issues, but were thought 
instead to be based in processes largely directed by the ‘market’.
That is not to say that the protection of manufacturing land is a futile task, nor that 
labour productivity growth offers a single explanation for the perceived lack of success 
of employment protection policy. Evidence presented in this thesis suggests that 
demand still exists for manufacturing land in London and that firms still wish to be 
located in the capital, and in this sense justification still exists for earmarking sites for 
manufacturing purposes because it is still a viable land use. In a recent report published 
by the GoL (1996) the present author developed an input-output model of the London 
economy which showed that the London manufacturing sector was strongly linked into 
London’s expanding service sector and that substantial opportunities for growth existed 
in particular manufacturing industries. Where the issue of labour productivity comes 
into play is in terms of the expectation of labour demand from retaining manufacturing 
uses, and the argument of this thesis is that expectations have not be realised over the 
1980s and that labour productivity growth must play a critical role in this respect. Thus, 
for employment protection policy, the importance is to understand that London’s 
manufacturing is increasing labour productivity, it is shifting labour demand in terms of 
the skills required, and it is now much higher waged. These characteristics of changing 
labour demand may be in conflict with the employment objectives of many London 
authorities which were outlined in chapter three, particularly in terms of the 
redistributive effects of employment protection. Increasingly, authorities may have to 
consider other options to help the less skilled residents into permanent employment.
9.4 The wider context of the research findings.
Individual findings within this thesis are relevant to a range of previous research, as may 
be evident from the scope of literature reviewed in different chapters. However, in the
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opinion of the author, it is the observation and analysis of labour productivity which 
may have some wider implications for present and future research into geographical 
differences in economic and employment change. The following section relates the 
relevance of this aspect of the thesis to some contemporary and possible future issues in 
urban and regional studies.
The first point worthy of consideration is how the focus on labour productivity 
differentiates the present research from the types of urban economic analysis discussed 
in chapter two. In one respect, the research findings could be aligned with the cost-based 
explanations of urban deindustrialisation. The thesis has shown that high labour costs in 
London are likely to have been critical in influencing reduced demands for labour and 
has suggested that higher operating costs in the capital may have been instrumental in 
creating a selective process of decline. However, the important point in this thesis is that 
factor costs and inputs are considered in relation to output and thus in terms of labour 
productivity, and in this way a strong distinction is drawn between the influence of 
ultimate and derived demands in employment change. Many previous analysis of 
London’s economic change, including cost-based approaches, appear to have confused 
employment decline with a loss of industrial activity, attempting to explain job loss 
through processes of decline and ignoring the importance of how the output of industry, 
or ultimate demand for industrial produce, is actually changing in relation to factor 
inputs. It has been shown here that there is an important difference between jobs that are 
lost through output change and those which are shed as productivity grows, and since 
levels of productivity are spatially differentiated, the exclusion of this variable may 
represent an important deficiency of previous analyses.
It is widely recognised that the choice of indicator used to examine any economic 
change will strongly influence any conclusions reached about underlying causal 
influences. The examination of geographical differences in labour productivity is only 
one way of approaching spatial economic analysis, however in some important respects 
it may be particularly useful. Some of the most fundamental theories of economic 
geography reviewed in this thesis could be usefully examined in light of productivity 
changes. For example, a recent study of change in the London economy over the 1980s 
showed that when output and employment are considered together spatially in a measure
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of productivity, even the usefulness of basic concepts in economic geography such as 
deindustrialisation and tertiarisation can be challenged because these types of broad 
definition simply do not capture the complexities and contradictions inherent in spatial 
economic change (Graham, Spence, 1995).
In the context of this thesis, one of the most important potential contributions that could 
arise from a comprehensive spatial study of labour productivity relates to the 
observation of the urban-rural employment shift, and the general finding that urban 
areas are the focus of deindustrialisation. As shown in chapter two, urban-rural 
differences have formed a major preoccupation in the analysis of intra-regional 
employment change. However, if it is the case that labour productivity is spatially 
differentiated, and not just for reasons of industrial structure, then this has to be taken 
into account in exploring the urban-rural distinction. While the thesis has shown that 
London stands out from the other British conurbations in its extremely high level of 
manufacturing labour productivity, it may be that in other empirical contexts, for 
example across the European Union, urban productivity could provide a vital 
component in the explanation of urban and rural differences in industrial employment 
change. This point may also be relevant to the service industries. Graham and Spence 
(1995) have shown that high levels of productivity and productivity growth characterise 
London’s service industries as much as they do manufacturing. In the specific case of 
London, the point is that job change has to be understood in terms of labour productivity 
growth as well as that created through output change, and should not be simply 
categorised as a poor performance relative to the nation. It may be that this type of 
observation could be extended across the urban hierarchy, and that what is really being 
highlighted in the urban rural shift is a broad difference in labour productivity generated 
through differences in costs and the nature of the specific activities that take place in 
each broad area.
This underlines another important contribution that could be made through an explicit 
focus on labour productivity change in spatial economic analyses. As regards the urban 
economy in particular, higher rates of increased productivity not only offer a powerful 
explanation for experiences of job change, but also provide important indications of the 
types of activities that are now located in cities. In the London case, high wages and
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high skills requirements characterised the manufacturing industries that exist there 
today. In other empirical contexts, a study of labour productivity in specific industrial 
sectors could indicate important differences in the actual activities which are being 
conducted in different locations.
Labour productivity has received little serious attention in the mainstream geographical 
literature. Largely it has been treated as a side issue, being viewed as simply one factor 
which can lead to employment decline. It is the contention of this thesis that 
geographical theories of structural economic change have paid insufficient attention to 
the conclusions reached in the economics literature about the importance of productivity 
change. This is despite the fact that international economists who have become 
interested in ‘new’ economic geography have been using the idea of productivity growth 
to explain the spatial concentrations of industry, which result in non constant and 
increasing returns to scale. (Krugman, 1991; 1993)
To attempt to understand the underlying causes of spatial differences in productivity in 
manufacturing and service industries, and to demonstrate what the implications of these 
differences are for regional development and competitiveness, and for national 
productivity advance, would add a valuable dimension to contemporary understanding 
of urban and regional economic change. Particularly because the issue of labour 
productivity is likely to take on even more importance in the future. Traditionally, it has 
been assumed that productivity growth is likely to be much higher in manufacturing 
than service industries. However, factors such as service sector output expansion and 
computerisation as well as the familiar processes of rationalisation intensification and 
capitalisation are likely to be increasingly important in creating productivity growth in 
the service industries. It is crucial to understand how productivity growth is achieved in 
different economic sectors in different locations, and to examine possible differences 
between ‘positive’ regional productivity growth in which output and productivity grow, 
and that which is achieved through economic sectoral downsising, in which productivity 
increases but output declines. At the urban and regional levels productivity growth may 
not be universally beneficial particularly if it is associated with rising unemployment 
and production decline, and these issues should be of interest in social science today.
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Urban and regional analysis of labour productivity change should also have much 
relevance at a national level of economic concern. The rate of productivity growth can 
have extraordinary implications for the economic performance of nations, being thought 
to represent one of the main determinant of a nation’s standard of living in the longer 
term. (Porter, 1990). For example, a growth in total national productivity of 1.5% per 
annum would cause a doubling of output after 47 years, with all factor inputs held 
constant. The issue of regional differences in productivity in service and manufacturing 
industries is of vital importance to the wealth creating capacity and regional economic 
equality of nation states. As has been pointed out in the case of the United States, “low 
interest loans, tax breaks, industrial recruiting, and other traditional tools of American 
economic development policy probably could not combine to have such a powerful 
effect on regional economic growth” (Gerking, 1994,155). Furthermore, the reasons 
behind spatial differences in productivity may have important implications for national 
economic strategies because the competitiveness of regions in the international economy 
is dependent to a large extent upon productivity growth and the ways in which this 
growth is achieved.
In sum, the widespread introduction of labour productivity analyses into urban and 
regional studies would provide one means to examine the nature and causes of internal 
spatial economic differences and could provide an understanding of factors, both 
geographical and economic, which are important in national productivity performance, 
and in the competitiveness and employment performance of individual cities and 
regions. The present research has only examined labour productivity in one city and 
only in manufacturing industry. However in doing so hopefully it has shown how a 
focus on this aspect of change has much to offer the understanding of urban 
deindustrialisation.
9.5 Limitations of the research and questions that arise from the thesis.
To a large extent, the limitations of the thesis and the future research questions that arise 
are complementary. The thesis has examined London’s manufacturing change, and the 
implications of land use planning controls in a fairly aggregate way and has not 
employed detailed case study methods. Aggregate analyses have been useful in isolating
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important trends and in demonstrating the overall empirical context of industrial change 
in London over the 1980s. However, important limitations are associated with the type 
of enquiry used and it is the purpose of this final section to highlight some of the main 
research constraints and some major issues that ideally need to be explored.
In a practical sense, the use of aggregate data will always be fraught with difficulties of 
measurement and accuracy. It has already been mentioned in this thesis that the 
industrial categories of the SIC do not disclose the nature of actual activities being 
undertaken within any industry in any particular geographical location. As outlined in 
appendix one, this thesis has used the standard official definition of manufacturing as 
those industries which comprise divisions two to four of the 1980 SIC. However, it must 
be that many of the activities categorised as manufacturing, certainly in employment 
terms, are actually office-based jobs which are not truly involved in productive activity. 
In the case of London, the official definition of the printing and publishing industry as a 
manufacturing industry may be questioned from the point of view of there being 
similarities between many of these occupations and those of service sector orientated 
office activities. Likewise, many of the statistically defined service industries in the 
capital may in fact be ‘off-shoots’ of manufacturing or be dependent upon the 
manufacturing sector and this is not clear in the official statistics. This problem is 
compounded when different data sources are used together, and incompatibilities in 
classification will almost always arise. In essence, an aggregate analysis of secondary 
data sources allows for a degree of comprehensiveness and for the use of a variety of 
analytical tools that would not be available through primary research methods, however, 
it is at the cost of having to accept official working definitions rather than being able to 
create what may be more suitable taxonomies for the particular research question.
While this in itself is an important limitation of the present study, more profound 
constraints on the research arise from the basic choice of aggregate rather than detailed 
analysis. Many of the thesis findings, particularly as regards labour productivity growth, 
point towards processes which could only really be identified properly at the firm level. 
As with any research project, time and resource constraints necessarily fashion the 
limits of the analytical approach that may be adopted. This thesis has asked broad 
questions about labour productivity and its effects on London’s manufacturing through
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statistical methods, however, it is recognised that a qualitative firm level analysis would 
shed light on the specific ways in which manufacturing firms make labour productivity 
gains and how changes in the derived demand for labour actually work in detail.1
A final limitation of the research to be discussed lies in the scope of analysis of land use 
planning policy. The thesis has considered the views of LPAs on this issue, but if 
possible, it would have been equally interesting to seek the views of industrialists, and 
the users of London’s manufacturing space on the influence of land use planning 
controls. This type of analysis could even be extended to seek the views of London’s 
manufacturers on the importance of space constraints and crowding out, and how 
planning helps or hinders the availability of manufacturing space in the capital today.
On the basis of the discussion above, and given the wider context of this thesis as 
outlined in section 9.6 above, some central research questions which remain unanswered 
are as follows : What are the mechanisms at the firm level in London manufacturing 
which have induced such a phenomenal rate of productivity growth? Are there specific 
common characteristics which define manufacturing activities that continue to demand a 
London location, and those that do not? What are the factors that underpin the 
comparative advantage of a London location for manufacturing and what aspects of 
London are behind firm closure and relocation? How do manufacturers in the capital 
view the availability and appropriateness of premises, and do planning controls make a 
difference? Are higher rates of labour productivity growth common to the urban 
environment in general and if so why?
The ways in which the research could be developed further to approach these and other 
research questions may be briefly sketched out. Given additional time and resources it 
would be important to conduct firm-level investigations into the nature of 
manufacturing change in London. This could conceivably be done through two 
complementary approaches. First, survey based methods could be employed to provide 
case study evidence of the detailed mechanisms behind reductions in the demand for
1 Interestingly, a recent paper which set out to explore employment generation in small to medium sized 
enterprises through firm level survey based methods did fmd labour productivity gains in selected 
London manufacturing industries. (North, Smallbone, 1995) On the basis o f manager’s responses they 
found that increased use o f capital and more flexible use of labour were important processes 
underpinning increased productivity.
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labour in different industrial sectors in different areas within the capital. Firms could 
also be questioned on specific aspect of planning policy. Second, using commercially 
available firm-level data, econometric investigations of labour productivity could be 
conducted for different industries in the capital to attempt to isolate the importance of 
location in returns to scale. The purpose of this second method would be to differentiate 
the types of manufacturing that may benefit from specific urban locations from those 
that do not.
For broader considerations, the present research could be advanced by moving the focus 
away from London manufacturing alone to consider labour productivity in different 
manufacturing and service industries in a broader range of cities, perhaps across the 
European Union. It may be that the types of analyses presented in this thesis, and 
particularly those of chapters seven and eight, hold the potential to probe into some of 
the fundamental mechanisms which affect economic and employment change in cities 
and regions across national boundaries. To ask general rather specific spatial questions 
would allow for a more comprehensive evaluation of the actual research contribution 
that can be made through analyses of labour productivity change.
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Appendix one : Sources of empirical data and classifications used in the thesis.
Appendix one describes sources of data which are used in this thesis, and associated 
classifications and definitions. Many of the data sets have been obtained from the 
National On-line Manpower Information System (NOMIS) data base held at the 
University Of Durham, or from the CSO publication Regional Trends (CSO, 1979- 
1994). Details on these sources can be found in the NOMIS user manuals, and in the 
appendix to Regional Trends. The descriptions that follow, comprise summaries from 
published documents and personal communications with the bodies responsible for 
collecting and publishing the data.
Data classifications and definitions.
Excluding data presented in chapter eight, all employment, output and firm data used in 
the thesis are classified under the 1980 SIC. Three levels of disaggregation of the 1980 
SIC are referred to in this thesis. Activity Headings are the most detailed level used 
and comprise 335 activities in industrial structure, the 61 Classes form the third level of 
the 1980 SIC, and 11 divisions form the fourth and top level of the SIC.
Reference is made to terms throughout the thesis which relate to these levels of 
disaggregation. Manufacturing, as conventionally defined by the Department of 
Employment, refers to the aggregation of divisions 2 to 4 inclusive and excludes 
construction. A further distinction is made within manufacturing industry: that of high 
and low technology manufacturing industry. Using the definition provided by Hall et 
al (1987) high technology industry comprises the following activity headings : 2570, 
3302, 3441, 3442, 3443, 3444, 3453, 3454 and 3640. Low technology manufacturing 
simply comprises all activities within divisions 2-4 less high technology industry.
Services refers to the aggregation of divisions 6 to 9 inclusive and excludes 
construction. Within services, producer services are sometimes referred to and for 
purposes of data analysis, the thesis has adopted the definition provided by Sassen 
(1991) which comprises activity headings 8140, 8150, 8200, 8310, 8320, 8340, 8350,
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8370, 8380, 8394, 8395, 8396, 8410, 8420, 8430, and 9631. Non-producer services 
includes all activities in divisions 6-9 less producer service employment.
In chapter eight, employment and output data are introduced which have been classified 
under the 1992 SIC (see below). These data were available for manufacturing industries 
at the section level of disaggregation which comprises sections DA to DN.
Any other sectoral definitions used or different classification are described at the 
appropriate place in the text or in the discussion below.
Data sources.
1) The Census of Employment: employment and unit size data.
Unless other wise specified (see Chapter 8), the employment data used in this thesis are 
collected via the Department of Employment’s (DE) Censuses of Employment (CoE), 
and made available through NOMIS. The CoE is a comprehensive postal survey 
questionnaire of employees in employment, analysed using the 1980 SIC. The register 
of addresses used for the census is derived from the Inland Revenue addresses for 
collecting employers income tax under the Pay-As-You-Eam (PAYE) scheme, and is 
thus a workplace based census. The address to which a census form is sent is referred to 
as a reporting unit, and each unit is asked to provide various details regarding the 
number of employees for each worksite and the distinct industrial activity. The census 
is updated triennially and polls all units with 25 or more employees, and a sample of 
those with 24 or fewer. It does not include information on the self-employed. The DE 
produces employment estimates on a quarterly basis each year. However, these 
estimates are not available at detailed levels of industrial and geographical 
disaggregation, and furthermore, their reliability is questionable because they are 
simply projections based upon the previous full census. Their use in this thesis has 
therefore been deliberately limited, and the focus of analysis is on the more 
comprehensive and reliable census figures.
324
In its most disaggregated form, employment data is available for activity headings at the 
ward level.
It should be stressed here that the CoE indicates the number of employees engaged 
within industries, it gives no indication of the nature of occupations being conducted.
As regards manufacturing, this means that one cannot distinguish between office based 
or non-office based employment or between ‘productive’ and non-productive 
manufacturing. This point is highlighted in chapter four.
In addition to the employment figures the CoE has, since 1987, also allowed access to 
the number of data units reporting to the census, and gives a breakdown of these units in 
terms of size, defined by number of employees. These units, do not correspond to firms 
or companies, but are roughly approximate to workplaces.
2) Manufacturing output data.
The principal source of output data for manufacturing industry are the Gross Value 
Added (GVA) figures collected via the Census of Production (CoP) and published in 
Regional Trends. The CoP is a yearly workplace based census of United Kingdom 
businesses engaged in industrial production. Prior to 1987 the reporting unit to the CoP 
was the establishment, and these were asked to exclude where possible non-production 
activity in their returns. In 1987, the system was changed to used companies as the main 
reporting units and the summary volumes stated that companies were generally no 
longer asked to exclude non-production activities, although it is not made clear what 
these activities actually involve. Personal communication with Mr Dam Barnes at the 
CSO Newport office clarified these issues. It would seem that non-production activities 
primarily comprise office and transport functions. The CSO were anxious that the data 
should be consistent over time and so were still concerned about non-production 
activities after 1987. The CSO anticipated that the new company based system may 
result in large mixed activity companies reporting all data from one geographical 
location when production could be spread across various regions. For this reason, 
companies are asked to make separate returns to the census for each of their production 
activities on an establishment basis. As regards headquarter functions, for example in
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London, Mr Barnes stated that the CSO would have excluded these activities from 
published data prior to 1987, and since then have attempted to distribute GVA from 
headquarters to regional establishments on the basis of employment. In this way the 
CSO are confident that headquarter functions should not bias the GVA estimates.
The London GVA figures are for manufacturing industry as a whole (sum of divisions 
2-4) and are available from 1984 to 1991 for London, and from 1987 to 1991 at the 
borough level. GVA is the preferred measure of manufacturing output used in the 
literature, largely because it excludes bought in services which are “a significant and 
increasing proportion of net output” (Tyler, Rhodes, 1986). Specifically, the CSO 
define GVA as the value of total sales and work done, less the value of purchases, less 
payments for industrial services received, less net duties and levies, and less the cost of 
non-industrial services, rates, and motor vehicle licences.
The CSO does not publish the regional and district data in constant prices because 
inflation varies spatially throughout the country. This creates unavoidable inaccuracy in 
applying a national deflator to the regional and district data. For analysis in this thesis, 
however, time-series comparison was essential. The CSO provided a consistent national 
price index of manufactured output from 1984 to 1991 in constant 1990 prices. This 
deflator has been cited in the literature as the most appropriate for GVA data (Borooah, 
Lee, 1991) and has been used to estimate the figures in real terms.
In chapter eight a different source of output data, workplace based Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), is introduced. This GDP data is disaggregated for manufacturing 
industries at the section level of the 1992 SIC. There is no clear account of the 
differences between GVA and GDP in the published documents, however like the GVA 
figures, GDP does exclude bought in services (Tyler, Rhodes, 1986). Mr Alan Smith at 
the London CSO office stresses that the differences between the two indicators, arise 
not so much conceptually, but in accounting methods used to compile the figures. 
Officially, regional GDP is measured as the sum of all incomes earned from the 
production of goods and services at factor cost. In a perfectly competitive economy, the 
value of output, or incomes earned, would be equivalent to the total costs of production. 
In a real world economy the imposition of taxes and subsidies distorts this relationship
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and factor cost is a term which describes the value of output at market prices, less taxes 
on expenditure, and plus the subsidies to production.
The London workplace based manufacturing GDP data were provided for the purposes 
of this thesis by Mr Bob Cooper at the CSO. These figures are estimates of GDP based 
on information from the CoP and are calculated to correspond to national figures of 
GDP, and to regional and county estimates of GVA. Difficulties arise in comparison of 
the GVA and GDP figures for London because the data are produced under different 
SICs. However, since the disaggregated GDP figures are essentially based on CoP data 
the two should be approximate, and in fact the raw data show that they are of an almost 
identical order of magnitude. The GDP data are not published in constant prices and to 
obtain time series data a national implied price deflator of GDP was used which was 
supplied by the CSO.
3) Firm data : VAT registration and deregistration data.
These data are produced by the DTI and made available through NOMIS. They give 
information on the number of businesses which register and deregister for VAT each 
year, and also of the total stock of registered businesses at the end of each year. The 
data are available at the Local Authority District (LAD) level and are disaggregated by 
11 industrial groups. One point worth stressing about this data set is that the definition 
of manufacturing available is actually slightly different than for the other sources. The 
VAT data define a category called production which is the summation of divisions 1-4 
of the 1980 SIC, rather than the standard definition of manufacturing which 
incorporates divisions 2-4. The implications of this difference are described in the thesis 
where the data are introduced.
4) Commercial and industrial floorspace statistics (CIFS).
The CIFS data, which were published each year until 1986 (DoE, 1981-1986), describe 
industrial and commercial property in England. The data are available at the LAD level, 
for six land use categories : commercial offices, shops and restaurants, shops with living 
accommodation, warehouses (covered), warehouses (open land and storage) and
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industry. The data were compiled by the Inland Revenue for the purposes of rating 
properties and the six land use categories are based on Inland revenue use classes. 
Industrial floorspace comprises most private manufacturing and include office 
floorspace within industrial premises. Properties excluded from the data set include 
establishments which contain so many different buildings that they are sufficiently 
complex to require special consideration for valuation purposes.
5) The London Development Monitoring System (LDMS).
The LDMS has been developed by the London Research Centre (LRC), and contains 
data derived from planning applications, submitted to the 32 boroughs and the City of 
London, for major development over 1000m throughout London. This data is not 
publicly accessible, however the LRC have permitted access for the purposes of this 
thesis. The LDMS is the most comprehensive planning data set that exists in London, 
however the most reliable data only runs from 1987 to the present day. The LDMS 
record the type of use and floorspace under categories of the 1987 UCO. The primary 
focus in this thesis is on data relating to the B2 (general industrial) and B3 (light 
industrial) use classes. The other special industrial classes B4-B7 are not recorded by 
the LDMS because such an insignificant amount of this space exists within the capital. 
Cowan and Gordon (1993) have taken use classes B2 and B3 as representative of 
manufacturing use and the same definition is used here. Two points of caution about the 
use of the LDMS should be raised. First, first the data quality varies by borough and 
inaccuracies do not permit the use of floorspace measurements. Second, the LDMS only 
records developments of over 1000m and thus does not provide fully comprehensive 
information on development activity in London.
6) New Earnings Survey (NES).
NES data are introduced in chapter eight. The NES is a sample survey of the earnings of 
employees in employment carried out in April of each year by the DE. The survey 
measures gross earnings of a 1% sample of employees, converted to a weekly and 
hourly basis where normal basic hours were reported. In the published tables (DE, 
1984-1991), data are disaggregated at the class level of the 1980 SIC, and for four
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employee groups : male manual workers, male non-manual workers, female manual 
workers, and female non-manual workers. For London however, many entries are 
missing in the published data, indeed, it is only for the male manual category that a 
sufficient number of entries were available for analysis. Discussion in Regional Trends 
confirms that data is only published at the regional level where the number of 
employees reporting in the survey were 50 or more and the standard error of average 
earnings 5% or less.
Where other sources of data used in the thesis they are described in the appropriate 
places in the text.
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Appendix two : The statutory and administrative bases of the London planning 
system.
Town and Country Planning in Britain.
For the purposes of brief explanation, three central components of the British town and 
country planning system may be defined (Nuffield, 1986). First, a system of 
governmental and quasi-govemmental agencies established to administer and undertake 
the functions of town and country planning; second, a system of development plans 
which outline policies and proposals for the development and use of land; and third, a 
system of development control, which with certain exceptions, requires the consent of 
the appropriate planning authority to undertake ‘development’ as defined in the 
legislation. These three components, which are entirely inter-related, were first fully 
established in the foundation Act of 1947. The 1947 Act was amended several times and 
consolidation Acts for England and Wales have been made in 1962,1971 and 1990. 
Currently the principle Act relating to town and country planning is the Town and 
Country Planning Act 1990, although other Acts created in 1990 and 1991 are also 
relevant (Grant, Heap, 1991). However, while important legislative changes have 
occurred since the 1947 Act, in essence the three elements defined above still comprise 
the basic framework for land use planning in Britain. It is worth discussing each 
component of planning in turn.
The institutional arrangements for town and country planning are essentially 
hierarchical in nature, with national government bodies being concerned with national 
and strategic planning policy, which constrains or influences the scope of local 
governmental and quasi-govemmental planning functions below. Overall responsibility 
for the administration of town and country planning in England and Wales rests with the 
Secretary of the State for the Environment. The 1947 Act charged the predecessor of the 
Secretary of State, the Minister of Town Planning, with the responsibility of “securing 
consistency and continuity in the framing of a national policy with respect to the use and 
development of land” (Grant, Heap, 1991,10015). Following the dissolution of the 
Ministry of Housing and Local Government under the Secretary of State for the 
Environment Order 1970, this statutory obligation was removed. However it is generally
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accepted that the basic role defined in the 1947 Act has continued since (Cullingworth, 
Nadin, 1994).
To allow this general role to be performed, the planning legislation has defined a 
number of important duties for the Secretary of State. These are the making of 
regulations and orders relating to town planning, for example the Use Classes Order and 
General Development Order; the approval of certain actions of LPAs; the determination 
of appeals against LPA decisions; the making of judicial determinations on planning 
issues, such as whether any proposed development is unlawful or not; and the issuing of 
directions were it is though appropriate, which may take the form of general directions, 
for example laying down some general form or planning procedures, or may be more 
specific, for example the ‘calling in’ of a particular planning application by direction for 
his own decision. The Secretary of State also has a number of default powers which can 
be used to ensure consistency and continuity in planning policy. For example, if the 
Secretary of State considers that a planning authority have failed in their obligation to 
undertake a statutory duty, then default powers may be used to permit the Secretary to 
undertake this duty.
Another important function which allows the Secretary of State to perform the broad 
role outlined above, is in the communication of central policy on town planning issues. 
The Secretary of State, through the DoE produces policy guidance which is of crucial 
importance to local planning authorities in drawing up their development plans, or in 
making development control decisions. There are various ways in which this guidance is 
issued. Since 1989, the series of Planning Policy Guidance notes (PPGs) have become 
the primary mechanism for the communication of government policy in substantive 
areas of planning, with Minerals Policy Guidance notes (MPGs), and Derelict Land 
Grant Advice notes (DLGAs) also being of importance. DoE circulars, which were the 
main source of planning policy output from the DoE before the introduction of PPGs, 
tend now to be concerned largely with the explanation of statutory procedures. Other 
main sources of central government policy guidance include Regional Policy Guidance 
Notes (RPGs), which provide strategic advice for the regions of England, and 
Development Control Policy notes, now being phased out, which provide advice to 
planning authorities on development control issues. Mention has been made of some of
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the main guidance issued by central government, however, in the communication and 
interpretation of central policy on planning ministerial statements, white papers, green 
papers, directions, appeal decisions and the like, may all be taken into account.
Thus, the Secretary of State, through the DoE, operates in both a quasi-judicial capacity, 
acting as arbiter in planning disputes, and as a developer of policy (Telling, Duxbury, 
1993; Cullingworth, Nadin, 1994). Other central government departments such as the 
Department of Transport, the Department of Natural Heritage, the Ministry of 
Agriculture Forestry and Food, are also importance in certain land use planning issues, 
and planning authorities must notify these departments of certain development 
proposals and planning policies.
The system of governmental and quasi-govemmental institutions involved in planning 
at the local level is not uniform throughout the country. Different types of planning 
authorities in different geographical areas are involved in different planning functions. 
The next section of this appendix considers the institutions involved in the London 
planning system. A discussion of the different institutions involved in British planning 
is not relevant to this thesis. Instead it is sufficient to simply provide a background to 
local planning in Britain generally, which is basically concerned with the remaining two 
elements of the British town and country planning system outlined above.
The origins of the development plan system can be traced back to the Housing, Town 
Planning, Etc. Act of 1909. However, it was not until the Town and Country Planning 
Act of 1947, that each planning authority was required by statute to draw up a plan 
which should show the proposed pattern of land use for twenty years ahead. The nature 
of the development plan system in England has changed substantially since the 1947 
Act, and most significantly under the Town and Country Planning Act of 1968, which 
made a fundamental change to the development plan system by enacting a two tier 
system of plans which distinguished between strategic and detailed tactical issues 
(Cullingworth, Nadin, 1994; Rydin, 1993; Hall, 1989b). The essential features of the 
1968 development plan system are still in place in much of Britain today, and certainly 
“the concept of development control within the framework of a development plan is still 
central to the town planning system” (Purdue, Young, Rowan-Robinson, 1989, 8).
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In very general terms, the development plan for an area sets out the policies and general 
proposals of the LPA for the development and use of land in their area. In considering 
planning applications, LPAs were expressly directed under the 1947 Act to have regard 
to the provisions of the development plan and any other material considerations. Thus, 
the plan was to form an important consideration in development control, though it is 
only one consideration. This highlights an important aspect of the British planning 
system - its highly discretionary nature. Traditionally the development plan has 
provided a generalised policy background and was not intended as a finite statement of 
proposed development control decisions. More recently, the 1991 Planning, Land and 
Compensation Act introduced Section 54A, which moves towards a more plan-led 
planning system, one in which the development plan will form the main consideration in 
development control decisions. However, as Cullingworth and Nadin (1994) note, it is 
too early to be sure about the consequences of this change, and for the purposes of this 
thesis which is concerned with the 1981 to 1991 period the development plan system 
can be regarded as consisting of a patchwork of generalised policies which form an 
important consideration in local authority development control decisions.
The third major element of the planning system concerns the control of new 
development. The scope of development control is set out under the relevant planning 
legislation. Under section 12 of the 1947 Act, development was defined as the carrying 
out of building, engineering, mining or other operations in, on, over or under land, or 
the making of any material change in the use of any building or other land. However, 
the 1947 Act also placed certain activities outwith the scope of the development control 
system including construction of buildings for purposes of agriculture and forestry, and 
certain changes of use or operations permitted under the Town and Country Planning 
Uses Classes Orders (UCO) and the Town and Country Planning General Development 
Orders (GDO).
Planning authorities can either grant, refuse or place conditions on applications for 
development. Applicants aggrieved by the decision of a planning authority may appeal 
to the Secretary of State for the Environment. As mentioned previously, in deciding 
upon an application planning authorities must take account of the provisions of the
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approved development plan and other ‘material considerations’. The scope of material 
considerations is not defined in the legislation, although they could include planning 
matters related to central government policy and advice, court decisions and precedent, 
as well as issues less directly related to planning such as social, personal, financial and 
amenity considerations (Heap, 1991, Bruton, Nicholson, 1987).
It should be stressed that much planning activity in Britain takes place outside this 
narrowly defined statutory framework and involves agencies other than central and local 
government. For example, Urban Development Corporation make plans and carry out 
development control in many British cities, and areas such as national parks, new towns 
and enterprise zones are outwith the scope of normal local planning authority control 
(Bruton, Nicholson, 1987). Furthermore, increasingly the making of policy in the 
British planning system is influenced by the policy agenda at the level of the European 
Union, particularly regarding environmental issues (Cullingworth, Nadin, 1994; Rydin, 
1993). Thus, it must be recognised that the planning system in Britain is not simply a 
function of the central and local government agencies. However, in this thesis the 
concern is with particular aspects of planning control which come within the legislative 
confines of statutory local planning, and much less emphasis is placed on quasi- 
govemmental or non-statutory forms of planning intervention. The following section 
describes the statutory arrangements for planning in London.
Statutory and administrative arrangements for planning in Greater London in the 1980s.
The institutional arrangements for planning in London have changed radically over the 
1980s. Central to these changes have been the important reforms arising from the Local 
Government Act of 1985 which abolished the Greater London Council (GLC), and with 
it, the then existing administrative arrangements for the strategic planning of the Greater 
London conurbation.
Some authors have argued that the abolition of the GLC may be considered more as a 
substantial modification to the structure of London’s government than as a fundamental 
reform (Travers et al, 1991). Both before and after the abolition of the GLC, the thirty 
two boroughs and the City of London formed the primary units of local government in
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London, and thus Travers et al argue that “the existing structure of government in 
London was created in 1965” (Travers et al, 1991,4). In terms of land use planning, 
however, the GLC did have important functions, being the LPA for Greater London as a 
whole, and since the abolition of the GLC and the metropolitan councils an important 
debate as to the future of strategic planning in Britain has emerged (Breheny, 1991; 
Hebbert, 1990; Roberts, 1990; Wannop, 1992).
Following most, but not all, of the recommendations of the Herbert committee report on 
the review of London government produced in 1960, the London Government Act of 
1963 was passed, the provisions of which came into operation in 1965. The Act 
established the GLC and defined an area of 1,600 square kilometres as its jurisdiction, 
Greater London, and also created thirty two all purpose borough councils within this 
area, providing identical powers for the unchanged Corporation of the City of London. 
These new institutional arrangements replaced the London County Council (LCC), the 
twenty eight metropolitan boroughs, the county council of Middlesex and the county 
boroughs of Croydon, East Ham and West Ham. Considerable parts of Essex, 
Hertfordshire, Kent and Surrey were also included within the new Greater London area. 
(Cullingworth, Nadin, 1994)
One of the main reasons behind the new institutional arrangements, and particularly 
behind the creation of a London-wide council, was the need for more effective strategic 
metropolitan planning (Gowling, Leith, 1988; Hebbert, 1991). The London Government 
Act of 1963 laid down provisions for the planning of greater London. The GLC were 
established as the local planning authority for Greater London as a whole, with further 
provision that the boroughs would also be local planning authorities for certain purposes 
(Heap, 1982). Section 25 part 3 of the 1963 Act required the GLC to prepare a 
development plan which should “lay down considerations of general policy with respect 
to the use of land in the various parts of Greater London including, in particular, 
guidance as to the future road system” (London Government Act 1963 quoted in GLC, 
1969, 9). This was to consist of a written statement and a map, and was to be concerned 
with broad policies and strategies for the future of London as a whole. Section 25 part 4 
of the Act required the boroughs to prepare local development plans, intended to be 
essentially structure plans, which would restate the relevant provisions of the GLC’s
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development plan (Collins, 1994). Following the Town and Country Planning Act of 
1971, some modifications were made to this development plan system. From then until 
1986, the GLDP was to be regarded as the structure plan for London, borough 
responsibility for the production of local development plans was removed. Instead, the 
1971 Act allowed the boroughs to prepare local plans, and thus introduced the principles 
of the Planning Advisory Group (PAG) development plan system as interpreted by the 
1968 Town and Country planning Act, into the London planning system.
A two tier planning system was therefore established in London. The upper tier was 
responsible for the production of the London structure plan, the GLDP; the overseeing 
of certain types of development of strategic importance; the ‘calling in’ of applications 
of ‘strategic significance’ from the boroughs; and the designation of action areas within 
Greater London. The primary planning responsibilities of the lower tier of boroughs 
were in the control of development and the preparation of local plans within the context 
of the GLDP. The GLDP was finally approved on the 9th of July 1976. Subsequent 
attempts to update it were unsuccessful and it remained unchanged until abolition in 
1986. The actual substance of the GLDP and of borough planning policy over this 
period is reviewed in Gowling and Leith (1988) and Collins (1994).
Following approval of the GLDP, the development plan for any borough in London 
consisted of the provisions of the GLDP, together with any notices given by the 
Secretary of State, and any provision of a local plan being applicable to the district 
(Heap, 1982). In matters of development control then, the boroughs would have regard 
to this development plan as well as the other material considerations which must be 
considered. Thus, the basic statutory institutional structure of planning in London did 
not appear dissimilar to that two tier system which existed in the rest of Britain 
following the PAG report and the Town and Country Planning Act of 1971.
However, while the division of planning functions between the boroughs and the GLC 
is characteristic of the general two tier system, due to the physical size of the boroughs 
and the wide variety of functions that they performed, the situation in London was 
unique (Cullingworth, 1985; Young, 1984). The relationship between the GLC and the 
boroughs was not straight-forward with much overlapping of functions, and as such was
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not clearly hierarchical in nature (Hebbert, 1993; Cullingworth, 1985). In fact, as 
Cullingworth notes, and as the GLC themselves pointed out, “borough plans prepared 
within the ‘context ‘of the GLDP may in themselves raise issues which require a 
revision of that context, and as such the GLDP should be regarded as a conceptual plan 
laying down a set of principles for the future development of London which will have to 
undergo a process of validation extending perhaps over several years” (GLC, 1969, 9).
The planning system in London until 1986 therefore, was not necessarily the type of 
hierarchical arrangement implied in the legislation. As mentioned previously, the 
Herbert committee report stressed that an overwhelming weakness of the then London 
planning system was the absence of a London wide authority capable of undertaking 
strategic land use and transport planning (Hall, 1989a). The most important impetus 
behind the reorganisation of London government was to create a single planning 
authority for the metropolis as a whole. However, in practice the 33 boroughs became 
planning authorities in their own right, and tended to dominate metropolitan planning in 
London, with many boroughs refusing to cooperate with GLC planning policy (Hebbert, 
1991; Eversley, 1984). As a result, the GLC’s strategic objectives were in many cases 
frustrated, particularly in relation to roads, public housing and even in the creation of a 
metropolitan land use strategy (Hebbert, 1991). Hall (1989a) argues that “the problem of 
the GLC was one of flawed design, being overly restricted from the top by central 
government and lacking the powers to command consistency in borough policy below” 
(Hall, 1989a).
The 1983 white paper ‘Streamlining the Cities’ announced the governments intention to 
abolish the metropolitan councils of England citing efficiency as the main rationale (GB 
Minister without Portfolio, 1983). To this end the Local Government Act of 1985 was 
passed, being “an Act to abolish the Greater London Council and the metropolitan 
county councils; to transfer their functions to the local authorities in their areas and, in 
some cases to other bodies; and to provide for other matters consequential on, or 
connected with; the abolition of these councils” (Local Government Act 1985, quoted in 
Travers et al., 1991). The speed at which the abolition legislation was enacted has 
received some attention. As Hebbert (1993) points out, while local government in 
Britain, in the absence of a written constitution, can be created or abolished by a
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majority in parliament; previous reorganisations of local government were enacted after 
detailed consultation and evaluation, and this was not evident prior to the 1985 Act.
The outcome of the 1985 Act for London, was that the GLC ceased to exist and its 
functions were distributed amongst a variety of bodies. The statutory responsibilities for 
land use planning in London, following the abolition of the GLC, have been divided 
amongst a number of different institutions. Although the 32 London boroughs and the 
City of London Corporation are now the prime bodies responsible for land use planning 
in London, their activities are influenced by and must accord with, the land use planning 
functions of other important institutions. Central government, through the Department 
of the Environment (DoE), has assumed important roles in the planning of London, 
essentially establishing the Secretary of State for the Environment as the strategic 
planning authority for London. In exercising his planning function, the Secretary of 
State may take advice from other bodies, and hence, other institutions come into play 
which are important in the planning of London, notably the London Planning Advisory 
Committee (LPAC) and the London and South East Regional Planning Conference 
(SERPLAN). To achieve an understanding of how the arrangements for land use 
planning in London work in practice since 1986, it is worth considering in turn the 
different roles of the main institutions involved.
Under the 1985 Act the London Boroughs and the City of London became the primary 
planning authorities in London. The most important land use planning functions of the 
boroughs are the preparation of Unitary Development Plans (UDPs), and the exercise of 
development control.
The Act established the legislative basis for UDP preparation, laying down guidelines 
on the form and content of UDPs, and the procedures to be followed, which have 
subsequently been clarified in circulars, regulations and planning policy guidance notes. 
A UDP is essentially an amalgamation of the structure and local plans which still exist 
in the non-metropolitan areas, and is to comprise two parts (Grant, Heap, 1991). Part I is 
analogous to the structure plan, and should be a broad development and land use 
strategy consisting of a written statement of the authority’s general policies for the 
development and use of land within their areas. The legislation also requires that in the
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preparation of Part I UDPs, local authorities are required to have regard to any regional 
or strategic planning guidance issued by the Secretary of State; any policies or proposals 
of an Urban Development Corporation (UDC) within the local authority area; social, 
economic and environmental considerations; the resources likely to be available for the 
plan; and any relevant national policy guidance. Part II of a UDP resembles a local plan, 
and translates the general strategy of Part I into detailed land use proposals, providing a 
framework for development control. “Part II contains a written statement of the 
authority’s proposals for the development and use of land; a map showing proposals on 
an ordnance survey base; over a reasoned justification for the general policies in part 1 
and the proposals in Part II of the plan” (DoE, 1992). The UDP may be adopted by the 
borough council following the necessary publicity of the plan policies and the results of 
any public local inquiry that has taken place. However, the Secretary of State has 
reserve powers which allow the calling in or amendment of any UDP as is seen fit. 
(Heap, 1991)
As mentioned previously, the 1990 Planning Compensation Act requires that in 
formulating UDPs, authorities must have regard to regional or strategic guidance as well 
as any current national policies. For the London conurbation, it is required that Part I of 
borough UDPs should reflect the strategic guidance of the Secretary of State. Once all 
Greater London UDPs are completed the network of Part I’s will form the basis of the 
strategic development plan for London. As the DoE point out “strategic guidance will 
assume less importance following UDP adoption since the UDP will have been 
formulated having regard to it. The UDP will of course be the statutory development 
plan for the area.” (DoE, 1989a, 6).
The second main planning function at the borough level is the exercise of development 
control. In carrying out development control the authority will have to consider the 
provisions of the development plan as well as any other ‘material considerations’ as 
outlined in the discussion of the national planning system above. Major development 
proposals may be called in by the Secretary of State for the Environment for his own 
decision or may also be submitted to LPAC who will attempt to give a pan London 
opinion on the application. The only major difference in development control practice in
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London now, prior to that of 1986, is that the GLC no longer exist to call in 
applications.
In considering these two borough land use planning functions it becomes apparent that 
while land use policy in Greater London is essentially a borough responsibility, the 
function of the boroughs are heavily influenced by the planning actions of central 
government, and in particular the DoE. As well as exercising national functions 
discussed previously which are important for London, the Secretary of State for the 
Environment has assumed responsibility for strategic land use planning in the Greater 
London conurbation. Within the DoE, the directorate specifically concerned with 
planning Greater London was the London Regional Office, and since the 5th of April 
1994, is the Government Office for London (GoL). The DoE planning division has four 
main tasks: pan-London strategic planning issued in the form of strategic guidance; the 
preparation of government views on major London development projects; the oversight 
of the Borough’s Unitary Development Plans (UDP’s); and advice to the Secretary of 
State on planning appeals. Of these four main tasks, it is the preparation of strategic 
guidance that has become the major new DoE responsibility in London planning in the 
absence of the GLC.
Two types of strategic guidance are prepared by the DoE, strategic guidance for London 
and guidance for the South East region. Strategic guidance for London has been issued 
in the form of a document outlining the general strategic approach that the government 
wish to be taken in relation to matters such as business and industry, transport, housing, 
the built environment, retailing, the environment and so on (DoE, 1989a). The content 
of the first strategic guidance issued by the DoE has been very general, and does not 
constitute a detailed strategic framework. In formulating strategic guidance for London 
the Secretary of State may take advice from LPAC who are discussed in full below. 
Regional Planning Guidance for the South East was initially provided in correspondence 
with the chairman of SERPLAN and later consolidated as PPG 9 (DoE, 1989b), and 
now RPG 9 (DoE, 1994). In preparing regional guidance for the South East the 
Secretary of State may take advice from SERPLAN. Strategic guidance for London 
should be formulated in the context of the Regional Guidance for the South East. As 
DoE point out: “Planning issues affecting London should not be viewed in isolation
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from those applying to the larger region in which it is set... issues of this kind are 
addressed jointly through SERPLAN, and in regional guidance issued by the Secretary 
of State. At present London guidance is consistent with the existing region-wide 
guidance” (DoE, 1989a).
The strategic guidance issued by the DoE provides an important context for the 
formulation of UDPs by the boroughs. UDPs are required to have regard to any 
strategic guidance issued by the Secretary of State who retains powers to ensure that 
borough plans conform to the guidance. In this respect, strategic guidance is potentially 
a very important component of land use planning in Greater London. However as 
Travers et al point out, “although it could be said that a strategic framework exists in 
law, central government has chosen not to provide a detailed policy framework for land 
use and transport planning in the capital” (Travers et al, 1991, 23). However, the content 
of the recently published consultation draft of the new strategic guidance for London, 
indicates that the Government may wish to provide a slightly more detailed framework 
in the next round of official guidance (GoL, 1995).
The London Government Act of 1985 also made provision for the establishment of a 
joint planning authority for Greater London. (Grant, Heap, 1991)The statutory duties of 
this joint committee as laid down by the legislation were to advise the London Boroughs 
on planning and development issues of common interest to them; to advise government 
departments on what the Boroughs think about planning and development issues; and to 
let local authorities around Greater London, and other bodies on which they and the 
London Boroughs are represented, know what the London Boroughs think about the 
issues. (LPAC, 1988b, Grant, Heap, 1991) The body established for this purpose by the 
boroughs is the London Planning Advisory Committee (LPAC), a statutory body with 
no executive powers. Membership of LPAC is comprised of one councillor from each 
of the 32 boroughs and from the City of London Corporation. LPAC’s most prominent 
statutory function is in providing advice to the Secretary of State for the Environment 
on behalf of the London boroughs, to assist in the formulation of the strategic guidance 
for London. The Secretary of State is not bound to take account of this advice in the 
preparation of strategic guidance. LPAC has to date submitted two rounds of strategic 
advice to the DoE, entitled Strategic Planning Advice for London. The purpose of this
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advice has not been to provide a strategic plan but simply to provide London-wide 
guidance, which has in fact formed important policy input into the London boroughs’ 
UDPs. LPAC’s powers, then, are limited being simply an advisory body with no 
executive powers, however, LPAC still exerts an important influence on the planning of 
London.
The final institution to be considered in this section on the London planning system are 
SERPLAN. SERPLAN was founded in 1962 is a voluntary body of 64 elected members 
of local authorities in the South East. Membership consists of up to three members 
from each of the 12 county councils up to 16 members nominated jointly by London 
boroughs and 12 members representing the 98 district councils. SERPLAN is not an 
executive body but an advisory body with no statutory responsibilities. The DoE 
(1989b) summarises SERPLAN’s function as being “to monitor regional planning and 
transport trends and to enable the authorities to achieve a better understanding of the 
regional context and, by study and discussion, to ensure co-ordination of policies”
(DoE, 1989b). The Secretary of State’s regional guidance for the South East was 
requested by SERPLAN, and the Secretary of State took into account advice provided 
by SERPLAN in the formulation of regional guidance. Thus the main function of 
SERPLAN in relation to the analysis of the London planning system outlined here is 
their role in advising the DoE on the issue of regional strategic guidance, within which 
the London strategic guidance is supposed to nest (DoE, 1989b).
The planning system in London, then, is fairly complex involving a number of different 
institutions playing a variety of roles. The brief outline above has not included other 
important policy aspects of London, such as the powers of the London Docklands 
Development Corporation, the non-statutory activities of local planning authorities and 
the variety of other governmental and quasi-govemmental organisations with an interest 
in the Town and Country planning system. However, for the purposes of this thesis the 
statutory land use planning system in London can be seen as basically a function of the 
institutions outlined above. Essentially, the arrangements in London are a unique and 
complex variation on the main elements of the British planning system.
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Appendix three : The Town and Country Planning (Use Classes) Order (UCO), 
the Town and Country Planning General Development Order (GDO), and the 
creation of the B1 (Business) use class and related permitted development.
The evolution of the Use Classes Order and the General Development Order.
The UCO and the GDO were established in 1948, consequent upon the statutory powers 
contained in the Town and Country Planning Act 1947. The two orders share common 
ground in the sense that they both place certain activities outwith the normal scope of 
development control, however, there is an important technical distinction between the 
two orders which should be stressed. The UCO defines a number of use classes (i.e. 
shops, offices, general industrial etc.) within which a change of use from one activity to 
another is deemed not to constitute ‘development’ as defined in the legislation. The 
GDO on the other hand, “...is a nation wide grant of planning permission for a diverse 
range of unconnected activities that do constitute ‘development’” (Grant, 1989,1). This 
is not the only distinction that can be drawn between the two orders, however, it does 
highlight the difference between exceptions to development under the UCO and 
permitted development under the GDO. The two orders therefore may have some 
common implications, but are technically and substantively very different.
The origins of the Use Classes Order
The legislative origins of the UCO can be traced back to the late nineteenth century, 
well before the first established UCO of 1948. The principle of land use classification 
was initially formalised in the series of ‘Model Clauses’ published by the Minister for 
Health between 1922 and 1939. Home (1989) cites these as the ancestor of the UCO. 
The Model Clauses, which were intended to assist local authorities in their preparation 
of Town Planning Schemes, contained planning standards for ‘character zones’, later 
called use zones. At the outset only four use zones were defined, residential, special 
industrial, general industrial or business, and undetermined. Other zones were later 
added such as a separate one for family dwelling houses and special industrial classes. 
Within each use zone “three categories of building types were identified....those which 
could be erected without consent, those which needed consent and those which were
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excluded” (Home, 1992, 188). Thus, the Model Clauses were an attempt to classify 
incompatible land uses and place control over particular developments within this 
classification.
The last series of model Clauses were published in 1939, and while the main 
characteristic they share with post war UCOs may only be that they represent a type of 
land use classification, they did lay the foundations for more sophisticated planning 
instruments. Following the establishment of the Ministry of Town and Country 
Planning in 1943, the Pound Committee was set up to undertake a ‘technical 
Examination of the Model Clauses in the light of subsequent developments and 
prospective legislation’. The Pound Committee considered use zones in detail and their 
recommendation, incorporated in the 1947 Ministry’s advisory handbook on central 
area redevelopment, was to establish 13 ‘building use groups’, intended to cover ‘all 
forms of development required in a town’, which would be allocated into eight different 
use zones. In each zone, the building use groups were categorised as either primary 
allocations, non conforming or contrary to good planning, and “acceptable or not 
according to the ‘scale and exact location of the proposed development’” (Home, 1992, 
189).
One year after the handbook was published, the first UCO was established which 
expanded the thirteen building use groups into 22 Use Classes. There were two main 
reasons for the creation of the UCO in 1948. First, to simplify the development control 
system, by removing changes of use within use classes from the definition of 
development. The UCO classified uses in terms of their similarity in environmental 
impact. A change of use within a use class was thought to be insignificant enough to be 
placed outwith planning control. This function of the UCO has led many commentators 
to regard it as essentially a deregulatory instrument (Grant, 1989; Thomley, 1991; DoE, 
1987; PAG, 1985). The second reason for the establishment of the UCO, was for the 
assessment of development charge, a part of the taxation of betterment value under the 
1947 Town and Country Planning Act. Home (1992) argues that it was this second 
reason that required the expansion of the 13 building use groups into 22 use classes 
because “any permission for change of use might attract a development charge, based 
upon the so called ‘governing principles’, as expressed in the land development charge
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regulations: ‘to secure as far as is practicable, that land can be freely and readily bought 
and sold or otherwise disposed of in the open market at a price neither greater nor less 
than its value for its existing use’” (Home, 1992, 191). In fact, the 1948 UCO was more 
a concern of possible valuation difficulties than it was potential environmental 
implications (Home, 1992; PAG, 1985). These two different reasons led to the passing 
of two distinct UCOs, identical in content but different in purpose.
The UCO which was specifically concerned with compensation matters remained 
unchanged, and is still in force today, since its amendment or revocation “was 
prohibited under a proviso to section III (4) of the 1947 Act, the reason being that 
valuation for planning compensation claims had to be made on fixed assumptions” 
(Home, 1989, 3). Relatively minor changes were made to the other UCO prior to the 
radical revisions of 1987. The Property Advisory Group (PAG) of 1985, established to 
undertake a review of the 1972 UCO, argued that there had been no significant changes 
to the UCO over the post-war period and that “the classification of some uses may have 
been drawn up with financial provisions in mind. Following the abolition of 
development charge, there would no longer be any need to perpetrate distinctions 
between uses where planning freedom in 1948 might have been given to owners and 
users were it not to have included the privilege of avoiding substantial development 
charges” (PAG, 1985, 12). Thus, the abolished financial provision of the 1947 Act, 
were still thought to be influential in the classification of the 1972 UCO, because the 
1948 UCO had remained largely unchanged. It was this lack of dynamism in the order, 
despite much changed circumstances, which led to pressure for a major review in the 
1980s.
The origins of the General Development Order.
Development orders were introduced as statutory planning instruments in 1919 as a 
reaction to the inadequacies of previous planning legislation (Grant, 1989). Under the 
Housing, Town Planning etc. Act 1909, local authorities would devise planning 
schemes for their areas, which if consented, allowed the local authority to demolish any 
development occurring within the area covered by the planning scheme, but which were 
contrary to it. This type of legislative provision led to a stalemate, where “a decision to
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apply for consent to make a scheme would freeze development in the area” (Grant,
1989, 34). This problem was addressed in 1919 with the introduction of development 
orders under the Housing, Town Planning etc. Act 1919. The Act empowered the Local 
Government Board to make development orders “to permit the development of estates 
and buildings to proceed pending the adoption of the town planning scheme, subject to 
such conditions as may be prescribed by the order” (Grant, 1989, 34).
The provisions of the 1919 Act allowed for the creation of the Town Planning (General 
Interim Development) Order 1922. Unlike the post-war GDOs, this order did not grant a 
general permission for development, but instead created a system of interim 
development control, where local authorities were empowered to grant permission 
subject to such requirements as might reasonably be imposed. The order also included a 
right of appeal to the Minister on a local authority decision. As Grant (1989) points out, 
the creation of the General Interim Development Order was an important fore runner to 
the comprehensive development control system established after the war. It laid the 
principles of granting permission and placing conditions on planning applications and, 
also the principle of the rights to appeal. Although significantly different from the post­
war GDOs, the contemporary government advised that its intention should be to allow 
development to commence, not to obstruct it, and in this sense the General Interim 
Development Order was at least of the same spirit as the permitted development of the 
post-war GDOs.
Under the 1932 Town and Country Planning Act, a GDO was established which was 
broadly similar to that of today. The Act empowered the minister to make a General 
Development Order, “with respect to the interim development of land, with power to 
permit the development of land either conditionally or subject to any conditions stated 
in the order” (Grant, 1989, 35). This was in essence the first GDO allowing a general 
grant of planning permission. At this time the GDO was still with respect to interim 
development, however interim development control was extended throughout the 
country under the 1943 Town and Country Planning Act, where all land was deemed 
subject to the preparation of a planning scheme.
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In 1948 the first ‘modem’ GDO was established following the provisions of the relevant 
sections of the 1947 Act. The main functions of this GDO were related to permitted 
development and allowing flexibility in the development control system. Thus over 
time the emphasis of the instrument has changed, from one of addressing the problems 
of interim development control, to one of simplifying development control and 
attempting to provide more flexibility in the planning system. Unlike the UCO, the 
GDO has changed quite significantly since 1948. The flexibility of the 1948 GDO 
proved inadequate, having 21 classes of permitted development which were rather 
narrowly defined. In 1950, a substantial deregulation measure was introduced, under the 
Town and Country Planning General Development Order and Development Charge 
Applications Regulations, which “incorporated the provisions on planning applications 
that had previously been contained in separate regulations, and extended significantly 
the classes of permitted development” (Grant, 1989, 37). Since that time successive 
governments have attempted to lessen the limitations of permitted development. Such 
attempts were often frustrated by the successful lobbying of objectors and conservation 
groups. The 1988 GDO marks a radical change to the remit of permitted development.
This brief review of the origins of the UCO and GDO has demonstrated the ways in 
which the roles of planning instruments change over time. In the case of the UCO and 
GDO, the reasons for establishing their legislative ancestors, are very different from the 
purposes of the instruments as they evolved. Essentially, the two instruments have 
emerged as deregulatory measures, simplifying the development control process and 
providing degrees of flexibility in the planning system. Both the UCO and the GDO 
were changed by the conservative government in the late 1980s as a means of further 
deregulation of the planning system. As Home (1989) points out, “the conservative 
Government since 1979 has made several changes to the GDO, with the aim of reducing 
the scope of the planning system and freeing much development from planning control 
and the 1987 UCO applies the same approach” (Home, 1989, 1).
The technical basis of the modem UCO and GDO
The UCO is made under the relevant section of the main planning Act (currently section 
55 (2) (f) of the 1990 Planning, Land, and Compensation Act), and enables the
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Secretary of State to exclude from the Act’s definition of development, changes of use 
falling within classes described in the order. Grant (1989) describes the UCO thus: “the 
order operates by prescribing a number of classes of use at a comparatively high level 
of abstraction, such as ‘shop’ or ‘office’. Changes of use within each class are then 
outside planning control” (Grant, 1989,2). The current UCO (1987) defines 16 use 
classes, within which change from one activity to another is deemed not to constitute 
development. Changes within a use class can take place bilaterally.
The use classes have generally been created through classifying activities together 
which have a similar impact upon amenity. The RTPI (1986) provide a useful summary 
of the legal and practical role of the UCO: “...the Use Classes Order is not intended as a 
device to permit or restrict development....rather its objective is for the clarification of 
section 22 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1971. This is to group together 
activities which are significantly similar in their character and effect on the 
surroundings so that a change from one activity in a group to another would, of itself, 
have so little effect that such a change would not amount to ‘development’ within the 
meaning of the Act” (RTPI, 1986, para 2).
There are a number of principles guiding the operation of the UCO, which have 
emanated largely from case law. Grant (1982; 1989) defines three main principles. 
Firstly, it is the predominant use of the planning unit, and not some ancillary use, 
against which the impact of the order is assessed. Thus, the order refers not only to 
buildings but to land occupied and used for the same purpose. The UCO relates to 
changes in primary use over this unit, not ancillary use. Secondly, the purpose of the 
order is to define certain types of use change which do not constitute development, but 
the order does not define types of use change which do involve development. Thus 
changes of use from one class another do not necessarily constitute a material change of 
use. As Grant (1989) points out, “development is not involved for example, merely 
because a new use would fall within a different class from the previous use or because 
one of them would be a sui-generis use. The question in each case is whether there has 
been a material change in the use of the building or other land” (Grant, 1989, 2). 
However, it would appear that the courts have used the use classes as a guide in the 
interpretation of what does, and does not, constitute a material change of use. There is
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no legal basis for this use of the UCO and in fact the government specifically stated in 
1985 that to view the UCO as a restrictive device was an erroneous way of regarding 
the order (PAG, 1985). The third important principle guiding the operation of the UCO 
is that not all land uses fall within a use class, some are excluded by article, others are 
classified as sui-generis in themselves as they do not exist with any class.
A number of other guiding principles have been established through case law. For 
example: use classes are to be interpreted narrowly so that they should not be stretched 
to accommodate uses which do not clearly fall within them; use class rights can be 
restricted by a condition on a planning permission; intensification of a use which falls 
within a use class will not require planning permission until intensification reaches a 
stage which places the use outside that class; where one use class is the subject of a 
successful enforcement notice it is not permitted to change from another permitted use 
in the class to that use; although freedoms granted by the UCO are national they may be 
stopped by a discontinuance order; and before the order can be relied upon to legitimate 
a change of use, there must be an existing use within one of the use classes (Purdue et 
al, 1989; Grant, 1982; Grant, 1989; Home, 1992; Norris, 1987; PAG, 1985).
One further important principle regarding the UCO relates to the introduction of a new 
order. The creation of a new UCO such as the 1987 order, cuts across pre existing 
planning permissions and existing use rights. In other words uses established before 
1987 are able to take advantage of the freedoms offered by the 1987 UCO. However, 
this general principle is qualified by three specific requirements. First, the planning 
permission must be implemented before the freedoms granted under the new order may 
be exploited. Second, the new order does not override any existing planning conditions 
which specifically prohibit the new use. Third, when planning permission is linked to a 
specific use then these conditions on an application still apply.
The GDO is created by the Secretary of State for the environment under section 59 of 
the 1990 Planning, Land and Compensation Act. This instrument is applicable to all 
land in England and Wales and grants a general planning permission for 76 classes of 
development, known as ‘permitted development’. The GDO has a number of other
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functions relating to planning procedure and to restricting development and defining 
development that is not permitted.
For purposes here, it is sufficient to simply consider the permitted development aspect 
of the GDO, and particularly that contained under section 2 part 3 which allows certain 
changes of use. Unlike the UCO, changes allowed under the GDO are defined as 
development but the order itself grants a general permission for them. The changes 
allowed under the GDO are not bilateral, but are specifically unilateral, and this aspect 
of the order is commonly referred to as the ratchet effect. The direction in which the 
GDO will permit a change of use is one which would generally constitute an 
environmental improvement. The ratchet effect therefore, is designed to promote 
changes of use which are less problematic in planning terms (Grant, 1989). In general, 
the GDO is a deregulatory planning instrument, rendering certain development 
activities outwith the scope of planning control. In this capacity, the GDO is thought to 
provide a means of ensuring flexibility in the planning system (Grant, 1982).
Permission granted under the GDO may be withdrawn in two ways. Firstly, the local 
authority, normally with the Secretary of State’s approval, or the Secretary of State 
himself, may by a direction under article 4 of the GDO, direct that some or all of the 
general permission granted by the GDO be withdrawn. This direction is normally in 
relation to defined geographical areas and only where the Secretary of State is satisfied 
that it is expedient that development within the order should not be carried on (Grant, 
1982). The direction under article 4 is a power of pre-emption rather than prohibition, 
since its effect is to require an application to be made for express permission for 
development proposals, and the application will be judged on its own merits. Article 4 
directions are therefore useful in providing a degree of flexibility within the freedoms 
granted by the GDO, however, they cannot be used extensively without good reason. 
Appendix D of the 1988 GDO states that the permitted development rights of the GDO 
have been endorsed by parliament, and as such they should not be withdrawn locally 
without compelling reasons. The second means through which the permitted 
development of the GDO may be restricted, is through the imposition of a condition 
upon a planning permission which may exclude, in an appropriate case, some or all of
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the benefits of the GDO. The use of conditions for this purpose remains largely 
uncertain as there has been no specific high court rulings on the matter (Grant, 1982).
The main general principles guiding the functions of the GDO are that permission 
granted by the GDO is subject to any limitations or conditions specified in the order; 
that there is a condition imposed on all permitted development restricting hazardous 
activity’ as defined; that the order does not permit development which requires or 
involves the formation, laying out or material widening of a means of access to an 
existing highway; and that rights to change use under part 3 of schedule 2 do not apply 
unless the existing use is lawful.
Reform of the UCO (1987) and the GDO (1988): the creation of the business use class 
and related permitted development.
By the mid 1980s the government announced that the existing 1972 UCO was in need 
of review. A sub-group of the Department of the Environment (DoE), the Property 
Advisory Group (PAG), were charged with the responsibility of undertaking, “a wide 
ranging and fundamental review of the order, with the object of modernising and 
recasting it, within the basic framework of Part III of the 1971 Act, in light of the 
circumstances and needs of the present and of the foreseeable future” (PAG, 1985, 
appendix B). However, even before the PAG report was commissioned, there had been 
pressure to change the UCO largely from developers and owners of property. The 
criticism surrounding the existing UCO was that it had become out of date and was 
inflexible to changes of use now required by modem businesses (RICS, 1984a; 1984b). 
Of particular interest here is that the 1972 UCO defined three separate use classes for 
offices, light industry, and general industry, and thus denied free interchange between 
these uses. The RICS argued that this classification of uses set out in the order was 
inadequate for certain business operations which “may involve research, development, 
manufacturing and office use within a single curtilage and therefore not fit into any 
single class in the present order” (RICS, 1984a, 2). For example, they argued, that the 
nature of modem high-technology industry required a flexibility in use classification to 
allow office space to change to research space, or productive space to change to storage 
space.
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Following pressure from bodies such as RICS, and at the same time as the general 
deregulation of the planning system was being undertaken, the government announced 
its intention to revise the UCO (Thomley, 1991; Brindley, Rydin, Stoker, 1989). The 
white paper ‘lifting the burden’ articulated the government’s view; “ the UCO enables 
land and buildings to be used for various purposes without the need for planning 
permission, and is thus a means of deregulation like the GDO. Unlike the GDO, 
however, the UCO has not been substantially changed since it was first introduced in 
1948, and is clearly overdue for review in light of today conditions. In particular it 
needs to take account of the requirements of the typical ‘high tech’ firms where 
manufacturing offices, research and development, warehousing and their activities may 
be carried on in a single building and where the mix of uses and space utilisation may 
need to be constantly changed and adapted to meet the needs of business. Since the 
UCO is intended to permit and not restrict compatible uses, it is essential that it should 
be designed to do this effectively” (GB Minister without Portfolio, 1985,11).
The review of the UCO was undertaken by PAG in 1985. Home (1989) argues that the 
tight schedule the sub group were given, having to produce a final report by December 
1985 following initial briefing on June 1985, meant that little background research 
could be attempted. Furthermore, PAG did not undertake any consultation before 
producing the report, despite the fact that the impact of the UCO reform would have 
wide reaching implications for the planning system.
The PAG report, produced in December 1985 regarded the UCO as essentially a 
deregulatory instrument, and in the deregulation measures it proposed, it claimed to 
have taken the view of the user of land and buildings, or the ‘consumer’ of the planning 
system. PAG argued that the 1972 UCO still promoted classifications based on the 
financial provisions of the 1947 Act, where planning freedom had been restricted in the 
UCO to avoid some owners and users receiving substantial development charges. The 
1972 UCO then, was seen as being out of date having “remained largely unchanged for 
37 years, and which clearly must be recast to meet the needs created by economic, 
technical and social change” (PAG, 1985,2). PAG specified the changes which had 
occurred that they felt were particularly significant: traditional industry had declined in
352
most of the country creating increases in unemployment as well as in the amount of 
vacant land and buildings; the service sector had grown in importance; different 
functions of productive administration and selling were often being undertaken by high 
technology industries within the same building; there had been major spatial shifts in 
population involving counter-urbanisation; a motorway network had been constructed 
with subsequent increases in the use made of roads for goods and personal transport; 
and that there had been changes in the size of many activities characterised by the 
contraction of many larger firms and some growth amongst smaller enterprises.
As the general means of amending the order, PAG recommended three different 
methods. First, use classes could be expanded by allotting certain sui generis uses into 
existing classes, with the effect of reducing the number of changes of use under 
planning control. Second, new use classes could be created by grouping together sui 
generis uses. Third, use classes could be merged to allow a much greater number of 
permutations of change of use outside planning control. In addition, PAG proposed that 
there could be a regrouping and relocation of certain uses which may have been 
wrongly classified.
The final PAG report provided 14 recommendations for change to the UCO. The one of 
relevance here is the proposal for the creation of a new ‘business use’ class. The 
business class was to embrace offices other than those providing a direct service to the 
public, light industrial use, and also a number of previously sui generis uses such as the 
use of premises as a laboratory or as a photographic, film, television or sound recording 
studio; use as a library; use for commercial training units; and use for the operation of 
computers. Thus, it would effectively merge the previously separate light industrial and 
office use classes of the 1972 UCO. The PAG report argued that this business class or 
‘single employment class’ would be beneficial since it would mean that, “the owners 
and users of commercial buildings could decide for themselves what activities or 
combination of activities could most profitably be carried on in their property from time 
to time and to enable them to adapt quickly to the changing demand of commerce, 
without having to go to the local planning authority, or, on appeal, to the Secretary of 
State” (PAG, 1985, 34).
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The business class proposals were met with both praise and criticism. RICS (1986a) for 
example, fully supported the proposals on the basis that they provided a degree of 
flexibility which was clearly needed. However, they also suggested that the proposals 
should be subject to a requirement about traffic generation. The RTPI on the other hand, 
rejected the business class, arguing that “offices and light industrial uses should 
continue to be sorted into separate classes, especially on traffic grounds, but permission 
could be granted for both uses in some buildings44 (Planning, 1986, 20). In fact the 
RTPI argued that the activities grouped in the business class have inherently different 
vehicular generation characteristics, with offices requiring more car parking than light 
industry, and light industry requiring more land for storage, loading, and service 
vehicles (RTPI, 1986).
Shortly after the publication of the PAG report, the DoE issued a consultation paper 
entitled 'Proposals to modernise the Town and Country Planning (Use Classes) Order 
1972’ (DoE, 1986b). The proposals outlined in this paper differed in important ways 
from those of the PAG report, however the business class was carried through. In fact, 
the parliamentary paper which accompanied the consultation paper argued that the most 
important change in the proposals to modernise the order, was the creation of a business 
class which would allow a more flexible use of business premises. The business class 
outlined by the DoE (1986b) was identical to the original PAG recommendation. It 
would appear that arguments were made to government on the implications of the 
creation of a business use class. However, some of the strongest arguments against the 
business use class were based on the effects of such a change on the rental values of 
business premises. The government discounted these arguments on the basis that rental 
values were “not relevant to the operation of the Town and Country Planning system” 
(DoE, 1986b, 6).
The consultation paper was actually a very short document, and did no more than 
summarise the PAG arguments in relation to the business use class. The RTPI again 
expressed reservations about the new class, as did local authorities amenity groups and 
others (Nuffield Foundation, 1986; RTPI, 1986). In fact even the RICS who had 
expressed full support for the PAG recommendations for a business class, were less 
certain by the time the DoE consultation paper was published, noting a “concern that
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light industry will disappear from inner city areas if there is an automatic right to 
change from industrial to office use, since industry will be unable to compete 
commercially with offices for inner city space. One effect of this could be the loss of 
traditional craft industries which hitherto have been sited in town centre areas” (RICS, 
1986b, 4).
The Town and Country Planning (Use Classes) Order introduced in 1987, proved 
identical to the proposals outlined in the consultation paper. There were many 
differences between the 1972 and 1987 UCO, however, the business class is arguably 
the most important change from the previous UCO. Entitled Bl, this class is categorised 
under the B classes of the order. Class B2 corresponds to general industry, classes B3- 
B7 are the special industrial classes, and class B8 is storage and distribution. The order 
states that class Bl represents:
“use for all or any of the following purposes:
(a) as an office other than a use within class A2(financial and professional services),
(b) for research and development of products or processes, or
(c) for any industrial process
being a use which can be carried out in any residential area without detriment to the 
amenity of that area by reason of noise, vibration, smell, fumes, smoke, soot, ash, dust 
or grit.”
Uses within Bl are therefore subject to environmental criteria or what has become 
known as the residential amenity test. This emphasis on broad similarities between uses 
in terms of their environmental impact was underlined by circular 13/87: “the new 
business use class brings together many of the uses described in the office and light 
industry classes of the 1972 order together into a single class with other uses which are 
broadly similar in their environmental impact” (DoE, 1987, 5). Circular 13/87 went on 
to clarify the types of uses that the Bl residential amenity test might encompass. These 
included laboratories and studios and high tech uses spanning offices, light industrial 
and research and development. Examples of such uses were cited as: the manufacture of 
computer hardware and software; computer research and development, provision of 
consultancy services and other sales services; and micro engineering, biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical research.
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The Bl class was intended to be flexible, as the government pointed out, its purpose 
was to “allow more flexible use of premises and thus to foster enterprise where that can 
be achieved without significant adverse effects on the environment or local amenity” 
(DoE, 1987, 2). Within various policy statements the government have attempted to 
ensure that this flexibility is safeguarded. Circular 13/87 for example, which contains 
general points about the 1987 order for local planning authorities has advised: that 
conditions on a planning permission which would limit changes of use within Bl will 
generally not be acceptable; and that local authorities should take account of the ‘spirit 
of the order’ in making planing decisions with respect to the new order. Other central 
government advice includes: PPG 4, which states that “development plans should not 
seek to limit the rights to change use which are conferred by the Use Classes Order 
1987” (DoE, 1988); and Strategic Planning Guidance for London (DoE, 1989a), which 
again specifically advises against the restriction of Bl freedom in UDPs. However, 
while flexibility is to be safeguarded, it is to be done so in respect of amenity and 
environmental criteria, and it is essentially the balance between a need for flexibility for 
business with a general similarity in environmental impact, which forms the basis of the 
classification of the UCO.
However, it is not only the changes to the UCO in the 1980s that were important. 
Further ‘flexibility’ and freedom was awarded to business uses under the 1988 GDO. 
Under Part 3 of Schedule 2 of the 1988 GDO, certain changes of use related to the 
business class were granted a general permission and thus placed outwith the scope of 
planning control. Within the B classes, the changes of use permitted were as follows:
356
Class B Permitted Development
Development consisting of the change of use of a building -
(a) to a use for any purpose within class Bl (business) of the schedule to the UCO from 
any falling within class B2 (general industry) or class B8 (storage and distribution) of 
that schedule.
(b) to a use for any purpose falling within class B8 (storage and distribution) of that 
schedule from any use falling within class Bl (business) or B2 (general industry).
Development not permitted
Development is not permitted by class B where the change is to or from a use falling 
within class B 8 of the schedule, if the change of use relates to more than 235 square 
metres of floorspace within the building.”
The implication of these permitted development rights is that in effect the three separate 
classes of light industrial, general industrial, and office use now no longer exist. So for 
example, general industrial space can now change to any use within the Bl class. As 
mentioned previously in this section, changes of use permitted by the GDO are one way 
and are generally aimed at an environmental improvement in use. As Grant (1989) 
points out with reference to permitted development under the B classes, “a temporary, 
interim, use of general industrial premises for a more environmentally acceptable light 
industrial use, for example, may be permitted under these provisions, but not a return to 
the former industrial use” (Grant, 1989, 7).
The changes permitted under the GDO, have significantly expanded the freedom 
allowed in the development and use of land for economic purposes, because Bl 
premises of a), b), or c) type could emerge in areas of general industrial use without 
planning approval. Thus, the creation of the business use class under the 1987 UCO, 
and the extension of permitted development related to this class under the 1988 GDO, 
represent two interrelated deregulatory measures. They have taken certain changes of 
use outside of the normal control of LPAs.
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Appendix four : The questionnaire survey of the London boroughs.
Methodological issues and approach to the design of the survey.
A survey based approach was used in the research to generate data that was not readily 
available from other sources. The survey method was used in preference to interview 
based techniques because many of the issues to be explored in the survey, particularly 
in relation to policy detail, may have required LPAs to refer to documents that they 
would not perhaps have had at hand in the interview situation. The use of this 
methodology may be criticised for a number of reasons. The possibility of producing a 
deficient questionnaire, and the related potential for bias, emphasise the difficulties 
which may be encountered when employing such a technique. A coherent methodology 
enhances the credibility of this type of research, and the methodological steps taken in 
the design of the survey are discussed below.
The planning and design of the survey loosely followed the procedure of Moser and 
Kalton (1987), from the initial definition of survey objectives, through consideration of 
the appropriate population and area to be surveyed, which in this case was the 33 
planning authorities of the London boroughs and the City of London, before 
formulating and arranging questions within the overall survey design. Four guiding 
objectives for the survey were initially defined. First, to determine if, and in what ways 
LPAs have responded to manufacturing employment decline through the use of 
planning controls to protect manufacturing jobs. Second, to attain a perspective on how 
important the operations of land use regulation are in influencing manufacturing 
employment change, and how successful LPAs believe these to have been. Third, to 
determine how LPAs view manufacturing employment change and what they consider 
to be dominant factors behind this change, and to relate this local knowledge to the 
theoretical and empirical work presented in chapter two and three. Fourth, to gather 
quantitative data from the boroughs, for example requesting information on 
development control decisions, land use and floorspace change, the numbers and types 
of local businesses, and land and rental value data for different uses.
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Having reviewed the literature relating to the legislative changes arising from the 
introduction of the business use class and related permitted development, it became 
apparent during the design of the survey, that these could provide a valuable ‘case 
study’ of the relationship between land use regulation and manufacturing employment 
change. For the purposes of fulfilling the survey objectives, a useful aspect of the 
legislative changes is that they have created a ‘policy-on’ and ‘policy-off situation for 
certain land use changes, since LPAs could control the changes before 1988 (policy-on) 
but not after (policy-off). An opportunity is therefore presented, to actually ask LPAs 
what difference it makes to regulate land use, albeit for a specific case. It was not 
intended however, that the focus on the legislative changes should limit the scope 
available to address the broader objectives of the survey. General questions about 
planning policy and manufacturing employment change, and about the success or 
otherwise of such policy would still be included. However, the use of the business class 
in the survey was considered extremely worthwhile because it would provide direct 
evidence on the research issues to be explored.
Following definitions of the main objectives, unstructured preliminary consultation over 
the content and design of the survey was undertaken with LPAC and with planning 
officers in the London boroughs of Barking and Dagenham, Southwark, Westminster, 
Kingston, and Richmond.1 This additional methodological stage was undertaken to 
determine the likelihood of achieving responses to the issues being explored and to 
assess the general appropriateness of the survey for completion by LPAs. The benefits 
of consultation are highlighted by Kidder and Judd (1986) who comment that “even if 
the main study is to involve a mailed or other written questionnaire, it is wise to do 
some personal interviews as part of the pre-test” (Kidder, Judd, 1986, 225).
1 The following people kindly assisted in consultation over the survey :
Dr John Lett and Mr Steve Cox o f LPAC
Mr Frank Sweeney o f the Planning and Development Division, London Borough o f  Barking and 
Dagenham
Mr Richard Linton and Mr Martin Cook o f the Regeneration and Environment Department, Southwark 
Council
Mr Andrew Craig o f the Planning and Environment Department, Westminster City Council
Mr Paul Gibson o f the Planning Department, Royal Borough of Kingston-upon-Thames
Mr John Sarson o f Planning, Transport and Client services, London borough o f Richmond-upon-Thames
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The interviews were particularly useful in obtaining initial feedback on the 
questionnaire design and on issues being addressed by the study, and actually altered 
the scope and content of the survey in three significant ways. First, LPAC and the 
boroughs advised that LPAs were unlikely to be able to provide detailed accounts of the 
mechanisms underlying manufacturing employment change, and particularly where 
these questions were framed on the basis of the types of theoretical perspectives 
outlined in chapter two. Second, the general opinion was that the survey would be more 
suitable if it addressed questions relating to policies and development control practice, 
rather than about the land value effects of regulation. Third, the five borough planning 
officers consulted all felt that the survey was unlikely to be able to gather the 
quantitative data desired as it either did not exist, or certainly not in most borough 
planning departments. There was a general consensus amongst the planning officers that 
quantitative work of the nature intended would be of particular value and that it was not 
well advanced in London at present. It was suggested that LPAC and the LRC were 
more likely to be able to provide data for my own personal analysis than the borough 
LPAs.
On the basis of this advice, the survey objectives were modified to focus predominantly 
on policy and development control issues, however, some general questions were also 
included about manufacturing employment decline. The survey was also changed from 
being qualitatively and quantitatively based, to address only qualitative issues. 
Following the advice of the boroughs, meetings with LPAC and the LRC were 
arranged, and both advised that up to date quantitative empirical research on London’s 
manufacturing would be useful, and both authorities advised and helped in the provision 
of data for this purpose. In addition, the consultation stage of survey design confirmed 
that it would be suitable to ask LPAs about the implications of the legislative changes 
arising from the modifications to the UCO and GDO in the late 1980s. In fact, LPAC 
suggested that since the introduction of the business class and related permitted 
development was an important issue in London, it was likely that borough LPAs would 
wish to respond to this issue and would perhaps be more aware of the employment 
consequences of land use regulation in this respect, than they would be regarding 
manufacturing change generally.
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A preliminary questionnaire was then constructed. LPAC had warned that many 
borough planning departments were understaffed, and that the response rate of the 
survey was likely to be poor. The rate of survey response may be adversely affected if 
the questionnaire itself is too long or too detailed (Moser, Kalton, 1987; Kidder, Judd, 
1986). The survey therefore had to be easy to answer and not overly time consuming, 
while still being capable of generating the data required. For this reason, many closed 
questions were used in the survey. Although closed questions are quick and easy to 
answer, they may also result in a loss of spontaneity and expressiveness and may ‘force’ 
the respondent to choose between given alternatives (Oppenheim, 1986). It is not 
possible to cover all potentialities in a survey questionnaire and previous research 
provides a guide to survey design. However, in order to obtain accurate information 
written explanations were sought for many of the closed questions, and respondents 
were invited to suggest alternative categories in most closed questions. Kidder and Judd 
(1986) argue that this type of approach should reduce sources of bias, but it was also 
hoped that this would allow for anecdotal evidence to be gathered, and also for the 
boroughs who were in a position to provide very detailed answers to do so. In other 
words, the survey was constructed to be easy to answer but flexible enough to allow 
respondents to express individual opinion.
Having prepared the first draft, the questionnaire was pilot-tested in the hope of 
identifying any important design deficiencies. Moser and Kalton (1987) stress that this 
is an extremely important stage in survey design, allowing the researcher to identify 
vague or ambiguous questions. Relative to other methods, it is generally not possible 
with a survey to correct mis-understandings or to answer any questions that the 
respondent might have. As Moser and Kalton (1987) point out, “there is no opportunity 
to probe beyond the given answer, to clarify an ambiguous one, to overcome 
unwillingness to answer a particular question or to appraise the validity of what a 
respondent said in the light of how it was said” (Moser, Kalton, 1987, 260).
The boroughs that had participated in the consultation stage were chosen as the pilot 
population. The returned questionnaires were adequately answered and the final 
questionnaire was drawn up. Following the final design of the questionnaire, phonecalls 
were made to all 33 London borough LPAs, and contact was established with the person
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most able to complete the questionnaire. At this stage some boroughs refused to co­
operate further. Having established a contact within the co-operating LPAs, 
questionnaires were sent with a covering letter which explained the exact purposes of 
the survey and the types of information that it was intended to gather. In addition, 
manufacturing employment change data at the class level of the SIC was prepared for 
each borough and attached to the questionnaire. The purpose of this was first, to ensure 
that the survey followed in a logical fashion to research completed in chapter three, 
second, to demonstrate the nature of manufacturing employment change in each area 
that the survey was concerned with, and third, to ensure that the questionnaire held 
relevance for each borough in the hope of maximising the response rate.
Several boroughs responded immediately to the survey. After a period of one month, 
‘follow up calls’ were made to the borough contacts. Eventually, 24 of the 33 borough 
completed and returned the questionnaire. This is a much higher response rate than is 
generally achieved in survey research, and considerably higher than the expectations of 
LPAC. The returned questionnaires were generally excellently answered. A copy of the 
survey questionnaire is provided below. Since the questions posed in the final survey 
were outlined in the appropriate sections of chapter five, they require no discussion 
here.
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Daniel Graham
Department o f Geography
London School o f  Economics
Houghton St
London, WC2A 2AE
TEL : 071-405-7686 E x t: 2613
F a x : 071-955-7412
SURVEY : Manufacturing Employment, Land Use Planning, and the B l (business) use class in the City 
of London.
Dear Mr Batchelor,
Thank you very much for agreeing to take part in this survey which is being undertaken as part o f my 
research for a doctorate at the London School o f Economics. The survey is being sent to all local 
planning authorities in Greater London.
This survey investigates the ways in which London’s planning authorities have responded to 
manufacturing employment decline. It seeks to determine how your authority feels about manufacturing 
job loss, whether policies have been developed to try to influence this loss, and how successful these 
policies have been. In particular, the survey focuses on policies which are aimed at the ‘protection4 of  
manufacturing jobs, where for example, the planning authority may have attempted to resist land uses 
change from manufacturing use in development control decisions, in order to protect the jobs offered by 
industry Many planning authorities in Britain have developed these types o f  policies, and this survey 
seeks to determine the extent o f their use in London and how successful they are perceived to have been.
The survey also addresses issues surrounding the introduction o f the business use class and how this has 
affected planning for manufacturing industry. In 1987 the Use Classes Order (UCO) was modified to 
create, amongst other things, a new business use class which essentially extended the 1972 light 
industrial use class to embrace offices other than those providing a direct services to the public, and 
research and development uses. The three uses within the B l class may be interchanged freely, without 
the need for planning permission. This new freedom was further extended in 1988 under the revised 
General Development Order (GDO), which granted a general permission for the change in the use o f  
land from general industrial use (B2), to any use within the B l class. The survey asks questions about the 
employment and land use change implications o f the new legislation and how it has affected planning 
policies which sought to protect manufacturing employment. It should be stressed, that when B l, 
business class, or legislative changes, are mentioned in the survey, they refer not only to the creation of  
the B l class under the 1987 UCO, but also to the related permitted development allowed under the 1988 
GDO.
The survey is organised into three main sections :
• Section 1 asks general questions about manufacturing employment in the borough over the 1980s.
• Section 2 is concerned with land use planning policies the borough may have developed over the 1980s, 
which were designed to influence manufacturing employment change.
• Section 3 deals with issues surrounding the introduction o f the B l legislation and how this has affected 
both land use planning policy and manufacturing employment within the borough.
If at any point in answering the survey questions more space is required than provided on the survey 
form, please do not hesitate to continue your answer on a separate sheet.
The information gathered from the survey shall be used, with an empirical analysis o f employment 
change in London which has already been completed, to determine the extent o f influence o f land use 
planning controls on manufacturing employment change. Manufacturing employment change figures for 
the City in the 1980s which were produced from the completed empirical work are reproduced on the 
following page. When ‘manufacturing’ is referred to in the survey, it corresponds to the aggregation of  
the detailed classes o f employment outlined in the table.
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Thank you very much for your co-operation with this survey. I would be very grateful if  you could return 
the completed survey as soon as possible in the addressed envelope provided. If you require any other 
information regarding either the content or use o f the data gathered from this survey, then please do not 
hesitate to contact me.
Once again, thank you very much for your assistance with my research.
Yours Sincerely,
Daniel Graham
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SECTION 1 : Employment Change in City of London 1981 - 1991.
The following section is concerned with issues of manufacturing employment change over the 1980s, 
which City o f London planning authority considered important. Employment change figures for the 
borough have been reproduced on the previous page.
1) How important have the following factors been in creating manufacturing employment decline in the 
borough over the 1981 - 1991 period ?
(I - important; NI - not important. Could you please rank the factors that you have ticked as important, on 
scale o f  1 to 4, using larger numbers to indicate higher importance)
I NI Rank
Closure o f  manufacturing firms ___  ___  ___
Relocation o f  manufacturing firms outside borough ___  ___  ___
Displacement o f manufacturing firms by service
sector activities ___  ___  ___
Shedding o f  jobs within existing manufacturing
establishments ___  ___  ___
Other Factors (Please specify): ___  ___  ___
2) Does City o f London planning authority view manufacturing decline in the borough as :
Extremely disadvantageous ___
Disadvantageous ___
Unimportant ___
Beneficial ___
Other______________________________
Could you please briefly state reason(s) for your answer :
SECTION 2 : Land Use Planning Policy for manufacturing industry 1981 - 1991.
3) Did the City of London planning authority develop land use planning policies over the 1980s which 
had the explicit intention o f protecting existing manufacturing employment ?
 Yes (go to question 4)
 No (go to question 11)
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4) Could you please give a specific description o f the main policies and the dates over which they were 
pursued.
5) Were there any qualifications or exceptions to the policies just described ?
 Yes (go to question 6)
 No (go to question 7)
6) Could you please give examples o f qualifications or exceptions to the main employment protection 
policies for manufacturing industry.
7) How much importance did City o f London place on the deployment o f land use planning policy to 
protect manufacturing employment ?
Very important_____________
Important__________________
Not important ___
8)Did the borough policies described in question 4 above place more importance on some types of 
manufacturing than others ?
 Yes (go to question 8)
 No (go to question 9)
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9) Considering the employment data attached at the front o f this survey, could you please indicate the 
importance attached by your planning authority to the protection o f  employment in each o f the industrial 
sectors described below.
(VI - very important; I - Important; Not Important)
VI I
NI
Extraction and preparation o f metalliferous ore ___  ___  ___
Metal Manufacturing ___  ___  ___
Extraction o f  minerals other than fuels ___  ___  ___
Manufacture o f non-metallic products ___  ___  ___
Chemical industry ___  ___  ___
Production o f  man-made fibres ___  ___  ___
Manufacture of metal goods not elsewhere specified ___  ___  ___
Manufacture of office machinery and data processing equip. ___  ___  ___
Electrical and electronic engineering ___  ___  ___
Manufacture o f motor vehicles and parts ___  ___  ___
Manufacture of other transport equipment ___  ___  ___
Instrument engineering ___  ___  ___
Food, drink and tobacco manufacturing ___  ___  ___
Textile industry ___  ___  ___
Manufacture o f leather and leather goods ___  ___  ___
Footwear and clothing industries ___  ___  ___
Timber and wooden furniture industries ___  ___  ___
Manufacture o f paper/paper products; printing and publishing ___  ___  ___
Processing o f rubber and plastics ___  ___  ___
Other manufacturing industries ___  ___  ___
10) Were the land use policies which sought to protect manufacturing employment strongly adhered to in 
development control practice over the 1980s?
Very strongly ___
Strongly________________ ___
Not Strongly ___
Not at all ___
11) Does City of London planning authority consider development control to have been successful in 
protecting manufacturing employment over the 1980s?
 Yes
 No
Could you please state reason(s) for your answer:
Note : Receipt of any detailed development control data that the borough may have for change o f  use of  
light and general manufacturing (i.e. number of refusals, permissions, appeals etc.) over the 1981 -1991 
period would be greatly appreciated.
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12) Could you please give a brief description o f any other land use planning policies that the borough 
had regarding manufacturing over the 1980s, indicating how successful the borough perceives these 
other policies to have been.
SECTION 3 : Impacts From the Introduction of the B l (Business) Use Class and Related Permitted 
Development.
13) As regards general employment opportunities Tall sectors') within the borough, does City o f London 
planning authority consider the introduction o f the B l use class and related legislation to have been :
  Beneficial
  Detrimental
  Both detrimental and beneficial
  Not Important
Could you please briefly state the reason(s) for your answer :
14) If City o f London pursued policies with the explicit intention o f protecting manufacturing 
employment over the 1980s as outlined in question 4 above, how has the introduction o f the B l 
legislation affected these policies ?
 Seriously undermined ability to protect manufacturing employment
 Undermined ability to protect manufacturing employment
 Not affected ability to protect manufacturing employment
15) Have any o f the following outcomes occurred in City o f London as a direct result o f the introduction 
o f the B l legislation ?
 Change o f use from general manufacturing use to office or research and development use
 Change o f use from general manufacturing use to light manufacturing use
 Change o f use from light manufacturing use to office or research and development uses
 Other (Please specify below)
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16) For the types o f land use change outlined below, could you please give a description o f :
• the types of properties which have been most prone to such a change;
• the locations o f these properties within the borough;
• the types o f uses which now occupy these previously industrial properties; and,
• any other factors which have been found important in initiating a B1 change o f these types.
i. change from general industrial to office or research and development uses.
ii. change from general industrial to light industrial use.
ii. change from light industrial to office or research and development uses.
ii. other land use changes.
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17) Over the 1987-1991 period, manufacturing employment declined in the city by 72% or by 12,331 
jobs. Would City of London planning authority view the role o f B1 in creating this overall manufacturing 
employment decline as being :
  Extremely important
  Important
  Insignificant
  Not related
  Other (please specify)
18) Are there any other issues surrounding the introduction o f the B1 legislation which were not dealt 
with above which City o f London planning authority considers important ?
19) Finally, if  this survey has not touched upon issues that City o f London planing authority has found to 
have been very important with B l, a brief description o f any issues would be much appreciated.
Receipt o f any additional information or data that City o f London may have on the B l issue or 
employment within the borough would be greatly appreciated.
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